Coel Hellier's Objections to Objective Morality

My browsing around the internet recently brought be to a post on “Six Reasons Why Objective Morality Is Nonsense.”

https://coelsblog.wordpress.com/2013/07/29/six-reasons-why-objective-morality-is-nonsense/

Objective vs. Objective

If, by “objective morality”, one means “intrinsically prescriptive moral properties”, I agree, these do not exist. Technically, the claim is not “nonsense” because it does make sense. However, all claims of this type are false.

But, It would serve Coel Hellier well to be a bit more precise in how he uses some terms.

For example, even though objective, intrinsic prescriptivity does not exist, objectively true value statements do exist. They are statements that relate objects of evaluation to desires (or, more precisely, malleable desires to other desires), and they are objectively true or false. To say, "This present is such that it would fulfill the desires of the person it will be given to" is an objectively true or false statement, as objectively true or false as, "This present has a mass of 32.8 kilograms."

Belief Subjective versus Desire Subjective

Another distinction that Hellier ignores is the distinction between belief and desire. He says that morality is grounded on subjective states, but he does not state clearly whether the relevant subjective states are beliefs or desires.

At one point, he wrote:

“If morality were objective, it would have to be conceivable that the statement “George’s actions were wrong and he deserves to be punished” would be true even if every human in the world were of the opinion, “George’s actions seem fine to me, perhaps even laudable”

This relates moral evaluation to beliefs. If the agent, or the community, or a sufficiently large and well defined subculture within a community believes “X is immoral” then (for them), “X is immoral” is true. All that is required is the belief. If the belief changes, then the immorality of the act changes.

The fact that a sufficiently large portion of the population of South Carolina believed that slavery was morally permissible in South Carolina in 1855 means that slavery was permissible. This would imply that, as a matter of fact, anybody who stated that slavery was immoral was mistaken. On a belief model, "slavery is wrong" can only mean "the dominant belief in this culture is that slavery is wrong", which, in South Carolina in 1855, was false.

Elsewhere, he relates morality to desires, as when he wrote:

Thus, a subjective morality is strongly preferable to an objective one! That’s because, by definition, it is about what we humans want. Would we prefer to be told by some third party what we should do, even if it is directly contrary to our own deeply held sense of morality?

Note: He says here that morality is about what people want (desire), not about what they believe.

This relates to the question of objectivity above because relations between objects of evaluation and desires are objective with respect to beliefs. There is a fact of the matter as to whether a certain state of affairs is such as to fulfill some set of desires. It is a fact that exists in the world, independent of beliefs. No matter how many people believe that apricot pits will help people realize a state in which their cancer is cured, this will not make it true.
So if, instead of relating moral judgment to belief, we relate it to desire, then we get moral claims that are objective with respect to belief. An objective morality exists – but morality turns out to be concerned with the question of how best to fulfill desires.

I would, of course, go a lot further and say that morality is about evaluating malleable desires and molding them using rewards such as moral praise and punishments such as moral condemnation, but we do not need to go that far to make the points relevant to this discussion.

Evaluating States Relative to Standards vs. Evaluating Standards

Finally, Hellier fails to distinguish between evaluating a state of affairs relative to some standards, and evaluating the standards themselves.

We humans have a lot to be proud of: by thinking it through and arguing amongst ourselves, we have advanced morality hugely, with Western society today giving vastly better treatment to individuals, to women, children, religious minorities, foreigners, those of other races, the disabled and mentally ill, criminals, etc, than any previous society.

Advanced?


We need an account of how morality can "advance" without there being an objective standard against which we can evaluate it. This would have to be a standard that allows us to compare one moral system (the old moral system) against another (the new moral system) and judge the latter to be "better" then the former.

Subjective morality allows us to make non-arbitrary judgments about states of affairs relative to some standards. However, it has difficulty evaluating different standards. We may just as well adopt a set of standards within that excludes women, children, religious minorities, foreigners, those other races, and promotes exclusively the interests of white males. If this is what people believed . . . if this is what people valued . . . then this is what would be true . . . on a subjectivist sense. If these are the values, then the changes that Hellier says we should be proud of are, in fact, things to be ashamed of.

You could evaluate standards according to some (subjective) meta-standard. But, then, how do you evaluate meta-standards? We could bring in a meta-meta standard, but how is that to be evaluated? Either this chain never ends, or it ends at a standard that cannot be evaluated - a standard that is, ultimately, arbitrary.

Distinctions

There are, then, three distinctions that Hellier should pay more attention to if he is going to continue to condemn objective value and defend subjective value.

The first distinction is the distinction between "objective value" in the sense of “intrinsically prescriptive value properties” versus “propositions whose truth is independent of whether people believe them to be true.” The denial of objective value in the first sense does not imply the denial of objective value in the second sense.

The second distinction is a distinction between grounding morality on belief versus grounding morality on desires. If morality is grounded on our desires, then the truth-value of moral claims are independent of belief. They are, in fact, "objective" in the sense that scientists use when scientists say that science is objective. A great deal of science is concerned with discovering relationships between things in the world.

The third distinction is evaluating states of affairs with respect to standards, and evaluating the standards themselves. Hellier is correct to say that morality is non-arbitrary where it concerns evaluating states of affairs with respect to standards. However, when Hellier goes on to say that some standards are better than others, he needs to provide an account of how we can compare different sets of standards - how we can possibly hold two different moral systems up to the same measure and determine one is superior to the other.

Debating Moral Objectivity

I have been asked if I wish to participate in a debate on morality at the blog “Truth Interrupted”.

I am deciding whether or not to participate in the debate. However, following a chain of links brought me to a post where the challenger attempted to defend the proposition that there are objective moral values and duties.

He defined “objective moral values and duties” as “moral values and duties that are valid and binding independent of human opinion.”

I believe that many of these debates are fruitless because of the ambiguity of terms such as “objective values”.

I deny the existence of objective, intrinsic prescriptivity – a moral value built into the very fabric of certain actions, character traits, or states of affairs. However, I assert that there are (or can be) objectively true moral claims that are substantially independent of the beliefs and desires of any given agent. I assert that values (including moral values, but also other types of values) exist as relationships between states of affairs and desires. Some people call this a subjectivist theory because “desires” are essential to value. However, these relationships exist as matters of fact in the real world, and are substantially independent of anybody’s belief in or about those relationships. They are as much a part of the real world as planets and atoms.

Valid

What would it mean to say that moral values and duties are “valid”?

I am being pedantic here. In logic, the terms “valid” and “invalid” apply to arguments. An argument is valid when, if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. A valid argument can still have a false conclusion, but only if one of its premises are false as well.

I hold that at least some moral propositions – propositions of the form, “It is wrong to respond to mere words or communicative acts with violence or threats of violence” – are, or can be, objectively true. I would not speak about a moral value being “valid”. The proposition either points to something that is true in the world, or it does not.

Binding

Moral values are “binding”?

I hear this phrase a lot in discussion. I do not know what this means. I don’t even have a good guess.

I think it has something to do with the relationship between moral facts and motivation. Therefore, let me explain what I think to be true about the relationship between moral facts and motivation, and let others decide what this implies about moral values being “binding”.

I hold that “It is wrong to respond to mere words or communicative acts with violence or threats of violence.”

I do not mean by this that everybody has a reason not to respond to mere words or communicative acts with violence or threats of violence. In fact, some people may have no reason to refrain.

However, I hold that people generally have many and strong reasons to give people generally an aversion to responding to mere words or communicative acts with violence or threats of violence. They might not have such an aversion, but they “ought to have” such an aversion, meaning that people generally have many and strong reasons to cause them to have such an aversion. The way that people generally can cause others to have such an aversion is by rewarding (praising) those who display such an aversion and punishing (condemning) those who appear to lack such an aversion. So, people generally have reason to reward/praise those who refrain from responding to words and communicative actions with violence or threats of violence, and to punish/condemn those who respond with violence or threats of violence.

What does this imply about a moral value being “binding”? Somebody is going to have to tell me.

Human Opinion

This term “opinion” is ambiguous.

In a strict sense, the term refers only to beliefs. If Bernadette believes that Carlos’ car is red, then Bernadette is of the opinion that Carlos’ car is red.

Using this definition, the truth of a moral proposition is independent of human opinion because it has nothing to do with beliefs. Moral claims are claims about the relationships between malleable desires and other desires. These relationships exist as a matter of fact – regardless of any person’s beliefs about those relationships.

Now, let’s take a statement of the form, “Jim prefers chocolate over butterscotch”. According to our first definition of “opinion”, this is independent of opinion. It is as much a fact of the world that Jim prefers chocolate over butterscotch as Jim’s age, height, weight, and any number of other perfectly objective facts. That is to say, if somebody else were to report, “Jim prefers butterscotch over chocolate”, that person would be wrong as a matter of fact. It is simply not true. If Jim himself were to say that he prefers butterscotch over chocolate he would be guilty of lying.

Yet, we sometimes call preferences “opinions”. So, here we have a set of things that are both referred to as “opinion” and, at the same time, reports a fact about the world.

I think this is where a lot of the discussion on the objectivity of moral values gets confused. People treat “opinion” as a clear and unambiguous term distinct from “fact”. However, this is not the case. We sometimes use the term “opinion” to refer to things that are, at the same time, “facts”. Relationships between states of affairs and desires – the type of facts reported in value claims including moral claims – are precisely the set of facts that are also, at the same time, called “opinions”.

Anyway, moral values are independent of human opinion in the narrow sense because relationships between states of affairs and desires are independent of beliefs. Moral values are not independent of desires since they actually describe relationships between objects of evaluation and desires. Yet, these relationships exist as a matter of fact. Whole societies can believe that a particular relationship exists between an object of evaluation and desires and be wrong. They would determine the truth or falsity of these propositions the same way they would investigate any objective, scientific claim about the world.

Conclusion

So, I would say: Moral claims sometimes report facts that are independent of beliefs and are independent of whether the speaker or people generally want the claim to be true. They are not independent of all desires because, when they are true, they report relationships between malleable desires and other desires. However, these relationships exist and are as objectively real as anything that any scientist may wish to study. 

J.L. Mackie's Error Theory Interpreted

In my return to academic philosophy, I have discovered that there is a new anthology of writings on J.L. Mackie’s “error theory”.

Joyce, Richard and Kirchin, Simon (eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory (Philosophical Studies Series, Book 114), 2009.

I find it interesting to note that people are still misinterpreting Mackie.

The standard interpretation of Mackie has him saying the following:

(P1) All moral claims attribute a property of objective, intrinsic prescriptivity to its objects of evaluation.

(P2) Objective intrinsic prescriptivity does not exist.

(C) Therefore, all moral claims are false.

All moral claims. “Rape is wrong”, “Slavery is wrong”, “You shouldn’t round up a whole group of people and kill them off”, “You should not kidnap a child and skin it alive while soaking it in a tub of salt water.” All of these statements are false.

This is exactly what Mackie says in the first three chapters of his book, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.

I have some objections to premise (P1) in this argument. However, I will allow that if (P1) is true, then the rest follows. Furthermore, I would argue that whether or not P1 is true is not particularly important. There is no reason to pour a lot of effort into deciding that particular issue.

This is what one gets if one reads the first three chapters of Mackie’s book. And, ironically, the editors of this new anthology actually comment that “few readers explore beyond Chapter 3”.

Yet, it is beyond Chapter 3 where Mackie wrote:

The fact that the word 'atom', as used in nineteenth-century physics, had as a part of its meaning 'indivisible particle of matter' did not in itself, even in the nineteenth century, compel anyone to believe that there are indivisible material particles. One could either refrain from using the term 'atom' in affirmative statement or, as physicists have subsequently done, use the term with other parts of its meaning only, dropping the requirement of indivisibility. (Mackie: p. 100).

 These claims invite us to draw the following analogy.

(P1) All claims in physics attribute to the smallest bits of gold, oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and any other element that it is without parts.

(P2) The smallest bits of an element has parts – they are made up of neutrons, protons, and electrons.

(C) Therefore, all physics claims about the smallest pieces of an element are false.

Why is this the case?

It is because the word “atom” literally means – or literally meant – “without parts”. “A-tom” meant “without parts” the same way that “a-theist” meant “without religion”.

By calling the smallest bits of gold, oxygen, carbon, and hydrogen “atoms”, physicists were saying that they were “without parts”. But they did have parts. Therefore, all claims about atoms were false.

Yet, this did not end all talk of atoms.

So, the argument seems to be, “Why can’t we do the same with respect to morality? Why can’t we just drop this claim of intrinsic prescriptivity – the same way that physicists dropped the claim of ‘without parts’ – and go from there?

My interpretation of Mackie is that this is exactly what he did. He dropped the claim of intrinsic prescriptivity from moral terms and went on to show that morality would look like if it did not include this error.

What it would look like is a lot like the morality that I discuss in this blog. I assert that there is no such thing as “objective, intrinsic prescriptivity,” but that there are moral facts. Those moral facts relate malleable desires to other desires.

I do not think that “objective, intrinsic prescriptivity” is built into the meaning of moral terms. I believe that many people falsely believe that some morality is to be understood in terms of intrinsic prescriptivity – but they have not built it into the meaning of the terms.

In other words, I hold that Mackie’s (P1) is false.

But here is where I say that this is not important. We can hold that Mackie’s (P1) is true, then drop intrinsic prescriptivity from the meaning of moral terms, and end up evaluating desires according to the strength and number of their connections to other desires. Or we can hold that morality is about the strength and number of connections between malleable desires and other desire to start with. Both options will get us to the same place. Both options will allow us to dismiss as false any claim that tries attributes intrinsic prescriptivity to objects of evaluation. Either way, Mackie’s (P1) becomes little more than an academic curiosity.

I am going to be reading through this anthology to see what they say about Mackie’s ethics. However, at first glance, this interpretation does not yet seem to be a part of the popular discussion. Possibly because, as the editors of this anthology report, few people explore beyond Chapter 3. 

Future Generations

What are our obligations towards generations?

If you do not mind, I would like to set aside the concepts of morality for a moment and look at the material facts.

An important material fact is that future desires have no ability to reach back through time. Future generations have no capacity to alter our interests - to make us into the type of people who will consider their welfare.

If our interests are not already in harmony with the interests of future generations, then the only people who can alter our current interests are those living at this time with us. The only way they can be motivated to bring our interests into alignment with future generations is if they already have a reason to do so.

The interests in the well-being of future generations has to be found in the present if they are going to have any effect at all on behavior.

If it is the case that, among humans, nobody has an interest in future generations, and nobody has a reason to promote an interest in future generations, then future generations are simply out of luck. That population will necessarily just shrug when the question of future generations comes up, and then change the subject to something they actually care about.

The only question that makes any practical sense is the question of whether we have an interest, or whether we have reason to create an interest, in the well-being of future generations.

Another material fact is that we do - many of us - have an interest in the well-being of future generations. Nature has given it to us in the form of an interest in the welfare of our children. Our interest in our children implies an interest in the well-being of their children - at the very least because it will be important to our children. Our interest in our friends implies an interest in the welfare of their children and grand children.

People with an interest in the well-being of future generations have reason to promote compatible interests in others. That is to say, they have reason to use rewards such as praise and punishments such as condemnation to promote interests in others that will serve the interests of future generations.

Furthermore, even without a regard for the interests of future generations, we have reason to promote in others a set of concern that will serve the interests of future generations. This is because we have reason to promote kindness and compassion in others towards people in the present - people such as ourselves, our friends and family, and our existing children. We have reason to make others averse to causing pain - an aversion that will make them reluctant to cause us pain, to cause pain to our friends and family, and to existing children. These desires and aversions will almost certainly impact people as they consider the effects of their actions on people not yet born.

We can get into a long discussion as to the degree to which we currently have reasons to promote interests in others compatible with the well-being of future generations.

However, if we were to claim that the interests of future generations have a built in ought-to-be-consideredness that compels us to consider those interests no matter what, we would be making a mistake. This claim simply is not true. There is no "ought to be consideredness" built into any desire - past, present, or future.

If a person wants others to act in a way that is compatible with the interests of future generations, here is one way to do this. (1) Give others an interest in doing that which is intrinsically right and an aversion to that which is intrinsically wrong, then (2) convince them that that it is intrinsically right to consider the interests of future generations and intrinsically wrong to fail to do so.

Similarly, one can (1) Give others a desire to serve God and an aversion to not doing so, and (2) convince them that God demands that they consider the interests of future generations.

Both of these courses of action will motivate people to act in ways that consider the interests of future generations. However, the usefulness of particular stories in molding the behavior of others does not make the stories true. No intrinsic value, and no divine value, exists as a matter of fact. The only thing that exists are current desires. Even future desires do not exist - at least not yet.

All of this leads to one simple and relevant facts. The interests in making current behavior compatible with the interests of future generations have to be found in the present. If they do not exist in the present, future generations are simply out of luck.

Value-Based Reasons

I have cause, recently, to return to reading more academic philosophy on the issues that interest me.

In that reading, I have come across the following:

Heathwood, Chris, Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6 (2011): 79–106.

I hold that value-based reasons do not exist. Desires provide the only end-reasons for intentional action.

This article concerns "normative reasons" - the types of reasons that justify an action. One can admit that a desire to inflict harm on another is a motivating reason, but it is not a normative reason. That is to say, it is not the type of reason that makes inflicting harm on another person a good thing to do. One could argue that normative reasons require value-based reasons.

Chris Heathwood provides two arguments in favor of value-based reasons in this article.

The first argument is the "Argument from Arbitrariness".

It goes as follows:

[D]esires can provide reasons. But if some desire is the ultimate basis for some reason, then there can be no reason for having this desire. If there were, then the desire wouldn’t be the ultimate basis for the reason. Whatever supplied the reason for having the desire would be more fundamental. But if there is no reason for having the desire, then the desire is arbitrary. . . . But, the argument claims, it can’t work that way. Arbitrariness is anathema to reasons. If a “reason” is based ultimately on an arbitrary state – a state we have no reason to be in – it can’t be a real reason after all. Why should we follow the direction of some desire, when that desire is itself without any justification? How could such a desire have any legitimate authority?

I would argue that you can't prove that something exists by arguing that we have built a claim of its existence into the meanings of our terms.

Our fundamental desires - from our basic desire for pleasure and aversion to pain to the desire for sex to our tastes for food - are all molded by evolution. They are determined by the way our brains have evolved, and the way our brains have evolved is determined in part by random chance (genetic mutation) and contingent facts (the environment in which those random variations occurred). They are, in an important way, arbitrary. That is simply the fact of the matter.

Heathwood expresses his argument another way:

Here is a way to illustrate the point. A says to B, “What reason is there for you to do X?” B replies, “Doing X will lead to Y, and I want Y to occur.” A inquires further, “Why do you want Y to occur?” B continues in the same vein: “Because Y will lead to Z, and I want Z to occur.” A won’t let it go: “What reason is there to want Z to occur?” B’s chain of desire must eventually stop of course, presumably in some intrinsic desire, or desire for something for its own sake rather than for what it leads to. Let’s suppose that B intrinsically desires that Z occur. In response to A’s question, “What reason is there to want Z to occur?”, B thus replies, “Well, Z won’t lead to anything else I want; I just want Z to occur, for its own sake.” But A can reasonably ask, “Ok, but why? Why want Z to occur for its own sake?”

The answer to "Why want Z to occur of its own sake" is "because evolutionary and environmental influence have made me such that I want Z to occur for its own sake. I have evolved to have a desire for pleasure, and an aversion to pain, a desire for sex, a preference for certain food types, an environment with a preferred temperature, the company of others, and the like."

We can still see the force of the argument that this certainly cannot justify behavior. If we evolved a disposition to murder neighboring and competing tribes and take their resources, or to commit rape, that would not justify those actions.

However, we do not need to introduce value-based reasons to bring in the subject of justification.

Epistemologists have faced a similar problem. When it comes to justifying a belief, it can be justified by showing that it follows logically from one or more premises. Those premises, in turn, can be justified only by appeal to prior premises. At some point, we are either going to have to reach some self-justified premises, or this chain will go on forever.

In epistemology, some thinkers have adopted a position called "coherentism". On this view, a belief is justified in virtue of the strength and number of its connections to other beliefs, which are justified in terms of the strength and number of their connections. There are no fundamental self-justifying beliefs.

Similarly, desires can be justified in virtue of the strength and number of their connections to other desires. We would look at the tendency of a desire to fulfill or thwart other desires, and use the strength and number of those connections to determine the merit of each individual desire. Desires that tend to fulfill other desires would be "justified" in the normative sense - they would count as providing reasons that people have (desire-based) reasons to endorse. Desires that tend to thwart other desires would be desires that others have reason to condemn (such as the desires contributing to tribal warfare and rape mentioned above).

But, the main problem with value-based reasons is that you can't prove their existence by writing an assumption that they exist into the meanings of our terms - any more than you can prove the existence of God by saying that it is a part of the meaning of the term "God" that it must exist. One needs a different type of argument to prove existence, and there is no evidence that value-based reasons exist.

How "All Lives Matter" Can Be Racist

In response to the "mistreatment" of black suspects by the police, some protesters and their allies adopted the slogan "Black Lives Matter".

Others then responded with the counter slogan, "All Lives Matter".

On the surface, it seems absolutely absurd to suggest that this response is racist. The counter slogan, in fact, explicitly states that all lives are to be considered equal regardless of race. Nothing could be less racist.

Yet, an argument can be made that it is, indeed, a racist response.

This argument pays attention to the fact that all communication takes place in a context, and the context can contain information that the words themselves do not contain.

Let me illustrate with an analogy.

Assume I were to say, "Amy's car is red."

Then somebody else answers, "There are lots of red cars."

The statement is true, so far as it goes. However, the question I want to ask is, "Why would somebody respond this way to the statement, 'Amy's car is red?'"

The most likely reason for this response is that the responder believes (or fears) that, in saying "Amy's car is red," what I am actually saying is "Only Amy's car is red - no other car is red." In this case, the responder would have reason to offer a correction - or at least a clarification. However, if there is no basis for this type of confusion, then there would be no motivation to offer this type of correction.

For example, if my sister were to ask me, "What color is Amy's new car?" and I were to answer, "Amy's car is red," it would be odd at best for somebody to say, "Well, there are other red cars, you know. Amy's car is not the only red car."

In fact, an impatient response of the form, "Did I SAY that Amy had the only red car?" would be in order.

Note that I am not questioning the fact that "Amy does not own the only red car" is true. This is not about the meaning of propositions. The is about motivation - about reasons for action.

Similarly, we can ask, "Why would somebody respond to the slogan 'Black Lives Matter' with 'All Lives Matter'." The first and best response is because they believe (fear) that those who are saying, 'Black Lives Matter' are really saying 'Only Black Lives Matter' and, as with the red car, one feels compelled to offer a correction or, at least, a clarification.

Now, we can ask, "From where comes the belief (fear) that those who are saying 'Black Lives Matter' mean by this 'Only Black Lives Matter'? As opposed to, "Black Lives Matter As Much As White Lives"?

More to the point: What is going on in the brain of a person who, when he hears, "Black Lives Matter" hears the person as saying, "Only Black Lives Matter" and thinks that some sort of correction is needed?

It is not at all unreasonable to suspect that there are some racist assumptions and attitudes behind this misinterpretation.

Now, let's go back to the initial example where I were to say, "Amy's car is red."

There is something else that can be said about the response, "There are other red cars."

It changes the subject.

A rational response in this case would be to say, "Look, the subject of the conversation is Amy's car. Amy's car is red. Yes, I know there are other red cars out there. We're not talking about them. We're talking about Amy's car. Amy's car is red. Try to keep up."

Similarly, a rational response to "All Lives Matter" would be, "Look, the subject of the conversation is the disregard for black lives, as is illustrated by the death and mistreatment of black subjects and, in some cases, by the very fact that the cop suspects the black person. I am well aware of the fact that other lives matter. We're not talking about them. We're talking about black lives. Black lives matter. Try to keep up."

This is, in fact, the case. The subject under discussion is the systematic devaluing of the lives of black individuals and that black people continue to face.

The Destruction of the Nation of Kiribati

Imagine being the President of a country that is about to be utterly destroyed.

Imagine being President under circumstances where one of your programs is to get people trained and educated so that, as refugees, they can find a place for themselves in some other country. Imagine having the dream that, some day, a descendant of one of your citizens might find himself in a position of authority and respect - in some other country.

It is not a Hollywood movie. It's the situation that President Anote Tong of Kiribati faces as climate change threatens to eliminate his country.

In the podcast linked to below, he describes what it is like to be the President of a country that will likely be destroyed.

He speaks of a newly built hospital being destroyed by sea level rise.

He speaks of crop lands lost - crop lands that feed the people of his country.

There is a moral dimension to this. His country is being destroyed by the actions of people in other countries - people who refuse to provide help or compensation for harms done. He speaks of the hope that others will realize and respect the immorality of destroying his country. What they are doing "is like an act of war".

There are those who argue that we must not have a carbon tax because of the harm it will do to the economy.

But what does it say when a country "protects its economy" by destroying another country - utterly, completely, wiping it off the face of the earth?

What type of country - what type of people - would do such a thing?

http://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=3314

The Basics of Morality

A friend was recently asked to defend his account of morality in 15 statements or less.

I thought of it as an interesting challenge.

So, there's the view of morality that I defend:

(1) All intentional action is grounded on beliefs and desires.

(2) Some desires are malleable - they are altered through interaction with the environment.

(3) A mechanism through which desires are modified is through reward and punishment where reward reinforces behavior that generates the reward and punishment creates aversions to those act-types that resulted in punishment.

(NOTE: "Reward" and "Punishment" here are being used in their biological and psychological sense, not their moral or legal sense, though the concepts overlap.)

(4) Praise effects the brain as a type of reward and condemnation effects the brain as a type of punishment.

(5) Each of us is a part of each other's environment.

(6) Consequently, each of us has the capacity (the means, the ability) to use rewards such as praise and punishments such as condemnation to alter the desires of others.

(7) Intentional actions (grounded on beliefs and desires as described in (1)) can fulfill or thwart other desires.

(8) This capacity to fulfill or thwart other desires gives others desire-based motives or reasons to promote desires (through reward/praise) and aversions (through punishment/condemnation) that tend to fulfill other desires or, at least, prevent the thwarting of other desires.

(9) If we designed a social institution for the efficient use of reward/praise and punishment/condemnation to mold desires, it would contain the elements we find in moral institutions. Such as:

(a) The institution, like morality, would focus heavily on where to direct rewards such as praise and punishments such as condemnation.

(b) It would identify some actions as those that people generally have reason to praise and to condemn their absence (moral obligation).

(c) It would identify some actions as those that people generally have reason to condemn and to praise their absence (moral prohibition).

(d) It would identify some actions as those that people generally have little reason to praise or to condemn (non-obligatory permission).

(e) It would identify some actions as those that people have reason to praise – but not to condemn their absence (supererogatory).

(f) It would recognize a set of statements that would block an inference from an action to the desires of the agent to deny that people generally have reason to condemn the agent (excuses).

(10) A system that can make sense of so many of the elements of morality can legitimately claim itself to be a moral system.

The idea in Step 10 is to apply the principle that if something walks like a duck, has feathers like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it is a duck.

In step 9, I listed only six of the ways in which this perspective on morality deals with the elements that we find in the institution called morality. There are more, but I was limited to 15 statements, if you recall. So, I listed, "walks like a duck", "flies like a duck", "has feathers like a duck", "lays eggs like a duck", "quacks like a duck", and "swims like a duck", but these are not the only features that are relevant. 

We have to take Step 9 as a promise of things to come. One cannot fit the whole defense into 15 statements - and it is not an objection against the theory that it cannot. Just as it is no objection against evolution or human-caused climate change that their full defense requires multiple volumes of material. However, this does identify where one would look for evidence, and, I hope, gives at least a hint as to what the evidence will look like and how it might succeed.

This promise to defend the items listed in number (9), and many items excluded because of limitations in space, is one of the main subjects for the rest of this blog.

One of . . . . because I also hold that morality must be practical and applicable to the day-to-day lives of ordinary people.

Law, Morality, and Medicine

Morality exists as an institution for promoting socially useful behavior and inhibiting socially harmful behavior.

Law and medicine (specifically, mental health) have the same end, at least in part.

How do they differ?

Law

Law works on an agent's existing desires and aversions in order to provide an incentive to perform socially useful behavior, or a disincentive to perform socially harmful behavior.

Well, ideally, this is what it is supposed to do.

The easiest way for the law to do this is to focus on welfare goods. Welfare goods are goods that are useful regardless of what a person desires. Cash is useful - regardless of what an agent desires - because it provides a means towards realizing those desires. Thus, giving cash provides a generally effective incentive, and taking cash (fines) provides a generally effective disincentive.

Liberty - a freedom to go places and to talk to people - is generally useful for fulfilling a number of desires. Consequently, imprisonment is a disincentive to performing socially harmful actions.

A problem with the law that is particularly relevant to socially harmful actions is that it depends on getting caught. A person who can benefit from a socially harmful action without getting caught can ignore the law's disincentives.

Morality

Morality, by contrast, does not take desires as they are. Morality works on changing desires - strengthening desires that tend to cause socially useful behavior and aversions that would block socially harmful behavior.

One of the advantages of morality over law is that morality works even when agents will not get caught.

You have to watch children who like cookies, because they may try to sneak a cookie whenever the parents are not watching. However, you don't have to worry that the child who hates broccoli is going to sneak into the refrigerator and walk off with the broccoli even when she would not get caught.

Similarly, if you give people an aversion to taking property without consent, then you can risk having your property in a place where others can walk off with it without being caught, and your property will be safe. Others will not take it simply because they are averse to taking it.

To the degree to which one is surrounded by people who are averse to taking one's property without consent, one's property is safer. To the degree that one is surrounded by people averse to killing, one's life is more secure. To the degree one is surrounded by people who like to help those in need, one can obtain help if one is in need. For these reasons, people generally have reasons to promote these aversions stealing and killing and promoting desires to help others.

Medicine

The mental health industry is also at least partially responsible for altering desires to promote socially useful behavior and to prevent socially harmful behavior - particularly the latter.

Yet, we distinguish between morality and medicine.

The distinction can be found in the fact that morality uses reward and punishment (like law) to change desires. Praise, in this context, works as a type of reward, while condemnation works as a type of punishment. Consequently, morality also uses praise and condemnation.

Medicine, on the other hand, uses such things as surgery, drugs, and blame-free talk therapy to accomplish these same ends.

Now, in the medical field - particularly with talk therapy - praise and condemnation is often used. However, this simply means that the practitioner is mixing a bit of morality in with their medicine - using reward and punishment to promote those desires and aversions that will keep people in treatment and taking their meds.

Similarly, in the medical field, practitioners will establish rules with incentives to follow the rules and punishments for violating them. However, this simply implies that the medical practitioner is combining aspects of law with aspects of medicine.

Nothing requires that only one of these tools can be used at a time.

However, they are three distinct tools each with their own distinct components.

Eliminativism

Now, we can talk about eliminating morality because morality does not exist. However, that would be like talking about getting rid of law because law does not exist, or getting rid of medicine because health does not exist.

The fact is, these things do exist. Furthermore, our moral institutions - like our legal institutions and health care institutions - are vital to our quality of life. They are all worth keeping around, and improving where there is room for improvement.

Talking About Morality

Moral philosophers have a serious problem when it comes to talking to non-philosophers about morality.

This is because moral philosophers have adopted a private language - a secret code that they use to discuss morality among themselves. They are off in a corner speaking their private language, every once in a while glancing out at the world to see what is going on, before continuing their discussion among themselves that nobody else can understand.

It seems somewhat inefficient.

It is an inefficiency that I hope to deal with as I resurrect this blog.

Take, for example, the denial of "moral realism" - the claim that there are no moral facts.

If you are in the corner with the philosophers talking about morality in their own private language, you will be quickly and sternly informed that denying the existence of moral facts does not imply that "everything is permitted". It does not imply that there is no reason to condemn the person who slits the throat of a neighbor out of anger, or that one should feel free to take the property of others whenever one can get away with it. The philosophers will say that there are non-moral reasons to be concerned about these things.

However, when you leave the philosophers' circle and step out onto the street, things are different. On the street, the denial of morality implies uninhibited murder, rape, and theft.

Here, some philosophers will tend to adopt an attitude of superiority and condescension. "This is because the plebes - the uneducated and unwashed masses - lack our sophistication and understanding."

Well, those "plebes" are the ones who are borrowing things and promising to return them, refraining from taking property that they can get away with taking, paying their bills on time (or not), deciding whether to lie about the broken window or to drive away from the accident, or deciding whether to donate to a charity or buy a new big-screen television, deciding which politician to vote for and whether or not to punish their children.

The moral philosopher who wants to talk to non-philosophers has two options.

Option 1: Teach everybody to speak the secret private language of philosophers. This is a poor option. It will require getting people to spend a huge amount of time on something they don't have time for.

Option 2: Learn to speak the "common tongue" of the non-philosopher. That is to say, talk to the people in their own language.

In the "common tongue," "there are no moral facts" implies "uninhibited murder, rape, and theft." And if "institutions for inhibiting socially harmful actions such as murder, rape, and theft exist" then "morality exists."

I hold that morality exists.

There is still some philosophical work to be done. There are two other major institutions that have a role to play in promoting socially useful behavior and inhibiting socially harmful behavior. One of these is "law". The other is "medicine" - specifically, "mental health". It would be useful to distinguish among these. It would be particularly useful to find the distinctions that exist between them in the "common tongue".

Atheist Ethicist: The Resurrection

I'm back.

I am making some changes in my life that will give me both opportunity and reason to spend more time reading and writing about ethics, And, as I read and write, I need a place to put the thoughts that come to me. This seems a good place to do so.

I thought about starting a new blog - specifically, one that did not have the word "atheist" in the title.

However, I remembered the reason why I selected this title. It is because there exists in the world a prejudice against atheists grounded on the premise that there is some sort of incoherence in the idea of atheism and morality. Morality comes from God. Atheists do not believe in God. Therefore, atheists do not believe in morality. Therefore, atheists will kill you, take your property, and rape and murder your children. Atheists are to be feared and hated. They particularly cannot be trusted to hold public office - nothing prevents them from abusing that power.

People who hold this view are bigots - plain and simple. Apparently, their "god-given morality" has failed to provide them with a defense of hate-mongering and bigotry, because they display those qualities here in abundance.

The argument is simple.

Atheists deny that a god created morality. This does not imply that atheists deny the existence of morality.

Atheists deny that a god created trees. This does not imply that atheists deny the existence of trees. There is no need to deny atheists a driver's license because atheists are at risk of running vehicles into trees that they cannot see and whose existence they forever deny. Atheists know that trees (and cows and people exist). They simply deny that a god created them.

One could adopt this same position regarding atheists and morality.

Atheists deny that a god created morality. This does not imply that atheists will kill you, take your property, and rape your children. Atheists still know that morality exists. They still recognize the value of putting up legal and social barriers against murder, theft, and rape. In part, because they do not wish to be murdered, robbed, or raped, and they do not wish anybody that they care about to be murdered, robbed, or raped.

Furthermore, at least some atheists care about a great many people - even strangers living on the other side of the planet. One no more needs a god to care about people than one needs a god to be averse to pain.

Given these two options, "Atheists deny that god created trees/morality therefore they deny the existence of trees/morality" and "Atheists deny that god crated trees/morality; however, they still believe in the existence of trees/morality but deny that they came from a god," why would a person choose the first option and not the second?

There is no evidence or argument that can be given that favors the first over the second. At the same time, the tree analogy favors the second over the first. So, it is against evidence to suggest that the person who denies the existence of god also denies the existence of morality. Yet, people insist on this option anyway.

Why?

Well, I propose that the first and most powerful reason is because they wish to cast atheists as morally inferior beings, so that they can justify seeing themselves and morally superior to these "others" who, themselves, are little better than animals.

It is a fundamental feature of bigotry to cast the "other" as morally inferior. Arabs are terrorists. Blacks are coked-up criminals. Latinos are lazy people who exist merely to freeload off of government handouts. And the atheist denies the existence of morality.

Bigotry is immoral.

I understand bigotry to mean the use of derogatory overgeneralizations. It asserts as true something that, in many cases, happens to be false; that just because those people are Arabian, they are terrorists; that just because those other people are black they are coked-up criminals, etc. It, in effect, declares people to be guilty of something where no evidence has been brought against them - only against others who are like them. To practice bigotry is to practice injustice - to inflict harms (or, at least, to refuse to render aid and assistance) based on a verdict that pays no attention to what is true of the individual.

Bigotry is inherently unjust.

Which, by the way, implies that derogatory overgeneralizations about Muslims in specific, or theists in general, are also immoral. While, obviously, I reject that "denying the existence of a god" implies "denying the existence of morality", I do not hold that atheists have any special insight or disposition to act morally. Nothing I write should be taken as assuming that atheists are inherently moral or "morally superior" to theists. I write only to deny that atheists are necessarily inferior.

If religion gives one special insight into right and wrong, then religion should be giving religious people special insight into the injustice of bigotry. Here, it fails spectacularly.

In light of this persistent bigotry, I think that there is still a place in the world for an "atheist ethicist" blog. Since I expect to be spending much more of my time in the future studying moral philosophy, I I have reason to resurrect this blog and make it a place to have that discussion.

Criticizing an Idea

The primary defense that Bill Maher and Sam Harris use against the charge of bigotry against their assertions against Islam is that it is permissible to criticize an idea.

"Islam is an idea, not a race."

Well, yes. That's true.

However, not all criticisms of ideas are equal. Some criticisms have merit, some do not. Some criticisms are legitimate and others are not.

One source of illegitimate criticism is to confuse the idea with the people who believe it. There is a difference between criticizing utilitarianism, and criticizing utilitarians. There is a difference between criticizing creationism and criticizing creationists. When people blur these distinctions it is very easy to go from criticizing an idea to making prejudicial and discriminatory claims about people.

Particularly when your remarks attribute to the '-ist' a set of derogatory and denigrating attitudes that are not actually a part of the '-ism' you claim to be criticizing.

So, here are the rules for criticizing an '-ism'.

First, any claim that you are criticizing an '-ism' implies that you are criticizing a defining characteristic of that belief. It is something that defines whether a person is an '-ist' or not.

If a person says, "I am criticizing an 'ism'", and in the next sentence says, "Not all -ists' believe this," that person is speaking as incoherently as he would be if he were speaking about a bachelor and saying that the bachelor is married.

So, to criticize act-utilitarianism is to criticize that which defines a person as being an act-utilitarian. An attack on the proposition, "The right act is the act that produces the most utility" would be a legitimate attack against act-utilitarianism.

However, let us assume that an opinion poll shows that 99% of act-utilitarians believed in capital punishment. Even under these conditions, a criticism of capital punishment is not the same as a criticism of act-utilitarianism. The criticism would not count as a criticism of act-utilitarianism unless the criticism ultimately penetrates the specific application and attacks the underlying premise that defines one as an act-utilitarian - the premise that the right act is the act that produces the most utility.

In other words, if what you are criticizing is not a defining characteristic - if an '-ist' can still be an '-ist' even if he agrees with your argument, then a claim that you are attacking the '-ism' is false.

Second, be truthful about the representation of people who believe what you are criticizing in any group. If 'some' of '-ists' believe X, then say, "Some -ists believe X". If many '-ists' believe X, then it is quite permissible to say, "May '-ists' believe X". If a public opinion poll shows that, "74% if '-ists' believe X", then it is perfectly legitimate to cite the public opinion poll and say, "According to this poll, 74% of '-ists' believe X."

But none of this gives one license to say that one is attacking the '-ism' unless and until one's argument proves to be an attack on what actually defines a person as an '-ist' - where the very concept of being an '-ist' who rejects what is being criticized is incoherent.

Third, if criticizing a passage in the book or a statement that a speaker made, then cite the passage or the statement (and provide an accurate account of the relevant context) and criticize the passage or the statement. This is all that is needed. One's criticisms will automatically imply a similar criticism of anybody else who would agree with that passage or the statement as described in that context.

Fourth, when criticizing an act-type, focus on the act-type.

For example, I argue that the right to freedom of speech is a right to immunity from violence or threats of violence in response to words or communicative acts (such as pictures, gestures, cartoons, or the awarding of honors or awards). It is not, however, a right to immunity from criticism or offense - indeed such 'rights' would constitute a violation of the right to freedom of speech since they can only be enforced by violence or threats of violence against people for words or communicative acts.

In defending the right to freedom of speech - or condemning violations of this principle - it is sufficient to focus on the principle itself. It does not matter if one is a Muslim threatening to kill people who offend Islam, a liberal threatening to imprison somebody who argues that homosexuality is a sin, or a gamer using rape-threats to intimidate women critics of female representations in video games, it applies to all of these.

If one focuses on the act-type itself there is no risk of either over-generalizing (assigning guilt to people who are not guilty of the violation) or under-generalizing (letting off the hook 'allies' who are doing the things that you criticize but are not members of your targeted group).

These are simple rules to follow. They easily allow the criticism of any idea that one thinks is worth criticizing, but does it in a way that disarms any charge of prejudice or bigotry. It prevents any case of over-generalizing and criticizing people who are innocent, or under-generalizing and letting people of the hook who are guilty.

If somebody seeks to violate the rule - if somebody shows little concern over whether their words over-generalize and condemn the innocent or under-generalize and ignore the guilty - then that itself is a form of behavior worthy of criticism.

Legitimate Criticism and Defining Characteristics

The most common objection currently being raised to my claim about criticizing a bad idea goes something like this:

"You say that it is only legitimate to say that you are criticizing an ideology if you are criticizing something that 100% of the people within that ideology agree on. There is virtually nothing that the holders of a particular ideology agree on. Thus, it would never be appropriate to criticize an ideology. This implication is absurd. Consequently, we reject your initial premise.

To start with, the initial premise as reported is not what I said.

I said that a claim that one is criticizing an ideology is legitimate only when one is attacking a defining characteristic of that ideology.

A "defining characteristic" is a belief where its denial means that the term for that ideology does not apply to a person.

Here are several examples of defining characteristic:

The defining characteristic of atheism is the belief that the proposition that there is at least one God is certainly or almost certainly false.

The defining characteristic of act utilitarianism is the belief that the right act is the act that maximizes utility.

The defining characteristic of communism is a belief that all property should be owned by the community and none by the individual.

The defining characteristic of moral relativism is the belief that what is morally right or wrong is what the culture (in the case of cultural moral relativism) or individual (in the case of individual moral relativism) judges to be right and wrong.

The defining characteristic of a Kantian is to act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.

The defining characteristic of a Muslim is that one must hold that there is no god but Allah and Mohammed was its prophet.

As another example - in my blog I defend a moral philosophy called 'desirism'. In doing so, I also make declarations on a range of topics - abortion, assisted dying, homosexuality, climate change, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, the right to a trial by jury, capital punishment, price gouging, minimum wage. In all of this, I consistently remind people that it would be a mistake to take criticism against any of these specific conclusions to be a criticism of desirism itself. A valid objection against desirism requires criticizing its defining concepts (the idea that desires are the ultimate object of moral evaluation, good desires are desires that tend to fulfill other desires while bad desires are desires that tend to thwart other desires, and the purpose of moral rewards/praise and condemnation/punishment is to mold desires). A critic is not criticizing desirism simply because they object to my position on capital punishment.

Now, a test for a defining characteristic is that the term used for the ideology does not apply to those who reject the defining characteristic. Consequently, the term 'atheist' does not apply to a person who denies that the existence of a god is certainly or almost certainly false. "Act utilitarian" does not apply to a person who denies that the right act maximizes utility, and so forth.

This is actually a stricter test than the 100% agreement test - because clearly there can be 100% agreement on a principle among a population without its being a defining characteristic for that ideology. 100% of all Muslims can believe that 2 + 2 = 4 and it is still the case that the denial of this proposition does not mean that the term 'Muslim' does not refer to that person.

Because this is a stricter test, some may think I have made my hole even deeper, though I am going to argue that it is no hole at all.

Some argue that this criterion is some sort of serious obstacle to philosophical debate over the merits of different examples. However, the examples above show that this is not a limitation at all. There are countless philosophical books, papers, presentations, and discussions every year that follow this standard with no problem.

In fact, in just about every area of public debate (except Islam) we are keen to recognize that it is not legitimate to take the criticism of a percentage of the people who hold a particular ideology with the ideology itself. It does not matter that Stalin or Mao were atheists - a criticism of their actions is not a criticism of atheism. It is not a criticism of atheism precisely because it is not a criticism of its defining characteristics.

In all of these others topics, people almost effortlessly distinguish between criticisms of the defining characteristics of an ideology and criticisms of some derivative idea shared by only a percentage of the population.

If some public opinion poll were to show that 80% of all atheists were communists (or Objectivists, or moral relativists, or post-modernists), this would STILL not be a legitimate complaint against atheism. Most importantly, it is not a legitimate complaint against atheism precisely because it is not an objection to the defining characteristic of atheism - the claim, the denial of which means that one is not an atheist - that the proposition that at least one god exists is certainly or almost certainly false.

What we would need, then, is some sort of justification for abandoning a standard that is in widespread use when discussing almost every other ideology under the sun when we talk about Islam.

What can possibly justify the attitude that, "If you want to criticize atheism you have to criticize its defining characteristic - where opinion polls about the number of atheists who are communists or Objectivists or moral relativists or post-modernists are irrelevant. But if you want to criticize Islam it is perfectly legitimate to object to what some percentage of Muslims believe?"

Why the double standard?

On Criticizing an Idea

When is a criticism of Islam bigoted, and when is it not?

This has been a hot topic of debate in some circles recently after an exchange between Ben Affleck on one side, and Sam Harris and Bill Mahar on the other. In this exchange, Sam Harris said the Islam is "the mother lode of bad ideas," and Affleck responded that such a statement is "racist" (a poor word choice - I will substitute the term 'bigoted').

(RealClearPolitics has a clip and a transcript of a part of the discussion.)

Separating Two Debates

Some confusion is generated because this discussion is taking place in a discussion on a different topic - on the virtues of standing up for liberal western values. Some people conflate the two. In fact, I think that it is fair to say that that this specific discussion took place BECAUSE some people (Bill Mahar) conflate the two.

The complaint is against the idea that standing up for western liberal values and criticizing other ideas is bigoted and must not be permitted.

The first thing to do, then, is separate the two discussions. I would defend the proposition that standing up for 'western liberal values' (freedom of speech, freedom of religion, etc.) is a virtue. However, they are to be defended using true premises and sound reasoning. One of those values is a prohibition on derogatory overgeneralizations that promote hated of the innocent by, in a sense, blaming them for things of which they are innocent. These types of overgeneralizations count as acts of bigotry.

In other words, sound criticisms of other ideas are not only legitimate, they may be obligatory. However, extending those legitimate criticisms to people who are innocent of wrongdoing, based on some property they share with those who are guilty, is not legitimate.

I am not going to defend the virtue of defending liberal western values here. I am going to take this as a given and argue that it is possible to agree with this and still brand the comments of Bill Mahar and Sam Harris as bigoted.

Bigotry

In this essay, I am going to understand 'bigotry' as a claim that shifts a target group in such a way that it ends up targeting people who are not guilty of the specific wrong, while (often, though not always) ignoring those who are guilty of the same wrong but are not members of the target group.

For example, if I were to take the condemnation of child molesters and apply it to the new target group 'men', I would commit the two wrongs of bigotry. I would be making an unjust and derogatory claim about men who have not molested children. At the same time, I ignore a group of people who have committed the same wrong but who do not belong to the target group.

Similarly, if I take the group 'those who endorse beheading those who do not share one's ideology' with 'Islam', I commit the twin crimes of bigotry. I unjustly brand those who are Muslims but who do not endorse the act of beheading unbelievers. At the same time, I ignore the beheading of 'unbelievers' when the ideology in question is not Islam - when, for example, the ideology is communism.

The way to prevent these twin injustices is to keep the focus specifically on the target group - those who call for the execution of those who reject a given ideology - whatever ideology that happens to be.

Criticizing an Idea

When it comes to criticizing an idea, the first thing to note is that there can be legitimate and illegimate criticisms. Legitimate criticisms spring from true premises and follow valid reasoning. Legitimate criticisms contain false assumptions or invalid leaps of logic such as those mentioned under the label 'bigotry' in the previous section.

The principle that I will defend is that a claim that one is criticizing an idea is only legitimate when one is targeting a defining characteristic of that ideology. That is to say, it must be attacking something whereby, anybody who rejects that which is being attacked cannot coherently be said to be a holder of that ideology.

Let us take communism, for example.

One legitimate criticism of communism is that the communal ownership of property destroys the incentive to work - to a large degree people will try to live off of the productive efforts of others. Another criticism is that it leads to the destructive overuse of basic resources (e.g., grazing land, buffalo, tuna) as people race to harvest as much benefit from themselves as possible before others get to that resource (the tragedy of the commons).

These are legitimate criticisms of communism because they target a defining characteristic of communism - the communal ownership of property. They attack something whereby, if a person gives up that which is under attack, it would no longer be sensible to say that they hold the ideology being criticized.

On the other hand, a claim that one is criticizing communism is not legitimate if one points to Stalin's purges in the Soviet Union and Mao's purges in China. A person can be a communist and still object to - and even abhor - these mass slaughters of people for the crime of questioning the central planners. Objections can be raised to these practices that are entirely irrelevant to communism itself. Consequently, it would be an unfair attribution to say or imply, "If you are a communist, then you are to be regarded as we would regard somebody who defends those practices."

There are also people who try to blame the purges of Stalin and Mao on atheism. Both leaders were promoting atheistic philosophies - that is, philosophies that denied the existence of a god. The defense against these accusations is to say that the defining characteristic of atheism is not believing in god. Atheism does not endorse or prescribe Stalin's purges. Because your criticism of Stalin's purges are not applicable to the defining characteristic of atheism, it is wrong for you to claim that you are attacking atheism when you attack those purges.

Furthermore, we can say that your claims are derogatory and prejudicial towards atheists. In fact, where we can show that the argument is motivated by a dislike of atheists - and thus a personal preference to see and to cast them in an unfavorable light - we can legitimately apply the term 'bigot' to those who would use and promote that argument.

Criticizing Islam

If we take this idea and apply it to the practice of criticizing Islam, then a criticism can legitimately be called a 'criticism of Islam' when it attacks a defining characteristic of Islam. That is to say, it must be attacking something where, if a person were to reject that which is under attack, it would no longer be true that they were a follower of Islam.

There is perhaps no characteristic that best qualifies as a defining characteristic of Islam than the first of the five pillars of Islam: There is no god but Allah and Mohammed was his prophet.

This, then, would count as a legitimate, non-bigoted criticism of Islam:

There is no God. Mohammed was nobody's prophet. Mohammed simply made stuff up. I will leave it to others to try to determine if he was being deliberately dishonest or suffering from delusions. Furthermore, when it comes to making things up that actually display moral virtue, JK Rawlings and George Lucas are just examples of people who did a far better job.

However, if a person is criticizing something that is believed by only a fraction of Muslims - where it makes perfectly good sense to say that the term 'Muslim' applies to a person who rejects the belief - and CLAIMS to be criticizing Islam, then that person is making a false attribution - a derogatory overgeneralization. What that person is doing instead is criticizing a faction within Islam. Extending that attribution to those who do not share that belief is unfair.

Not All Muslims Believe That

Ironically, Sam Harris repeatedly states that the 'bad ideas' he is criticizing are not shared by all Muslims. Unfortunately, this is all that needs to be admitted for the claim of, "Islam is the mother lode of bad ideas' to be a false attribution. To claim that one is criticizing Islam is to claim that one is attacking a defining characteristic of Islam - which means that the term 'Muslim' does not apply to those who reject what one is criticizing.

To claim that only X% (where X < 100) of Muslims hold that opinion is to deny that one is talking about a defining characteristic of Islam. Speaking about it as a criticism of Islam is to make a false and derogatory attribution to those who are Muslim but who do not share the attribute being criticized. The derogatory and potentially bigoted part of this is in attributing a bad idea agreed to by a faction of Muslims to all Muslims.

By speaking about it as if it is a defining characteristic of the class, this implies that it is shared by all the members of the class (by definition), and those who do not share this derogatory characteristic can legitimately claim to be falsely maligned.

Harris' claims are comparable to a person claiming, "Harold, who is a bachelor . . . ." Somebody then objects that Harold is married to Chris. Harris answers, "Of course I know that. I am not denying that Harold is married to Chris." The critic continues, "But you just said that Harold is a bachelor." Harris answers, "We must be permitted to say that Harold is a bachelor even though he is married to Chris. It is absolutely absurd to claim that, just because Harold is married to Chris, we cannot be permitted to say that Harold is a bachelor."

I want to repeat the key point that makes this analogy valid. To claim that, in attacking a 'bad idea', that one is attacking Islam is to claim that the bad idea is a defining characteristic of Islam. In other words, one is claiming that the common understanding of the term 'Muslim' is such that the term does not legitimately point to anybody who rejects the idea that you are criticizing.

If, in fact, the term 'Muslim' does apply to those who reject the 'bad ideas' you are criticizing, then you are not criticizing Islam, you are criticizing a faction (think of the term 'fraction') within Islam. The claim that this is criticism of a faction within Islam is a criticism of Islam is to make a false and derogatory overgeneralization - the defining characteristic of bigotry.

Criticizing Bad Ideas

None of this implies that it is wrong or bigoted in any way to condemn as a bad idea 'beheading those who do not accept a particular ideology'. What it implies is that there is a virtue in putting a great deal of effort into criticizing this bad idea. However, in doing so, one should simply state their objections to 'beheading those who do not accept a particular ideology'.

By keeping one's focus specifically on the bad idea, one can avoid the twin mistakes of bigotry - which is extending the target group beyond those who are actually guilty, while ignoring those who are guilty but who are not members of the new target group.

People should, in fact, defend the right to freedom of the press. People should object to legal penalties for blasphemy or heresies. In fact, people should actively promote the principle that the only legitimate response to words or private actions expressing an opinion or attitude are words and private actions (meaning those actions such as deciding where to shop that do not require public justification) - never violence.

Another thing that one should defend is the principle against making derogatory overgeneralizations - of attributing the wrongs to a fraction of a group (a faction within a group) to the whole group. This means that a claim of attacking an idea is only valid if one is attacking a defining characteristic of that idea. If a person can reject that which is criticized and still belong to a given ideology, then the legitimate claim is that one objects to a faction within that ideology.