



## 2010 G8 SUMMIT – ISU JIG INTELLIGENCE REPORT

**2010 G8 Summit – Integrated Security Unit Joint Intelligence Group**

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**RE: An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Investigative Team**

### **2010 G8 JOINT INTELLIGENCE GROUP**

#### *An Investigative Baseline for the Primary Intelligence Investigative Team*

The 2010 G8 Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) was established in January 2009, as a component of the Integrated Security Unit (ISU), in order to fulfill its mandate in relation to the 2010 G8 Summit to be held in Huntsville, Ontario in June 2010. The mandate of the JIG is to collect, collate, analyse and disseminate accurate information and intelligence in a timely manner to facilitate the decision-making process in both the planning and execution phases of securing the 2010 G8.

The JIG fulfils this mandate by conducting intelligence investigations on possible threats and suspicious activity associated to the 2010 G8. Credible threats and criminal offences will be reported to the appropriate authorities for the required enforcement action. This is to ensure that JIG Management, law enforcement personnel, and the intelligence community at large, are fully apprised of specific events and that their respective partners are continuously and accurately informed of all activity and threats directly related to the G8 Summit. The JIG will produce a variety of analytical reports including Threat Reports, Situation Reports, Trend Analyses and other reports. These reports will contribute to the development of the national threat assessment for the 2010 G8 which will be produced by the National Security Threat Assessment Section at the RCMP National Headquarters. The JIG is comprised of several components: This includes the Primary Intelligence Investigative Team (PIIT), the Liaison Management Team (LMT), and the Intelligence Information Management Team (IIMT).

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While the mandate of the JIG is clear, it must be recognized that there are several functions and/or prerequisites that fall within that mandate. Specifically, there are a variety of tasks/missions that must be successfully completed in order to allow the JIG to execute its mandate. From a strategic perspective, the JIG is the initial catalyst to success – if it does not acquire the requisite threat-related intelligence, all other mandates are placed in jeopardy. This primary importance underscores the critical necessity of discerning the threats to the 2010 G8 Summit, the entities which pose that threat, the motivation and intention of these entities, the criminality to be employed in this activity and the public safety issues that may arise as a result. Further, once an understanding of these operational concerns is acquired, the PIIT is required to strategically implement investigative techniques to ensure that law enforcement is cognizant of the evolving nature of these threats, the perpetrators, the targets/venues, the timing and the impact for the public safety and integrity of any/all investigations. Only by achieving success in these primary areas can the 2010 G8 Integrated Security Unit (ISU) achieve overall success.

Given the importance of this primary investigative role, both strategically and tactically, it is the intention of this document to articulate the mission of the PIIT and to establish an investigative foundation for the initiation of this function. In effect, this document will afford an investigative baseline for the investigative teams and will provide a genesis for investigative direction.


The document is compartmentalized to serve several purposes in establishing the investigative parameters of the PIIT. It will provide the following:

1. A brief description of threats posed to the 2010 G8 and a discussion of the criminal activity that comprises these threats, and thereby poses a threat to the 2010 G8 by proxy.
2. An articulation of the PIIT Mandate implemented to detect, deter, prevent and/or investigate these threats together with various stakeholders.
3. A discussion of the investigative threshold of the PIIT to ensure a two-fold priority:
  - a. Accurate identification of threats to the 2010 G8 and action on these identified threats including investigation on the perpetrators, mode of threat, and impact to public safety; and

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- b. A measured investigative response to the above, recognizing the inherent politico-ideological motivation for much of the anticipated criminal activity. Thus, the PIIT management is cognizant of ensuring the right to lawful assembly and dissent as enshrined in Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
4. A discussion of a “targeting procedure” or “investigative threshold” for the PIIT management: This will include definitions of “Terrorist Activity”,<sup>1</sup> “Criminal Extremism”, “Criminal Extremist”,<sup>2</sup> “Suspect”, “Person of Interest”, and “Associate”.<sup>3</sup>
5. A list of current “Suspects”, “Persons of Interest” and “Associates” for the PIIT investigative teams. This component of the document will continually evolve based upon information received.
6. *Tactical Intelligence/Crime Analysis* in relation to Suspects and POIs.
7. Investigative Direction for each Suspect

It should be stated at the outset that this investigative foundation is not intended to provide a complete threat assessment for the 2010 G8, nor is it a comprehensive analysis of criminal extremism, terrorism or any of the threats anticipated. These documents exist elsewhere (some of which produced by JIG personnel) and have been utilized as source material for this brief.<sup>4</sup> Generally speaking, the threats anticipated have been identified by subject matter experts subsequent to extensive analysis of the criminality surrounding these

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<sup>1</sup> Provided in section 83, CCC

<sup>2</sup> Criminal Extremism incorporates entities that exercise or encourage violence in an attempt to engender social and political change. Criminal Intelligence Service of Ontario 2008.

<sup>3</sup> Suspect and Person of Interest are defined in the Ontario Major Case Management Manual. The definitions are also provided in this document.

<sup>4</sup> Reference the 2010 G8 JIG Strategic Threat Assessment, Task 55 2010 G8.

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events in a variety of venues, both in Canada and abroad, in the recent past. Further, the document is based upon an in-depth understanding of the requirements of policing an event of this nature. These requirements include the primary law enforcement functions of criminal investigation, law enforcement, assistance to victims of crime, public order maintenance and emergency management. Lastly, this enterprise is an inherently dynamic environment – it is recognized by the PIIT that threats will alter in terms of quantity and severity and investigation will discern both aggravating and mitigating factors. From the identification of individual suspects to a threat assessment on a particular, related venue, the threat picture will constantly evolve based upon information received.

### 2010 2010 G8 Threats

The threats posed to the 2010 G8 can be categorized into four separate components:

- Threats posed by terrorist entities, or individuals/organizations planning terrorist activity in relation to the 2010 G8 Summit or one of its attendees (i.e. Internationally Protected Persons);
- Public Order threats and/or possible terrorist threats posed by individual or collective, criminal extremists who have historically illustrated a politico-ideological motivation for radical opposition to these events/participants, and have expressed this opposition by engaging in criminal activity. It is a priority of the PIIT to monitor this activity where justified, and the plans to perpetrate this activity, to ensure awareness of all activity that will lead to violence or any threat to public safety;
- Independent Asymmetric Threats (IAT) have often plagued controversial, public venues such as the 2010 G8 or the Olympics. This threat typology is comprised of individuals, acting on their own, motivated by very personal reasons, whose actions are likely to include criminal activity and/or initiate a public safety concern. It should be noted that unlike several of the other threat variants, these threats may include those posed by persons suffering from mental illness.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> For an in-depth view of the threats posed to the 2010 G8 please see the above-noted Strategic Threat Assessment.

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- Internecine Strife/Conflict may produce public safety threats. Given that the 2010 G8 will be attended by in excess of twenty countries, it is likely that their participation will engender resentment from social entities that harbour resentment against these states. Examples include anti-Chinese protests by organizations/individuals supporting a “free Tibet” or Tamil protests against Indian participation. The PIIT is only to be engaged to assess the extent to which these actions may result in public safety challenges.

Any of these threat variants may be motivated by international, domestic or issue-specific catalysts, further the actions taken may be the culmination of grievances that are subjective or objective. Thus, they are, to varying degrees, difficult to detect pro-actively. The following is a concise articulation of the threats anticipated based upon analysis of similar venues, precedent in Canada and abroad, and the criminal activity to date.

### 1. a. The Terrorist Threat

Certainly the most egregious threat to the 2010 G8 Summit, its participants and public safety in Canada generally, is the threat posed by a terrorist act. Given the current international climate, Canada’s high-profile role in combating *Al Qaida*, and its allies, in Afghanistan, and the fact that the event itself is an assembly of the world’s major leaders, the 2010 G8 is a viable target for international or domestic terrorists.<sup>6</sup> This threat could be posed against the event itself, a related venue or a specific IPP attending the event. This threat is aggravated by the fact that the 2010 G8 will, in all probability, host the representatives of approximately twenty-four countries. Further, as has been witnessed in recent venues of this type (i.e. the G-20 in the United Kingdom), the global economic malaise has fostered considerable frustration and anger with world leaders and their perceived inability to revert a downturn in the economy. This anger has led most analysts to predict an escalation in lawful dissent and, most importantly, legitimized (to some) the need for more radical/criminal action.

While this threat is significant, it must be noted that there is no specific intelligence at this time indicating that the 2010 G8 Summit will be targeted by any terrorist entity.

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<sup>6</sup> This specific threat is aggravated by the fact that *Al Qaida* has cited Canada as a viable target on several occasions.

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This threat will be continually assessed by the PIIT and a variety of investigative stakeholders both nationally and internationally. If a threat is identified, the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (INSET) will be notified immediately.

### 1. b. The Public Order Threat

The 2010 G8 Summit in Huntsville, as with most venues of this type, will likely be subject to actions taken by criminal extremists motivated by a variety of radical ideologies, resulting in potentially serious public safety challenges.<sup>7</sup> These ideologies may include variants of anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism, nihilism, socialism, and/or communism. These ideologies may also include notions of racial supremacy and white power and engage in public incitement of hatred. The important commonality is that these ideologies (or at least the interpretations included here) place these individuals and/or organizations at odds with the *status quo* and the current distribution of power in society: This may include a theoretical and practical opposition to authority (i.e. law enforcement and government), the capitalist or mixed market economy, multiculturalism, notions of free trade, and/or the current political systems embodied in most of the participating countries, etc. In addition to these generally held tenets, a variety of grievances exist: These grievances are based upon notions/expectations regarding the environment, animal rights, First Nations' resource-based grievances, gender/racial equality, and distribution of wealth, etc. Most importantly, the ideologies or motivations that propel these individuals/organizations incorporate an acceptance of criminal activity and violence to achieve their various goals. Often this acceptance of criminal activity as a means is overtly stated, while at times it is known only internally.

The existence of these ideologies and the grievances that emanate from them is not, in itself, problematic. In fact, public dissent based upon differences in opinion is intrinsic to any democratic system. The core of the problem, however, is the evolution of these philosophical differences into the advocating of criminal activity and the creation of significant public security threats. Given the high profile of the political philosophy of

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<sup>7</sup> Radical, in this sense, merely underscores that the adherents incorporate criminal activity, including violence, to pursue ideological goals. It does not include lawful expressions of dissent as protected in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

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anarchy within this milieu, it is instructive to note that anarchists pursue a destruction of law, order and government as a precursor to the imposition of anarchy.

The threat posed by what will be termed criminal extremists is a significant threat. As past international summits have illustrated, criminal activists of this type have engaged in a variety of direct actions and thereby posed significant challenges. These actions, and the law enforcement response, have led to death, significant injury, massive property damage, and tremendous public expenditure. By way of example, the G-20 in London in March 2009 witnessed one death, significant injuries, massive property damage, threats to persons (including police),

In Canada, the criminal extremist activity has never reached the level experienced in some European countries. Dating back to the 1970s, however, there have been several criminal extremist acts that have created significant public security concerns.


The PIIT team has engaged in a significant amount of data-mining, crime analysis and intelligence analysis of the activities of individuals/organizations that publicly or covertly incorporate criminal activity and/or violence within their *modus operandi*. The conclusions thus far illustrate a dramatic escalation in criminal activity ostensibly motivated by a politico-ideological stance. Further, a variety of criminal extremists are currently attempting to reorganize their structure with the intention to build a capacity for resistance to venues such as the 2010 G8 Summit and the Winter Olympics. It is precisely this activity – the establishment of covert organizations to engage in criminal conspiracies to disrupt the 2010 G8 via criminal activity – that is currently the most significant priority for the PIIT. A thorough understanding of these threats and their impact is essential in order to fulfill the mandate of the JIG.

### 1. c. Independent Asymmetric Threats (IAT)

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IATs consider the possibility of individuals acting alone to perpetrate a criminal act usually motivated by a very personal grievance. It usually comprises the acts of the 'powerless' against the 'powerful'. These individuals may be the subjects of mental illness resulting in their actions. These threats are difficult to foresee.

### 1. d. Internecine Strife/Conflict

This form of threat is not new to Canada. Given the multicultural composition of the country, the visits of heads-of-state, or governmental leaders, from other nation-states, are often perceived to be controversial by some sectors of society. Further, large-scale venues such as the 2010 G8 are often viewed by certain ethnic/linguistic groups that hold grievances with the status quo to be advantageous opportunities to illustrate their dissent. Again, this may be entirely lawful. Oftentimes, however, these protests have led to inter-ethnic conflict and public safety challenges. Examples have include clashes between Greeks and Macedonians, Serbs and Croats, Sikhs and Indians, etc.

The interest of the PIIT is to engage in discerning if any public safety issues will arise as a result of this activity.

### 2. PIIT Mandate

The Primary Intelligence Investigation Team is the investigative arm of the JIG. It is comprised of six teams of investigators concentrating on developing information/intelligence and investigations relating to Domestic and Foreign Terrorism, threats to Public Order, and threats posed by Independent Asymmetric Threats, Organized Crime and individual criminal activity related to the G8 Summit. This includes security issues related to economic integrity and cyber-security. In the event intelligence is developed that supports criminal charges, the investigation will be referred to the law enforcement agency of jurisdiction. Investigations developed, involving terrorism will be turned over to INSET. A trained and experienced National Security investigator will provide advice on these matters to the JIG Command.<sup>8</sup>


<sup>8</sup> The Security Offences Act gives primary responsibility for matters of national security to the RCMP. The RCMP exercises its operational responsibilities for this mandate via the INSETs. When the PIIT develops files

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An Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP) has been established to discern possible threats to the 2010 G8. Precedent indicates that these threats may emanate from individuals/organizations that are opposed to the 2010 G8 (or some component of it) and are conspiring to perpetrate some criminal act (or other act) that will lead to a significant public safety issue. Investigations are ongoing to establish the nature of these potential threats.

In relation to these potential threats, it is the mandate of the PIIT, and the Analytical Team (AT), to:

- a. Pro-actively identify public safety issues related to the 2010 G8 and assess/prioritize these threats in relation to the anticipated impact upon public safety.
- b. Establish suspects, persons of interest, and associates in relation to these threats according to established criteria, which are described below. All “targeting” will be based upon *criminal predicate*: Suspects will be determined based upon their proven willingness, capacity and intention to commit criminal acts and/or create situations that pose public safety concerns. The threshold for this determination will be “reasonable grounds” to suspect/believe that the individual entity in question poses a threat to the 2010 G8 or related venue. This determination will be a continual process based upon *assessment of incoming information*.
- c. Take investigative steps/measures to remain fully cognizant of the evolving threat(s) in order to engage in the mandate to detect, deter, prevent, investigate and/or disrupt threats to the 2010 G8. These steps will include a wide array of investigative techniques.
- d. Engage in constant prioritization to ensure action is being taken on the threats that pose the highest threat to public safety.
- e. Ensure that criminal information/intelligence received is correctly investigated to ensure the highest degree of reliability/validity and that it is disseminated/shared via the JIG management to/with relevant stakeholders in a timely manner.

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that appear to be national security threats (as defined in the Security Offences Act and the CSIS Act), the appropriate INSET will be advised via their intake officer. In the case of the 2010 G8, a liaison has been developed with the “O” Division INSET.

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
It should be noted that the PIIT mission complements the mandate of the JIG. In order for the JIG to fulfill its mandate, the PIIT must first be successful in its intelligence-led capacity. By way of example, for the JIG to be able to disseminate criminal intelligence regarding the intentions of an individual suspect toward the 2010 G8, or any related venue, the PIIT must first have been successful in acquiring information/intelligence in relation to this act via some investigative technique. The PIIT then must maintain both a pro-active and reactive capacity.

While the ultimate goal of the PIIT is to ensure the ability of the JIG to fulfill its mandate in relation to the 2010 G8 specifically, the PIIT is required to view suspicious and threatening activity from a more strategic and global perspective. That is to say that criminal extremists, terrorists, organized criminals, cyber-hackers or other individuals that intend to perpetrate criminal activity against the 2010 G8 will not, in all likelihood, openly engage in discussions that relate to the 2010 G8 specifically – an event that is currently fourteen months in the future. Most of these threats emanate from individuals and/or organizations that are ideologically opposed to the 2010 G8 for a variety of reasons and are overwhelmingly venue-driven. Further, their motivation, and propensity for criminal activity, as a means to act out their motivation, places them at odds with a variety of venues that precede the actual 2010 G8. These venues are in many ways predictable on the basis of motivation and will provide an investigative focal point for the PIIT. These venues will include the Winter Olympics in 2010, the associated Torch Run in 2009/10 and the 2010 G8 in Italy in 2009, as well as a host of localized issues (i.e. a political gathering, an economic meeting, etc.) where entities entertain criminal actions related to this motivation.

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The PIIT mandate is to acquire intelligence related to threats to the 2010 G8. To do so pre-supposes the ability to first identify threats and the perpetrators of those threats and secondly, to acquire insight via some investigative technique into the nature of the threat. Simply put, this requires a pro-active approach – investigative action based on reasonable grounds.<sup>11</sup> Further, one must consider the *modus operandi* of the criminal milieu. Criminal extremist groups that will present threats to the 2010 G8 Summit (as they have at all such summits) will not focus on the 2010 G8 in any tactical way until the 2010 G8 draws near. They will focus on more imminent, related matters, stimulated by their ideological stance. The 2010 G8, however, will be discussed, as will their general opposition to its occurrence.

### 3. PIIT Investigative Threshold

In order to be intelligence-led, the PIIT must acquire all available intelligence related to known or anticipated threats. This information is to be acquired by a wide variety of investigative techniques, including open source information analysis, a review of police occurrence reports, and more covert techniques such as the recruitment of confidential informants and undercover operations. It is the intention of the PIIT to acquire an accurate, comprehensive list of three categories of individuals related to these threats. This includes: Suspects, Persons of Interest, and Associates in relation to the ongoing and anticipated criminal activity. The definitions of these categories are provided herein as is the

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<sup>11</sup> Simply put, if an intelligence requirement was established to identify *Al Qaida's* actions in relation to a Pakistani military meeting on June 28 2010, or the actions of Hell's Angels in relation to a specific event, it is unlikely that open discussion of the said event could act as the catalyst for action. The investigative entity would have needed to already infiltrated the organization in some way, shape or form.

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methodology for establishing this categorization. The definitions noted in black type-print are derived from the Ontario Major Case Management Manual. As the PIIT is engaged in an intelligence-led investigation, the definitions have been altered slightly to accommodate a strategic approach vis a vis “conspiracies to commit” criminal offences. While the Persons of Interest and Suspect categories are standard definitions, the category for associate has been added.

- **Suspect:**

A suspect is a person of interest whom investigators believe to have culpability in the commission of an offence(s) based on the evidence.

*A suspect is a person(s) of interest whom investigators believe to have culpability in the commission of an offence or a conspiracy to commit offence(s) based on the intelligence or evidence received and processed.*

**Example:** A person would be considered a “suspect” if investigators believe, on the basis of intelligence/evidence, that that individual has culpability in the commission of an offence, or in a conspiracy to commit an offence related to the 2010 G8. This may include a mischief, a Personation, an assault, or any criminal offence.

- **Person of Interest:**


A person whose background, relationship to the victim or the opportunity to commit the offence(s) warrants further investigation, but no evidence currently exists to suggest culpability in the commission of an offence.

*A person whose background, motivation, relationship to the criminal act/victim, or the opportunity to commit the offence(s), or conspire to commit the offence(s), warrants further investigation, but no evidence currently exists to suggest culpability in the commission of the offence(s), or the conspiracy to commit the offence(s).*

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- **Associate:**

*An associate is a person(s), who has a relationship with a Person of Interest or a Suspect, and/or appears to be aligned with that individual in terms of motivation and/or organizational affiliation, but there is no information to support further investigation into the activity of that individual.*

The categorization of suspects and persons of interest undoubtedly incorporates a degree of subjectivity but there are objective factors as well. From an analytical perspective, the criteria considered for each individual include, but are not limited to, the following:

- **Criminal Activity Related to Politico-Ideological Motivation** (i.e. Venue such as the 2010 G8):
  - This incorporates criminal activity that is known (i.e. charges and/or convictions) or relating to which investigators have developed reasonable grounds to believe or suspect has been committed by the individual, is about to be committed by the individual, or the individual is engaged in a conspiracy towards;
  - Source information includes CPIC, police occurrence reports, surveillance reports, source de-briefing reports, undercover officer reports/notes and/or other investigative techniques;
  - Source information also includes open source information such as media analysis, public pronouncements, media releases etc.;
- **Other Criminal Activity:**
  - This refers to criminal activity that is known but to which there is no obvious link to the politically motivated criminal activity. The criminal activity, however, may have an impact upon other areas in that it provides a propensity for violence, deceit, etc.
  - Sources include CPIC, various police data-bases and police occurrence reports, etc.
  - It also may include source de-briefing reports, admissions, etc.

- **Motivation:**

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- This refers to the motivation for the criminal activity. This component considers ideology, organizational involvement, etc. It is instrumental in establishing motive and likelihood for criminal activity.
- Resource material includes statements, writings, Web-Site publications, public pronouncements, source de-briefing reports, undercover officer reports;
- **Organizational Affiliation:**
  - This refers to any specific organization/entity to which an individual belongs. This is important due to the stated intent of several organizations.
  - Certain organizations are more overt about how their dissent would be illustrated including consideration and/or promotion of criminal activity. Examples include White Supremacists that would consider the assassination of black or President, or anti-capitalist anarchists who would perpetrate criminal acts against governmental or corporate participants.
- **Grounds for Arrest:**
  - This refers to actions of a specific individual, which would provide reasonable grounds for arrest.

It is important to note that intelligence or evidence received may place an individual into a certain category (i.e. Person of Interest) but that this classification may change. The PIIT and AT commit to a constant review of an individual's status in relation to the investigation(s). This review will be documented at the end of every month on the basis of information known at that time.

### **CONCLUSION**

As stated at the outset, it is the intention of this document to provide an investigative foundation for the PIIT. The initial component is to provide the operational parameters regarding the threats anticipated for the 2010 G8; an articulation of the PIIT mandate; an established investigative threshold; and a targeting rationale (including required definitions and criteria).

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
The segment to follow will provide a list of investigative suspects, POIs and associates. In the following section, a specific profile sheet will be supplied for each subject according to the criteria established. The profiles will be divided and color-coded into three distinct categories: Suspect (Red); Person of Interest (Orange); and Associate (Yellow). These classifications are based upon an analysis of what is known on each individual. This distinction is subject to change – as new information/intelligence/evidence is received, the assessment of a given individual will change.

**\*THE CURRENT LIST OF SUSPECTS, POI'S, AND ASSOCIATES WILL BE ATTACHED AT APPENDIX A TO FOLLOW AT A LATER DATE.**

Prepared by,

2010 G8 Summit JIG  
  
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Co-Commander 2010-G8

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