Answers to Certified Questions. The Second Circuit had sent two certified questions to the New York State Court of Appeals in Regatos v. North Fork Bank. The questions were:

1. Can the one-year statute of repose established by New York UCC 4-A-505 be varied by agreement? If so are there any minimum limits of the variation thereof (such as "reasonable time") that estop the bank from denying Regatos recovery?

2. In the absence of agreement, deos New York UCC Article 4-A require actual notice, rather than merely constructive notice? If so, can this requirement be altered by agreement of the parties and was such achieved in this case?

The New York State Court of Appeals held that the statute of repose could not be varied by agreement. It further held that actual notice was required by the statute and that this requirement could not be altered by agreement.

In light of these answers, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's award of $731,005.48, plus interest, to Regatos.

The decision in this case can be found here.

Another cross-posting. The Second Circuit is on the verge of deciding whether, in considering a challenge to the substantive validity of an individualized education program (IEP) in special education cases, a court may consider retrospective evidence. That issue had not been considered in the administrative proceedings or by the district court, so the Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court to decide that issue. The decision in D.F. v. Ramapo Central School District can be found here. This post will also be posted on my other blog, The FAPE Page, which deals with special education issues.

Class Attorney's Fiduciary Duties. Where a party, who is technically part of a class, but enters an appearance in the class action by his own attorney, he cannot sue the class attorney for breach of fiduciary duty. Because he had his own attorney, he was not represented by the class attorney. The decision in Schick v. Berg can be found here.

Reduced fees. Well, there's one attorney who probably will take a hit in his business now that the decision in In re Goldstein has been released. David Goldstein, for reasons that are not clear, took an inordinate amount time to consummate the settlement of a wrongful death action in which he represented the plaintiff. Different explanations for the delay were given to different parties at different times in the case. At any rate, despite the delay, Goldstein asked for his full contingeny fee. The magistrate judge balked, noting that a number of Goldstein's cases had languished because of his lack of attention and disregard of court orders and that she had previously recommended sanctions against him in another case. The magistrate judge issued a recommendation that Goldstein's fees and expenses be radically reduced. The District Court adopted the recommendation. The Court referred the case to the Grievance Committee for the First Department and for the Eastern District of New York. Goldstein appealed.

The Second Circuit held that the District Court had the authority to reduce his fees and its decision to do so in this case was not an abuse of discretion. The Court stated: "Goldstein's arguments regarding the reduction of his fees demonstrate no error, much less and abuse of discretion. When asked to provide evidence of his disbursements, he did not do so. That failure and the treatment of his client, who had to personally seek the court's aid in forcing Goldstein to complete the settlement, slone justify the reduced award."

The Second Circuit held that it did have jurisdiction to consider an appeal from that part of the District Court's order, referring the matter to the disciplinary committees because the order had reputational consequences and potential costs in responding to the referral. This jurisdiction is limited. The Court may only review in such a case "for prejudicial procedural error, clear error in findings of fact, and abuse of discretion in the sanction imposed." Under the circumstances of the case, the Court affirmed this section of the order as well.

The decision in this case can be found here.

A3G Revealed! Not that it's news anymore, but blogger Article III Groupie of Underneath Their Robes is no longer anonymous and he's a federal prosecutor. And now that it's known that David Lat is the infamous A3G, he has closed down the blog. For more info, click here. This post is not really about the Second Circuit, but I don't want to be the only legal blogger who didn't mention it.

No chill. The Second Circuit has held that a public employee alleging retaliation for having exercised his or her First Amendment rights is not normally required to show that the State's conduct had an actual chilling effect. Morrison v. Johnson can be found here.

Argumentative summations. Samuel Yakobowicz was convicted on four counts of filing false federal excise tax returns on behalf of his company and one count of attempting to impede the administration of internal revenue laws. The district court allwed the parties to make short statements to the jury at the conclusion of every witness. Yakobowicz objected to this procedure on the ground that it was not authorized by the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure. The government used its "interim summations" to argue and reargue its theory of the case to the jury.

The Second Circuit held that, in the context of criminal proceedings, such interim argumentative summations favored the prosecution, constituting structural error that warranted reversal.

Judge Sotomayer dissented, stating that while the District Court erred by allowing such interim summations, such error was not structural, but was were trial error, subject to harmless error analysis. She felt that the error was harmless.

The decision in United States v. Yakobowicz can be found here.

No recusal. Five years ago, Judge Winter, right before he took senior status, had a conversation with the member of a law firm about whether he would continue to serve on the bench or take senior status. The lawyer told Judge Winter that if he chose to leave the bench, his firm would be interested in discussing the possibility of employing him at his firm. Judge Winter chose to continue on the bench as a senior judge. There were no further conversations on the matter. Now, one of the firms (I suspect that it is Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw L.L.P., but I could be wrong.) is appearing in a case before Judge Winter. He has stated that he does not think this conversation five years ago warrants recusal. No kidding.

The decision in In re CBI Holding Co. (Bankruptcy Services, Inc. v. Ernst & Young) can be found at the Second Circuit website. If I find a better site, I will post it.

Congratulations. I know that it's off-topic, but I want to congratulate fellow-blogger Heidi Bond of Letters of Marque, who has just disclosed on her blog that she will be clerking for the Honorable Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit. True, it's not as good as the Second Circuit, but it's still pretty good.

Hague Protocol of 1955. The dispute was simple. A shipper was seeking to recover from an air carrier for loss of goods transported by international air freight. The legal issue, however, turned on something more esoteric -- whether the United States was a party to the Hague Protocol of 1955, which amended tthe Warsaw Convention of 1929. The Warsaw Convention is a multilaateral treaty that regulates, among other things, the liability for international air carriers. The District Court had held that United States has acceded to the Hague Protocol when it ratified Montreal Protocol No. 4 in 1998, but the Second Circuit held that the United States did not become a party to the Hague Protocol until after the Senate consented to the Protocol's ratification on July 31, 2003. The case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. The decision in Avero Belgium Insurance v. American Airlines, Inc. can be found on the Second Circuit website. When I get a more direct URL, I will post it.

Motion for costs after remand. A plaintiff sought sanctions and attorneys' fees because a case he had commenced had been improperly removed to federal court. The defendants had agreed to stipulate to remand, but the plaintiff refused to so stipulate. The plaintiff's initial motion to remand had been granted, but its motion for fees and sanctions was denied. The Second Circuit on appeal from the district court's order on fees and sanctions, affirmed the decision of the district court, but made clear that the district court had had jurisdiction to hear the motion. The decision in Bryant v. Britt can be found here.

Late appeal. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed an appeal as untimely. The petitioner had sent his notice of appeal by overnight delivery (as recommended by the BIA), but it was not delivered for five days. Had it been delivered on time, it would have been timely. The Second Circuit held that these facts might constitute the "unique and extraordinary circumstances" that would allow the BIA to consider the appeal although it was technically late. The Court vacated the BIA opinion and remanded the case for further proceedings. The decision in Sun v. United States Department of Justice can be found here.

What's the amount. The Second Circuit reversed the denial of a defendant's presentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea on a criminal drug charge brought under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), which charge requires a finding of a specific quantity of crack. The defendant had not admitted to the quantity of crack involved in the offense. The decision by the Second Circuit in United States v. Gonzalez can be found here.

Non-argument calendar. Commencing October 3, 2005, the Second Circuit will institute a Non-Arguement calendar for all INS cases, involving the denial of an asylum claim. For more information on this procedure, check out the Second Circuit website.

No pretrial restraint. The Second Circuit has decided that 28 U.S.C. 2461(c), part of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, does not authorized pretrial restraint of assets that the government claims are subject to criminal forfeiture. The decision in United States v. Razmilovic can be found here.

No 9/11 Insurance Money for Citigroup. The Second Circuit has affirmed the judgment of the District Court of the Southern District of New York that Citigroup was not entitled to insurance money paid to 7 World Trade Company, L.P. for Citigroup's permanent but removable property at 7 World Trade Center, where Citigroup had rented space. The Court held that because Citigroup's property was explicitly excluded from coverage, it was entitled to no money from the insurance proceeds. The decision (very short) in Citigroup, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers can be found here.

Local call. All it takes is a local telephone call to meet the requirement of a connection to interstate commerce to support a federal conviction. The statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. 1958, requires the use of a facility in interstate commerce. The Second Circuit held that that phrase only means that the facility (which includes means of transportation and communication) is used -- at times -- in interstate commerce, not that the alleged criminal used it in interstate commerce. The circuits appear to be split on this issue. The decision in United States v. Perez can be found at here.

New blog. Well, OK, it's been around since December 2004, but it's new to me. I've just run across the Second Circuit blog, authored by a group of Federal Public Defenders in New York, New York. I haven't done an exhaustive look at the blog, but it seems to be oriented toward criminal law (understandably, given the identities of their authors). Welcome to the blogosphere, gang.

Parents. Under immigration law, someone subject to coercive family planning policies in his or her native land (or that person's spouse) may seek asylum in the United States. The Second Circuit has held that parents or parents-in-law of such persons are not entitled to seek asylum. The decision in Yuan v. United States Department of Justice can be found here.

Dickens. I usually don't report on criminal cases involving sentencing disputes, but being a big Charles Dickens fan, I could not go without providing you with a link to United States v. Brady, a case where Judge Cardamone starts off with a quote from A Tale of Two Cities. Unfortunately for Brady, the sentence she was given by the District Court, along with the giant downward departure, was remanded because the District Court's factual findings were insufficient to justify the departure. The decision can be found here. The worst of times, indeed! (Of course, further factfinding will be performed by the District Court, which may then warrant the departure, so you never know.)