Value of a rescission claim

The Second Circuit, in a claim brought under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty -- Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, held that the value of a contract, without offset, is the amount in controversy for purposes of a rescission claim that was brought under the Act, agreeing with the Third and Sixth Circuits.  In Pyskaty v. Wide World of Cars, LLC, the plaintiff sued the defendant, from whom she had purchased a car for violating the Act and under state law.  The cost of the car was $51,195.  The defendant claimed that the amount in controversy did not meet the jurisdictional threshold for a claim brought under the Act ($50,000), believing that the value of the claim was the amount paid under the contract minus the actual value of the car.  While the district court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the claim, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the value of the claim met the jurisdictional threshold.

A copy of the decision in this case can be found here.

Adequate Notice under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

In Carlin v. Davidson Fink, the defendant, a law firm engaged in, among other things, the business of debt collection and foreclosure actions, commenced a foreclosure action against the plaintiff.  The defendant attached to the complaint a "Notice Required by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act," which stated that the debt set out in the complaint will deemed to be valid unless the plaintiff disputed it within 30 days of receipt of the Notice.

On July 12, 2013, The plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant within the 30-day period disputing the validity of the debt and requesting a verification of the dollar amount of the the purported debt.

On August 9, 2013, the defendant complied, but stated that the amount provided included certain fees that were not yet due, and that if the amount was paid and any of those fees did not actually become due, such fees would be refunded.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act requires that within five days of an initial communication with a consumer, a debt collector has to provide a written notice containing, among other things, the amount of the debt.

The action was brought because plaintiff claimed that the defendant had not complied with that requirement.  The defendant moved to dismiss.the action, which motion was denied, but on a motion for reconsideration, the court dismissed the action.  The plaintiff appealed.  The two questions at issue was which document was the initial communication, and whether the notice had been provided.

The Court first held that the complaint was not the initial communication.  The Second Circuit had previously held that a complaint could be an initial communication, but the statute had been amended to eliminate a pleading as an initial communication.

The plaintiff's letter was not an initial communication because an initial communication under the statute was one sent by the debt collector to the consumer.

The Court held that the defendant's August 9, 2013 letter to the plaintiff was the initial communication.

The Court then held that the notice contained in the letter did not comply with the statute because because it "d[id] not specify what the 'estimated fees, costs,  [and] additional payments' are."  The Court stated that "[w]e do not hold that a debt collector may never satisfy its obligation under [the statute] by providing a payoff statement that provides an amount due, including expected fees and costs.  But a statement is incomplete where, as here, it omits information allowing the least sophisticated consumer to determine the minimum amount she owes at the time of the notice, what she will need to pay to resolve the debt at any given moment in the future, and an explanation of any fees and interest that will cause the balance to increase."

The Court acknowledged that the defendant's notice may be common in the debt collection interest, but stated that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act "does not insulate a debt collector from liability merely because others in the industry engage in the same practice."

The Court vacated the order and judgment of the District Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The decision in this appeal can be found here.

No Common Law Right of Public Performance for Creators of Pre-1972 Sound Recordings

A decision in Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc has come down.

The plaintiff, which claim to own the rights to the recordings of "The Turtles," a well-known band with a string of hits in the 1960s, sued Sirius XM Radio, Inc., a radio and internet-radio broadcaster, claiming that Sirius infringed on the plaintiff's copyright in The Turtle's recordings.  On a motion for summary judgment, Sirius claimed that there was no public performance rights in pre-1972 recordings under New York law and that if such a right existed, it violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.

The District Court held that there was such a right and that it did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.  Sirius then moved for reconsideration or to certify its order for interlocutory appeal.  The Court denied the motion for reconsideration, but certified both the summary judgment and reconsideration orders for immediate appeal.

On appeal, the Second Circuit decided that there was an unclear issue of state law that should be decided by the New York State Court of Appeals -- whether there is a right of public performance for creators of pre-1972 sound recordings.

On December 20, 2016, the Court of Appeals held that New York common law does not recognize such a right.

Based on this finding, the Second Circuit reversed the District Court's order denying summary judgment and remanded the case to the District Court with instruction to grant Sirius's motion for summary judgment and to dismiss the case with prejudice.

The New York State Court of Appeal's decision can be found here.  The Second Circuit's decision can be found here.

FMLA -- Obligation on Employer to Ask for Information to Determine whether Employee is Entitled to Relief

In Coutard v. Municipal Credit Union, the District Court dismissed a claim brought by an employee under the Family Medical Leave Act in which the employee claimed that the employer denied him leave to care for his grandfather.  The District Court held that the failure of the employee that he was in a loco parentis relationship with his grandfather doomed his claim.  The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the employer had an obligation to specify any additional information that it needed in order to determine whether plaintiff was entitled to such leave and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings.  The plaintiff had asked the Court to grant him partial summary judgment, but the Second Circuit declined to do so.  Even though it held that his claim should be dismissed on failure to give proper notice grounds did not establish as a matter of law that he was entitled to the relief he sought.

A copy of the decision can be found here.

Special Education Case -- "Clear Consensus"

The Second Circuit, in A.M. v. New York City Department of Education, held that where the school district developed an Individualized Education Program ("IEP") for an autistic child, that was against the clear consensus of the substance of the evaluative materials present at the IEP meeting of the Committee on Special Education ("CSE"), such IEP failed to provide the child  with a free, appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Act.  In so holding, the Court vacated the decision of the District Court and remanded the case for a determination as to whether the placement that the parents had made was appropriate and that equitable considerations favor reimbursement for the sum that the parents had to pay for that placement.

In A.M., the evidence before the CSE showed that A.M. needed intense applied behavior analysis therapy.  The school district had declined to provide for such therapy in the IEP.

A copy of the Court's decision in this case can be found here.

Certified Question on Punitive Damages in Cases under New York City Human Rights Law

What is the standard for assessing punitive damages in a pregnancy discrimination under the New York City Human Rights Law?.  The law itself doesn't set a standard, so the district judge in Chauca v. Abraham, borrowed the standard  from the standard under the federal Title VII and based on that standard declined to give a punitive damages instruction to the jury.  On appeal, the plaintiff contended that this was error because the Human Rights Law should be construed liberally and independently of federal law.  Because there is no controlling New York precedent setting the standard and because that standard is an important issue of state law, the Second Circuit certified a question to the New York State Court of Appeals, asking it to decide as follows:

What is the standard for finding a defendant liable for punitive damages under the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8‐502?

The decision in Chauca can be found here.

Clear and Unmistakable.

The Second Circuit has reiterated its holding that if a contract agreement provides for arbitration for discrimination claims does not include statutory claims unless the contract's language is clear and unmistakable that such statutory claims are included.  The contract at issue in Winston Lawrence v. Sol G Atlas Realty Co. did not meet this standard.  While the contract stated that discrimination was prohibited and that any violation of the anti-discrimination provision were subject to arbitration.  Because nothing was stated as to claims  under anti-discriminatory statutes, the Court held that the contract did not clearly and unmistakably require such statutory claims be resolved in arbitration.  Accordingly, the District Court's decision sending the case to arbitration and dismissing the action was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings.  The Court noted that its decision was in concert with decisions of other circuits that have addressed the issue.

The decision in this case can be found here.

Post - Release Supervision

The New York State Legislature amended the sentencing scheme for violent felons to require that every sentence for a violent felony must be followed by a post-release supervision ("PRS") term.  Some judges.however did not pronounce PRS terms during sentencing proceedings  As a result, certain inmates entered the custody of the Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") with sentence and commitment orders that did not include PRS terms required by the statute.  Instead of bringing the failure to the attention of the sentencing court, DOCS simply added the PRS term administratively.

This policy was challenged in Earley v. Murray, in which the Second Circuit held that policy was unconstitutional and that the administratively added-on PRS terms were a nullity because that term had not be imposed by a judge.  The Office of Court Administration of New York took the position that the Second Circuit's decision in Earley was not binding on state court and issued a memorandum to judges expressing this view, but urged courts to pronounce PRS terms going forward until the New York State Court of Appeals had the opportunity to rule on this issue.

The New York courts were inconsistent in adhering to to Earley.  The New York State Court of Appeals ruled on the issue in People v. Sparber and Garner v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, holding that New York state law required teh judge to pronounce teh term of PRS orally at sentencing if it was to be included in an inmate's sentence, but did not address whether this rule was also required by the Constitution.

The plaintiffs in Betances v. Fischer were offenders who were subject to mandatory PRS terms and who alleged the DOCS,rather than the sentencing judges, had imposed the PRS terms.  They sought compensatory damages for this violation of their constitutional rights.  The defendants, state officials of DOCS and the Department of Parole, moved to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The district court denied the motion, and the Second Circuit affirmed, remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings.  In its remand, the Second Circuit directed the district court to develop the record as to objective reasonableness of defendants' efforts to relieve the plaintiffs of the burdens of those unlawfully imposed PRS  terms after the defendants know it had been ruled that the imposition violated federal law.

On remand, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion to certify the case as a class action, and after the parties had cross-moved for summary judgment, denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and granted plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment holding the defendants' personally liable.

After  the defendants had filed a notice of appeal, but before their brief was filed, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion to deem the appeal frivolous, which would have enabled the district court to retain jurisdiction and proceed with a trial on damages notwithstanding the trial.  The defendants' moved for a stay, and the Second Circuit stayed the proceedings in the district court pending the appeal.

The Second Circuit held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because they were aware of the holding of Earley and had not taking objectively reasonable steps to comply with the case.  Indeed, the Court was not sure that the defendants would ever have complied had it not been for the actions of the New York State Court of Appeals.

The decision of the Second Circuit in Betances v. Fischer can be found here.

A disability is not a disability is not a disability

The question presented in this case is whether being disabled for purposes of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") categorically qualifies and individual as having a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("Section 504").

The plaintiffs in B.C. v. Mount Vernon School Dist. are high school students with disabilities under IDEA (actually the plaintiffs were the students' parents, but it amounts to the same thing).  Their schools had placed them in AIS remedial classes for which academic credit was not given.  As a result at the end of the school year, they did not have enough credits to graduate to the next grade.  Both students ultimately graduated from high school.

The plaintiffs brought suit in federal court under the ADA and Section 504, claiming that the Mount Vernon School District's policy of scheduling the AIS classes during school hours disparately impacted students with disabilities.  The school district moved for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiffs should have exhausted their claims through the administrative process under the IDEA before raising these claims in federal court.  The plaintiffs claimed that they were excused from the exhaustion requirement of IDEA because their claims challenged a district-wide policy of discrimination and exhausting administrative remedies with respect to the district's framework and procedures would have been futile.

The District Court accepted the plaintiffs argument that they fall within the "futility" exception to the IDEA exhaustion requirement because they were challenging a district-wide policy.

The District Court granted the district's motion for summary judgment, stating that the plaintiffs' disparate impact evidence only showed the the district's policy only had a disparate impact on students with a disability under IDEA, not under ADA and Section 504, which defines "disability" differently.

The Second Circuit affirmed.  The plaintiffs statistical evidence only showed that district's policy only had a disparate impact on individuals with a disability under IDEA.  It is only if , as a matter of law, a child with a disability under the IDEA necessarily qualifies as an individual with a disability under ADA or Section 504.

ADA and Section 504 define  "disability" as a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities."  By contrast, under IDEA, a "child with a disability" has one or more of an enumerated list of impairments requiring "special education or related service."  Hence, a student could have a disability that requires special education or related services without it substantially limiting one or more major life activities.  The Court held that the plaintiffs' position, in effect, read the ADA's substantial limitation requirement out of the statute.  The Court, while acknowledging that many students who qualify for special education or related services under IDEA might also qualify under ADA and Section 504, that is not always the case.  Other circuits have similarly held.

The Second Circuit's decision can be found here.

Plausible Malice

The Court, in Biro v. Conde Nast held that a defamation claim made by a limited purpose public figure, the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to demonstrate that the required allegation of actual malice is plausible.  In this case, the Second Circuit, in affirming the decision of the District Court, held that the plaintiff had not made any adequate showing of plausibility with respect to actual malice.

The decision in this case can be found here.

Judge Cardamone dies

Former Judge Richard J. Cardamone died at age 90 on October 16, 2015.

Post-garnishment residual wages -- Certified to Connecticut Supreme Court

The Second Circuit has certified the following question to the Connecticut Supreme Court:

Do Conn. Gen. Stat. sections 52-361a and 52-367b, read together, exempt post-garnishment residual wages held in a third-party's bank account from further execution, so that the become freely transferable under the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. section 52-552a et seq.?

This question arose under the following facts:

The Appellants owes more than $3,000,000 to the Appellee with respect to two state court judgments.  The Appellant transferred to his wife (also an appellant) more than $300,000 by depositing his wages into her bank account.  During part of this period, the appellee and another judgment creditor garnished appellee's wages.

The Appellee sued the Appellants to recover those transfers.  Both parties moved for summary judgment and the District Court ruled in favor of the Appellee, answering the above-cited question in the negative..  The Appellants appealed.

The Second Circuit stated: "Although [the District Court's" well-reasoned opinion accords with an earlier District of Connecticut decision and one Superior Court opinion, the weight of state authority -- including two Superior Court cases, an opinion of the state Attorney General, and a Judicial Branch form -- has adopted the contrary view."

Because the uncertainty of the state law, the Second Circuit certified the question to the Connecicut Supreme Court.

The decision in The Cadle Co. v. Fletcher can be found here.

Vaccination

The Second Circuit has held that it is within the State's police power to require children to be vaccinated in order to attend public school and that such a requirement does not violate the First Amendment or other constitutional rights.

Citing Supreme Court precedent, the Second Circuit held that the right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill
health or death.

The Second Circuit further held that the Supreme Court had held in 1905 that a compulsory vaccination law was not a violation of substantive due process.

The Court also held that the plaintiffs had not made a showing of any violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution.

Finally, the Court held that the Ninth Amendment was not a source of individual rights, and, accordingly, the plaintiffs claim under that amendment could not stand.

The decision is Phillips v. City of New York can be found here.

Repudiating arbitration agreements

The Second Circuit has held that, pursuant to 13 U.S.C. 1787(c), the Nation Credit Union Administrative Board ("NCUA") may repudiate the contract of a credit union that it is liquidating, including any arbitration clauise.

In National Credit Union Administration Board v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., NCUA brought a lawsuit against Goldman, Sachs on behalf of a credit unit that it was liquidating.  Goldman Sachs sought to arbitrate the claims, pursuant to a Cash Account Agreement that contained an arbitration clause.  The NCUA repudiated the agreement and claimed that it was not obligated to arbitrate.

Goldman Sachs claimed that the NCUA's repudiation of a contract is equivalent to that of a trustee in bankruptcy, and that, pursuant to Second Circuit precedent, a trustee in bankruptcy cannot repudiate an arbitration clause.  The Second Circuit, however, held that its prior precedent does not hold that a bankruptcy trustee may not reject an arbitration agreement or clause.

Goldman Sachs further argued that, under common law, a repudiation of an agreement constitutes a breach, and a breaching party is still bound by the contract.  The Second Circuit held that the common law was inapplicable because the statute gave the NCUA the right to repudiate.

Finally, Goldman, Sachs argued that repudiation does not apply to purely procedural provisions of the contract, and, accordingly, the arbitration clause was not enforceable.  The Second Circuit, while not acknowledging that arbitration agreement are "purely procedural," held that Goldman, Sachs had shown neither reason nor authority supporting the proposition that arbitration agreements should be excluded from the NCUA's repudiation power.

The decision can be found here.

Foreign Securities

The Second Circuit as  a matter  of first impression, considered whether the bar on extraterritorial application of the United States securities laws, as set forth in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010), precludes claims arising out of foreign‐issued securities  purchased  on  foreign  exchanges,  but  cross‐listed  on  a domestic exchange.  It concluded that federal courts had no jurisdiction to consider such claims under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.

The decision in City of Pontiac Policeman's and Fireman's Retirement System v. UBS AG can be found here.

Penal Law Rule

In an interpleader action brought by the United States, the District Court granted summary judgment to Brazil, one of the parties who claimed entitlement to certain funds, holding that Brazil was entitled to the funds under a Brazilian forfeiture law, which was grounded in Brazil criminal law.  The other parties seeking the money claimed that summary judgment was not appropriate in that enforcement of the forfeiture law violated the common law penal law rule under which a country will not enforce the penal laws of another country.  On appeal, the Second Circuit held that summary judgment had been improperly granted based on the penal law rule, however, it also held that because Brazil was seeking assistance from the United States Attorney General in enforcing its forfeiture judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2467, the District Court should allow Brazil and the Attorney General time to complete this process before taking further action in the case.

The decision in United States v. The Federative Republic of Brazil can be found here.

Charbucks

The Second Circuit upheld the decision of the District Court and held that a company's use of its "Mr. Charbucks" and "Charbucks Blend" trademarks is not likely to dilute by blurring Starbuck's trademarks.

The decision in Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc. can be found here.

Statutes of Limitations in CERCLA Actions

If the State brings a remedial action -- that is, measures to permanently remediate hazardous wastes --   under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), the statute of limitations begins to run by the commencement of cleanup construction.  If a State brings a removal action -- that is, measures taken to address immediate threats to public health -- the statute of limitations begins to run at the completion of the removal action.

In State of New York v. Next Millenium Realty, LLC, a case involving pollution emanating from the New Cassel Industrial Area in the Town of Hempstead, the District Court had held that the action was a remedial action, and granted summary judgment to the defendants, claiming that the limitations period had run.  The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that it was a removal action and that because the removal action was not complete, the statute had not even begun to run.  The Court found that the actions taken by the state were taken to address an immediate threat to public health and did not permanently remediate the environmental problem at issue.  Hence, the case was not time barred.

The decision in this case can be found here.

Sanctions

An attorney who informed the Court that her client had asserted a gender discrimination case when he had not, and who was sanctioned sua sponte by the District Court got a break from the Second Circuit.    When a Court sanctions Rule 11 sanctions sua sponte, the standard is different.  When a party moves for Rule 11 sanctions, the standard as to whether sanctions should be imposed is the subjective unreasonableness of the attorney's conduct.  However, because a sua sponte decision to sanction an attorney under Rule 11 does not provide the 21-day safe harbor protection, which allows the attorney to correct his or her conduct, the standard is different.  The Second Circuit has held that the standard is subjective bad faith.  The Court found that the record could not support a finding of bad faith and reversed and vacated the District Court's decision imposing sanctions.

The decision in Muhammad v. Walmart Stores East, L.P. can be found here.

Senior Judge Joseph McLaughlin

Second Circuit Senior Judge Joseph McLaughlin died on August 8, 2013 at age 80.  The Judge was appointed to the bench by Ronald Reagan in 1981 as a district judge of the Eastern District of New York and was elevated to the Second Circuit by George H.W. Bush.

More certified questions -- Turnover order

The Second Circuit has certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals. The questions are:

(1) May a court issue a turnover order pursuant to N.Y. CPLR § 5225(b) to an entity that does  not have actual possession or custody of a debtor’s assets, but whose subsidiary might  have possession or custody of such assets?

(2) If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, what factual considerations
should a court take into account in determining whether the issuance of such an order is
 permissible?

The decision in Commonwealth of the Northern Marina Islands v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce can be found here.

Certified Question -- Coverage for Replacement Costs

The Second Circuit has certified a question to the New York State Court of Appeals.  The question is:

If a fire insurance policy contains (1) a provision allowing reimbursement of replacement costs only after the property was replaced and requiring the property to be replaced "as soon as reasonably possible after the loss"; and (2) a provision requiring an insured to bring suit within two years after the loss; is an insured covered for replacement costs if the insured property cannot reasonably be replaced within two years?

The decision is Executive Plaza, LLC v. Peerless Insurance Co. can be found here.

Oy!

Don't neglect your deadlines in the Second Circuit; you may not get a second chance.  The Second Circuit denied an appellant's motion to reinstate its appeal after it had missed a filing deadline.  And the opposing party had not even opposed the motion; on the contrary, it had consented.  The Court noted that the motion for reinstatement did not "append to it  appellant’s proposed brief or an appropriately detailed statement
demonstrating that the appeal is meritorious. Indeed, it does  not even mention the merits of the appeal, an important factor in  determining whether reinstatement of an appeal is appropriate. "  This is another "don't let this happen to you" case.

The decision in RLI Insurance Co. v. JDJ Marine, Inc. can be found here.

Smokers' Right to Medical Monitoring

The Second Circuit has certified certain questions to the New York State Court of Appeals in a case brought by certain smokers against a cigarette manufacturer.  The questions are:


(1) Under New York law, may a current or former longtime heavy
 smoker who has not been diagnosed with a smoking-related disease, and who
 is not under investigation by a physician for such a suspected disease, pursue
 an independent equitable cause of action for medical monitoring for such a
 disease?

 (2) If New York recognizes such an independent cause of action for
 medical monitoring,
 (A) What are the elements of that cause of action?
 (B) What is the applicable statute of limitations, and when does
 that cause of action accrue?

The decision in Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. can be found here.

Political Committee

The National Organization for Marriage, Inc. ("NOM") brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the definition of a "political committee" in New York Election Law 14-100.1 violates the First Amendment.  It also sought preliminary and permanent injunctions barring enforcement of the statute.  The effect of being a political committee was that it would, among other things, be required to disclose contributions received and expenditures made.  NOM stated that it would not engage in its speech-related activities (opposing same-sex marriage) unless the requested relief was granted  The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, holding that NOM had not sought to ascertain its status with Board of Election nor had the Board of Elections attempted to enforce the "political committee" provision against NOM.

The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the case was ripe because NOM had a reasonable basis to conclude that it might be deemed a political committee under the statute, chilling its free speech rights and there was no prudential reason to abstain.  The Court further held that the case was not moot; although the election cycle had passed, the case fell in the category of cases "capable of repetition, yet evading review."  The Court vacated the District Court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Judge Jon O. Newman dissented, stating that a determination on the merits is not appropriate until the Board of Elections determines whether NOM is a political committee.

The decision in National Organization for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh can be found here.

First Sale Doctrine -

The Supreme Court, having reversed the Second Circuit's decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., and held that the first-sale doctrine is applicable as a defense against a copyright infringement claim based on unauthorized resale of authorized copies manufactured abroad and remanded the case to the Second Circuit, the Second Circuit, having nothing further to decide, reversed the District Court's judgment and remanded the case to the District Court for such further proceedings as are appropriate prior to entry of a final judgment.  The Second Circuit's per curiam decision can be found here.

Certified Question in Gun Case

The Second Circuit, in a decision by retired Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, has certified a question to the New York State Court of Appeals, in a case involving New York's gun licensing rules.  The case involved an individual who was denied a gun license because he was not domiciled in New York; he merely had a vacation home in the State.  The relevant statute was understood to require a domicile in New York.  The individual brought an action, asserting that to the extent that the gun licensing statute prevented him from having a license, it was unconstitutional.  The District Court granted summary judgment to the State, dismissing the action.  On appeal, the Second Circuit declined to rule and certified the following question to the New York State Court of Appeals:


Is an applicant who owns a part-time residence in New York but makes his permanent domicile elsewhere eligible for a New York handgun license in the city or county where his part-time residence is located?

The decision in Osterweil v. Bartlett can be found here.

Strict Compliance

The Second Circuit overturned a District Court decision that allowed a party to file a late notice of appeal.  The ECF staff had failed to update the party's attorney's e-mail address and, accordingly, the party did not receive notice of entry of a judgment against his client.  The District Court held that this was excusable neglect, warranting an opportunity to file a late notice.  The Second Circuit reversed.

The Court noted that it was the responsibility of the attorney to update the system in the ECF system and not the responsibility of the ECF stafff.  Hence, the failure to receive notice was solely the fault of the attorney, and the District Court has abused its discretion in extending the party's time to file a notice of appeal.

Judge Lynch dissented from the decision, stating the the Court should have deferred to the judgment of the District Court.

The decision in In re Worldcom, Inc. (Communications Network International, Ltd. v. MCI WorldCom Communications can be found here.

Malice.  The Second Circuit has certified a question to the New York State Court of Appeals.  In Georgitsi Realty, LLC v. Penn-Star Insurance Co., the Court had to address the question of whether an act performed on adjacent property that caused damage to the plaintiff's property can constitute "vandalism" under the plaintiff's property insurance company.  A subsidiary question of whether "malicious damage" may be found to result from an act not directed specifically at the insured property is critical to the resolution of the issue.  Because that question had not been decided by the New York State Court of Appeals and because the Second Circuit believed that that Court should have the opportunity to address taht issue, the Second Circuit has certified that question for decision to the New York State Court of Appeals.

The decision in the case can be found here.

Bad Mistake.  In Gusler v. City of Long Beach, the plaintiff brought an action, claiming retaliation for making statements about his employer, the Long Beach Fire Department. The action was brought against the City of Long Beach, the police department, the volunteer fire department and eleven individuals. The individuals moved to dismiss, in part, on the ground of qualified immunity. The Court denied the motion on that ground, but dismissed as to certain of the individuals on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to state a valid cause of action against them. After the motion (and the death of one of the defendants), only three of the individuals remained in the action. The remaining individuals filed a notice of appeal within the 30-day period, however, the notice of appeal stated that it was Nassau County, which was not a party to the action, that was appealing. After the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal had passed, an amended notice of appeal, properly naming all of the individuals – both those who had been dismissed and those who had not -- as the appealing parties was filed. The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The notice of appeal did not meet the requirements of Rule 3(c)(1)(A), which requires a notice of appeal to specify who is taking the appeal. The Court found that the notice of appeal did not meet the requirement of the rule.

Interestingly, the Court's opinion does not list the name of the attorneys involved.

The decision in this case can be found here.








It is interesting that the opinion, unlike most Second Circuit opi

Volley and Cheering.  The Second Circuit upheld a District Court's issuance of a permanent injuntion, preventing Quinnipiac University from eliminating its women's volley ball program.  The District Court had held that Quinnipiac's proposed elimination of the program would violate Title IX.  The Circuit Court agreed and held that competitive cheer leading is not a sport and, accordingly, the existence of Quinnipiac's varsity competitive cheer leading squad should not be considered in determining whether Quinnipiac had been discriminating against women in providing athletice opportunities.

The decision in Biediger v. Quinnipiac University can be found here.

Investor Claims.  The Second Circuit has held that an investor may assert a claim against a portfolio manager even though the investor was not a party to the contract spelling out the manager's duties.  The Court held that the relationship between the investor and the manager was sufficiently close to impose a duty on the manager, allowing the investor to sue for gross negligence.

The decision in Bayereische Landesban v. Aladin Capital Mangement can be found here.

Picketing the RNC.  It's sort of counterintuitive, but anti-abortion protesters cannot picket the Republican National Convention.  Two such protesters who picketed at  the 2004 Republican National Convention were arrested for not moving themselves to an area reserved for picketing when instructed to do so by the police.  The protesters brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the police had violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights.  The District Court granted summary judgment to the Police, and the Second Circuit affirmed, claiming that what was involved was a valid time, place and manner restriction.

The decision in Marcavage v. City of New York can be found here.

New York Times.  Well, it's not technically about the Second Circuit, but it was published by the New York Times, which is in the Second Circuit, and it's about federal appellate judges, which include the judges of the Second Circuit, so close enough.  I'm not sure I totally agree with it, but this op-ed piece, which rails against judicial opinions being written by law clerks should be of interest to those interest in the appellate procedure.

Standard of Review. The Second Circuit rejected the Board of Immigration Appeals' ruling that an Immigration Judge's finding concerning a future event is not fact-finding subject to clear error review. The Court noted that "[a] determination of what will occur in the futre and the degree of likelihood of the occurrence has been regularly regarded as fact-finding subject to only clear error review." The Second Circuit, however, agreed with the Board of Immigrations Appeals on its holding that de novo review applies to the ultimate question of whether the applicant for asylum has sustained her burden to establish that her subjective fear of persecution is objectively reasonable. The Court stated: "What the law's legal construct of a reasonable person would believe or do under the particular circumstances of a case is normally a question of law, the decision of which is reviewed de novo.

The decision in Huang v. Holder can be found here.

On February 17, 2012, Judge Roger J. Miner of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit died.

Incarcertation Is Not Withdrawal. The Second Circuit has held that a party to a conspiracy can be held responsible for losses caused by the conspiracy after his incarcertation. In United States v. Leslie, the defendant arguedthat his sentence had been incorrectly calculated because certain losses caused by the conspiracy in which he had been engaged had been imputed to him and used to establish his sentence even though he had already been incarcerated at the time those loses were incurred. The defendant took the position that incarceration should be seen as withdrawal from the conspiracy. The Court held that withdrawal from a conspiracy required an affirmative act; cessation from participation in the conspiracy was not enough. Accordingly, the defendant, because he had not shown any affirmative act constituting withdrawal, had not withdrawn from the conspiracy, and the entire loss caused by the conspriacy was imputable to him for purposes of sentencing.

The decision in this case can be found here.

Seventh Circuit. OK, it's not from the Second Circuit, but you have to read this opinion just for the first line, especially if you are an appellate lawyer.

Certified question. The Second Circuit has certified two questions to the Virginia Supreme Court. The questions are:

1. Does Virginia law permit equitable tolling of a state statute of limitations due to the pendancy of a putative class action in another jurisdiction?

2. Does Va. Code Ann. 8.01-229(E)(1) permit tolling of a state statute of limitations due to the pendency of a putative class action in another jurisdiction?

In Casey v. Merck & Co., the plaintiffs had filed a products liability claims that were governed byVirginia law after the limitations period had elapsed, but argued that the statute should have been tolled because of the existence of a class action asserting the same claims in Tennessee under the doctrine of American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah. The plaintiffs claimed that Virginia recognized this doctrine. The Second Circuit felt unsure of this issue and certified the questions. The decision in Casey can be found here.

No baseball caps. The Second Circuit has upheld a District Court decision, dismissing an action by an attorney who was ordered not to wear a baseball cap and casual attire when appearing in Court. The attorney had asserted claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. The Second Circuit held that the restriction was content neutral (which the plaintiff acknowledged) and was appropriate to support the legimate goal of maintaining decorum in Court proceedings. Assuming that a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in one's personal appearance existed, the Court held that such a right was not "fundamental" and the restriction was not subject to strict scrutiny. Since there was a rational basis for the restriction, that claim was properly dismissed.

The decision in Todd v. Katz can be found here.

Defaulted. Defendant was charged with murder. The jury was hung on his first trial. On his second trial, the testimony of a state's witness at the first trial was admitted without informing the jury at the second trial that the witness had since recanted his testimony. The Defendant sought habeas corpus relief from the district court, which was granted. On appeal, however, the Second Circuit held that the issue had not been raised and preserved before the trial court and was procedurally defaulted under New York law.

The decision in Whitley v. Ercole can be found here.

Waiving Penalties. The Second Circuit has held that only the Attorney General, not a district court, has the authority towaive all or part of any delinquency or default penalties properly assessed under 18 U.S.D. 3612(g) for failure to pay restitution.

The decision in United States v. Lauersen can be found here.

School paper. The Second Circuit held that a school can prohibit a student newspaper from publishing a sexually explicit stick-figure cartoon.

R.O. v. Ithica City School District can be found here.

Cigarette taxes on Indian reservations. The Second Circuit has held that the District Court improperly enjoined the state from enforcing a cigarette tax on sales in Indian reservations. Because the tax was paid by the consumer, not by the Indian retailer, the law did not violate tribal immunity or the tribal immunity for state taxation. And while the retailers would bear an economic burden from the prepayment of the tax, that is only because they chose to participate in the taxable cigarette market.

The decision in Oneida Nation of New York v. Cuomo can be found here.

UPDATE: After losing before the Second Circuit, the tribes went to state court and obtained a temporary restraining order enjoining New York frommtaxing reservation cigarette sales to non-Indian customers. A hearing on the tribes' motion for an injunction will be held on June 1, 2011.

Certified Question. In Connecticutt, there is a common law "make whole" doctrine, under which an insurer's right of subrogation may only be enforced after the insured has been fully compensated for his loss. In Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. TD Banknorth Ins. Agency Inc., an insured argued that the insurer could not collect from the escrowed funds containing the settlement of its claims against third-parties until it had recovered its deductible ($150,000) under the "make whole" doctrine. The District Court held that the subrogation clause in the insurance contract abrogated the "make whole" doctrine. On appeal, the Second Circuit disagreed. However, the Court noted that the Connecticut courts had not decided whether the "make whole" doctrine applied to deductibles. The Court certified this question to the Connecticutt Supreme Court.

The Second Circuit's decision in this case can be found here.

Sanctions for frivolous and vexatious litigation. When April Gallop commenced an action claiming that Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld orchestrated the September 11, 2001 attacks for their own political purposes, you could predict that the case was not long for the world. And, of course, it was dismissed. But unwisely, Ms. Gallop and her attorneys chose to appeal, and now they face an award of sanctions. The Second Circuit held that under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 28 U.S.C. 1927 and its inherent power, it had the authority to impose such sanctions, provide adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard is afforded. The Court gave Ms. Gallop and her attorneys 30 days to show cause why they should be ordered to pay double costs and damages in the amount of $15,000.

The decision in Gallop v. Cheney can be found here.

No private right of action. The Second Circuit, in M.F. v. State of New York Executive Department Division of Parole has held that the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision does not create a private right of action. M.F., an individual who had been convicted of endangering the welfare of children in New Jersey sought to move to New York, where he worked. New Jersey made a request to New York that it take over the lifetime supervision imposed upon him. New York agreed, but required him, among other things to inform his employer of his conviction. M.F refused and decided not to relocate to New York. It brought an action against the New York Division of Parole, claiming that it had violated the Interstate Compact by placing requirements on him that would not be placed on a New York offender. The District Court granted summary judgment to New York, holding that M.F. had failed to show that a New York offender would have been treated differently. On appeal, M.F. argued that New York, on a motion for summary judgment, had the initial burden of showing that the same restriction would have been placed on a New York offender, and that because New York failed to make such a showing, an issue of material fact existed, precluding summary judgment. (M.F. also claimed for the first time that the District Court did not have jurisdiction over the action and requested that the Court remand the case to the District Court with instruction to dismiss the action so that M.F. could refile in state court.) The State on appeal claimed that the restrictions placed on M.F. were no different than those that could have been placed on a New York offender. It also argued, for the first time, that the Interstate Compact created no private right of action. The Second Circuit affirmed. First, the Court held that the District Court did have jurisdiction to hear the action. The Court then held that the Interstate Compact did not create a private right of action, so that even if the State had violated the Interstate Compact, M.F. had no remedy under it to bring an action for damages. The decision can be found here.

Standing. The Second Circuit has reversed the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Government in a case involving the constitutionality of a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillane Act of 1978, which provides the Government unregulated authority to monitor international communications. The action had been brought by attorneys, journalists, and labor, legal, media and human rights organizations, who had reason to believe that their international communications might be monitored. The District Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the action. The Second Circuit reversed, holding the because the plaintiffs have reason to fear that they will be injured by the statute and that they have incurred expenses to avoid such injury, they have standing to bring the action. The Court did not address the merits of the action.

The decision in Amnesty International USA v. Clapper can be found here.

New Judge. The Senate has confirmed the nomination of Raymond Joseph Lohier, Jr. by a vote of 92-0.

Extraterritorial reach. The Second Circuit has held that the RICO statute does not have extraterritorial reach. The decision in Norex Petroleum Limited v. Access Industries, Inc. can be found here.

She's arrived! Who has? Why the daughter of my latest law student blogger adoptee, Izzie, that's who. She's named Z, at least on the blog, and Izzie has been stingy with pictures, but I'm sure that will change.

I haven't mentioned Izzie because I thought I'd wait until I updated my blogroll. But who knows when that will happen? You can follow her law school adventures (and non-law school adventures) at Only 3 Years.

And while I'm at it, my first law student blogger adoptee, Heidi Bond, after clerking for Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor (retired) and Anthony Kennedy of the United States Supreme Court is now an Assistant Professor at Seattle University School of Law. (She has been since 2009. I've been holding out on you.)

And my second law student blogger adoptee, Butterflyfish is still blogging and is pregnant (second time). I'm sworn to secret about anything else.

No private right of action. The Second Circuit had held that a federal statute that bars discrimination against health care workers who refuse to participate in abortion procedures does not create a private cause of action. In Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hospital, an operating room nurse claimed that she was forced to participate in a late-term abortion and sued the hospital. The Court held that there was no evidence of congressional intent to create a private right of action.

The decision in the case can be found here.

Ooooh, technical. In Local Union 36, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, the Second Circuit dealt with a technical issue. The NLRB sought to have the case transferred to the DC Circuit because it had not been served with a copy of the petition for review stamped by the court with the date of filing, as required by statute. Because of this defect, the NLRB asserted that the appeal should be heard where the case had been instituted, i.e., in the DC Circuit. The petitioner had, however, served it with the petition for review, accompanied by the e-mail bearing the date and time of filing. The Second Circuit held that this was sufficient compliance with the statute and denied the NLRB's motion.

The decision in this case can be found here.

Attorneys' Fees. The Second Circuit has held that an attorney appearing pro se in a bankruptcy proceeding is not entitled to seek attorneys' fees under Bankruptcy Code 7430 after prevailing in challenging a claim filed against him in the bankruptcy court.

The decision in United States v. Hudson can be found here.

Reissued Order. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed a petitioner's appeal on the ground that no brief was filed within the time scheduled by the Court. The reason for this was that her attorney withdrew, and her new attorney moved for reconsideration. Within 30 days of the denial of that motion and after the BIA had issued a "Reissued Order," she appealed to the Second Circuit even though more than 30 days after had passed since the issunace of the original order. The Second Circuit held that the appeal was timely in that the petitioner was seeking relief was from the Reissued Order.

The decision in Lewis v. Holder can be found here.

Burned. In Moltner v. Starbucks Coffee Co. (discussed below), the plaintiff had been burned while opening the lid on a "Venti"-sized cup of coffee from Starbucks. The defendant moved for summary judgment, which motion was granted. The plaintiff put in expert affidavits to show that cups and/or lids were defectively designed. The district court held that all of affidavits did not meet the standard required by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Second Circuit agreed in a summary order.

The summary order can be found here.

Removal. The Second Circuit held that the time to remove a case begins to run from the time that the amount of damages are specified, not from the time the complaint is served (though, of course, that can be the same time). In Moltner v. Starbucks Coffee Co., the plaintiff did not specify the damages in her complaint. The defendant served a Request for Supplemental Demand for Relief. The plaintiff responded that she sought damages not to exceed $3 million. The defendant then sought to remove the case to federal court. The plaintiff sought to remand the case to state court, claiming that the removal was untimely. The Court declined to remand and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment (discussed in another post). The plaintiff appealed from the order denying her motion for remand and granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

The Second Circuit in upholding the decision not to remand the case, stated: "We join the Eighth Circuit, as well as all of the district courts in this Circuit to have addressed the issue, inholding that the removal clock does not start to run until the plaintiff serves the defendant with a paper that explicitly specifies the amount of monetary damages." The Court felt that it was unreasonable for a defendant to be forced to guess the defendant's damage and seek removal on the basis of such a guess.

The decision in this case can be found here.

No tax. The Indian and Mongolian missions are not subject to taxation, pursuant to a Notice issued by the State Department, pursuant to its authority under the Foreign Missions Act. The Notice establishes an exemption from real property taxes on property owned by foreign governments and used to house the staff of permanent missions to the United Nations or the Organization of American States or of consular posts. The Second Circuit held that the State Department had acted within its power in issuing the Notice.

The decision in City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations can be found here.

Psychedelic Drug Blawg. My friend and colleague Noah Potter has entered the blawgosphere with a new blog, which deals in large part, with medical marijuana issues. You can find the New Amsterdam Psychedelic Law Blog here.

Top Guns. While the Second Circuit is one of the most important commercial courts in the United States, we rarely get a number of top gun attorneys appearing in a single case. In Fox Television Statements, Inc. v. FCC. Three top well-known appellate lawyers appeared in the case -- Carter Phillips, Miguel Estrada and Seth Waxman. In a prior decision in the case, the Second Circuit had held that the indecency policy of the FCC was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Supreme Court disagreed and remanded the case to the Second Circuit to consider the petitioners' constitutional argument. On remand, the Second Circuit held that the policy violates the First Amendment because it is unconstitutionally vague, creating a chilling effect that goes beyond the "fleeting explitives" at issue in the case. The decision can be found here. Congratulations to Carter, Miguel and Seth for being among the prevailing attorneys. The case was argued on January 13, 2010. If I had known of the star power being assembled in this case, I certainly would have made time to come down for the argument.

No arbitration. The Second Circuit has held that an arbitration clause in a promissory note was unconscionable under California law because of class-action and class-arbitration provisions. Accordingly, the plaintiff, in Fensterstock v. Education Finance Partners, was able to continue his class action, which involved allegations of fraudulent and deceptive practices in connection with the solicitation, consolidation and servicing of student loans, in court. The Second Circuit's decision can be found here.

Wrong. The Appellate Division, Third Department has disagreed with the Second Circuit on the constitutionality of New York's persistent felony offenders sentencing statute. In People v. Battease, the Third Department rejected the defendant's contention that his 20-years-to-life sentence was excessive and unconstitutional. The decision in that case can be found here. The Second Circuit, in Besser v. Walsh and other cases, has invalidated heavy sentences imposed under the statute because they were imposed by judges on persistent felony offenders and not by jurors, in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Second Circuit's decision can be found here. The Third Department held that it was not bound by local federal circuit court rulings.

This raises an interesting issue. Assume that the New York State Court of Appeals hears this case and agrees with the Third Department. All state courts will be bound by this precedent. But then, if the case goes to federal habeas review, the federal courts will be bound by the Second Circuit decision. In questions of constitutional law, the Second Circuit would not be bound by the decision of the New York State Court of Appeals. So the two court systems would seem to be directly competing on this matter, with the federal system winning in the end. So was the Third Department correct in finding that it was not bound by the Second Circuit's interpretation of federal constitutional law?

EFTs. The Second Circuit has held that electronic fund transfers temporarily in the possession of an intermediate bank in New York may not be garnished. The decision in Export-Import Bank of the United States v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co. can be found here.

Costs. The Second Circuit has held that a district court was not restricted in any way from awarding a successful appellant as a cost the expense of obtaining a letter of credit in order to bond an appeal. The mandate of the appellate court does not have to specify what costs may be sought from the district court.

The decision in L-3 Communications Corp. v. OSI Systems, Inc. can be found here.

More certified questions. This time the questions are being certified to the Connecticut Supreme Court. The case, Arrowood Indemnity Co. v. King, involves an insurance company's disclaimer of liability purportedly because the accident at issue did not occur in an "insured location." The questions are:

1. With respect to a claim for negligent entrustment under a liability policy that excludes coverage for "[a]rising out of . . . [t]he entrustment by an insured" "to any person""of a motor vehicle" other than "[a] motorized land conveyance designed for recreational use off public roads, not subject to motor vehicle registration and . . . [o]wned by an insured and on an insured location," is the insured location
(a) the place where the entrustment of the vehicle took place; or
(b) the place where the vehicle is garaged; or
(c) the place where the accident occurred?

2. In the absence of a policy definition of "premises," should a private road located within a residential development owned by insured's homeowners association be considered "premises used . . . in connection with a [residence] premises" under the terms of a homeowner's insurance policy if the portion of the road where the liability arose is not regularly used by the insured, although other portions of the road are so used?

3. Under Connecticut law, where a liability insurance policy requires an insured to give notice of a covered claim "as soon as practical," do social interactions between the insured and the claimant making no reference to an accident claim justify a delay in giving notice of a potential claim to the insured?

The decision in which the Court certified these questions can be found here.

Certified questions. This time the questions are certified to the Vermont Supreme Court. The case, Hunt Construction Group, Inc. v. Brennan Beer Gorman/Architects, P.C., involves a dispute between a general contractor and design professionals. The District Court dismissed the action, holding that the action was barred by the Vermont economic loss doctrine. The question certified by the Second Circuit are:

1. Does the economic loss doctrine bar a contractor from seeking purely economic damages against design professionals who allegedly provided negligent professional services in violation of the designed professionals' contractual obligations with a mutual counterparty?

2. Does the economic loss doctrine apply to claims of negligent misrepresentation?

Federal rate. The Second Circuit has held that the federal rate of post-judgment interest rather than the New York rate should be applied in a diversity case where the contract at issue contains a choice-of-law provision providing that New York law applies. The Court held that the choice-of-law provision was insufficient to establish that the parties intended that the federal rate would not apply. The decision in FCS Advisors, Inc. v. Fair Finance Co. can be found here.

Nomination to the Second Circuit. President Obama has nominated Yale University deputy general counsel Susan Carney to a seat on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

No appellate jurisdiction. The Second Circuit, in Greenwich Financial Services Distressed Mortgage Fund 3 LLC v. Countrywide Financial Corp., held that the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 bars appellate review of orders remanding securities class actions to state court.

The Second Circuit's decision can be found here.

Pro se Estate. The Second Circuit has held that the administrator of an estate can represent the estate pro se where the estate has no other beneficiaries (other than the administrator) or creditors. The decision in Guest v. Hansen can be found here.

Late again. In Lora v. O'Heaney, the appellants, two defendants in a prisoner lawsuit had moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The District Court denied the motion on January 21, 2009. The appellants moved for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (That motion was not made within the ten days period within which such motions must be made.) The Court denied that motion on July 29, 2009. The appellants filed notices of appeal from both the underlying decision and the decision denying reconsideration on August 27, 2009.

The plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeals. On November 19, 2009, a motions panel of the Second Circuit held that the District Court's orders denying qualified immunity are appealable collateral orders because the defendants had conceded the plaintiff's version of the facts for the purposes of the appeal. The motions panel also stated that only the appeal from the order denying reconsideration was timely.

On full appeal, the Second Circuit noted that an untimely Rule 59(e) motion is treated as a motion for relief from a final judgment, order or proceeding, under Rule 60(b). Such a motion does not toll the time within which an appeal from the underlying order must be taken. An appeal from an order denying Rule 60(b) relief does not bring up the merits of the underlying judgment or order. Such an order is not an appealable collateral order. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal.

The decision in this case can be found here.

Late. Bad news for the defendant in Napoli v. City of Windsor. A motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity was denied on January 12, 2009. On May 14, 2009, an order was issued clarifying the January 12, 2009. On June 9, 2009, the defendant filed a notice of appeal. Too late! Because the May 14, 2009 order did not relate to qualified immunity issue, it did not restart the time to appeal. The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

The decision in the case can be found here.

New nomination. President Obama as nominated Assistant U.S. Attorney Raymond Lohier, Jr. for a seat on the Second Circuit. Mr. Lohier is chief of the Securities and Commodities Fraud Task Force of the U.S. Attorney's Office of the Southern District of New York.

For more information on this nomination, click here.

Certified questions. On an appeal from a preliminary injunction, enjoining the sale of untaxed cigarettes by a American Indian merchant to anyone other than members of the tribe, the Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York State Court of Appeals:

1. Does New York Tax Law 471-e, either by itself or in combination with the provisions of section 471, impose a tax on cigarettes sold on Native American reservations when some or all of these cigarettes may be sold to persons other than members of the reservation's nation or tribe?

2. If the answer to Question 1 is "no," does New York Tax Law 471 alone impose a tax on cigarettes sold on Native American reservations when some or all of those cigarettes may be sold to person other than members of the reservation's nation or tribe?

The decision in City of New York v. Golden Feather Smoke Shop, Inc. can be found here.

New Second Circuit Judge. President Obama has nominated Judge Robert Chatigny for a seat on the Second Circuit. Judge Chatigny currently sits as a district court judge in the District of Connecticut.

More information about the appointment can be found here.

Lynne Stewart. The Second Circuit refused to rehear en banc its decision relating to the sentence of attorney Lynne Stewart. The decision denying rehearing en banc in United States v. Stewart, along with the concurrences (by one by Chief Judge Jacobs and joined by Judges Wesley and Hall and one by Judge Pooler) and dissent (by Judges Cabranes and Raggi) can be found here. Even Judge Cabranes's dissent did not favor en banc review in order to shorten Lynne Stewart's sentence or even to maintain the lenient sentence imposed by the District Court. He felt that certain issues should have been addressed, but were not, by the panel. These issues included the reasonableness of Lynne Stewart's sentence, the "nature" and "seriousness" of Stewart's offense and the purported lack of harm caused by the offense. It is likely that she will be spending a longer period behind bars than was originally thought.

Holocaust insurance claims. The plaintiffs, relatives of victims of the Holocaust, sought to recover insurance proceeds from policies purchased by the victims. The Second Circuit, agreeing with the District Court, held that the state law claims were preempted by the United States foreign policy, which favors the resolution of such claims by the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims. The Court's decision was based on the Supreme Court case, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi.

The decision in In re Assicurizioni Generali, S.P.A. can be found here.

Commerce Clause. The District Court, in United States v. Guzman, had held that 42 U.SC. 16913, which provides that a convicted sex offender must register "and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, . . is . . . employ[ed], [or] is a student," exceeds congressional power under the Commerce Clause. The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that "[t]o the extent that [section] 16913 regulates solely intrastate activity, its means 'are "reasonably adapted" to teh attainmnet of a legitimate end under the commerce power.'"

The decision can be found here.

Significant romantic relationship. The Second Circuit vacated a condition of supervise release that required the defendant to inform the Probation Department if he entered into a significant romantic relationship and to inform the other party in the relationship of his conviction for possession of child pornography. The Court held that the condition was too vague and not reasonably related to sentencing objectives in that there was nothing in the record suggesting that he had been a threat to a romantic partner. The Court also found that the condition effected an unnecessary deprivation of liberty.

The decision in United States v. Reeves can be found here.

Qualified Immunity. While caseworkers who allegedly wrongfully remove a child from his home are not entitled to absolute immunity for their actions, the Second Circuit has asserted that they are entitled to qualified immunity, and upheld the ruling of a District Court (while disagreeing with it on the absolute immunity issue), dismissing an action for wrongul removal of a child.

The decision in Cornejo v. Bell can be found here.

Electronic Filing Cometh. From the Second Circuit website relating to electronic filing in the Second Circuit can be found here.

Blurring. A coffee company got sued by Starbucks when it marketed a dark roasted blend that it called Charbucks Blend (and later Mr. Charbucks). The District Court dismissed Starbuck's action, holding that there was no dilution of Starbuck's trademark or likelihood of dilution and no likelihood that consumers would confuse the dark roasted blend with Starbucks. The Second Circuit reversed in part, and remanded the case to the District Court for a determination as to whether the use of Charbucks Blend and Mr. Charbucks would dilute Starbuck's trademark by "blurring" or tarnishment.

The decision in Starbucks Corporation v. Wolfe's Bourough Coffee, Inc. can be found here.

Not defamatory. The Second Circuit has held that a news report that a prisoner planned to cooperate with prosecutors was not defematory. Cooperating with law enforcement is not a bad thing.

The deciison in Michtavi v. New York Daily News can be found here.

Lynne Stewart is screwed. Lynne Stewart, attorney for radicals and terrorists (allegedly), is now in deep trouble. The Second Circuit has affirmed her conviction and has even suggested that the District Court may have been too lenient. It probably didn't help that she stated that she could do the two-and-a-half-year sentence "standing on her head." For a smart lawyer, she sure didn't handle herself well post-conviction. In my view, she might have expressed her gratitude to the District Court for its lenient sentence (the prosecution had asked for thirty years) and done in her time. If she had done so, she would have completed her sentence by now and could be working on getting reinstated to the bar. That' s not going to happen now.

The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Stewart can be found here.

Cautionary Tale. Not from the Second Circuit, but of interest to appellate practitioners is the decision in Espitia v. Fouche. The Wisconsin Court of Appeal sanctioned a litigant for an citation error.

The decision in the case can be found here. The relevant portion of the decision is in paragraph 5.

Aiding and Abetting Alien Torts. The Second Circuit has set a high bar for foreign plaintiffs attempting to use U.S. courts to hold foreign defendants accountable for aiding and abetting human rights violations in foreign lands. Such a defendant may only be found liable if he or she "purposefully" aided and abetted a violation of international law. Knowledge alone is not enough.

The decision in The Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. can be found here.

Global warming. The Second Circuit reinstated lawsuits brought by New York State and others who challenged major utilities on carbon dioxide emissions from coal-burning power plants, holding that there was no need for the District Court to defer to the political branches and refrain from hearing the suit until there is a definitive policy statement on global warming from Congress and the President.

The decision in State of Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. can be found here.

Superior respondeat (or something). The Second Circuit has held that an employer may be held liable for discrimination by third parties, including independent contractors authorized by the employer to make hiring decisions on its behalf.

The decision in Halpert v. Manhattan Apartments Inc. can be found here.

Internet radio. The Second Circuit is the first appellate court to determine whether a webcasting service that provides users with individualized internet radio stations, the content of which can be affected by the users ratings of songs, artists and albums, is an interactive service under 17 U.S.C 114(j)(7). If it were an interactive service, the webcasting service would be required to pay individual license fees to the copyright holders of the sound recordings of songs the webcasting service pays for its users. If it is not, it must only pay a statutory licensing fee set by the Copyright Royalty Board. The Court held that it was not an interactive service.

The decision in Arista Records, LLC. v. Launch Media, Inc. can be found here.

Another certified question. The Second Circuit, in Zakrzewska v. New School, certified the following question to the New York State Court of Appeals:

Does the affirmative defense to employer liability articulated in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth apply to sexual harassment and retaliation claims under section 8-107 of the New York City Administrative Code.

The Supreme Court in those cases provided that an employer would not be liable under Title VII for sexual harassment by a supervisor if the employer can prove that (1) no tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion or undesireable reassignmentwas taken as part of the alleged harassment, (2) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior and (3) the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.

The decision can be found here. When the Court of Appeals acts, it will be reported.

Admission to U.S. Denied. Tariq Ramadan was denied admission into the United States because he had made a donation to a charity that had supplied funds to Hamas and that such contributions were "material support" to a terrorist organization (the charity). The Second Circuit vacated and remanded the decision of the District Court, holding that the record was not clear whether the consular officer had confronted Ramadan with the allegations against him and afford him the opportunity to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know (and reasonabley should not have known) that the recipient of his contributions was a terrorist organization.

The decision in American Academy of Religion v. Napolitano can be found here.