Q24 A2: Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?

Yes. The book of life implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life because the life of glory is an end exceeding human nature.

The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in consequence no book of life.

The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively.

Likewise they are not said to be written in the book of life simply, but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life, according to their participation in grace.

Q24 A1: Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?

Yes. All the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life and this conscription of the predestined is called the book of life because the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that He has predestined some to eternal life, is called the book of life.

The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs: for it is usual among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly were called "conscript" fathers.

Predestination and the book of life are different aspects of the same thing: for this latter implies the knowledge of predestination.

Q24: The book of life

1. What is the book of life?
2. Of what life is it the book?
3. Can anyone be blotted out of the book of life?

Q23 A8: Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?

Yes. Predestination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence.

But predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints as regards the preordination.

Yet God is helped by us inasmuch as we execute His orders (1 Cor. 3:9: "We are God's co-adjutors.")

Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.

Q23 A7: Whether the number of the predestined is certain?

Yes. The number of the predestined is certain because of His deliberate choice and determination, not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal pre-ordination.

Q23 A6: Whether predestination is certain?

Yes. Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect, yet it does not impose any necessity (so that its effect should take place from necessity) because predestination is a part of providence (and the order of providence is infallible) but not all things subject to providence are necessary.

The order of predestination is certain, yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency.

The divine knowledge and will do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are most certain and infallible.

And God does not permit some to fall, without raising others.

Q23 A5: Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?

No. It cannot be said that anything begun in us (merits) can be the cause of the effect of predestination because there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination (as there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause).

It is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us, because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination, even the preparation for grace.

The cause for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation, because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being, some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen.

Q23 A4: Whether the predestined are chosen by God?

Yes. All the predestinate are objects of election and love because love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination.

Election in us precedes love because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love.

In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others.

If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election, inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness.

But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election, since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied.

Q23 A3: Whether God reprobates any man?

Yes. As men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end (this is called reprobation) because it belongs to providence to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence.

Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined--namely, glory--and of what is received in this life--namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present--namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future--namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace.

Q23 A2: Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?

No. Predestination is not anything in the predestined but only in the person who predestines because predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind.

The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God.

Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination is anything temporal.

Q23 A1: Whether men are predestined by God?

Yes. Predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence because the direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination: to destine, is to direct or send, but the reason of that direction pre-exists in God, as in Him is the type of the order of all things towards an end.

Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end.

Q23: Predestination

1. Is predestination suitably attributed to God?
2. What is predestination, and does it place anything in the predestined?
3. Does the reprobation of some men belong to God?
4. The comparison of predestination to election; that is, are the predestined chosen?
5. Are merits the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election?
6. The certainty of predestination: will the predestined infallibly be saved?
7. Is the number of the predestined certain?
8. Can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints?

Q22 A4: Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?

No, not on all things. Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things but not upon all (as some formerly believed) because to providence it belongs to order things towards an end, but after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe, which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things, whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being.

The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow but that they should happen either by necessity or by contingency.

Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency.

Q22 A3: Whether God has immediate providence over everything?

Yes. God has immediate providence over everything because He has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest, and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He gives them the power to produce those effects, whence it must be that He has beforehand the type of those effects in His mind.

Two things belong to providence--namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution of this order, which is called government.

There are certain intermediaries of God's providence for He governs things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures.

Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid. viii, 3), is exploded. Plato taught a threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes. The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal things in a circular direction. The third providence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14).

Note RO3: It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil.

Q22 A2: Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?

Yes. All things are subject to divine providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual selves because since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends.

Since the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine providence.

God knows all things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering, as all things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art.

Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the author of nature.

Q22 A1: Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?

Yes. It is necessary to attribute providence to God because it belongs to prudence to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself (as for instance, a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life, but in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end) or in regard to others subject to him (and in this way prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to God).

Two things pertain to the care of providence--namely, the reason of order (ratio ordinis), which is called providence (providentia) and disposition (dispositio); and the execution of order (executio ordinis), which is termed government (gubernatio). Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal.

Providence resides in the intellect but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done for an end unless he wills that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty is directed towards good.

Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect are one and the same thing, as we have said above (Q19).

God's operations of intellect and will

We now proceed to consider Providence (Q22), in respect to all created things; for in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence belongs.

1. Is providence suitably assigned to God?
2. Does everything come under divine providence?
3. Is divine providence immediately concerned with all things?
4. Does divine providence impose any necessity upon things foreseen?

Predestination (Q23) and the book of life (Q24) are then to be treated next in connection with God's operations of intellect and will.

Q21 A4: Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?

Yes. God out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is proportionate to their deserts because less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness confers but the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes since between creatures and God's goodness there can be no proportion.

Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God.

In this way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom and goodness.

And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence.

Q21 A3: Whether mercy can be attributed to God?

Yes. Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion because a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum cor] (i.e., being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own) and hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his: and this is the effect of mercy.

To sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery, whatever be the defect we call by that name.

The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown above (Q6, A1, A4); insofar as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already said (Q21, A1); insofar as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; insofar as perfections given to things by God expel defects, it belongs to mercy.

Q21 A2: Whether the justice of God is truth?

Yes. God's justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom (which is the law of His justice) is suitably called truth because as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord.

When the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in the equation of the thing to the mind, just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his art.

Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are governed according to the law, it resides in the will.

Q21 A1: Whether there is justice in God?

Yes. God is truly just because He gives to all existing things what is proper to the condition of each (and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it).

Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His wisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His will is right and just.

Hence, what He does according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power, God is a law unto Himself.

Q21: God's justice and mercy

In our own wills we find both the passions (such as joy and love), and the habits of the moral virtues (such as justice and fortitude). Hence we considered the love (Q20) of God first, but now His justice and mercy (Q21) in four articles:

1. Is there justice in God?
2. Can His justice be called truth?
3. Is there mercy in God?
4. Are justice and mercy in every work of God?

Q20 A4: Whether God always loves more the better things?

Yes. God loves more the better things because it has been shown that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because God's will is the cause of goodness in things (and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater good).

God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above all names," insofar as He was true God.

God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the Godhead.

But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to Rev 21:17, the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an angel is better than a man.

God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but because the needs of man were greater (just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that he does not give to his own son in sound health).

Q20 A3: Whether God loves all things equally?

No. God loves some things more than others because since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.

God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness.

Q20 A2: Whether God loves all things?

Yes. God loves all existing things because all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good (and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses).

Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know things existing in themselves.

Q20 A1: Whether love exists in God?

Yes. In God there is love because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty.

Q20: God's love

We have just discussed God's will (Q19). In our own wills we find both the passions (such as joy and love), and the habits of the moral virtues (such as justice and fortitude). Hence we shall next consider the love (Q20) of God, and then His justice and mercy (Q21).

Q20 has four articles:

1. Does love exist in God?
2. Does He love all things?
3. Does He love one thing more than another?
4. Does He love more the better things?

Q19 A12: Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?

Yes. Five expressions of will -- namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission -- are rightly assigned to the divine will because by these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something.

It may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.

Q19 A11: Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?

Yes. In God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor because will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will.

Q19 A10: Whether God has free-will?

Yes. God has free will with respect to what He does not necessarily will because God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily (Q19 A3).

It is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be.

In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.

Q19 A9: Whether God wills evils?

No. God neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done because this is a good.

It is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will.

Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation.

God in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good.

But in willing justice He wills punishment; and in willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.

Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally.

Q19 A8: Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?

No. The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all because God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe.

Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects.

Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.

Q19 A7: Whether the will of God is changeable?

No. The will of God is entirely unchangeable because both the substance of God (Q9 A1) and His knowledge (Q14 A15) are entirely unchangeable .

The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes.

Q19 A6: Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?

Yes. The will of God must needs always be fulfilled because something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause (under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause).

Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause.

Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect.

Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order.

If not all good actually exists, can we therefore say that the will of God is not always fulfilled?

No. An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower, while an act of the appetite faculty is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists. (RO2)

Q19 A5: Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?

No. God wills this [A] to be as means to that [B]; but does not will this [A] on account of that [B] because, in Him, to will an end [B] is not the cause of His willing the means [A], yet He wills the ordering of the means [A] to the end [B] (as in God to understand the cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause).

Consider the analogy to human understanding and will:

If anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end.

Since the will follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the human person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the human person that understands.

But as God by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness.

Note that this theological truth is a guarantee for rational scientific inquiry (RO3):

Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. (It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such causes were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the will of God.)

Q19 A4: Whether the will of God is the cause of things?

Yes. He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature because the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature.

Because the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature -- unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (Q7 A2).

He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.

Because the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode.

Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will, for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will.

Q19 A3: Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?

No. His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary because the goodness of God is perfect and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them.

Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.

God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily.

But God wills things apart from Himself insofar as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end.

As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. (The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves.)

Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God -- but no absolute necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, insofar as they exist in themselves -- it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.

Q19 A2: Whether God wills things apart from Himself?

Yes. God wills not only Himself but other things apart from Himself because if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible.

He wills both Himself to be, and other things to be; but He wills Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end (inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein).

The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them (Q13, A4).

For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from Himself.

As He understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.

Q19 A1: Whether there is will in God?

Yes. There is will in God as there is intellect because will follows upon intellect.

In every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite.

And so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him.

And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His will.

Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what it does not possess, but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as having always good which is its object, since His will is not distinct from His essence.

Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His essence, for by His essence He is good (Q6, A3): for the end has the aspect of good.

Q19: The will of God

We now begin to study the operations of God's will. Q19 has twelve articles:

1. Is there will in God?
2. Does God will things apart from Himself?
3. Does God necessarily will whatever He wills?
4. Is the will of God the cause of things?
5. Can any cause be assigned to the divine will?
6. Is the divine will always fulfilled?
7. Is the will of God mutable?
8. Does the will of God impose necessity on the things willed?
9. Is there in God the will of evil?
10. Does God have free will?
11. Is the will of expression distinguished in God?
12. Are five expressions of will rightly assigned to the divine will?

Q18 A4: Whether all things are life in God?

Yes. All things in God are the divine life itself because all things that have been made by Him are in Him as things understood.

Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, insofar as they are held together and preserved by the divine power (even as we say that things that are in our power are in us). And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their own natures.

In another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence.

Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement, but life.

If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation.

But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not.

Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.

Q18 A3: Whether life is properly attributed to God?

Yes. Life is in the highest degree properly in God because that being whose act of understanding is its very nature (and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another) must have life in the most perfect degree.

Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life.

From this Aristotle, after showing God to be intelligent, concludes (Metaph. xii, 51) that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.

Q18 A2: Whether life is an operation?

No. "Living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate because the name is given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather to signify a substance to which self-movement (and the application of itself to any kind of operation) belongs naturally.

"To live", accordingly, is nothing else than to exist in this or that nature. And "living" signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running" denotes "to run" in the abstract.

From external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it (Q13, A1), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences.

Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, such names are taken to denote the properties by reason of which such names are imposed.

Q18 A1: Whether to live belongs to all natural things?

No. We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life because things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind (whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude).

Every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force" (as some in fact have mistakenly held), in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies.

Q18: The life of God

To understand belongs to living beings; therefore, in four articles, Q18 concludes the discussion of God's intellectual operations by considering the life of God:

1. To whom does it belong to live?
2. What is life?
3. Is life properly attributed to God?
4. Are all things in God life?

Q17 A4: Whether true and false are contraries?

Yes. True and false are opposed as contraries because contraries both assert something (unlike negation) and determine the subject (unlike negation and privation).

Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as Aristotle says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said (or seems) to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is.

For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary.

What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily resides.

Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety.

Q17 A3: Whether falsity is in the intellect?

Yes, but falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the judgment of the intellect because the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences (since this is either true, or it understands nothing at all).

Falsity can exist in the intellect because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth -- whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known (Q17 A2).

As the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the sense about its proper object (Q17 A2).

But in judgment (i.e., when affirming and denying), the intellect may be deceived, by attributing (to the thing of which it understands the essence) something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it.

Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby (as takes place in demonstrations in which there is no falsity).

The intellect is always right as regards first principles, since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.

Q17 A2: Whether there is falsity in the senses?

Yes, but falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them because truth is not in them in such a way as that the senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly.

This takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really are.

Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object.

Sense has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly.

The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation.

Since, however, sense is sometimes affected erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense about the object, but not about the fact of sensation.

Q17 A1: Whether falsity exists in things?

Yes, but in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the intellect because "things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not" (Metaph. v, 34).

In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, insofar as they are compared with the divine intellect.

But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively.

Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear to things which they actually are not.

Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.

Q17: Falsity and God

Q17 takes up the question of falsity and God in four articles:

1. Does falsity exist in things?
2. Does it exist in the sense?
3. Does it exist in the intellect?
4. The opposition of the true and the false

Q16 A8: Whether truth is immutable?

No. The mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect because the truth of intellect consists in its conformity to the thing understood.

The truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable (not because it is itself the subject of change, but insofar as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable). Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.

Q16 A7: Whether created truth is eternal?

No. Nothing else but God is eternal because the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself.

Things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal.

Because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity.

Q16 A6: Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?

No. In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not because truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect.

If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects (and even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known).

But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by one primary truth, to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true.

The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is greater than the soul.

And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection (even as science may be said to be greater than the soul). Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God.

Q16 A5: Whether God is truth?

Yes. God is truth itself -- the sovereign and first truth -- because His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of understanding.

Q16 A4: Whether good is logically prior to the true?

No. The true is prior to good because the true is more closely related to being than is good.

For the true regards being itself simply and immediately, while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect (for thus it is desirable).

Knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be logically prior in idea to the good.

A thing is prior logically insofar as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being.

Hence the idea of being is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things.

Q16 A3: Whether the true and being are convertible terms?

Yes. The true and being are convertible terms because everything, inasmuch as it has being, is knowable.

Being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being.

Q16 A2: Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?

Yes. Truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing (and not in the senses, nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is") because it is then that the intellect judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing.

It is then that it first knows and expresses truth, i.e., as the thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth".

Q16 A1: Whether truth resides only in the intellect?

Yes, but truth resides primarily in the intellect and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle because truth is the adequation of thought and thing.

Q16: Truth

In eight articles:

1. Does truth reside in the thing, or only in the intellect?
2. Does it reside only in the intellect composing and dividing?
3. The comparison of the true to being
4. The comparison of the true to the good
5. Is God truth?
6. Are all things true by one truth, or by many?
7. The eternity of truth
8. The unchangeableness of truth

Q15 A3: Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?

Yes. God has ideas of all things known by Him because ideas are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation.

So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar", and belongs to practical knowledge.

But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a "type", and may belong to speculative knowledge also.

Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type".

God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to these there is no idea in God insofar as idea signifies an "exemplar" but only insofar as it denotes a "type".

Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea.

Divine providence extends not merely to species, but to individuals as will be shown later (Q22, A3).

Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God (but not apart from the idea of the composite: for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known).

Q15 A2: Whether ideas are many?

Yes. God understands many particular types of things (and these are many ideas) because the divine essence is not called an idea insofar as it is that essence, but only insofar as it is the likeness or type of this or that thing.

Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence.

Relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with these things.

Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God.

It is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images.

Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it.

Q15 A1: Whether there are ideas?

Yes. It is necessary to suppose ideas (the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves) in the divine mind because, since the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect (Q46, A1), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the world was made.

God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect.

Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.

God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.

God's ideas

We continue our study of God's intellectual operations in which Q14 treated God's knowledge.

Now, in three articles, Q15 treats the ideas which exist in His knowledge:

1. Are there ideas?
2. Are they many, or one only?
3. Are there ideas of all things known by God?

Q14 A16: Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?

Yes. God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only because He Himself is not operable.

But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge.

He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly.

Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only insofar as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things.

Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time.

And, as regards evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art.

The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that is, of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can make, and which nevertheless are never made.

Q14 A15: Whether the knowledge of God is variable?

No. God's knowledge must be altogether invariable because the knowledge of God is His substance (Q14, A4) and His substance is altogether immutable (Q9, A1).

The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. But He has instead knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things which are in act in some period of time.

From the fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things.

If, however, anything existed which God did not previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, it follows that it is known by God from eternity.

Q14 A14: Whether God knows enunciable things?

Yes. God knows all enunciations that can be formed because by understanding His essence, God knows the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them.

Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations.

Instead, He knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing: as if we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man.

Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.

Q14 A13: Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?

Yes. God knows future contingent things because they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality (yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes).

God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself.

And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively as they are in their own being (as we do) but simultaneously.

The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time (Q10, A2).

Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality.

An analogy: He who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by the way.

Q14 A12: Whether God can know infinite things?

Yes. God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts (which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for ever) because the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one: the knowledge of vision.

God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively.

The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things.

Q14 A11: Whether God knows singular things?

Yes. God knows singular things in their singularity because His essence is the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular.

Since God is the cause of things by His knowledge (Q14 A8), His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends: i.e., not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter (Q44, A2) -- and singular things are individualized by matter.

Although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.

Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular.

But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also singular things.

Q14 A10: Whether God knows evil things?

Yes. By the fact that God knows good things, He knows evil things also, because the essence of evil is that it is the privation of good.

God knows evil, not by privation existing in Himself, but by the opposite good: e.g., as by light, darkness is known.

The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but it is the cause of the good whereby evil is known.

Evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil. Evil is opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His essence. (And hence, by knowing these effects, He knows the opposite evils.)

Evil is not of itself knowable, inasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good. Therefore evil can neither be defined nor known, except by good.

Q14 A9: Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?

Yes. God has knowledge even of things that are not because those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality (for it is true that they are in potentiality, and as such they are known by God).

Although some things may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity (and since eternity is without succession, comprehending all time), the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time, as to objects present to Him.

But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.

Q14 A8: Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?

Yes. The knowledge of God is the cause of things because God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it.

Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them.

Q14 A7: Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?

No. In the divine knowledge there is no discursion because God sees all things in one act, which is Himself (therefore God sees all things together, and not successively) and because, all at once, God sees His effects in Himself as their cause (not needing to resolve the effects into their causes, i.e., from known to the unknown, from principles to conclusions).

As Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately here and there; but He sees all things together at once."

Q14 A6: Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?

Yes. God has proper knowledge of things (which is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other) because the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being (and far more).

The nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection.

The created essence is compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the converse.

To know a thing in general (and not in particular) is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular (as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect). If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect. We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their own nature.

Q14 A5: Whether God knows things other than Himself?

Yes. God necessarily knows things other than Himself because the divine power extends to other things by the very fact that it is the first effective cause of all things: and His existence as first effective cause is His own act of understanding.

His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself.

The intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible form (which makes the intellect in act): and this is the image of the principal thing understood. But in God this is nothing but His own essence (in which all images of things are comprehended).

Q14 A4: Whether the act of God's intellect is His substance?

Yes. The act of God's intellect is His substance because His essence itself is also His intelligible species: it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence (since in God there is no form which is something other than His existence).

The act of understanding is the perfection and act of the one understanding. To understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection.

Existence is the perfection of the one existing. And just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand follows on the intelligible species. But in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and His act of understanding are entirely one and the same.

Q14 A3: Whether God comprehends Himself?

Yes. God perfectly comprehends Himself (i.e., He knows Himself as much as He is knowable) because the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing (i.e., God is most cognitive because He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality).

Everything is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality. A thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as it is in actuality. And God alone is pure act.

Q14 A2: Whether God understands Himself?

Yes. God understands Himself through Himself because, although in us sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object (since both are in potentiality), God has nothing in Him of potentiality (since He is pure act, i.e., His intellect and its object are altogether the same) so that He neither is without the intelligible species (as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially) nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect (as it differs in our intellect when it understands actually) but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself: and thus God understands Himself through Himself.

As for us, the reason why we actually feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species. And because of this only, it follows that our sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object, since both are in potentiality. God, however, is a pure act.

Note RO3: Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things.

Hence our passive intellect can be exercised concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other things: for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding, and by this act knows the intellectual faculty.

But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself.

Q14 A1: Whether there is knowledge in God?

Yes. In God there exists the most perfect knowledge because the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive: the mode of knowledge is according to the mode of immateriality.

Since God is in the highest degree of immateriality (Q7, A1), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge (cognitio).

Intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower.

Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above (Q7, A1), forms, according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity.

Plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and unmixed.

Note RO2: Man has different kinds of knowledge (habet diversas cognitiones), according to the different objects of his knowledge (secundum diversa cognita).

He has "intelligence" (intelligentia) as regards the knowledge of principles.

He has "science" (scientia) as regards knowledge of conclusions.

He has "wisdom" (sapientia) according as he knows the highest cause.

He has "counsel" (consilium) or "prudence" (prudentia) according as he knows what is to be done.

Note RO3: Divine knowledge does not exist in God after the mode of created knowledge.

Q14: God's knowledge

Q14 considers God's knowledge with sixteen articles:

1. Is there knowledge in God?
2. Does God understand Himself?
3. Does He comprehend Himself?
4. Is His understanding His substance?
5. Does He understand other things besides Himself?
6. Does He have a proper knowledge of them?
7. Is the knowledge of God discursive?
8. Is the knowledge of God the cause of things?
9. Does God have knowledge of non-existing things?
10. Does He have knowledge of evil?
11. Does He have knowledge of individual things?
12. Does He know the infinite?
13. Does He know future contingent things?
14. Does He know enunciable things?
15. Is the knowledge of God variable?
16. Does God have speculative or practical knowledge of things?

God's intellectual operations

Having treated of God's existence (Q2) and what we can know of His essence (QQ3-13), we turn now to consider His operations, beginning with five questions on the operations of His intellect:

God's knowledge (Q14).

The ideas (Q15), which exist in His knowledge.

Truth (Q16) in God, for knowledge is of things that are true.

Falsity (Q17) in God.

The life of God (Q18), since to understand belongs to living beings.

Q13 A12: Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?

Yes. True affirmative propositions can be formed about God because the plurality of predicate and subject in the proposition represents the plurality of idea (since in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea); thus by composition does the intellect represent the unity of the reality.

God, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple; yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions, because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself.

Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions.

Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves; therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject, and attributes something else to it.

Q13 A11: Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?

Yes. This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God because of three reasons:

(1) it signifies simply existence itself (since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other)

(2) it is most universal (it determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean of substance": pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum)

(3) its consignification (since it signifies present existence, and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not past or future)

Note RO2: This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above.

But as regards the object intended by the name, this name "God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature.

And still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak, singular.

Q13 A10: Whether this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion?

No. This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically because it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is comprised in the other significations.

The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification.

Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion.

Q13 A9: Whether this name "God" is communicable?

No. This name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion, because this name "God" is communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude.

But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His "suppositum" (i.e., accordingly as He is considered as "this something") that name would be absolutely incommunicable (as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew).

The singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called "Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength.

Q13 A8: Whether this name "God" is a name of the nature?

Yes. The name "God" signifies the divine nature because, although God is not known to us in His nature (but is made known to us from His operations or effects), this name was imposed to signify Him existing above all things who is exercising universal providence over all things (since we can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects).

Q13 A7: Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally?

Yes. The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally because it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself (since God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely).

In God, however, there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him.

Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the change of the creature.

For example, as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal who is pacing around the column.

Q13 A6: Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?

No. As regards what the name signifies, these analogical names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures.

But as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures, because creatures are that which we know first.

Q13 A5: Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them?

No. Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures because no name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures.

For example, "wisdom" in creatures is a quality, but not in God.

Instead, some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures (Q13 A1).

This mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing.

For an example of analogy, consider how "healthy" has multiple senses: when applied to urine, "healthy" signifies the sign of animal health; and when applied to medicine, "healthy" signifies the cause of the same health.

Q13 A4: Whether names applied to God are synonymous?

No. Although the names applied to God signify one thing, they are not synonymous because they signify that one thing under many and different aspects.

Synonymous terms, however, signify one thing under one aspect.

The many aspects of these non-synonymous names, when applied to God, are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality, but represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.

The idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures.

Q13 A3: Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?

Yes. Not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense (e.g., "rock"), but there are some which are said of Him in their literal sense, because as regards what is signified by these names (e.g., "being", "good", "living", etc.), they belong properly to God.

That is, they belong to God more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him.

But note: as regards their mode of signification, these literal names do not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of signification applies to creatures.

That is, what such a literal name signifies does not belong to Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way.

In summary: literal names imply corporeal conditions, not in the thing signified, but as regards their mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing signified.

Q13 A2: Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?

Yes. Some names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him because these names express God so far as our intellects know Him, as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short.

Some names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly.

So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or "God is not evil"; the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent and higher way.

Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because He is good.

Q13 A1: Whether a name can be given to God?

Yes. God can be named by us because we can give a name to anything insofar as we can understand it.

As Aristotle realized, because words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception.

We have minds capable of knowing something about God by reasoning with our intellect from His manifest physical effects to the concept of their first cause.

Of course, His essence is above all that we do understand about God and signify in word.

Q13: The names of God

We conclude our study of what we can know of the essence of God by summarizing what we can say of God when predicating names of Him:

1. Can God be named by us?
2. Are any names applied to God predicated of Him substantially?
3. Are any names applied to God said of Him literally, or are all to be taken metaphorically?
4. Are any names applied to God synonymous?
5. Are some names applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally?
6. Supposing they are applied analogically, are they applied first to God or to creatures?
7. Are any names applicable to God from time?
8. Is this name "God" a name of nature, or of the operation?
9. Is this name "God" a communicable name?
10. Is it taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God, by nature, by participation, and by opinion?
11. Is this name, "Who is," the supremely appropriate name of God?
12. Can affirmative propositions be formed about God?

Q12 A13: Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason?

Yes. We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason because the knowledge which we have by natural reason contains images (percepts derived from sensible objects) and the natural intelligible light (enabling us to abstract from percepts intelligible conceptions); in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace.

The intellect's natural light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light. And sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed (e.g., visions and voices), so as to express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects.

Q12 A12: Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?

Yes. God is known by natural knowledge because we can know of Him from the images of His effects.

From the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known (nor therefore can His essence be seen). But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know of God whether He exists and, further, to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him (i.e., as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him).

Q12 A11: Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?

No. It is impossible for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God because our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form.

But it is evident that the Divine essence cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above (Q12, A9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence.

Q12 A10: Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time?

Yes. What is seen in the essence of God is seen not successively, but at the same time because things seen in God are not seen singly by their own similitude but all are seen by the one essence of God: hence they are seen simultaneously, and not successively.

As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding according to time; but as regards what they see in God, they see all at the same time.

Q12 A9: Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any similitude?

No. Those who see the divine essence see what they see in God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to their intellect because all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror.

That is, the cognitive faculty is assimilated not by likenesses (i.e., similitudes or ideas) but by the object itself (i.e., by His own essence).