1a 2ae q21 a2: Whether a human action deserves praise or blame, by reason of its being good or evil? Yes.

Actus humanus ex hoc quod est bonus vel malus, habet rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis, quia bonum vel malum in solis actibus voluntariis constituit rationem laudis vel culpae (in quibus idem est malum, peccatum et culpa).

A human action has the formal aspect of praiseworthy or blameworthy through being good or evil because good or evil, only in voluntary actions, has the formal aspect of praiseworthy or blameworthy (and in such like actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing).

Sicut malum est in plus quam peccatum, ita peccatum est in plus quam culpa. Ex hoc enim dicitur aliquis actus culpabilis vel laudabilis, quod imputatur agenti: nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus.

Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so is sin more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve praise or blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise or to blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the malice or goodness of his action.

Tunc autem actus imputatur agenti, quando est in potestate ipsius, ita quod habeat dominium sui actus.

Now an action is imputed to an agent, when it is in his power, so that he has dominion over it: because it is through his will that man has dominion over his actions.

Philosophus dicit, quod "laudabilia sunt virtutum opera; vituperabilia autem, vel culpabilia, opera contraria".

The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that "virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to virtue deserve censure and blame."

In moralibus, ubi attenditur ordo rationis ad finem communem humanae vitae, semper peccatum et malum attenditur per deviationem ab ordine rationis ad finem communem humanae vitae. Et ideo culpatur ex tali peccato homo et inquantum est homo, et inquantum est moralis. Unde philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod "in arte volens peccans est eligibilior; circa prudentiam autem minus, sicut et in virtutibus moralibus", quarum prudentia est directiva.

In moral matters, where we take into consideration the order of formal aspect to the general end of human life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order of formal aspect to the general end of human life. Wherefore man is blamed for such a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art, he who sins voluntarily is preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues," which prudence directs, "he is the reverse."

Ratio aliter se habet in artificialibus et aliter in moralibus. In artificialibus enim ratio ordinatur ad finem particularem, quod est aliquid per rationem excogitatum. In moralibus autem ordinatur ad finem communem totius humanae vitae. Finis autem particularis ordinatur ad finem communem.

Formal aspect stands in different relations to the productions of art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, formal aspect is directed to a particular end, which is something devised by aspectual apprehension. Whereas in moral matters, it is directed to the general end of all human life. And a particular end is subordinate to the general end.

1a 2ae q21 a1: Whether a human action is right or sinful, insofar as it is good or evil? Yes.

Actus humanus ex hoc quod est bonus vel malus, habeat rationem rectitudinis vel peccati, quia omnis actus voluntarius est malus per hoc quod recedit ab ordine rationis et legis aeternae, et omnis actus bonus concordat rationi et legi aeternae.

A human action has the formal aspect of rectitude or sin from the fact that it is either good or evil, because every voluntary action that turns aside from the order of formal aspect and of the Eternal Law, is evil, and every good action is in accord with formal aspect and the Eternal Law.

Unumquodque ordinatur ad finem per actum suum. Et ideo ratio peccati, quae consistit in deviatione ab ordine ad finem, proprie consistit in actu.

Each thing is ordained to its end by its action. And therefore the formal aspect of sin, which consists in straying from the order to the end, consists properly in an action.

1a 2ae q21: The consequences of human actions by reason of their goodness and badness

1. Is a human action right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil?
2. Does it thereby deserve praise or blame?
3. Is it accordingly meritorious or demeritorious?
4. Is it accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God?

1a 2ae q20 a6: Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil? No.

Unus actus non potest esse bonus et malus quia si accipiatur unus actus prout est in genere moris, impossibile est quod sit bonus et malus bonitate et malitia morali; si tamen sit unus unitate naturae, et non unitate moris, potest esse bonus et malus.

The same action cannot be both good and evil because if we consider one action in the moral order, it is impossible for it to be morally both good and evil; whereas if it be one as to natural and not moral unity, it can be both good and evil.

Actio et passio pertinent ad genus moris, inquantum habent rationem voluntarii. Et ideo secundum quod diversa voluntate dicuntur voluntaria, secundum hoc sunt duo moraliter, et potest ex una parte inesse bonum, et ex alia malum.

Action and passion belong to the moral order, insofar as they have the formal aspect of being voluntary. And therefore insofar as they are voluntary in respect of wills that differ, they are two distinct things, and good can be in one of them while evil is in the other.

1a 2ae q20 a5: Whether the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or badness? No.

Eventus sequens non addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus quia virtus causae existimatur secundum effectus per se, non autem secundum effectus per accidens.

The consequences of an action doe not increase its goodness or badness because the virtue of a cause is measured by the effect that flows from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by accident.

Manifestum est enim meliorem actum esse ex suo genere, ex quo possunt plura bona sequi; et peiorem, ex quo nata sunt plura mala sequi.

It is evident that an action is generally better, if better results can follow from it; and generally worse, if it is of a nature to produce worse results.

Si vero per accidens, et ut in paucioribus, tunc eventus sequens non addit ad bonitatem vel ad malitiam actus: non enim datur iudicium de re aliqua secundum illud quod est per accidens, sed solum secundum illud quod est per se.

On the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident, and seldom, then they do not increase the goodness or badness of the action: because we do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to it by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of itself.

1a 2ae q20 a4: Whether the external action adds any goodness or badness to that of the interior act? Yes.

Bonitas actus exterioris quam habet ex materia et circumstantiis, est alia a bonitate voluntatis quae est ex fine, non autem alia a bonitate voluntatis quam habet ex ipso actu volito, sed comparatur ad ipsam ut ratio et causa eius, quia si per actum exteriorem nihil additur de bonitate vel malitia, frustra qui habet bonam voluntatem vel malam, facit opus bonum, aut desistit a malo opere—quod est inconveniens.

The goodness which the external action takes from its matter and circumstances, is distinct from that which it derives from the end, but it is not distinct from that which it has from the very act willed, to which it stands in the relation of formal aspect and cause, because if by the external action no further goodness or malice be added, it is to no purpose that he who has a good or an evil will, does a good deed or refrains from an evil deed—which is unreasonable.

1a 2ae q20 a3: Whether the goodness and badness of the external action are the same as those of the interior act?

Est una bonitas actus interioris et exterioris quia actus voluntatis se habet ut formale ad actum exteriorem; ex formali autem et materiali fit unum.

There is but one goodness of the internal and external act because the act of the will is the form, as it were, of the external action; but that which results from the material and formal element is one thing.

1a 2ae q20 a2: Whether the whole goodness and badness of the external action depends on the goodness of the will? No.

Circa utrosque actus potest esse differentia boni et mali quia voluntarium dicitur non solum actus interior voluntatis, sed etiam actus exteriores, prout a voluntate procedunt et ratione.

The difference of good and evil is applicable to both the interior and external act because voluntariness applies not only to the interior act of the will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as they proceed from the will and the formal aspect.

Si igitur voluntas sit bona, et ex obiecto proprio, et ex fine, consequens est actum exteriorem esse bonum.

If therefore the will be good, both from its proper object and from its end, if follows that the external action is good.

Sed non sufficit ad hoc quod actus exterior sit bonus, bonitas voluntatis quae est ex intentione finis.

But if the will be good from [only] its intention of the end, this is not enough to make the external action good.

Sed si voluntas sit mala sive ex intentione finis, sive ex actu volito, consequens est actum exteriorem esse malum.

And if the will be evil either by its intention of the end, or by the act willed, it follows that the external action is evil.

Non solum aliquis voluntate peccat, quando vult malum finem, sed etiam quando vult malum actum.

A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil end, but also when he wills an evil act.

In actu exteriori potest considerari duplex bonitas vel malitia: una secundum debitam materiam et circumstantias; alia secundum ordinem ad finem. Et illa quidem quae est secundum ordinem ad finem, tota dependet ex voluntate. Illa autem quae est ex debita materia vel circumstantiis, dependet ex ratione: et ex hac dependet bonitas voluntatis, secundum quod in ipsam fertur.

We may consider a twofold goodness or badness in the external action: one in respect of due matter and circumstances; the other in respect of the order to the end. And that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends entirely on the will. But that which is in respect of due matter or circumstances, depends on the formal aspect: and on this goodness depends the goodness of the will, insofar as the will tends towards it.

Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, quod "quaedam sunt quae nullo quasi bono fine, aut bona voluntate, possunt bene fieri".

Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that "there are some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make good."

1a 2ae q20 a1: Whether goodness or badness is first in the action of the will prior to the external action? Yes.

Bonum et malum morale per prius consistit in voluntate quia cum finis sit proprium obiectum voluntatis, manifestum est quod ista ratio (boni vel mali quam habet actus exterior ex ordine ad finem) per prius invenitur in actu voluntatis, et ex eo derivatur ad actum exteriorem.

Moral good and evil are first in the will because since the end is the will's proper object, it is evident that this formal aspect (i.e., of good or evil, which the external action derives from its relation to the end) is to be found first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes to the external action.

Bonitas autem vel malitia quam habet actus exterior secundum se (propter debitam materiam et debitas circumstantias) non derivatur a voluntate, sed magis a ratione.

On the other hand, the goodness or badness which the external action has of itself (i.e., on account of its being about due matter and its being attended by due circumstances) is not derived from the will, but rather from the aspectual apprehension.

Unde si consideretur bonitas exterioris actus secundum quod est in ordinatione et apprehensione rationis, prior est quam bonitas actus voluntatis, sed si consideretur secundum quod est in executione operis, sequitur bonitatem voluntatis, quae est principium eius.

Consequently, if we consider the goodness of the external action, insofar as it comes from the ordination and apprehension of aspect, it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will; but if we consider it insofar as it is in the execution of the action done, it is subsequent to the goodness of the will, which is its principle.

Actus exterior est obiectum voluntatis, inquantum proponitur voluntati a ratione ut quoddam bonum apprehensum et ordinatum per rationem; et sic est prius quam bonum actus voluntatis. Inquantum vero consistit in executione operis, est effectus voluntatis, et sequitur voluntatem.

The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by aspectual apprehension, as a certain good apprehended and ordained by the formal aspect; and thus it is prior to the good in the act of the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the execution of the action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will.

1a 2ae q20: Goodness and badness in external human affairs

1. Is goodness and malice first in the act of the will, or in the external action?
2. Does the whole goodness or malice of the external action depend on the goodness of the will?
3. Are the goodness and malice of the interior act the same as those of the external action?
4. Does the external action add any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?
5. Do the consequences of an external action increase its goodness or malice?
6. Can one and the same external action be both good and evil?

1a 2ae q19 a10: Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed? Yes.

Quicumque non conformat voluntatem suam voluntati divinae in volito, habet malam voluntatem, quia forma voluntatis est ex obiecto sicut et cuiuslibet actus; si ergo tenetur homo conformare voluntatem suam voluntati divinae, sequitur quod teneatur conformare in volito.

Whoever does not conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing willed, has an evil will, because the will takes its form from the object, as does every act; if therefore man is bound to conform his will to the Divine will, it follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed.

Quod volitum divinum, secundum rationem communem, quale sit, scire possumus. Scimus enim quod Deus quidquid vult, vult sub ratione boni. Et ideo quicumque vult aliquid sub quacumque ratione boni, habet voluntatem conformem voluntati divinae, quantum ad rationem voliti. Sed in particulari nescimus quid Deus velit. Et quantum ad hoc, non tenemur conformare voluntatem nostram divinae voluntati.

We can know by a general formal aspect what God wills. For we know that whatever God wills, He wills it under the formal aspect of good. Consequently whoever wills a thing under any formal aspect of good, has a will conformed to the Divine will, as to the formal aspect of the thing willed. But we know not what God wills in particular. And in this respect we are not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.

In statu tamen gloriae, omnes videbunt in singulis quae volent, ordinem eorum ad id quod Deus circa hoc vult. Et ideo non solum formaliter, sed materialiter in omnibus suam voluntatem Deo conformabunt.

But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in that particular matter. Consequently he will conform his will to God in all things not only formally, but also materially.

1a 2ae q19 a9: Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine will? Yes.

Bonitas voluntatis dependet ex conformitate ad voluntatem divinam quia sicut dictum est, bonitas voluntatis dependet ex intentione finis; finis autem ultimus voluntatis humanae est summum bonum, quod est Deus, ut supra dictum est.

The goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine will because, as stated above (a7), the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end; and the last end of the human will is the Sovereign Good, namely, God, as stated above (q1 a8; q3 a1).

Voluntas hominis non potest conformari voluntati divinae per aequiparantiam, sed per imitationem. Et similiter conformatur scientia hominis scientiae divinae, inquantum cognoscit verum. Et actio hominis actioni divinae, inquantum est agenti conveniens. Et hoc per imitationem, non autem per aequiparantiam.

The human will cannot be conformed to the will of God so as to equal it, but only so as to imitate it. In like manner human knowledge is conformed to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it knows truth. And human action is conformed to the Divine, in so far as it is becoming to the agent. And this by way of imitation, not by way of equality.

Requiritur ad bonitatem humanae voluntatis, quod ordinetur ad summum bonum.

The goodness of the human will requires it to be ordained to the Sovereign Good.

Hoc autem bonum primo quidem et per se comparatur ad voluntatem divinam ut obiectum proprium eius. Illud autem quod est primum in quolibet genere, est mensura et ratio omnium quae sunt illius generis.

Now this Good is primarily and essentially referred to the Divine will, as its proper object. Again, that which is first in any class is the measure and formal aspect of all that belongs to that class.

Unumquodque autem rectum et bonum est, inquantum attingit ad propriam mensuram. Ergo ad hoc quod voluntas hominis sit bona, requiritur quod conformetur voluntati divinae.

Moreover, everything attains to rectitude and goodness, insofar as it is in accord with its proper measure. Therefore, in order that man's will be good it needs to be conformed to the Divine will.

1a 2ae q19 a8: Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention? No.

Si vero consideretur quantitas intentionis et actus, secundum intensionem utriusque, sic intensio intentionis redundat in actum interiorem et exteriorem voluntatis, quia ipsa intentio quodammodo se habet formaliter ad utrumque, ut ex supra dictis patet.

If we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act, according to their respective intensity, then the intensity of the intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the will, because the intention stands in relation to them as a kind of form, as is clear from what has been said above (q12 a4; q18 a6).

Licet materialiter, intentione existente intensa, possit esse actus interior vel exterior non ita intensus, materialiter loquendo: puta cum aliquis non ita intense vult medicinam sumere, sicut vult sanitatem. Tamen hoc ipsum quod est intense intendere sanitatem, redundat formaliter in hoc quod est intense velle medicinam.

And yet considered materially, while the intention is intense, the interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much intensity to take medicine as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless the very fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal principle, upon the intense volition of medicine.

Sed quia etiam ipsa intentio quodammodo pertinet ad actum voluntatis, inquantum scilicet est ratio eius; propter hoc redundat quantitas bonae intentionis in voluntatem, inquantum scilicet voluntas vult aliquod bonum magnum ut finem, licet illud per quod vult consequi tantum bonum, non sit dignum illo bono.

Yet because the intention also belongs, in a way, to the act of the will, inasmuch, to wit, as it is the formal aspect thereof; it comes to pass that the quantity of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act of the will; that is to say, insofar as the will wills some great good for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so great a good, is not proportionate to that good.

1a 2ae q19 a7: Whether the goodness of the will, as regards the means, depends on the intention of the end? Yes.

Bonitas voluntatis ex intentione finis dependet quia bonitas voluntatis dependeat a bonitate voliti.

The goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end because the goodness of the will depends on the goodness of the thing willed.

Quando intentio est causa volendi, ordo ad finem accipitur ut quaedam ratio bonitatis in obiecto.

When the intention is the cause of [the act of] willing, the order to the end is considered as a certain formal aspect of the goodness of the object.

Intentio dupliciter se potest habere ad voluntatem: uno modo, ut praecedens; alio modo, ut concomitans.

The intention may stand in a twofold relation to the act of the will: first, as preceding it; secondly, as accompanying it.

Praecedit quidem causaliter intentio voluntatem, quando aliquid volumus propter intentionem alicuius finis. Et tunc ordo ad finem consideratur ut ratio quaedam bonitatis ipsius voliti: puta, cum aliquis vult ieiunare propter Deum; habet enim ieiunium rationem boni ex hoc ipso quod fit propter Deum.

The intention precedes the act of the will causally, when we will something because we intend a certain end. And then the order to the end is considered as a certain formal aspect of the goodness of the thing willed: for instance, when a man wills to fast for God's sake; because the act of fasting has the formal aspect of good from the very fact that it is done for God's sake.

Consequitur autem intentio voluntatem, quando accedit voluntati praeexistenti: puta si aliquis velit aliquid facere, et postea referat illud in Deum. Et tunc primae voluntatis bonitas non dependet ex intentione sequenti, nisi quatenus reiteratur actus voluntatis cum sequenti intentione.

On the other hand, intention accompanies the act of the will, when it is added to a preceding act of the will: for instance, a man may will to do something, and may afterwards refer it to God. And then the goodness of the previous act of the will does not depend on the subsequent intention, except insofar as that act of the will is repeated with the subsequent intention.

Voluntas non potest dici bona, si sit intentio mala causa volendi. Qui enim vult dare eleemosynam propter inanem gloriam consequendam, vult id quod de se est bonum, sub ratione mali; et ideo, prout est volitum ab ipso, est malum. Unde voluntas eius est mala. Sed si intentio sit consequens, tunc voluntas potuit esse bona; et per intentionem sequentem non depravatur ille actus voluntatis qui praecessit, sed actus voluntatis qui iteratur.

The [act of the] will cannot be said to be good, if an evil intention is the cause of [the act of] willing. For when a man wills to give an alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in itself, under a formal aspect of evil; and therefore, as willed by him, it is evil. Wherefore his [act of] will is evil. If, however, the intention is subsequent to the [act of the] will, then the [act of the] will may be good; and the subsequent intention does not spoil that act of the will which preceded, but that act of the will which is repeated.

Sicut iam dictum est, "malum contingit ex singularibus defectibus, bonum vero ex tota et integra causa". Unde sive voluntas sit eius quod est secundum se malum, etiam sub ratione boni; sive sit boni sub ratione mali: semper voluntas erit mala. Sed ad hoc quod sit voluntas bona, requiritur quod sit boni sub ratione boni; idest quod velit bonum, et propter bonum.

As we have already stated (a6 ad 1), "evil results from each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire cause". Hence, whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even under the formal aspect of good; or to the good under the formal aspect of evil: it will be evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good, it must tend to the good under the formal aspect of good; in other words, it must will the good, and for the sake of the good.

1a 2ae q19 a6: Whether the will is good when it abides by erring reason? No.

Voluntas concordans rationi erranti, potest esse mala, quia si ratio vel conscientia erret errore voluntario, vel directe, vel propter negligentiam, quia est error circa id quod quis scire tenetur: tunc talis error rationis vel conscientiae non excusat quin voluntas concordans rationi vel conscientiae sic erranti, sit mala.

The will can be evil when it abides by erring aspectual apprehension because if aspectual apprehension or conscience err with an error that is voluntary, either directly, or through negligence, so that one errs about what one ought to know: then such an error of aspectual apprehension or conscience does not excuse the will that abides by that erring aspectual apprehension or conscience, from being evil.

Si autem sit error qui causet involuntarium, proveniens ex ignorantia alicuius circumstantiae absque omni negligentia: tunc talis error rationis vel conscientiae excusat, ut voluntas concordans rationi erranti non sit mala.

But if the error arise from ignorance of some circumstance, and without any negligence, so that it cause the act to be involuntary: then that error of aspectual apprehension or conscience excuses the will, that abides by that erring aspectual apprehension, from being evil.

Puta, si ratio errans dicat quod homo teneatur ad uxorem alterius accedere, voluntas concordans huic rationi erranti est mala (eo quod error iste provenit ex ignorantia legis Dei, quam scire tenetur). Si autem ratio erret in hoc, quod credat aliquam mulierem submissam, esse suam uxorem, et, ea petente debitum, velit eam cognoscere, excusatur voluntas eius, ut non sit mala (quia error iste ex ignorantia circumstantiae provenit, quae excusat, et involuntarium causat).

For instance, if erring aspectual apprehension tells a man that he should go to another man's wife, the will that abides by that erring aspectual apprehension is evil (since this error arises from ignorance of the Divine Law, which he is bound to know). But if a man's aspectual apprehension, errs in mistaking another for his wife, and if he wish to give her her right when she asks for it, his will is excused from being evil (because this error arises from ignorance of a circumstance, which ignorance excuses, and causes the act to be involuntary).

Sicut Dionysius dicit in IV cap. de Div. Nom., "bonum causatur ex integra causa, malum autem ex singularibus defectibus". Et ideo ad hoc quod dicatur malum id in quod fertur voluntas, sufficit sive quod secundum suam naturam sit malum, sive quod apprehendatur ut malum. Sed ad hoc quod sit bonum, requiritur quod utroque modo sit bonum.

As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good is caused by the entire cause, but evil from each particular defect". Consequently in order that the thing to which the will tends be called evil, it suffices, either that it be evil in itself, or that it be apprehended as evil. But in order for it to be good, it must be good in both ways.

Sicut praemissa quaestio eadem est cum quaestione qua quaeritur utrum conscientia erronea liget, ita ista quaestio eadem est cum illa qua quaeritur utrum conscientia erronea excuset.

Whereas the previous question is the same as inquiring "whether an erring conscience binds", so this question is the same as inquiring "whether an erring conscience excuses".

1a 2ae q19 a5: Whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason? Yes.

Voluntas discordans a ratione errante, est mala, quia voluntas discordans a ratione errante, est contra conscientiam.

The will is evil when it is at variance with erring aspectual apprehension because when the will is at variance with erring aspectual apprehension, it is against conscience.

Iudicium rationis errantis licet non derivetur a Deo, tamen ratio errans iudicium suum proponit ut verum, et per consequens ut a Deo derivatum, a quo est omnis veritas.

Although the judgment of an erring aspectual apprehension is not derived from God, yet the erring aspectual apprehension puts forward its judgment as being true, and consequently as being derived from God, from Whom is all truth.

Voluntas erit mala, quia vult malum, non quidem id quod est malum per se, sed id quod est malum per accidens, propter apprehensionem rationis.

The will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that which is evil in itself, but that which is evil accidentally, through being apprehended as such by the formal aspect.

Et ideo philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod, "per se loquendo, incontinens est qui non sequitur rationem rectam; per accidens autem, qui non sequitur etiam rationem falsam". Unde dicendum est simpliciter quod omnis voluntas discordans a ratione, sive recta sive errante, semper est mala.

Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 9) that "properly speaking, the incontinent man is one who does not follow correct aspectual apprehension; but accidentally, he is also one who does not follow incorrect aspectual apprehension." We must therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will at variance with aspectual apprehension, whether correct or erring, is always evil.

1a 2ae q19 a4: Whether the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law? Yes.

Multo magis dependet bonitas voluntatis humanae a lege aeterna, quam a ratione humana, et ubi deficit humana ratio, oportet ad rationem aeternam recurrere, quia in omnibus causis ordinatis, effectus plus dependet a causa prima quam a causa secunda, quia causa secunda non agit nisi in virtute primae causae.

The goodness of the human will depends on the eternal law much more than on human aspectual apprehension, and when human aspectual apprehension fails, we must have recourse to the Eternal Formal Aspect, because wherever a number of causes are subordinate to one another, the effect depends more on the first than on the second cause, since the second cause acts only in virtue of the first.

Quod autem ratio humana sit regula voluntatis humanae, ex qua eius bonitas mensuretur, habet ex lege aeterna, quae est ratio divina.

Now it is from the eternal law, which is the Divine Formal Aspect, that human aspectual apprehension is the rule of the human will: the rule from which the will's goodness is measured.

Unde in Psalmo IV, dicitur, "multi dicunt, quis ostendit nobis bona? signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine", quasi diceret, "lumen rationis quod in nobis est, intantum potest nobis ostendere bona, et nostram voluntatem regulare, inquantum est lumen vultus tui, idest a vultu tuo derivatum.

Hence it is written (Psalm 4:6-7): "Many say: Who showeth us good things? The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": as though to say: "The light of the formal aspect, which is in us [as our aspectual apprehension], is able to show us good things, and guide our will, insofar as it is the light of Thy countenance, i.e., derived from Thy countenance".

Lex aeterna sit nobis ignota secundum quod est in mente divina, innotescit tamen nobis aliqualiter, vel per rationem naturalem, quae ab ea derivatur ut propria eius imago, vel per aliqualem revelationem superadditam.

Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as it is in the Divine Mind, nevertheless it becomes known to us somewhat, either by natural aspectual apprehension, which is derived from the divine mind as its proper image, or by some sort of additional revelation.

1a 2ae q19 a3: Whether the goodness of the will depends on formal aspect? Yes.

Bonitas voluntatis dependet ex hoc quod sit subiecta rationi quia bonitas voluntatis proprie ex obiecto dependet, et obiectum voluntatis proponitur ei per rationem.

The goodness of the will depends on its being subject to the formal aspect because the goodness of the will depends properly on the object, and the will's object is proposed to it through the formal aspect.

Bonum sub ratione boni (idest appetibilis) per prius pertinet ad voluntatem quam ad rationem.

The good, considered under the formal aspect of being good (i.e., as desirable), pertains to the will before pertaining to aspectual apprehension.

Sed tamen per prius pertinet ad rationem sub ratione veri, quam ad voluntatem sub ratione appetibilis, quia appetitus voluntatis non potest esse de bono, nisi prius a ratione apprehendatur.

But considered under the formal aspect of being true, it pertains to aspectual apprehension before pertaining to the will under the aspect of being desirable [in its goodness], because the will cannot desire a good that is not previously apprehended in [the truth of] its formal aspect.

In his autem quae sunt ad finem, rectitudo rationis consistit in conformitate ad appetitum finis debiti. Sed tamen et ipse appetitus finis debiti praesupponit rectam apprehensionem de fine, quae est per rationem.

In regard to the means, the correctness of aspectual apprehension depends on its conformity with the desire of a due end. Nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes a correct apprehension of the end, which [correctness of apprehension] occurs through [the apprehension of] the formal aspect.

Voluntas quodam modo movet rationem; et ratio alio modo movet voluntatem: ex parte scilicet obiecti, ut supra dictum est.

The will moves aspectual apprehension in one way; the formal aspect moves the will in another: viz., on the part of the object, as stated above (q9 a1).

Nam bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis proportionatum ei. Bonum autem sensibile, vel imaginarium, non est proportionatum voluntati, sed appetitui sensitivo, quia voluntas potest tendere in bonum universale, quod ratio apprehendit, appetitus autem sensitivus non tendit nisi in bonum particulare, quod apprehendit vis sensitiva. Et ideo bonitas voluntatis dependet a ratione, eo modo quo dependet ab obiecto.

For the good understood is the proportionate object of the will. But a good apprehended by sense, or a good apprehended in perception, is proportionate, not to the will, but to the sensory appetite, because the will is able to tend to the universal good that the formal aspect apprehends, whereas the sensory appetite tends only to a particular good that is apprehended by the sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on the apprehension of the formal aspect in the same way as [the goodness of the will] depends on the object.

1a 2ae q19 a2: Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone? Yes.

Bonitas et malitia voluntatis non dependet ex circumstantiis, sed ex solo obiecto, quia bonitas voluntatis ex solo uno illo dependet, quod per se facit bonitatem in actu; scilicet ex obiecto, et non ex circumstantiis (quae sunt quaedam accidentia actus).

The goodness and badness of the will depend, not on the circumstances, but on the object alone, because the goodness of the will's act depends on that one thing alone, which essentially causes goodness in the act; and that one thing is the object, and not the circumstances (which are accidents, as it were, of the act).

Illud autem unum quod est principium in quolibet genere, non est per accidens, sed per se, quia omne quod est per accidens, reducitur ad id quod est per se, sicut ad principium.

That one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not something accidental to that genus, but something essential thereto, because whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential, as to its principle.

Principium autem bonitatis et malitiae humanorum actuum est ex actu voluntatis.

Now the principle of the goodness and malice of human actions is taken from the act of the will.

Finis est obiectum voluntatis, non autem aliarum virium. Unde quantum ad actum voluntatis, non differt bonitas quae est ex obiecto, a bonitate quae est ex fine, sicut in actibus aliarum virium; nisi forte per accidens, prout finis dependet ex fine, et voluntas ex voluntate.

The end is the object of the will, but not of the other powers. Hence, in regard to the act of the will, the goodness derived from the object, does not differ from that which is derived from the end, as they differ in the acts of the other powers; except perhaps accidentally, insofar as one end depends on another, and one act of the will on another.

Supposito quod voluntas sit boni, nulla circumstantia potest eam facere malam.

Given that the act of the will is fixed on some good, no circumstances can make that act bad.

1a 2ae q19 a1: Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object? Yes.

Bonum et malum in actibus voluntatis proprie attenditur secundum obiecta, quia differentia speciei in actibus est secundum obiecta, ut dictum est.

Good and evil in the acts of the will is derived properly from the objects, because the specific difference in acts is according to objects, as stated above (q18 a5).

Ergo bonitas voluntatis est ex hoc quod aliquis vult bonum.

Therefore the goodness of the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is good.

Voluntas non semper est veri boni, sed quandoque est apparentis boni, quod quidem habet aliquam rationem boni, non tamen simpliciter convenientis ad appetendum. Et propter hoc actus voluntatis non est bonus semper, sed aliquando malus.

The will is not always directed to what is truly good, but sometimes to the apparent good, which has indeed some formal aspect of good, but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence it is that the act of the will is not always good, but sometimes evil.

Bonum per rationem repraesentatur voluntati ut obiectum; et inquantum cadit sub ordine rationis, pertinet ad genus moris, et causat bonitatem moralem in actu voluntatis. Ratio enim principium est humanorum et moralium actuum, ut supra dictum est.

Good, according to its formal aspect, is presented to the will as its object; and insofar as an object falls under the order of formal aspect, it enters the moral order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will, since formal aspect is the principle of human and moral acts, as stated above (q18 a5).