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Friday, May 28, 2010
Too Good To NOT Show
For two years I've been saying Justin Morneau was the captain of this team. Apparently he does have at least a little captain in him.
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Wednesday, May 26, 2010
Maybe Bert is Right (Part 1)
Pitch Counts May Be BS
(This is the first of a 3-part series that I’ll be running on the TwinsCentric blog and at TwinsGeek.com. Part 2 will be published on Memorial Day and Part 3 on June 3rd.)
Let’s be honest: for the first one hundred years or so of major league baseball, the players were chattel. That’s the biggest reason that starting pitchers were allowed to throw until their arms fell off. Management didn’t really give a damn if they fell off or not.
That’s also why things have changed. With the introduction of guaranteed contracts, a fragile arm can sink an entire front office. (Just ask Omar Minaya next fall.) So teams, coaches, agents and certainly players are looking for a way to protect those investments. Pitch counts seemed like a good place to start. And 100 is such a nice round number.
But don’t make the mistake of thinking there is any science behind it. Or at least that it isn’t paper thin. The current wisdom that 100 pitches is some kind of limit is an overly simplified interpretation of very specific studies that weren’t afraid to point out their own limitations.
The initial and most significant research on pitching abuse was a pair of essays in the 2001 edition of Baseball Prospectus. The first is called “Re-Thinking Pitcher Abuse” by Rany Jazayerli, which gives a brief history of his attempts at studying pitching abuse and summarizes a new measurement called PAP3. The second is “Analyzing PAP,” written by Jazayerli and Keith Woolner, which details the study that led them to develop the new measurement.
Both essays are very candid about what they found and what their limitations are, mostly without an ax to grind. Unfortunately, the measurements they created have been misinterpreted and oversimplified to become some deranged gospel of truth that doesn’t exist. So let’s take a look at what we REALLY know about pitch counts from those essays.
Re-Thinking Pitcher Abuse Essay
Jayazerli introduces both essays by explaining his original theory: that all pitches are not created equal. In particular, pitches thrown later in a game, once the arm is tired, are more damaging than those thrown earlier in a game.
When Jayazerli had proposed that idea earlier, he also devised a statistic to try and measure it called Pitching Abuse Points, or PAP. The original idea was that the first 10 pitches over 100 would be worth one point each. The next 10, two points each. The next 10, three points each, and so on. The more points, the worse the risk to the pitcher.
(In the later essay, Jayazerli says he chose 100 as a starting point because of research dating back to Craig Wright’s The Diamond Appraised, which suggested the 100-pitch limit for developing pitchers. I’m afraid I haven’t procured a copy of that book to see exactly where it came from.)
Jazayerli had thrown out this statistic as a starting point, but BaseballProspectus.com was exploding in popularity at that time, and he noted that a strange thing happened:
“And for two years, I have tried to use PAP as a framework in which to center the ongoing discussion of pitcher usage. In the process, though, PAP became more than a framework for measurement; it became the standard for measurement. Which it was never intended to do.”
Jazayerli then points out that he had never found any evidence that this PAP score is tied to injuries. He explains that it is a very difficult thing to measure because of all the confounding factors. So he enlisted Keith Woolner’s help and they conducted another study (detailed in the second essay) which resulted in a new measure called PAP3.
PAP3 was similar to PAP except that the points increase exponentially once you get over 100 pitches. Basically, you cube the number of pitches over 100, so 105 pitches would be 5^3 or 125 points. But 110 pitches would be 10^3 or 1000 points. And 120 pitches would be 20^3 or 8000 points.
You can see, that creates some very scary looking numbers in a hurry. However, the standard for what was truly damaging was also raised considerably. So they also included a table which listed the pitch counts along with their risk. Anything below 105 pitches was “virtually none.” Anything under 122 pitches was “moderate” and anything over 133 pitches was “severe.”
So let’s review what this essay just said. First, it explains that there was never any evidence that a previous metric (PAP) was ever valid. It pushes any significant risk in pitch counts up to 120+ pitches. And finally it explains a new metric (PAP3) for evaluating pitcher risk.
Of course, the basis for PAP3 and those conclusions are in the second essay, and we’ll start evaluating that in Part 2 on Monday.
I really, really, really cannot believe that I haven’t covered this next item yet. I’ve just been distracted by some life stuff. Many of you may have heard that one of the TwinsCentrick authors, Parker Hageman, has been designing some t-shirts for Twins fans. His initial one is a “Thome is my Homey” t-shirt and the first batch already sold out, but they’ve ordered a second batch. You know you’re going to want to rock this shirt at your next Twins game, so get it now, because I don’t think there will be a third batch.
(This is the first of a 3-part series that I’ll be running on the TwinsCentric blog and at TwinsGeek.com. Part 2 will be published on Memorial Day and Part 3 on June 3rd.)
Let’s be honest: for the first one hundred years or so of major league baseball, the players were chattel. That’s the biggest reason that starting pitchers were allowed to throw until their arms fell off. Management didn’t really give a damn if they fell off or not.
That’s also why things have changed. With the introduction of guaranteed contracts, a fragile arm can sink an entire front office. (Just ask Omar Minaya next fall.) So teams, coaches, agents and certainly players are looking for a way to protect those investments. Pitch counts seemed like a good place to start. And 100 is such a nice round number.
But don’t make the mistake of thinking there is any science behind it. Or at least that it isn’t paper thin. The current wisdom that 100 pitches is some kind of limit is an overly simplified interpretation of very specific studies that weren’t afraid to point out their own limitations.
The initial and most significant research on pitching abuse was a pair of essays in the 2001 edition of Baseball Prospectus. The first is called “Re-Thinking Pitcher Abuse” by Rany Jazayerli, which gives a brief history of his attempts at studying pitching abuse and summarizes a new measurement called PAP3. The second is “Analyzing PAP,” written by Jazayerli and Keith Woolner, which details the study that led them to develop the new measurement.
Both essays are very candid about what they found and what their limitations are, mostly without an ax to grind. Unfortunately, the measurements they created have been misinterpreted and oversimplified to become some deranged gospel of truth that doesn’t exist. So let’s take a look at what we REALLY know about pitch counts from those essays.
Re-Thinking Pitcher Abuse Essay
Jayazerli introduces both essays by explaining his original theory: that all pitches are not created equal. In particular, pitches thrown later in a game, once the arm is tired, are more damaging than those thrown earlier in a game.
When Jayazerli had proposed that idea earlier, he also devised a statistic to try and measure it called Pitching Abuse Points, or PAP. The original idea was that the first 10 pitches over 100 would be worth one point each. The next 10, two points each. The next 10, three points each, and so on. The more points, the worse the risk to the pitcher.
(In the later essay, Jayazerli says he chose 100 as a starting point because of research dating back to Craig Wright’s The Diamond Appraised, which suggested the 100-pitch limit for developing pitchers. I’m afraid I haven’t procured a copy of that book to see exactly where it came from.)
Jazayerli had thrown out this statistic as a starting point, but BaseballProspectus.com was exploding in popularity at that time, and he noted that a strange thing happened:
“And for two years, I have tried to use PAP as a framework in which to center the ongoing discussion of pitcher usage. In the process, though, PAP became more than a framework for measurement; it became the standard for measurement. Which it was never intended to do.”
Jazayerli then points out that he had never found any evidence that this PAP score is tied to injuries. He explains that it is a very difficult thing to measure because of all the confounding factors. So he enlisted Keith Woolner’s help and they conducted another study (detailed in the second essay) which resulted in a new measure called PAP3.
PAP3 was similar to PAP except that the points increase exponentially once you get over 100 pitches. Basically, you cube the number of pitches over 100, so 105 pitches would be 5^3 or 125 points. But 110 pitches would be 10^3 or 1000 points. And 120 pitches would be 20^3 or 8000 points.
You can see, that creates some very scary looking numbers in a hurry. However, the standard for what was truly damaging was also raised considerably. So they also included a table which listed the pitch counts along with their risk. Anything below 105 pitches was “virtually none.” Anything under 122 pitches was “moderate” and anything over 133 pitches was “severe.”
So let’s review what this essay just said. First, it explains that there was never any evidence that a previous metric (PAP) was ever valid. It pushes any significant risk in pitch counts up to 120+ pitches. And finally it explains a new metric (PAP3) for evaluating pitcher risk.
Of course, the basis for PAP3 and those conclusions are in the second essay, and we’ll start evaluating that in Part 2 on Monday.
------------------------
I really, really, really cannot believe that I haven’t covered this next item yet. I’ve just been distracted by some life stuff. Many of you may have heard that one of the TwinsCentrick authors, Parker Hageman, has been designing some t-shirts for Twins fans. His initial one is a “Thome is my Homey” t-shirt and the first batch already sold out, but they’ve ordered a second batch. You know you’re going to want to rock this shirt at your next Twins game, so get it now, because I don’t think there will be a third batch.
Monday, May 24, 2010
More Endgame Talk
You may have heard about the Atlanta Braves big seven-run comeback in the bottom of the ninth last week versus the Cincinnati Reds. It ended on a grand slam that gave the Braves a 10-9 victory.
But one thing I didn't know about was that the Reds, leading 9-3, missed out on chances to add to the score in both the eighth and ninth inning. In both cases, the Reds had runners on first and second base with no outs, but the third batter hit into a double play and the fourth struck out. It seemed unimportant at the time - up until the Braves remarkable comeback.
The lost opportunities were a topic of analysis in the local SABR forum. (I'm including the link because I think you can sign up, and I'm guessing most of my readers probably would like some of the topics. I hope you can sign up. I'm not really sure how - it's been so long since I joined. And please, be nice.) The question is whether the Reds should have tried playing "smallball" to push an extra insurance run across in those two innings.
I replied:
Some folks may find this interesting. Below is the URL for something called the Win Expectancy Tracker, which shows the probability of winning a baseball game in various situations, based on historical results.
http://winexp.walkoffbalk.com/expectancy/search
Using it, I find that from 1997 through 2006, there were 1993 games where the home team entered the bottom of the ninth losing by six runs. They won three of them. So the visiting team won in that situation 99.85% of the time.
How much more would an extra run have helped? During the same time period, there were 4224 where the home team entered the bottom of the ninth losing by seven OR MORE runs. (Sorry about the OR MORE, but the tool just lumps everything over 6 together.) The home team came back to win just four of those, so they lost 99.91% of the time.
So getting that extra run across would've helped in approximately 0.06% of all games, and that's being generous. How insignificant is that? Let's take a look at another seemingly trivial situation and see how it would rank.
If the lead off batter of the visiting team just gets on base at the beginning of the first inning, he's improved his team's chances of winning 4.4%, or about 70 times more than that single extra run should've helped in the ninth inning.
One could do a similar analysis on the question raised yesterday - at what point do you really need a closer? So, if there wasn't a "save" statistic, at what point does the percentage chance of winning a game justify putting in someone other than your best reliever? So let's use the Win Expectancy Tracker to see historically what percentage of games were won by the home team carrying various leads or deficits into the top of the ninth.
Leading by 5 - win 99.7% of the time
Leading by 4 - win 98.8% of the time
Leading by 3 - win 98.0% of the time
Leading by 2 - win 94.5% of the time
Leading by 1 - win 86.6% of the time
Tied - win 52.2% of the time
Losing by 1 - win 15.2% of the time
Losing by 2 - win 6.3% of the time
Losing by 3 - win 2.9% of the time
Losing by 4 - win 1.3% of the time
Losing by 5 - win 0.6% of the time
Looking at those odds, I suppose you can make a pretty good case that whoever tries to hold a three run lead should be the same guy that tries to hold a four run lead. But I would argue that you don't need your best reliever to try and hold a three-run lead, either. 98% of the time a three run lead is safe, for chrissakes.
For the home team, the times a closer should be used include holding a one-run lead and a two-run lead. It also certainly includes a tie game, where giving up a single run decreases the chances of winning by 35%. I suppose one could even make a case for using him when losing by a run, since that second run decreases the chances of winning the game by almost 9%.
So I think it's a fair question to ask what the difference is between protecting a three-run and a four-run lead. But to claim that a closer needs to be used to protect a game that is already won 98.8% of the time seems a little severe.
But one thing I didn't know about was that the Reds, leading 9-3, missed out on chances to add to the score in both the eighth and ninth inning. In both cases, the Reds had runners on first and second base with no outs, but the third batter hit into a double play and the fourth struck out. It seemed unimportant at the time - up until the Braves remarkable comeback.
The lost opportunities were a topic of analysis in the local SABR forum. (I'm including the link because I think you can sign up, and I'm guessing most of my readers probably would like some of the topics. I hope you can sign up. I'm not really sure how - it's been so long since I joined. And please, be nice.) The question is whether the Reds should have tried playing "smallball" to push an extra insurance run across in those two innings.
I replied:
Some folks may find this interesting. Below is the URL for something called the Win Expectancy Tracker, which shows the probability of winning a baseball game in various situations, based on historical results.
http://winexp.walkoffbalk.com/
Using it, I find that from 1997 through 2006, there were 1993 games where the home team entered the bottom of the ninth losing by six runs. They won three of them. So the visiting team won in that situation 99.85% of the time.
How much more would an extra run have helped? During the same time period, there were 4224 where the home team entered the bottom of the ninth losing by seven OR MORE runs. (Sorry about the OR MORE, but the tool just lumps everything over 6 together.) The home team came back to win just four of those, so they lost 99.91% of the time.
So getting that extra run across would've helped in approximately 0.06% of all games, and that's being generous. How insignificant is that? Let's take a look at another seemingly trivial situation and see how it would rank.
If the lead off batter of the visiting team just gets on base at the beginning of the first inning, he's improved his team's chances of winning 4.4%, or about 70 times more than that single extra run should've helped in the ninth inning.
One could do a similar analysis on the question raised yesterday - at what point do you really need a closer? So, if there wasn't a "save" statistic, at what point does the percentage chance of winning a game justify putting in someone other than your best reliever? So let's use the Win Expectancy Tracker to see historically what percentage of games were won by the home team carrying various leads or deficits into the top of the ninth.
Leading by 5 - win 99.7% of the time
Leading by 4 - win 98.8% of the time
Leading by 3 - win 98.0% of the time
Leading by 2 - win 94.5% of the time
Leading by 1 - win 86.6% of the time
Tied - win 52.2% of the time
Losing by 1 - win 15.2% of the time
Losing by 2 - win 6.3% of the time
Losing by 3 - win 2.9% of the time
Losing by 4 - win 1.3% of the time
Losing by 5 - win 0.6% of the time
Looking at those odds, I suppose you can make a pretty good case that whoever tries to hold a three run lead should be the same guy that tries to hold a four run lead. But I would argue that you don't need your best reliever to try and hold a three-run lead, either. 98% of the time a three run lead is safe, for chrissakes.
For the home team, the times a closer should be used include holding a one-run lead and a two-run lead. It also certainly includes a tie game, where giving up a single run decreases the chances of winning by 35%. I suppose one could even make a case for using him when losing by a run, since that second run decreases the chances of winning the game by almost 9%.
So I think it's a fair question to ask what the difference is between protecting a three-run and a four-run lead. But to claim that a closer needs to be used to protect a game that is already won 98.8% of the time seems a little severe.
Sunday, May 23, 2010
Gardy's Late Inning Decisions
Is that where we are now? We can be frustrated by a near sweep?
Yeah, that's right, and I'm not going to apologize for it. The Twins seemed like a vastly superior team compared to the Brewers. Maybe that was due to the party-like atmosphere of Friday night. Maybe it was the quick start on Saturday. Even the Brewers late-inning comeback on Saturday felt like a fluke, and you had to love the pitching matchups for Sunday.
So even though the Twins finished with the same results we should have expected (I doubt the Twins were favored throwing Kevin Slowey versus Yovani Galarado), it left me frustrated, and I'm not going to apologize for it. Listening to the post-game audio for the game, the manager and players sounded like they were frustrated too.
One aspect that is bound to be analyzed after a couple of one-run games is the late-inning decisions, and the last two games provided more than their share for manager Ron Gardenhire. In fact, he's all ready drawn a little second-guessing from Patrick Reusse. So let's review them quickly:
1. Saturday, top of the ninth - 6-2 lead - Ron Mahay starts the inning over Jon Rauch.
This is the move that Reusse not only criticizes, but ponders whether Gardenhire learned from it. I'm sure his argument resonates, seeing as it provides an opportunity to trash managing to a fairly useless statistic, the save. Reusse (probably correctly) postulates that Rauch didn't start the inning because it wouldn't have resulted in a save.
I guess. To, if you're going to criticize the blown lead, it falls 10% on Gardenhire and 90% on Mahay and Rauch. There needs to be some dividing line - you're not going to have Rauch hold a seven run lead - and three runs is as good as any. The southpaw Mahay has been one of the Twins more reliable relievers this year and he got to start an inning where the first and third batters were batting left-handed. Oh, and he got to face the bottom of the Brewers order.
A priori, there was no reason that the Twins should have felt like they needed Rauch there. It was only after Mahay laid a major egg - and Rauch contributed a few extra-base hits himself - that it was a move that merited any criticism.
2. Saturday, bottom of the ninth - having Jim Thome pinch hit for Trevor Plouffe - and get intentionally walked.
It was a tie game with one out and runners on 2nd and 3rd when Gardenhire used the last bullet in his holster for what everyone knew would be an intentional walk. Of the three moves here, this is the most debatable in my mind, but still pretty defendable.
Gardenhire had two choices: he could either choose to have Plouffe bat with runners on second and third (and again, one out) or he could have Nick Punto bat with the bases loaded and one out. To me, the second is a defensible choice, and probably the one I would make. But it is a choice that can easily drawn two criticisms.
The first is that the Brewers would've walked Plouffe anyway to load the bases, which would've allowed Thome to bat with the bases loaded. Maybe, but not intentionally. Brewers manager Ken Macha has a decision to make too, and his is a lot easier to figure out. Would he rather face Plouffe with runners on 2nd and 3rd or Thome with the bases loaded? There is no doubt they pitch to Plouffe.
The second criticism is that it's a fairly incremental upgrade from Plouffe to Punto and the price for it is too high - it's Thome. That's a fair criticism, but I can only fault Garenhire so much for being aggressive in that situation. And it turned out that over the next couple innings, the Twins had good players at the plate in the high-leverage situations anyway. He ended up not needing Thome on his bench.
3. Sunday, bottom of the ninth - trailing by one run, Thome replaces Brendan Harris and is walked so Plouffe needs to drive in the winning run. He strikes out to end the game.
In this situation, Gardenhire had another choice to make. With two outs, he had to decide between batting Harris with runners on the corners or Plouffe with the bases loaded. Again, he went with the bases loaded, which means that the batter only need to draw a walk, instead of get a hit.
The problem wasn't where Thome pinch-hit. The problem was that Gardenhire had two spots where he needed a pinch-hitter and only one Thome. If one really wants to second-guess Gardenhire, the place to start might be to ask why there wasn't another option on the bench, cuz there coulda been. Joe Mauer was available until an inning earlier, when he had been inserted for Sal Butera. That was with one out and the bases empty, a much lower leverage spot. But, of course, Gardenhire couldn't see that another, better option would be coming an inning later.
The problem is that all three moves failed, and the last one led to a loss. The frustration we feel about the series might magnify them, but I can't say I disagree with any of the moves.
Yeah, that's right, and I'm not going to apologize for it. The Twins seemed like a vastly superior team compared to the Brewers. Maybe that was due to the party-like atmosphere of Friday night. Maybe it was the quick start on Saturday. Even the Brewers late-inning comeback on Saturday felt like a fluke, and you had to love the pitching matchups for Sunday.
So even though the Twins finished with the same results we should have expected (I doubt the Twins were favored throwing Kevin Slowey versus Yovani Galarado), it left me frustrated, and I'm not going to apologize for it. Listening to the post-game audio for the game, the manager and players sounded like they were frustrated too.
One aspect that is bound to be analyzed after a couple of one-run games is the late-inning decisions, and the last two games provided more than their share for manager Ron Gardenhire. In fact, he's all ready drawn a little second-guessing from Patrick Reusse. So let's review them quickly:
1. Saturday, top of the ninth - 6-2 lead - Ron Mahay starts the inning over Jon Rauch.
This is the move that Reusse not only criticizes, but ponders whether Gardenhire learned from it. I'm sure his argument resonates, seeing as it provides an opportunity to trash managing to a fairly useless statistic, the save. Reusse (probably correctly) postulates that Rauch didn't start the inning because it wouldn't have resulted in a save.
I guess. To, if you're going to criticize the blown lead, it falls 10% on Gardenhire and 90% on Mahay and Rauch. There needs to be some dividing line - you're not going to have Rauch hold a seven run lead - and three runs is as good as any. The southpaw Mahay has been one of the Twins more reliable relievers this year and he got to start an inning where the first and third batters were batting left-handed. Oh, and he got to face the bottom of the Brewers order.
A priori, there was no reason that the Twins should have felt like they needed Rauch there. It was only after Mahay laid a major egg - and Rauch contributed a few extra-base hits himself - that it was a move that merited any criticism.
2. Saturday, bottom of the ninth - having Jim Thome pinch hit for Trevor Plouffe - and get intentionally walked.
It was a tie game with one out and runners on 2nd and 3rd when Gardenhire used the last bullet in his holster for what everyone knew would be an intentional walk. Of the three moves here, this is the most debatable in my mind, but still pretty defendable.
Gardenhire had two choices: he could either choose to have Plouffe bat with runners on second and third (and again, one out) or he could have Nick Punto bat with the bases loaded and one out. To me, the second is a defensible choice, and probably the one I would make. But it is a choice that can easily drawn two criticisms.
The first is that the Brewers would've walked Plouffe anyway to load the bases, which would've allowed Thome to bat with the bases loaded. Maybe, but not intentionally. Brewers manager Ken Macha has a decision to make too, and his is a lot easier to figure out. Would he rather face Plouffe with runners on 2nd and 3rd or Thome with the bases loaded? There is no doubt they pitch to Plouffe.
The second criticism is that it's a fairly incremental upgrade from Plouffe to Punto and the price for it is too high - it's Thome. That's a fair criticism, but I can only fault Garenhire so much for being aggressive in that situation. And it turned out that over the next couple innings, the Twins had good players at the plate in the high-leverage situations anyway. He ended up not needing Thome on his bench.
3. Sunday, bottom of the ninth - trailing by one run, Thome replaces Brendan Harris and is walked so Plouffe needs to drive in the winning run. He strikes out to end the game.
In this situation, Gardenhire had another choice to make. With two outs, he had to decide between batting Harris with runners on the corners or Plouffe with the bases loaded. Again, he went with the bases loaded, which means that the batter only need to draw a walk, instead of get a hit.
The problem wasn't where Thome pinch-hit. The problem was that Gardenhire had two spots where he needed a pinch-hitter and only one Thome. If one really wants to second-guess Gardenhire, the place to start might be to ask why there wasn't another option on the bench, cuz there coulda been. Joe Mauer was available until an inning earlier, when he had been inserted for Sal Butera. That was with one out and the bases empty, a much lower leverage spot. But, of course, Gardenhire couldn't see that another, better option would be coming an inning later.
The problem is that all three moves failed, and the last one led to a loss. The frustration we feel about the series might magnify them, but I can't say I disagree with any of the moves.
Thursday, May 20, 2010
An Apology to UZR
Several times over the last year, I've tried to explore the details of Ultimate Zone Rating(UZR), a defensive metric, in part because I thought it was unfairly rating Twins outfielders. It started back in October, but if you click back, make sure you make it down to the second comment. It was by Parker Hageman of OverTheBaggy.Blogspot.com, whose research suggested that maybe UZR is biased against smaller outfields.
That's because we thought the zones in UZR didn't take into account the particular ballpark they were in. So a 350 ft fly ball down the right field line was judged similarly in park after park - even if that fly ball was a home run in the Metrodome or Target Field, but not in another field. So, somewhat ironically, the larger, more spacious outfields pumped up UZRs because fielders had more chances to make plays, while the smaller ones penalized UZR.
But we were wrong. I'm sorry UZR, I should not have doubted you.
It is apparent I was wrong because FanGraphs.com has now added a "Split" option to their statistics, including UZR. Here is Cuddyer's for last year. Instead of having the Metrodome hurt him, it helped him. Cuddyer's UZR/150 was just -6.6 at home but -22.2 on the road. All in all he cost the team just 2.7 runs at home and 7.3 runs on the road.
The same thing happens as you look at his statistics year to year, and you also see the same thing in other ballparks, like Fenway's left field. Jason Bay's 2009 season shows him having a better UZR in Fenway than on the road.
So it appears that somehow, UZR is making the appropriate call for smaller outfields. There are other weaknesses we can pick apart, but all stats have weaknesses. UZR's method for handling somewhat extreme outfields is not one of them. In fact, it seems to be a strength.
But there is something else going on here, too, I think. Somehow, Cuddyer's defense got a lot better in 2009. This offseason I'm 99% sure it said that his UZR/150 was -22.1 in 2009, but now it's -13.6? That's not an insignificant change.
In some ways, that's good news, because I think that's a lot closer to what we're really seen from Cuddyer, and demonstrates his defense hasn't hurt the Twins the way other outfielders, like Jermaine Dye, have hurt their teams. But it's also very, very bad news, because I don't know why it changed. Was there an error before? Is there an error now?
If anyone knows, I'd love to hear it.
That's because we thought the zones in UZR didn't take into account the particular ballpark they were in. So a 350 ft fly ball down the right field line was judged similarly in park after park - even if that fly ball was a home run in the Metrodome or Target Field, but not in another field. So, somewhat ironically, the larger, more spacious outfields pumped up UZRs because fielders had more chances to make plays, while the smaller ones penalized UZR.
But we were wrong. I'm sorry UZR, I should not have doubted you.
It is apparent I was wrong because FanGraphs.com has now added a "Split" option to their statistics, including UZR. Here is Cuddyer's for last year. Instead of having the Metrodome hurt him, it helped him. Cuddyer's UZR/150 was just -6.6 at home but -22.2 on the road. All in all he cost the team just 2.7 runs at home and 7.3 runs on the road.
The same thing happens as you look at his statistics year to year, and you also see the same thing in other ballparks, like Fenway's left field. Jason Bay's 2009 season shows him having a better UZR in Fenway than on the road.
So it appears that somehow, UZR is making the appropriate call for smaller outfields. There are other weaknesses we can pick apart, but all stats have weaknesses. UZR's method for handling somewhat extreme outfields is not one of them. In fact, it seems to be a strength.
But there is something else going on here, too, I think. Somehow, Cuddyer's defense got a lot better in 2009. This offseason I'm 99% sure it said that his UZR/150 was -22.1 in 2009, but now it's -13.6? That's not an insignificant change.
In some ways, that's good news, because I think that's a lot closer to what we're really seen from Cuddyer, and demonstrates his defense hasn't hurt the Twins the way other outfielders, like Jermaine Dye, have hurt their teams. But it's also very, very bad news, because I don't know why it changed. Was there an error before? Is there an error now?
If anyone knows, I'd love to hear it.
Tuesday, May 18, 2010
Frustrated by the Slow(ey) Stuff
I’m going to admit it that I’m more than just a little frustrated with Kevin Slowey right now. And by “little frustrated,” I mean turning myself into a parody of Chris Farley’s Matt Foley character every time Slowey fails to make it past the middle innings. I'm one more long middle inning from breaking our coffee table.
It happened again last night. For the fifth consecutive start, and the seventh of his eight starts, he failed to make it through the sixth inning. His ERA has climbed to 4.70, a trend that has also been going on for almost a month. And as I listened to this, I wondered two things:
1) What’s going on with Slowey and
2) How much longer before Slowey finds himself living in a VAN, DOWN BY THE RIVER?!?
Is it possible Slowey just isn’t going to be that good? After all, he’s now 26 years old. This is his fourth year in the majors. His high water mark for endurance is 27 starts and 160.1 innings. He’s given up 50 more hits than innings pitched, and his home run rate is pretty consistently about 50% higher than you would hope. And his career ERA heading into last night’s game is 4.42.
To find the promise, you need to go back to his minor league career. He was drafted in the second round in 2005. In his first full year he posted a 1.88 ERA between High-A and Double-A. In his second full year he dominated AAA-Rochester, with a 1.89 ERA. While Matt Garza was getting all the hype, Slowey was right behind him, moving up a level just after Garza, and often posting at least as nasty numbers.
But in his four years in the majors, we’ve really only seen that promise once, in 2008. That year he stayed relatively healthy, only missing time at the beginning and ending of the year. He still gave up the home runs, but showed the impeccable control that was supposed to make him such a reliable rotation staple. But even then his ERA was only as low as 3.99. As Mr. Foley said, “Well, lad-dee-FRICKIN-da.”
Outside of that year, he’s posted a 4.73 ERA, a 4.86 ERA and now a 4.70 ERA. He received a fair amount of hype last before the All-Star break for having won 12 games, but that was mostly due to being in the right place at the right time; only nine of his 16 starts were quality starts.
Mostly, he’s just plain been hittable. Last year hitters had a batting average of .309 against him and this year it is .304. If you’ve got a lineup full of .300 hitters, your team is a powerhouse. Slowey does that to a team.
But given the injuries he’s faced with his wrist (which really go back to September of 2008) it’s way too early to say he’s never going to amount to JACK SQUAT. 2008 was a very good sign of what Twins fans could expect. And it’s silly to overlook those years in 2007 and 2006 in the minors. Our expectations are not out of line. He could be very good.
So what’s gong on? Because right now, he is easily the weakest of the Twins starters, and it’s not particularly close.
Taking a look at the Pitcher Report Card for him MyInsideEdge.com, the easy answer seems to be that he’s having trouble with his namesake – the slow stuff. He is just plain having trouble throwing his offspeed pitches for strikes. In 2008 he was throwing 63% of his offspeed pitches for strikes, which Inside Edge graded out as a B+. (MLB Average is 61%). This year he’s throwing just 50% for a strike, which grades out as an F.
And it looks like Major League batters have gotten the memo, because they’re not chasing those pitches. Again in 2008, he got hitters to chase 33% of those off-speed pitches (MLB average was 31%). This year, they’re chasing just 12%, which grades out as another F.
Is that how things played out last night?
It’s hard to say. The first two runs happened in the second inning, when he found himself in two full-count battles with Alex Gonzalez and Jose Bautista. In both cases he was throwing primarily offspeed pitches, sometimes for strikes, sometimes not. Both hits he gave up were pitches that drifted into the inside edge of the plate about thigh-high. In Gonzalez case it was an off-speed pitch that he singled. In Bautista’s it was a sinking fastball that he hit for a homerun.
It was a little different in the fourth inning. Freddie Lewis got on base after seeing almost exclusively sinking fastballs. Vernon Wells drove him in hitting a changeup on the outside of the plate. In neither case was the batter really ahead in the count, or in a full count.
So I don’t know if the problem is that offspeed pitch control, or that batters just aren’t being fooled. Either way, it could certainly indicate why Slowey is suddenly having trouble keeping his pitch count low enough to get deep into games, and why batters are adjusting to him in middle innings. Let’s hope he makes an adjustment for my own coronary health.
It happened again last night. For the fifth consecutive start, and the seventh of his eight starts, he failed to make it through the sixth inning. His ERA has climbed to 4.70, a trend that has also been going on for almost a month. And as I listened to this, I wondered two things:1) What’s going on with Slowey and
2) How much longer before Slowey finds himself living in a VAN, DOWN BY THE RIVER?!?
Is it possible Slowey just isn’t going to be that good? After all, he’s now 26 years old. This is his fourth year in the majors. His high water mark for endurance is 27 starts and 160.1 innings. He’s given up 50 more hits than innings pitched, and his home run rate is pretty consistently about 50% higher than you would hope. And his career ERA heading into last night’s game is 4.42.
To find the promise, you need to go back to his minor league career. He was drafted in the second round in 2005. In his first full year he posted a 1.88 ERA between High-A and Double-A. In his second full year he dominated AAA-Rochester, with a 1.89 ERA. While Matt Garza was getting all the hype, Slowey was right behind him, moving up a level just after Garza, and often posting at least as nasty numbers.
But in his four years in the majors, we’ve really only seen that promise once, in 2008. That year he stayed relatively healthy, only missing time at the beginning and ending of the year. He still gave up the home runs, but showed the impeccable control that was supposed to make him such a reliable rotation staple. But even then his ERA was only as low as 3.99. As Mr. Foley said, “Well, lad-dee-FRICKIN-da.”
Outside of that year, he’s posted a 4.73 ERA, a 4.86 ERA and now a 4.70 ERA. He received a fair amount of hype last before the All-Star break for having won 12 games, but that was mostly due to being in the right place at the right time; only nine of his 16 starts were quality starts.
Mostly, he’s just plain been hittable. Last year hitters had a batting average of .309 against him and this year it is .304. If you’ve got a lineup full of .300 hitters, your team is a powerhouse. Slowey does that to a team.
But given the injuries he’s faced with his wrist (which really go back to September of 2008) it’s way too early to say he’s never going to amount to JACK SQUAT. 2008 was a very good sign of what Twins fans could expect. And it’s silly to overlook those years in 2007 and 2006 in the minors. Our expectations are not out of line. He could be very good.
So what’s gong on? Because right now, he is easily the weakest of the Twins starters, and it’s not particularly close.
Taking a look at the Pitcher Report Card for him MyInsideEdge.com, the easy answer seems to be that he’s having trouble with his namesake – the slow stuff. He is just plain having trouble throwing his offspeed pitches for strikes. In 2008 he was throwing 63% of his offspeed pitches for strikes, which Inside Edge graded out as a B+. (MLB Average is 61%). This year he’s throwing just 50% for a strike, which grades out as an F.
And it looks like Major League batters have gotten the memo, because they’re not chasing those pitches. Again in 2008, he got hitters to chase 33% of those off-speed pitches (MLB average was 31%). This year, they’re chasing just 12%, which grades out as another F.
Is that how things played out last night?
It’s hard to say. The first two runs happened in the second inning, when he found himself in two full-count battles with Alex Gonzalez and Jose Bautista. In both cases he was throwing primarily offspeed pitches, sometimes for strikes, sometimes not. Both hits he gave up were pitches that drifted into the inside edge of the plate about thigh-high. In Gonzalez case it was an off-speed pitch that he singled. In Bautista’s it was a sinking fastball that he hit for a homerun.
It was a little different in the fourth inning. Freddie Lewis got on base after seeing almost exclusively sinking fastballs. Vernon Wells drove him in hitting a changeup on the outside of the plate. In neither case was the batter really ahead in the count, or in a full count.
So I don’t know if the problem is that offspeed pitch control, or that batters just aren’t being fooled. Either way, it could certainly indicate why Slowey is suddenly having trouble keeping his pitch count low enough to get deep into games, and why batters are adjusting to him in middle innings. Let’s hope he makes an adjustment for my own coronary health.
Sunday, May 16, 2010
Need
You can't always get what you want, but you get what you need.
It wasn't what I hoped for in the Yankees series, but it may have been the best possible outcome.
Friday night I got validation that the Twins (and Ron Gardenhire) were absolutely psyched out by Yankee Stadium. On Saturday, as hit after hit found their way into Yankee gloves, it became apparent that the Twins were also snakebit. (In fact, on Sunday I listened to the Yankees announcers confirm both points throughout the game. They were virtually shaking their heads about how break after break seemed to be going the Yankees way.)
There is only one way for a trend like that to end - in the strangest possible manner. And so I stoically listened to Sunday's late innings hoping that this would be the game that lightning struck.
Did it ever. Down 3-2 in the eighth inning, the Twins were faced with four seemingly insurmountable obstacles:
1. Yankee Stadium
2. Mariano Rivera
3. the bases loaded and
4. Jason Kubel at the plate.
All year the last two virtually assured failure. All decade the first two virtually assured failure. But apparently it's easier to throw four monkeys off your back than just one. Who knew?
And so the Twins will head into the playoffs knowing that they can win at Yankee Stadium, that they can beat Rivera, and that closer Jon Rauch can strike out the top three guys in the Yankees order. That is a far better ending than I would have hoped for on Saturday night, Friday night or even Thursday night.
I got what I need. I think the Twins did too.
I gotta say, I had a GREAT time at the TwinsCentric Viewing Party on Saturday. That's saying something considering the Twins were being shellacked and we probably only had 30-35 people there. Or maybe that was what made it so much fun for me, because the gallows humor kicked in and we just had such a great group relaxing and debating baseball. Sincerely, thanks to everyone who came. It really was a fun communal baseball experience. And I LOVE that.
I did some research on the Blue Jays that I was going to write up tonight, but instead I'm going to try and tweet it tomorrow prior to the game, so please sign up for my Twitter feed, which I think you can even get on your cell phone. See you tomorrow.
- The Rolling Stones
It wasn't what I hoped for in the Yankees series, but it may have been the best possible outcome.
Friday night I got validation that the Twins (and Ron Gardenhire) were absolutely psyched out by Yankee Stadium. On Saturday, as hit after hit found their way into Yankee gloves, it became apparent that the Twins were also snakebit. (In fact, on Sunday I listened to the Yankees announcers confirm both points throughout the game. They were virtually shaking their heads about how break after break seemed to be going the Yankees way.)
There is only one way for a trend like that to end - in the strangest possible manner. And so I stoically listened to Sunday's late innings hoping that this would be the game that lightning struck.
Did it ever. Down 3-2 in the eighth inning, the Twins were faced with four seemingly insurmountable obstacles:
1. Yankee Stadium
2. Mariano Rivera
3. the bases loaded and
4. Jason Kubel at the plate.
All year the last two virtually assured failure. All decade the first two virtually assured failure. But apparently it's easier to throw four monkeys off your back than just one. Who knew?
And so the Twins will head into the playoffs knowing that they can win at Yankee Stadium, that they can beat Rivera, and that closer Jon Rauch can strike out the top three guys in the Yankees order. That is a far better ending than I would have hoped for on Saturday night, Friday night or even Thursday night.
I got what I need. I think the Twins did too.
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I gotta say, I had a GREAT time at the TwinsCentric Viewing Party on Saturday. That's saying something considering the Twins were being shellacked and we probably only had 30-35 people there. Or maybe that was what made it so much fun for me, because the gallows humor kicked in and we just had such a great group relaxing and debating baseball. Sincerely, thanks to everyone who came. It really was a fun communal baseball experience. And I LOVE that.
---------------------
I did some research on the Blue Jays that I was going to write up tonight, but instead I'm going to try and tweet it tomorrow prior to the game, so please sign up for my Twitter feed, which I think you can even get on your cell phone. See you tomorrow.
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
Numerical Limits
We can take a lot of comfort in numbers, but it doesn't take a mathematician to tell you that they have limits.
Pick a game that you play, even if it's somewhat casual. Darts. Pool. Ping-pong, of maybe a video game. Now think of someone that you play who is maybe slightly better than you at it. Their "VORP" is a little bit better in that game. Not dominant, mind you. Just a little bit better.
If it was important, could you find a way to beat that person in that game? Could you beat them three out of five? Four our of seven? Do you believe you could find a way to do that?
I hope so. Maybe you find a weakness and pound it. Maybe you catch a few lucky breaks. Maybe there are a few distractions, or they're dealing with an injury. The bottom line is that the slight difference in talent doesn't mean anything in a short series. That's the limit of the numbers. In a short series, the team with the better numbers won't necessarily win.
That seems obvious, and it's more obvious when you take a look at two examples.
In 1965, the Yankees were visiting Metropolitan Stadium for four game just before the All-Star break. This might not have seemed like the biggest series, seeing as the Yankees were 12 games behind the division leading Twins. Except that the Yankees had won the division the year before, in 1964. And in 1963. And in 1962. And 1961. 1960, too.
And in 1958, 1957, 1956 and 1955.
And 1953, 1952, 1951, 1950 and 1949.
That's fourteen times in sixteen years, for those of you who care to count. So you can bet that when the Twins lost two of the first three game in that series, it felt as inevitable as wave crashing into shore. Even moreso when the Yankees grabbed the lead in the top of the 9th in the fourth game.
But in the bottom of the ninth, that changed when Harmon Killebrew hit the most important home run in the first 30 years of the franchise. It beat the Yankees for that game, saved the series, and announced to the Yankees and the rest of the world that their dynasty was over. And the Twins were intending to start their own.
Fast forward forty years to when the Twins have established their own mini-dynasty. The only AL team that has been more successful winning their division has been the Yankees. There is no doubt that they've won more games and been the slightly better team objectively. But that doesn't explain the dominance they have had individually versus the Twins in the regular season and in the playoffs. It certainly doesn't explain the dominance and dramatic wins they've consistently pulled off in Yankee Stadium.
So don't tell me the numbers say this is just another series. Maybe it's a measuring stick. Maybe it's a chance for the Twins to prove something to themselves. Or to identify a weakness, or to figure out a way to take that three out of five. There are an infinite number of reasons this series means more, just like there are an infinite number of ways to win a game.
So I'll let the numbers, and their limits, rest this weekend. Bring on the Yankees.
I've been harping on it, but WOW, and I looking forward to Saturday. TwinsCentric Viewing Party at Major's in Bloomington, Yanks vs. Twins, $2 pints, 2-4-1 appetizers, raffle of row 6 Twins tix and now Francisco Liriano is starting? Seriously? Show up early....
More TwinsCentric stuff today...
- Switch over to KFAN 1130 this morning at 9:15 to hear Seth and read his latest notes here.
- Nick thinks that Nick Punto's walk rate last year was a fluke.
- In a tweet yesterday, Parker points out that Delmon Young isn't swinging at as many bad pitches.
Pick a game that you play, even if it's somewhat casual. Darts. Pool. Ping-pong, of maybe a video game. Now think of someone that you play who is maybe slightly better than you at it. Their "VORP" is a little bit better in that game. Not dominant, mind you. Just a little bit better.
If it was important, could you find a way to beat that person in that game? Could you beat them three out of five? Four our of seven? Do you believe you could find a way to do that?
I hope so. Maybe you find a weakness and pound it. Maybe you catch a few lucky breaks. Maybe there are a few distractions, or they're dealing with an injury. The bottom line is that the slight difference in talent doesn't mean anything in a short series. That's the limit of the numbers. In a short series, the team with the better numbers won't necessarily win.
That seems obvious, and it's more obvious when you take a look at two examples.
In 1965, the Yankees were visiting Metropolitan Stadium for four game just before the All-Star break. This might not have seemed like the biggest series, seeing as the Yankees were 12 games behind the division leading Twins. Except that the Yankees had won the division the year before, in 1964. And in 1963. And in 1962. And 1961. 1960, too.
And in 1958, 1957, 1956 and 1955.
And 1953, 1952, 1951, 1950 and 1949.
That's fourteen times in sixteen years, for those of you who care to count. So you can bet that when the Twins lost two of the first three game in that series, it felt as inevitable as wave crashing into shore. Even moreso when the Yankees grabbed the lead in the top of the 9th in the fourth game.
But in the bottom of the ninth, that changed when Harmon Killebrew hit the most important home run in the first 30 years of the franchise. It beat the Yankees for that game, saved the series, and announced to the Yankees and the rest of the world that their dynasty was over. And the Twins were intending to start their own.
Fast forward forty years to when the Twins have established their own mini-dynasty. The only AL team that has been more successful winning their division has been the Yankees. There is no doubt that they've won more games and been the slightly better team objectively. But that doesn't explain the dominance they have had individually versus the Twins in the regular season and in the playoffs. It certainly doesn't explain the dominance and dramatic wins they've consistently pulled off in Yankee Stadium.
So don't tell me the numbers say this is just another series. Maybe it's a measuring stick. Maybe it's a chance for the Twins to prove something to themselves. Or to identify a weakness, or to figure out a way to take that three out of five. There are an infinite number of reasons this series means more, just like there are an infinite number of ways to win a game.
So I'll let the numbers, and their limits, rest this weekend. Bring on the Yankees.
---------------
I've been harping on it, but WOW, and I looking forward to Saturday. TwinsCentric Viewing Party at Major's in Bloomington, Yanks vs. Twins, $2 pints, 2-4-1 appetizers, raffle of row 6 Twins tix and now Francisco Liriano is starting? Seriously? Show up early....
------------------
More TwinsCentric stuff today...
- Switch over to KFAN 1130 this morning at 9:15 to hear Seth and read his latest notes here.
- Nick thinks that Nick Punto's walk rate last year was a fluke.
- In a tweet yesterday, Parker points out that Delmon Young isn't swinging at as many bad pitches.
Phoning It In: Delmon Young Week
Today is Delmon Young day across the Twins blogosphere, but only TwinsGeek.com has had a Delmon Young week. Back in June 2009, I lot all perspective and dedicated a whole week and a ton of words to evaluating Delmon Young's history and specifically Minnesota's reaction to him. Since I just couldn't get myself to write anything new about him last night, I'm just going to revisit those this morning. Here they are:
What the Hell Happened to Delmon Young?
Part 1: The Promise
Part 2: The Big Problem
Sidebar: Delmon Young vs. Joe Mauer
Part 3: Traps
Part 4: The Future
Part 1: The Promise
Part 2: The Big Problem
Sidebar: Delmon Young vs. Joe Mauer
Part 3: Traps
Part 4: The Future
Sunday, May 09, 2010
More on Patience
Could history be repeating itself?
A little over two years ago, I raised the question about whether Denard Span, a first round draft choice and non-prospect, had perhaps turned a corner? At 24 years old, he was putting up slightly better numbers than we expected in spring training. It was easy to write them off because of his history, just like we wrote off his late-year success the previous year as "one nice month."
But looking closer at his numbers, one noticed a change in walks and strikeouts that indicated a guy taking substantially different at-bats. I suggested that maybe he had developed some patience, and maybe we should have waited for someone with first-round talent to shine through. That year ended with him essentially nailing down the center field job for the Twins.
If we learned that lesson, we certainly didn't apply it to the first round pick taken years later. Like Span, Trevor Plouffe has been a poster child for an area in which the Twins have struggled - middle infielders. Plouffe has never posted an on-base percentage over .340 and never exceeded a 736 OPS. Or at least he never has until this year, where he is hitting .299 with an on-base percentage of .355 and a slugging percentage of .468.
But like Span, the numbers that are most interesting to me are his walk and strikeout numbers. So far this year, Plouffe has 9 walks and 13 strikeouts, or about 1 walk per 1.5 strikeouts. He hasn't shown that kind of a rate since the low minors. Last year it was 1:2, and that's been the case for most of his career.
And like Span, you can see the same change starting in August of last year:
That looks like a little like a progression, especially when you add in 2010. Plouffe is just 23 years old, plays shortstop, and is looking like a hitter that can both get on base and provide a little pop at AAA. If these numbers are legit for the year, he becomes a top prospect. He also, by the way, is right-handed, something else that would fit in well in the Twins lineup.
So let's hope that history really is repeating itself. And while we're at it, we might want to withhold judgment on Chris Parmelee. He's the first round pick two years after Plouffe, a 21-year-old who is hitting just .195 in AA-New Britain with a 24:5 K:BB ratio. History suggests that sometime these things turn around.
Get it on your calendar right now - Twins vs Yankees this Saturday at Major's in Bloomington. The whole gang will be there, we'll have big specials and a raffle for Twins tix, too. Plus, I have a hunch this could be one of the biggest games of the year. Hope to see you there.
A little over two years ago, I raised the question about whether Denard Span, a first round draft choice and non-prospect, had perhaps turned a corner? At 24 years old, he was putting up slightly better numbers than we expected in spring training. It was easy to write them off because of his history, just like we wrote off his late-year success the previous year as "one nice month."
But looking closer at his numbers, one noticed a change in walks and strikeouts that indicated a guy taking substantially different at-bats. I suggested that maybe he had developed some patience, and maybe we should have waited for someone with first-round talent to shine through. That year ended with him essentially nailing down the center field job for the Twins.
If we learned that lesson, we certainly didn't apply it to the first round pick taken years later. Like Span, Trevor Plouffe has been a poster child for an area in which the Twins have struggled - middle infielders. Plouffe has never posted an on-base percentage over .340 and never exceeded a 736 OPS. Or at least he never has until this year, where he is hitting .299 with an on-base percentage of .355 and a slugging percentage of .468.
But like Span, the numbers that are most interesting to me are his walk and strikeout numbers. So far this year, Plouffe has 9 walks and 13 strikeouts, or about 1 walk per 1.5 strikeouts. He hasn't shown that kind of a rate since the low minors. Last year it was 1:2, and that's been the case for most of his career.
And like Span, you can see the same change starting in August of last year:
| MONTH | BB | K | BA |
| APRIL | 7 | 6 | 0.228 |
| MAY | 4 | 23 | 0.215 |
| JUNE | 10 | 20 | 0.273 |
| JULY | 3 | 9 | 0.272 |
| AUGUST | 10 | 10 | 0.314 |
That looks like a little like a progression, especially when you add in 2010. Plouffe is just 23 years old, plays shortstop, and is looking like a hitter that can both get on base and provide a little pop at AAA. If these numbers are legit for the year, he becomes a top prospect. He also, by the way, is right-handed, something else that would fit in well in the Twins lineup.
So let's hope that history really is repeating itself. And while we're at it, we might want to withhold judgment on Chris Parmelee. He's the first round pick two years after Plouffe, a 21-year-old who is hitting just .195 in AA-New Britain with a 24:5 K:BB ratio. History suggests that sometime these things turn around.
-----------------
Get it on your calendar right now - Twins vs Yankees this Saturday at Major's in Bloomington. The whole gang will be there, we'll have big specials and a raffle for Twins tix, too. Plus, I have a hunch this could be one of the biggest games of the year. Hope to see you there.
Thursday, May 06, 2010
What I Believe
There aren't a lot of good reasons to be a blogger. The pay is nonexistent. The daily appetite of readers is constant. You’re competing in a wide open market for attention without any outside promotion. You're the butt of every joke established media can dream up, and members of the organizations you promote seemingly go out of their way to provide barriers. Hmmm. Let me revise that first sentence.
There is really only one good reason to be a blogger, or, as they were called before weblogs, an independent writer. It's the independent thing. You get to write what you want when you want to write it. You get attention on your own merits. And you can take as many risks as you want without needing to worry about everything you're going to lose. Because, frankly, you don't have a damn thing to lose.We’ll start with the AL standings, but rather than just look at the wins and losses, we’ll see how each team is doing by runs scored and runs against. This is as of midnight:
| EAST | GB | Runs Scored | Runs Against | Run Differential |
| Tampa Bay | - | 160 | 85 | 75 |
| NY Yankees | 1 | 151 | 96 | 55 |
| Toronto | 5 | 140 | 125 | 15 |
| Boston | 6.5 | 139 | 144 | -5 |
| Baltimore | 13.5 | 97 | 144 | -47 |
| CENTRAL | GB | Runs Scored | Runs Against | Run Differential |
| Minnesota | - | 149 | 106 | 43 |
| Detroit | 3.5 | 139 | 135 | 4 |
| Chicago Sox | 7 | 118 | 139 | -21 |
| Kansas City | 8 | 113 | 148 | -35 |
| Cleveland | 8.5 | 95 | 134 | -39 |
| WEST | GB | Runs Scored | Runs Against | Run Differential |
| Oakland | - | 126 | 122 | 4 |
| Texas | 0.5 | 122 | 116 | 6 |
| LA Angels | 3 | 112 | 155 | -43 |
| Seattle | 3 | 91 | 103 | -12 |
What do I think?
I think Oakland or Texas is going to find themselves in the postseason. By default.
But I'll readily admit, I sure didn't think that four weeks ago, so stay tuned.
I had picked the Angels to win the division, because they won 97 games last year, distancing them from the second place Rangers by 10 games. This year they are only 2.5 games back in the standings, but they've already been outscored by 41 runs. That's the second worst differential in the league, ahead of only the 7-21 Orioles. Forget the Red and White Sox - this is the most disappointing team in the American League.
Don't get me wrong - I still don't think they are quite this bad, but they aren't going to compete, and they aren't even going to finish second in this division.
Their pitching is going to get better. There is no reason that staff and that bullpen should be giving up over five runs a game, except – OK, there is one reason. And it may be the critical error GM Kenny Williams and manager Ozzie Guillen made in compiling this team this offseason.
What do I know?
I know the Red Sox don’t matter.
The national media wants to talk about the Red Sox’ demise because the Rays and Yankees, two excellent teams, already have sizable leads over them. That’s not the problem. The problem is that the Red Sox aren’t a very good team. They’re a .500 team, and that’s not going to be good enough in that division. Just ask Toronto, who has played that role for years.
May 14-16 @ NYY
May 25-27 vs. NYYJune 18-20 @ PHL
July 1-4 vs. TBAugust 1-4 @ TB.
Do those series mean everything? No, but they mean something. This team needs to prove that they’re more than first round fodder to the big guns in the AL East. That was abundantly clear as gaffe after gaffe caused them to cough up games last October.
A couple of weeks ago I suggested that the Twins might hold a seven game lead in the division by the time they go on next week’s killer road trip. That's no longer likely to happen, but if it wasn't for that epic meltdown in Game 2 of last week's Detroit series, they would be well on their way.
But that run differential column shows me what Detroit's record doesn't: they are a mediocre team. While I'm willing to concede that their pitching will improve, their lineup is going to hold them back. Beyond their top four hitters, there is nothing to fear in that lineup. And even Magglio Ordonez and Miguel Cabrera will lose some firepower once Austin Jackson comes back to earth.
More TwinsCentric...
- Seth discusses the misdiagnosis of Pat Neshek's "Finger" injury.
- Nick thinks the Twins should be looking to trade Wilson Ramos.- Seth will be on KFAN today (thursday) with Paul Allen around 9:15.
- And don't forget the TwinsCentric and Twins blogger get-together on May 15th at Major's in Bloomington. I'm so excited about laying a beat down on the Yankees in their ballpark I might fly too close to the sun myself.Tuesday, May 04, 2010
Twins 4, Tigers 3: Quick Notes
I took my kids to Target Field for the first time tonight. The most memorable reaction? The Boy asking me "If they put so much money already into this thing, why not add a roof?"
That just about killed me. And I don't mean that in a ha-ha funny way. I mean in a "Oh my god, what have I done to my impressionable young son?" kind of way. Keep in mind that he is named after an outdoor ballpark.
And then, because God wanted to make me his own personal Job for a half hour, he made sure it rained on us for the first couple of innings. The kids enjoyed that quite a bit. So that was nice.
Fortunately, The Big Guy ended up coming through before the night was out. And by "The Big Guy", I mean JJ Hardy. I saw the defensive play and the offensive blast, but I missed how he got the skies to clear in that third inning. Still, it's a skill that should come in handy with an outdoor ballpark, but probably not as much in a place with a retractable roof. No wonder the Brewers were willing to trade him away.
Hey - how is that trade going for the Brewers anyway? I'm honestly asking. I haven't heard Gomez' name since he went 4-5 in that first game. Let's find out....
Since that first game he's 14-62 since then with a .225 batting average. Overall he's hitting .269 with a .310 OBP and 14 K in 67 AB with 4 walks. Those ratios look awfully (emphasis on the first five letters) similar to what we saw here the last two years. And of course he's batting second, where he can do the most damage. But I'm sure his defense makes him worth all of that....
Finally, I have two questions to those who could watch replays at home...
- The miss by Delmon should have been an error, right? It looked from our seats like he had that measured all the way.
- Did Hardy break into a home run trot up to the point where he was rounding first base? It looked like it in the brief replay I saw.
That's it for tonight. The Voice of Reason is waiting out on the stoop for me with a pint of Premium. We'll talk more tomorrow.
That just about killed me. And I don't mean that in a ha-ha funny way. I mean in a "Oh my god, what have I done to my impressionable young son?" kind of way. Keep in mind that he is named after an outdoor ballpark.
And then, because God wanted to make me his own personal Job for a half hour, he made sure it rained on us for the first couple of innings. The kids enjoyed that quite a bit. So that was nice.
Fortunately, The Big Guy ended up coming through before the night was out. And by "The Big Guy", I mean JJ Hardy. I saw the defensive play and the offensive blast, but I missed how he got the skies to clear in that third inning. Still, it's a skill that should come in handy with an outdoor ballpark, but probably not as much in a place with a retractable roof. No wonder the Brewers were willing to trade him away.
Hey - how is that trade going for the Brewers anyway? I'm honestly asking. I haven't heard Gomez' name since he went 4-5 in that first game. Let's find out....
Since that first game he's 14-62 since then with a .225 batting average. Overall he's hitting .269 with a .310 OBP and 14 K in 67 AB with 4 walks. Those ratios look awfully (emphasis on the first five letters) similar to what we saw here the last two years. And of course he's batting second, where he can do the most damage. But I'm sure his defense makes him worth all of that....
Finally, I have two questions to those who could watch replays at home...
- The miss by Delmon should have been an error, right? It looked from our seats like he had that measured all the way.
- Did Hardy break into a home run trot up to the point where he was rounding first base? It looked like it in the brief replay I saw.
That's it for tonight. The Voice of Reason is waiting out on the stoop for me with a pint of Premium. We'll talk more tomorrow.
Thursday, April 29, 2010
How Predictive are Stats?
We use stats a lot in our analysis, and I often cringe when they are used to "prove" something will happen. Frankly, I think anyone who has tried to do that and followed up later probably cringes, too. Because it doesn't take long before a few of those publicly proven predictions come back to bite you in the butt.
Besides cringing, I wonder if the stats really prove anything about the future. For instance, we might say that we expect Delmon Young to be a .280-.290 hitter this year because he hit .284 last year. Or that Michael Cuddyer will have a -25 UZR because it was -26.5 last year. Both seem like reasonable expectations. But are those stats truly predictive? Let's find out:
I pulled all players that qualified for a batting title from 2006 through 2009, and if they qualified in two consecutive years, I matched up their stats in a bunch of basic and advanced hitting statistics. Then I ran a statistical test that shows how predictive they are. It ranks each statistic from 1 to 100. 100 means that you can perfectly predict the following year based on the previous year. 1 means that the following year is totally random compared to the previous year.
I also did this for the UZR and UZR/150 fielding metrics, but for them I used a benchmark of 850 innings played at a position. Why 850? Because it came to about the same number of players that qualified for the batting title each year.
Here are the results:
There are some surprises for me in there:
Besides cringing, I wonder if the stats really prove anything about the future. For instance, we might say that we expect Delmon Young to be a .280-.290 hitter this year because he hit .284 last year. Or that Michael Cuddyer will have a -25 UZR because it was -26.5 last year. Both seem like reasonable expectations. But are those stats truly predictive? Let's find out:
I pulled all players that qualified for a batting title from 2006 through 2009, and if they qualified in two consecutive years, I matched up their stats in a bunch of basic and advanced hitting statistics. Then I ran a statistical test that shows how predictive they are. It ranks each statistic from 1 to 100. 100 means that you can perfectly predict the following year based on the previous year. 1 means that the following year is totally random compared to the previous year.
I also did this for the UZR and UZR/150 fielding metrics, but for them I used a benchmark of 850 innings played at a position. Why 850? Because it came to about the same number of players that qualified for the batting title each year.
Here are the results:
| Stat | Predictive |
| K% | 91 |
| SO | 87 |
| SB | 87 |
| Spd | 82 |
| BB% | 80 |
| BB | 76 |
| HR | 75 |
| ISO | 74 |
| BB/K | 74 |
| IBB | 73 |
| CS | 71 |
| SH | 71 |
| 1B | 70 |
| RBI | 69 |
| HBP | 65 |
| 3B | 61 |
| SLG | 60 |
| OPS | 59 |
| OBP | 59 |
| wRAA | 57 |
| wOBA | 56 |
| wRC | 56 |
| H | 50 |
| GDP | 50 |
| R | 49 |
| UZR/150 | 47 |
| UZR | 45 |
| AVG | 44 |
| AB | 42 |
| BABIP | 37 |
| PA | 37 |
| 2B | 33 |
| SF | 31 |
| G | 23 |
There are some surprises for me in there:
- I'm surprise that batting average is fairly low. It ranks about the same as FIP does to ERA when we studied that a few months ago. That's also about the same for the correlation between Opening Day payroll and number of wins a team has.
- I'm surprised that OBP, SLG and OPS are lower than something like HR and RBI. Note to self: when someone says "He's a 20 HR, 85 RBI guy," don't start talking about his OPS.
- I'm surprised that stats like BB% and K% are so far up at the top of that list. Those are stats that we talk about players improving as they develop plate discipline. It sure doesn't look like that varies very much.
- I'm surprised that BABIP is so low. I've always heard it is fairly consistent and can be counted on to rebound. This doesn't support that at all.
- I'm pleasantly surprised that UZR and UZR/150 aren't at the very bottom of the list. I still have some concerns over its limitation and feel it is often misused, but at least it's somewhat consistent.
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
Twins 2, Tigers 0: Play of the Game
Most of the attention for tonight's victory will (correctly) go to Francisco Liriano and his impressive pitching performance. After all, he went 8 innings on the road against a Detroit Tigers lineup that was desperate to show the Twins that they should be considered competitors this year. He overcame numerous offensive letdowns. And he was simply dominant, announcing to anyone that still doubts him that this winter, spring, and April have not been a fluke.
But for all that effort, the Twins still only led by two runs going into the ninth inning, and seven pitches later the game was seriously in doubt. Johnny Damon had singled on the second pitch and Magglio Ordonez had worked a full count. He bounced that eight pitch to the left side of the diamond, far enough from third baseman Alexi Casilla (who was correctly hugging the third base line) that he wouldn't have had a chance. And in previous years, it was the kind of groundball that a Twins shortstop would've just missed or stopped but not converted to an out.
This was not previous years. JJ Hardy ranged to his right, picked it up and rifled a throw to second base to get the lead runner.
How big was that play? Ironically it was about as big as anything else anyone in the lineup did.
If you look at all MLB baseball games played between 1977 and 2006, there have been 1689 games that the same situation that the Twins had when that play was over: a two-run lead, one out, in the bottom of the ninth with a runner on first base. The visiting team has won 155 of them, or 90.8%
But if that play wasn't made? If it ended with runners on first and second and no outs, the visiting team has won just 72% of the games. So that single play increased the Twins chances of wining that game by 19%.
I'm not going to claim there is a morale to this story. I just thought I should point it out, since I don't think there is a single statistic that is going to do it justice.
But for all that effort, the Twins still only led by two runs going into the ninth inning, and seven pitches later the game was seriously in doubt. Johnny Damon had singled on the second pitch and Magglio Ordonez had worked a full count. He bounced that eight pitch to the left side of the diamond, far enough from third baseman Alexi Casilla (who was correctly hugging the third base line) that he wouldn't have had a chance. And in previous years, it was the kind of groundball that a Twins shortstop would've just missed or stopped but not converted to an out.
This was not previous years. JJ Hardy ranged to his right, picked it up and rifled a throw to second base to get the lead runner.
How big was that play? Ironically it was about as big as anything else anyone in the lineup did.
If you look at all MLB baseball games played between 1977 and 2006, there have been 1689 games that the same situation that the Twins had when that play was over: a two-run lead, one out, in the bottom of the ninth with a runner on first base. The visiting team has won 155 of them, or 90.8%
But if that play wasn't made? If it ended with runners on first and second and no outs, the visiting team has won just 72% of the games. So that single play increased the Twins chances of wining that game by 19%.
I'm not going to claim there is a morale to this story. I just thought I should point it out, since I don't think there is a single statistic that is going to do it justice.
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
Fifty Years, Two Styles
It’s sacrilege to admit such a thing, but I’m not much of a baseball book reader. To be totally honest, I’m not much of a book reader, period. Even in a household with kids just entering their second decade of life, I’m quite sure I’m the least proficient reader in the household, and probably by an order of magnitude.
So it is always with some guilt that I receive books to review. I know I’m not likely to read them all, and without a vacation or long flight coming up, I’m just as likely to not read them at all. But I didn’t let those misgivings stop me from requesting a copy of the StarTribune’s Minnesota Twins: The Complete Illustrated History by Dennis Brackin and Patrick Reusse or We’re Gonna Win Twins: 50 Years of Minnesota’s Hometown Team by Doug Grow. I’m glad I didn’t. They’re both excellent, and while they cover the same topic, they’re very different books, and that’s by design.
The Strib’s effort is trying to be an illustrated history that can be displayed on a coffee table or used as a reference book, and it succeeds. It’s big, it’s got lots of pictures from the Strib’s massive archives, and lots of fun lists like the Top 50 Twins that are distributed throughout it as sidebars. It is by far the more thorough of the two books when it comes to what happened on the field each season.
It should go without saying that both books are well-written in a concise, informative and accurate manner. Brackin, Reusse and Grow should need no introductions due to their tenure as journalists in the area, and I’m not likely to do them justice in trying to recap their careers.
That writing style is especially important in the Strib’s book. It is as extensive and informative as a textbook, and could have easily become a dry as one. Instead, it’s clean, and that neatness allows generous doses of Reusse’s pepper to spice it up. Thus it does double-duty as both something you can show off and actually enjoy reading.
By comparison, Grow’s book is smaller, plainer and with a significantly different goal. It has photos, but they are black and white, and a couple per chapter as opposed to the full scale graphics that the Strib’s book sports. Each year is a chapter, but each chapter might have only a couple of sentences recapping the Twins year, and the rest might be a story or a player that Grow wants to talk about.
And that’s the different goal - to tell a story. Grow’s is the book that I kept finding myself picking up, almost compulsively, the way one picks up a good novel. The chapters build on each other, foreshadow each other, drive one to keep reading. That’s a remarkable achievement considering that most of the readers know how this particular story proceeds.
He gets away with this by mostly ignoring those seasons begging to be ignored. 1985 is almost completely about Andy McPhail. 1986 is almost entirely about Tom Kelly. 2000 is about bobbleheads and I was shocked to find that 2005 was about blogs, including a somewhat bitter Twins Geek.
That’s why I didn’t like one feature that I suspect will be universally mentioned (and more than likely admired) by other reviews. At the start of each chapter there is a short paragraph of what on in each of the following: the world, the nation, the state, pop culture and the season. It’s somewhat interesting, but that belonged in the more structured Strib’s book. In this page-turner, it just got in the way. Get me back to the stories, dammit.
Neither book is cheap (the Strib’s is $30 and Grow’s is $25) but I’ve become a fan of paying for content that I like and is rare. Still, if I had to pick just one to buy…
I’d probably pick both. The Strib’s is probably the more essential guide, one that I’ll pull off the bookshelf when I want to research something. But to me, Grow’s was more fun, and the one that is going to have a longer life on my nightstand.
If you want to hear more about Doug Grow’s book, stop by the Townball Tavern in Target Field on Saturday afternoon from 2:00 to 4:00. He’s having a talk and book signing with Clyde Doepner, the curator for the Twins. It says that you’ll need to enter at the 5th street gate entrance, which I think is Gate 3 (or else Gate 6) near the LRT. That sounds exactly like the kind of event I would love, but I’m afraid I’ll be out of town that weekend, so I’ll need to get him to sign my book some other time.
I had the volume down on the broadcast during the ninth inning last night so I need someone to tell me – did Bert grouch about Francisco Liriano not pitching the ninth inning?
For the record, I wouldn’t have had any problem with sending Liriano out there after throwing 102 pitches. A common misperception is that there is this large body of evidence that teams are taking risks with their pitchers’ health at anything over 100 pitches. But the truth is that there is really only a small body of evidence (just one study that I know of) that suggests any kind of effect - and that’s mostly an effect in performance, and it starts at 120 pitches. So if Gardenhire felt like the bullpen could use the break or that getting the shutout would’ve helped Liriano’s confidence, I say go for it.
Not that I had any problem with throwing Crain out there either. He needed the work.
Thanks to MLB.com’s At-Bat iPhone App, I’ve been listening pretty regularly to opposing team’s radio announcers. Last night’s Cleveland announcers, by the bottom of the second inning, had awarded the 2010 AL Central title to the Twins. Good times.
For more good times, you might want to follow me on Twitter this weekend. It could be especially interesting/embarrassing/non-existent as I’ll spend some time in Vegas. You’ve been warned.
So it is always with some guilt that I receive books to review. I know I’m not likely to read them all, and without a vacation or long flight coming up, I’m just as likely to not read them at all. But I didn’t let those misgivings stop me from requesting a copy of the StarTribune’s Minnesota Twins: The Complete Illustrated History by Dennis Brackin and Patrick Reusse or We’re Gonna Win Twins: 50 Years of Minnesota’s Hometown Team by Doug Grow. I’m glad I didn’t. They’re both excellent, and while they cover the same topic, they’re very different books, and that’s by design.
The Strib’s effort is trying to be an illustrated history that can be displayed on a coffee table or used as a reference book, and it succeeds. It’s big, it’s got lots of pictures from the Strib’s massive archives, and lots of fun lists like the Top 50 Twins that are distributed throughout it as sidebars. It is by far the more thorough of the two books when it comes to what happened on the field each season.
It should go without saying that both books are well-written in a concise, informative and accurate manner. Brackin, Reusse and Grow should need no introductions due to their tenure as journalists in the area, and I’m not likely to do them justice in trying to recap their careers.
That writing style is especially important in the Strib’s book. It is as extensive and informative as a textbook, and could have easily become a dry as one. Instead, it’s clean, and that neatness allows generous doses of Reusse’s pepper to spice it up. Thus it does double-duty as both something you can show off and actually enjoy reading.
By comparison, Grow’s book is smaller, plainer and with a significantly different goal. It has photos, but they are black and white, and a couple per chapter as opposed to the full scale graphics that the Strib’s book sports. Each year is a chapter, but each chapter might have only a couple of sentences recapping the Twins year, and the rest might be a story or a player that Grow wants to talk about.
And that’s the different goal - to tell a story. Grow’s is the book that I kept finding myself picking up, almost compulsively, the way one picks up a good novel. The chapters build on each other, foreshadow each other, drive one to keep reading. That’s a remarkable achievement considering that most of the readers know how this particular story proceeds.
He gets away with this by mostly ignoring those seasons begging to be ignored. 1985 is almost completely about Andy McPhail. 1986 is almost entirely about Tom Kelly. 2000 is about bobbleheads and I was shocked to find that 2005 was about blogs, including a somewhat bitter Twins Geek.
That’s why I didn’t like one feature that I suspect will be universally mentioned (and more than likely admired) by other reviews. At the start of each chapter there is a short paragraph of what on in each of the following: the world, the nation, the state, pop culture and the season. It’s somewhat interesting, but that belonged in the more structured Strib’s book. In this page-turner, it just got in the way. Get me back to the stories, dammit.
Neither book is cheap (the Strib’s is $30 and Grow’s is $25) but I’ve become a fan of paying for content that I like and is rare. Still, if I had to pick just one to buy…
I’d probably pick both. The Strib’s is probably the more essential guide, one that I’ll pull off the bookshelf when I want to research something. But to me, Grow’s was more fun, and the one that is going to have a longer life on my nightstand.
***
If you want to hear more about Doug Grow’s book, stop by the Townball Tavern in Target Field on Saturday afternoon from 2:00 to 4:00. He’s having a talk and book signing with Clyde Doepner, the curator for the Twins. It says that you’ll need to enter at the 5th street gate entrance, which I think is Gate 3 (or else Gate 6) near the LRT. That sounds exactly like the kind of event I would love, but I’m afraid I’ll be out of town that weekend, so I’ll need to get him to sign my book some other time.
***
I had the volume down on the broadcast during the ninth inning last night so I need someone to tell me – did Bert grouch about Francisco Liriano not pitching the ninth inning?
For the record, I wouldn’t have had any problem with sending Liriano out there after throwing 102 pitches. A common misperception is that there is this large body of evidence that teams are taking risks with their pitchers’ health at anything over 100 pitches. But the truth is that there is really only a small body of evidence (just one study that I know of) that suggests any kind of effect - and that’s mostly an effect in performance, and it starts at 120 pitches. So if Gardenhire felt like the bullpen could use the break or that getting the shutout would’ve helped Liriano’s confidence, I say go for it.
Not that I had any problem with throwing Crain out there either. He needed the work.
****
Thanks to MLB.com’s At-Bat iPhone App, I’ve been listening pretty regularly to opposing team’s radio announcers. Last night’s Cleveland announcers, by the bottom of the second inning, had awarded the 2010 AL Central title to the Twins. Good times.
***
For more good times, you might want to follow me on Twitter this weekend. It could be especially interesting/embarrassing/non-existent as I’ll spend some time in Vegas. You’ve been warned.
Tuesday, April 20, 2010
Back-of-the-Napkin Analysis: Have Bullpens Become Better?
Sometimes it’s what you don’t see that’s important.
Monday night I was in my first live chat session, hosted by Phil Mackey of ESPN 1500. Semi-predictably, I settleD into the role of elderly curmudgeon, ala Patrick Reusse, except without the charm. That became especially apparent when the topic of bullpen usage came up.
In 1985, Bill James tackled the changing role of relievers in Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract. He noted the changing roleS and predicted further changes. And he was right, as roles became more defined and we saw the rise of the one-inning closer by the 90s. No longer did we see the best relief pitcher enter the game at a critical time early in the game. Their new role was to protect a lead in the ninth inning.
It’s become a hotly debated topic, especially when a game is lost, and I find myself on the opposite side of it than many of my peers. I have no problem with stricter roles in a bullpen, even if that means "saving" the closer for the end of the game. I suspect there are long-term benefits that equal the short-term gain in using them in a more flexible manner:
TwinsGeek: But Mackey, managing a bullpen could be similar to managing any other group of people - they perform best when expectations are set.
Aaron Gleeman: Plenty of setup men seem to do just fine being thrown into all kinds of spots without knowing exactly when and where.
Phil Mackey: Right TwinsGeek, but they'd get used to it.
But Monday night was the first time I really asked myself the question:
TwinsGeek: So do we thing that bullpen's blow MORE games now than they did before 1985? Do we have any evidence of this?
Aaron Gleeman: John, bullpens now also have 3-4 extra pitchers and specialized roles. So you'd expect them to be better, in general.
So let’s do a little back-of-the-napkin analysis today around this. I’m hoping to get a sense whether:
(On caveat – I’m going to skip two years. I’m going to skip 1999 because the site that I’m using doesn’t have any data for 1999. And I’m going to skip 1994 because it was the strike-shortened year. Because of that, I'm not comfortable with the sample data size, because I'm seeing some goofy results. For instance, in 1994 fewer teams could hold a one-run lead going into the eighth than could hold a one-run lead going into the seventh. Think about that for a minute.)
So, how does it look? For year to year comparisons, it’s a little bit of a mess:
Yikes, that's like my EKG during Game 163. It’s hard to see any trends here because the data jumps around a lot. So let’s smooth it a bit by taking the average for every five-year period instead…..
That’s odd. During the late 70s and 80s, bullpens didn’t change very much in protecting a ninth inning lead – that green line is pretty level at first. However, teams got about 5% better at preserving a win in the seventh or eighth inning between 1982 and 1990. That’s a very strange result if, as the theory goes, the best relievers were being moved to work strictly the ninth inning. I’d expect exactly the opposite – a slight uptick for that green line and declines in the red and blue lines.
I’d also feel a lot more comfortable if those lines evened off a bit in the 90s, but instead they decline slightly back to previous levels, except for the eighth inning guy who had a couple of very good years in 2001 and 2002. So there are obvious plenty of other factors impacting these lines. It might be that the previous increase in middle-relief effectiveness had nothing at all to do with the change in usage.
But I think one thing that I don’t see here is relevant. I don’t see any evidence that at any macro-level, the change in bullpen usage that swept through the 80s hurt team’s ability to hold onto one-run leads. We can claim that utilizing a team’s best relievers in this new modern way isn’t particularly smart, but it sure doesn’t look like it spectacularly stupid, either.
Monday night I was in my first live chat session, hosted by Phil Mackey of ESPN 1500. Semi-predictably, I settleD into the role of elderly curmudgeon, ala Patrick Reusse, except without the charm. That became especially apparent when the topic of bullpen usage came up.
In 1985, Bill James tackled the changing role of relievers in Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract. He noted the changing roleS and predicted further changes. And he was right, as roles became more defined and we saw the rise of the one-inning closer by the 90s. No longer did we see the best relief pitcher enter the game at a critical time early in the game. Their new role was to protect a lead in the ninth inning.
It’s become a hotly debated topic, especially when a game is lost, and I find myself on the opposite side of it than many of my peers. I have no problem with stricter roles in a bullpen, even if that means "saving" the closer for the end of the game. I suspect there are long-term benefits that equal the short-term gain in using them in a more flexible manner:
TwinsGeek: But Mackey, managing a bullpen could be similar to managing any other group of people - they perform best when expectations are set.
Aaron Gleeman: Plenty of setup men seem to do just fine being thrown into all kinds of spots without knowing exactly when and where.
Phil Mackey: Right TwinsGeek, but they'd get used to it.
But Monday night was the first time I really asked myself the question:
TwinsGeek: So do we thing that bullpen's blow MORE games now than they did before 1985? Do we have any evidence of this?
Aaron Gleeman: John, bullpens now also have 3-4 extra pitchers and specialized roles. So you'd expect them to be better, in general.
So let’s do a little back-of-the-napkin analysis today around this. I’m hoping to get a sense whether:
- Have teams become better at winning games with close scores, and did this happen at about the same time as the rise of the closer?
- Is it possible that while saving the "closer" for late innings helps the team preserve late leads that it has had a similar negative impact on leads earlier?
(On caveat – I’m going to skip two years. I’m going to skip 1999 because the site that I’m using doesn’t have any data for 1999. And I’m going to skip 1994 because it was the strike-shortened year. Because of that, I'm not comfortable with the sample data size, because I'm seeing some goofy results. For instance, in 1994 fewer teams could hold a one-run lead going into the eighth than could hold a one-run lead going into the seventh. Think about that for a minute.)
So, how does it look? For year to year comparisons, it’s a little bit of a mess:
Yikes, that's like my EKG during Game 163. It’s hard to see any trends here because the data jumps around a lot. So let’s smooth it a bit by taking the average for every five-year period instead…..
That’s odd. During the late 70s and 80s, bullpens didn’t change very much in protecting a ninth inning lead – that green line is pretty level at first. However, teams got about 5% better at preserving a win in the seventh or eighth inning between 1982 and 1990. That’s a very strange result if, as the theory goes, the best relievers were being moved to work strictly the ninth inning. I’d expect exactly the opposite – a slight uptick for that green line and declines in the red and blue lines.
I’d also feel a lot more comfortable if those lines evened off a bit in the 90s, but instead they decline slightly back to previous levels, except for the eighth inning guy who had a couple of very good years in 2001 and 2002. So there are obvious plenty of other factors impacting these lines. It might be that the previous increase in middle-relief effectiveness had nothing at all to do with the change in usage.
But I think one thing that I don’t see here is relevant. I don’t see any evidence that at any macro-level, the change in bullpen usage that swept through the 80s hurt team’s ability to hold onto one-run leads. We can claim that utilizing a team’s best relievers in this new modern way isn’t particularly smart, but it sure doesn’t look like it spectacularly stupid, either.
Monday, April 19, 2010
A Second Chance for Twins Fans
For today's post, please click over to the Downtown Journal, where I wrote about the impact the Twins last new stadium had on the Twins.
Also, tonight I'll be taking part in a live chat at 8:00 Central over at the http://1500espn.com/ with Seth Stohs, Parker Hageman, Phil Mackey and Aaron Gleeman. I've never done one of these before, and am interested to see just how much trouble I can get into. I hope to talk to you there.
Also, tonight I'll be taking part in a live chat at 8:00 Central over at the http://1500espn.com/ with Seth Stohs, Parker Hageman, Phil Mackey and Aaron Gleeman. I've never done one of these before, and am interested to see just how much trouble I can get into. I hope to talk to you there.
Friday, April 16, 2010
Three Final Points about Race Biases in Baseball
Is Jermaine Dye a decent example of a player that might have been affected by race biases in baseball? I think so, and especially so this year.
I would characterize Dye as an aging, defensively challenged corner outfielder who can still mash. This year, there were three other players on the market who have that same skill set: Bobby Abreu, Hideki Matsui, and Vladimir Guerrero. Let’s just quickly draw up the most relevant facts about each:
Dye – 35 years old, 793 OPS in 2009 & UZR was -20,
Abreu – 35 year old, 825 OPS in 2009 & UZR was -11 (signed for $19M/2 years)
Matsui – 35 years old, 876 OPS in 2009 & he really only played DH (signed for $6M/1 year)
Guerrero – 34 years old, 794 OPS in 2009 & her really only played DH (signed for $6.5M/1 year)
Dye has two characteristic that I thought made him more like Abreu than Matsui and Guerrero: he’s stayed healthy and he’s stayed in the outfield. The two are related, by the way. Both Matsui and Guerrero were just as shaky in the outfield as Dye, but what really moved them to DH is that they couldn’t stay healthy out there. Dye remains an option in the outfield, or at least he and his agent thought so.
But there aren’t huge differences between these guys, and I can understand and respect others opinions. I suspect it is the same in GM offices. They look at these four guys, and if they need that type of player, they give the offer to whichever one their gut tells them they like best.
Of course, that’s where an unconscious bias might play a role. “I’ve always like Guerrero’s makeup”, one assistant GM will say, and everyone else will nod. And for some reason, he didn’t say “I’ve always liked Dye’s makeup.” Not because he disliked Dye, but just because he never thought of him quite the same way as he thought of Guerrero, for whatever reason.
On the other hand, if you’re a GM, and any of those guys look good, maybe you’re willing to sign the guy that says “yes” at the price you want. There is ample evidence that guy repeatedly wasn’t Dye, so maybe he and his agent are the victims of their own bad driving. We can’t tell, but I’m personally puzzled why Dye was ultimately valued lower in the market than these other guys. And I don't think it's crazy to think an unconscious race bias could have been a subtle contributing factor.
And while we’re taking a look at the free agency market, anyone want to guess who was the top free agent second baseman in our Offseason GM Handbook? Yep. It was Orlando Hudson. But he certainly wasn’t the guy that signed the best contract. Think that might be in the back of his mind?
Orlando Hudson is a couple years younger than Placido Polanco, who signed a 3-year/ $18 million contract (compared to Hudson’s $5M/1 year deal). Of course, Polanco was able to sign that deal in part because he was moving to third base.
Mark DeRosa signed a 2-year/ $12 million deal with the Giants. He’s three years older than Hudson, had a lower OPS, doesn’t have a gold glove and was hurt a good chunk of last year. Of course, he’s also switching positions away from second base, moving to left field. So maybe in both of those cases it’s their arm strength that made them worth the extra years and millions.
The Giants also made a commitment to Freddy Sanchez, who they paid $12 million over two years to not be a free agent. He is Hudson’s age, and spent the end of last year not playing because of knee problems.
Hudson didn’t necessarily get a raw deal this year. And there was plenty of rumors that indicated that he and his agent needed to adjust their market expectations, which Dye apparently needed to do too. But I find it interesting that Hudson himself might be looking at the free agent market from last year and wonder how MLB teams were evaluating him lower than some other players. And what might have caused it.
OK, follow my math here…
According to Major League Baseball, 73% of all major leaguers are American born. And it's my understanding that 12% of the US population is black. So 12% of that 73% should be black if African-Americans are to be fairly represented by major league baseball players. 12% of 73% is 8.8%.
But according to the stories I read yesterday, 10% of major league rosters are black players. So doesn’t this mean that black are overrepresented on major league baseball rosters? Is this really a problem?
I would characterize Dye as an aging, defensively challenged corner outfielder who can still mash. This year, there were three other players on the market who have that same skill set: Bobby Abreu, Hideki Matsui, and Vladimir Guerrero. Let’s just quickly draw up the most relevant facts about each:
Dye – 35 years old, 793 OPS in 2009 & UZR was -20,
Abreu – 35 year old, 825 OPS in 2009 & UZR was -11 (signed for $19M/2 years)
Matsui – 35 years old, 876 OPS in 2009 & he really only played DH (signed for $6M/1 year)
Guerrero – 34 years old, 794 OPS in 2009 & her really only played DH (signed for $6.5M/1 year)
Dye has two characteristic that I thought made him more like Abreu than Matsui and Guerrero: he’s stayed healthy and he’s stayed in the outfield. The two are related, by the way. Both Matsui and Guerrero were just as shaky in the outfield as Dye, but what really moved them to DH is that they couldn’t stay healthy out there. Dye remains an option in the outfield, or at least he and his agent thought so.
But there aren’t huge differences between these guys, and I can understand and respect others opinions. I suspect it is the same in GM offices. They look at these four guys, and if they need that type of player, they give the offer to whichever one their gut tells them they like best.
Of course, that’s where an unconscious bias might play a role. “I’ve always like Guerrero’s makeup”, one assistant GM will say, and everyone else will nod. And for some reason, he didn’t say “I’ve always liked Dye’s makeup.” Not because he disliked Dye, but just because he never thought of him quite the same way as he thought of Guerrero, for whatever reason.
On the other hand, if you’re a GM, and any of those guys look good, maybe you’re willing to sign the guy that says “yes” at the price you want. There is ample evidence that guy repeatedly wasn’t Dye, so maybe he and his agent are the victims of their own bad driving. We can’t tell, but I’m personally puzzled why Dye was ultimately valued lower in the market than these other guys. And I don't think it's crazy to think an unconscious race bias could have been a subtle contributing factor.
~~~~
And while we’re taking a look at the free agency market, anyone want to guess who was the top free agent second baseman in our Offseason GM Handbook? Yep. It was Orlando Hudson. But he certainly wasn’t the guy that signed the best contract. Think that might be in the back of his mind?
Orlando Hudson is a couple years younger than Placido Polanco, who signed a 3-year/ $18 million contract (compared to Hudson’s $5M/1 year deal). Of course, Polanco was able to sign that deal in part because he was moving to third base.
Mark DeRosa signed a 2-year/ $12 million deal with the Giants. He’s three years older than Hudson, had a lower OPS, doesn’t have a gold glove and was hurt a good chunk of last year. Of course, he’s also switching positions away from second base, moving to left field. So maybe in both of those cases it’s their arm strength that made them worth the extra years and millions.
The Giants also made a commitment to Freddy Sanchez, who they paid $12 million over two years to not be a free agent. He is Hudson’s age, and spent the end of last year not playing because of knee problems.
Hudson didn’t necessarily get a raw deal this year. And there was plenty of rumors that indicated that he and his agent needed to adjust their market expectations, which Dye apparently needed to do too. But I find it interesting that Hudson himself might be looking at the free agent market from last year and wonder how MLB teams were evaluating him lower than some other players. And what might have caused it.
~~~~
OK, follow my math here…
According to Major League Baseball, 73% of all major leaguers are American born. And it's my understanding that 12% of the US population is black. So 12% of that 73% should be black if African-Americans are to be fairly represented by major league baseball players. 12% of 73% is 8.8%.
But according to the stories I read yesterday, 10% of major league rosters are black players. So doesn’t this mean that black are overrepresented on major league baseball rosters? Is this really a problem?
Wednesday, April 14, 2010
Maybe Hudson Got It Right
"We both know what it is. You’ll get it right. You’ll figure it out. I’m not gonna say it because then I’ll be in [trouble].”
Give the media some credit. We got it right. We figured it out. And whether Orlando Hudson said the word "racism" or not, he's in trouble. But not for the reason he should be.
The problem is not that he raised this issue. When Orlando Hudson hinted that Jermaine Dye and Gary Sheffield couldn’t get a job in part because of the color of their skin, he couldn’t have timed his comment much better. This week, and today of all days, the issue should be raised. Today Major League Baseball celebrates Jackie Robinson Day, the day that Jackie Robinson first broke the color barrier. This is exactly the day and the week that we SHOULD cut some slack to those willing to take on the risks inherent in talking about race biases.
No, the problem is that Hudson didn't talk enough. By only hinting at the argument, he left it for us to interpret his thoughts. It also allowed us to construct straw dogs, easily torn to pieces. Do we really need media heads to bravely declare that there isn't some conspiracy in the higher offices in major league baseball? Is that what we really think was being suggested?
I'll give the nine-year veteran a little more credit than that.
One doesn't need a conspiracy to be affected by racism, and we have ample proof of that. The most recent sports-related proof is a study three years ago which was wildly misrepresented because of when it was reported. In 2007, Joseph Price of Cornell University & Justin Wolfers from University of Pennsylvania conducted a study on racial discrimination among NBA referees. Using game data they examined statistically whether teams of referees who were predominantly one race called more fouls on players of the opposing race. They did.
“Against these baselines, we find systematic evidence of an own-race bias. Players earn up to 4 percent fewer fouls or score up to 2½ percent more points when they are the recipients of a positive own-race bias, rather than a negative opposite-race effect.” (link)
The study was publicized during the same time period as the Tim Donaghy scandal, and so the coverage generally followed the same tack as the headline from this CBS News story: Study On Race Calls Foul On NBA Referees. The NBA scrambled to do damage control and there was lots of debate, but the main point was missed. The point of the study wasn't to prove that NBA refs were racist. It was to demonstrate that we all have our own race biases in hidden ways.
NBA referees were studied precisely because it is so ludicrous to suggest that their group is racist. They work in a highly integrated environment with differing races working together every day. They are constantly scrutinized in public, making even the slightest tendency obvious. They are rewarded and penalized based on their fairness and objectivity. You would be hard-pressed to find another group of people who could be held as a higher example of NOT having a same-race bias.
It would be almost impossible to show anecdotally that NBA referees have any race bias. But it was unquestionable when done statistically. In the split-second in which a referee must make a decision about whether a foul was committed, they are slightly more likely to make a call against a player of an opposing race.
(By the way, the study did not differentiate between the races. The abstract clearly states “Our results do not distinguish whether the bias stems from the actions of white or black referees.”)
What is important about this study isn't that the NBA refs have a race bias. What is important is that they display a same-race bias that isn't – and really couldn’t be - conscious. It doesn't affect all fouls - just the marginal ones. It can’t be proven anecdotally, only statistically. It’s there, it’s real, and it’s almost impossible to put your finger on.
Does something similar exist in the major league baseball free agency market that only affects fairly marginal players, like Dye? I can’t find any study that says so, but there has been a similar study done for the NBA and was referenced in the Price and Wolfers’ study. It was conducted by Lawrence Kahn of Cornell and Malav Shah of Emory University. (link) The abstract notes:
“We study race and pay in the NBA for 2001-2002. For players who were neither free agents nor on rookie scale contracts, there were large, statistically significant ceteris paribus nonwhite shortfalls in salary, total compensation, and contract duration. But for players under the rookie salary scale (first-round draft picks) and free agents, race effects were small and insignificant. These results suggest discrimination against marginal nonwhite players.”
The Price and Wolfers study is a good place for the MLB free agency discussion to begin. We know that same-race biases exist in sports and we know that they are not easily erased, even given the best efforts of leagues. Would it really surprise us if a similar problem existed within the highly charged free agent market? If it did, would a couple of aging, defensively challenged ballplayers of African-American heritage like Dye and Sheffield be adversely affected? (Especially, if like Dye, the player reportedly erred in turning down some fairly substantial contract offers a few months ago?)
It’s legitimate to debate the degree which race bias might play when predominantly white front offices evaluate free agents like Dye and Sheffield. It may be significant, or maybe it isn’t. But before that conversation takes place, we need to welcome people, ballplayers included, that raise the issue. We need to recognize that biases exist, and not construct straw dogs that can be easily torn down. We may not get to the truth, but we’ll at least raise some awareness, and on this day, sports fans should be all about awareness.
That’s how we figure it out. That’s how we get it right.
- Orlando Hudson
Give the media some credit. We got it right. We figured it out. And whether Orlando Hudson said the word "racism" or not, he's in trouble. But not for the reason he should be.
I'll give the nine-year veteran a little more credit than that.
One doesn't need a conspiracy to be affected by racism, and we have ample proof of that. The most recent sports-related proof is a study three years ago which was wildly misrepresented because of when it was reported. In 2007, Joseph Price of Cornell University & Justin Wolfers from University of Pennsylvania conducted a study on racial discrimination among NBA referees. Using game data they examined statistically whether teams of referees who were predominantly one race called more fouls on players of the opposing race. They did.
The study was publicized during the same time period as the Tim Donaghy scandal, and so the coverage generally followed the same tack as the headline from this CBS News story: Study On Race Calls Foul On NBA Referees. The NBA scrambled to do damage control and there was lots of debate, but the main point was missed. The point of the study wasn't to prove that NBA refs were racist. It was to demonstrate that we all have our own race biases in hidden ways.
NBA referees were studied precisely because it is so ludicrous to suggest that their group is racist. They work in a highly integrated environment with differing races working together every day. They are constantly scrutinized in public, making even the slightest tendency obvious. They are rewarded and penalized based on their fairness and objectivity. You would be hard-pressed to find another group of people who could be held as a higher example of NOT having a same-race bias.
It would be almost impossible to show anecdotally that NBA referees have any race bias. But it was unquestionable when done statistically. In the split-second in which a referee must make a decision about whether a foul was committed, they are slightly more likely to make a call against a player of an opposing race.
(By the way, the study did not differentiate between the races. The abstract clearly states “Our results do not distinguish whether the bias stems from the actions of white or black referees.”)
What is important about this study isn't that the NBA refs have a race bias. What is important is that they display a same-race bias that isn't – and really couldn’t be - conscious. It doesn't affect all fouls - just the marginal ones. It can’t be proven anecdotally, only statistically. It’s there, it’s real, and it’s almost impossible to put your finger on.
Does something similar exist in the major league baseball free agency market that only affects fairly marginal players, like Dye? I can’t find any study that says so, but there has been a similar study done for the NBA and was referenced in the Price and Wolfers’ study. It was conducted by Lawrence Kahn of Cornell and Malav Shah of Emory University. (link) The abstract notes:
“We study race and pay in the NBA for 2001-2002. For players who were neither free agents nor on rookie scale contracts, there were large, statistically significant ceteris paribus nonwhite shortfalls in salary, total compensation, and contract duration. But for players under the rookie salary scale (first-round draft picks) and free agents, race effects were small and insignificant. These results suggest discrimination against marginal nonwhite players.”
The Price and Wolfers study is a good place for the MLB free agency discussion to begin. We know that same-race biases exist in sports and we know that they are not easily erased, even given the best efforts of leagues. Would it really surprise us if a similar problem existed within the highly charged free agent market? If it did, would a couple of aging, defensively challenged ballplayers of African-American heritage like Dye and Sheffield be adversely affected? (Especially, if like Dye, the player reportedly erred in turning down some fairly substantial contract offers a few months ago?)
It’s legitimate to debate the degree which race bias might play when predominantly white front offices evaluate free agents like Dye and Sheffield. It may be significant, or maybe it isn’t. But before that conversation takes place, we need to welcome people, ballplayers included, that raise the issue. We need to recognize that biases exist, and not construct straw dogs that can be easily torn down. We may not get to the truth, but we’ll at least raise some awareness, and on this day, sports fans should be all about awareness.
Tuesday, April 13, 2010
Peeking Ahead
Q: What is the most exciting part about the Twins fast start?
A: That it could be have just as easily gone exactly the other way.
Start with a west coast road trip to the 97-win Los Angeles Angels, followed by road games at the division rival's ballpark. Add in a brutal travel schedule that included flights from Florida to Minnesota to Los Angeles to Chicago and back to Minneapolis. It also didn't include a getaway day prior to Chicago, and then there was no break before the home opener.
It's conceivable that the Twins could've taken just one game in Anaheim and one game in Chicago, then laid an egg in the emotional and distracted home opener. That would have been a 2-6 start, and it still would've been hard to be too critical, given the other challenges. Instead they're 6-2 with two games coming up against the Red Sox and then....
Well, then is when it gets interesting, because the Twins play their next 18 games versus their division. KC and Cleveland come to the new ballpark, then the Twins travel to Kansas City, Detroit and Cleveland, before coming back to face Detroit, Baltimore and finally a pair of game versus the White Sox. Unless you have a high opinion of the Tigers (and I don't) that stretch looks mighty inviting.
Things get tough again in mid-May. The Twins travel to Yankee Stadium, to Toronto, and then to Boston. They come home to face the Brewers and then then Yankees again. So by May 27th, the Twins are completely done with the Yankees and Red Sox and only have three games left against the Angels, and those are at home.
Not that there aren't other challenges. The interleague schedule includes a visit to Philadelphia and Milwaukee, as well as a home series against the Braves and Rockies. The Twins also have eight games against that other AL East team, the Tampa Bay Devil Rays. And if the Mariners and Rangers fufill the promise that many see in them, the Twins will need to navigate through 20 games with those two teams.
But still, by the end of May, the Twins will be almost done with last year's American League playoff teams. They'll have had a chance to put some distance between themselves and most of the rest of the division. And now, because of a hot start, they get to start that stretch already near the top of the division.
A: That it could be have just as easily gone exactly the other way.
Start with a west coast road trip to the 97-win Los Angeles Angels, followed by road games at the division rival's ballpark. Add in a brutal travel schedule that included flights from Florida to Minnesota to Los Angeles to Chicago and back to Minneapolis. It also didn't include a getaway day prior to Chicago, and then there was no break before the home opener.
It's conceivable that the Twins could've taken just one game in Anaheim and one game in Chicago, then laid an egg in the emotional and distracted home opener. That would have been a 2-6 start, and it still would've been hard to be too critical, given the other challenges. Instead they're 6-2 with two games coming up against the Red Sox and then....
Well, then is when it gets interesting, because the Twins play their next 18 games versus their division. KC and Cleveland come to the new ballpark, then the Twins travel to Kansas City, Detroit and Cleveland, before coming back to face Detroit, Baltimore and finally a pair of game versus the White Sox. Unless you have a high opinion of the Tigers (and I don't) that stretch looks mighty inviting.
Things get tough again in mid-May. The Twins travel to Yankee Stadium, to Toronto, and then to Boston. They come home to face the Brewers and then then Yankees again. So by May 27th, the Twins are completely done with the Yankees and Red Sox and only have three games left against the Angels, and those are at home.
Not that there aren't other challenges. The interleague schedule includes a visit to Philadelphia and Milwaukee, as well as a home series against the Braves and Rockies. The Twins also have eight games against that other AL East team, the Tampa Bay Devil Rays. And if the Mariners and Rangers fufill the promise that many see in them, the Twins will need to navigate through 20 games with those two teams.
But still, by the end of May, the Twins will be almost done with last year's American League playoff teams. They'll have had a chance to put some distance between themselves and most of the rest of the division. And now, because of a hot start, they get to start that stretch already near the top of the division.
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