To help answer questions about the Kay report, and many others that may have resulted from what seems now to be the constant attention on weapons of mass destruction, we consulted Jonathan Tucker, a senior researcher at the Monterey Institute for Nonprofileration Studies and the author of “Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox”. We also consulted a U.S. government publication, “Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction”.

The questions are divided into two categories, chemical and biological weapons. Nuclear weapons, because it would have made this article too lengthy and because they’re much easier to detect than biological and chemical, have been excluded.

Q: Which chemical weapons is Iraq suspected of having?

A: Iraq, a crouching tiger before the ‘91 Gulf War, was known to have a large selection of WMDs. Its chemical weapons included mustard gas and a variety of nerve agents, including tabun, sarin, cylosarin, and VX. These chemical weapons, however, were not stable. That is, during the Iran-Iraq war, in the eighties, if the chemical weapons were not used within weeks of production, they were military ineffective.

Q: How hard is it to produce a chemical WMD? Could my neighbor, who has an undergraduate degree in chemistry, do it?

A: It depends. Regarding chemical weapons, according to Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, there are some specialized steps for major chemical production. It can be assumed, however, that your neighbor isn’t interested in producing large amounts. More importantly, detailed examples are found in the open literature that follow from standard engineering principles. So, with a lot of investment in education, time and money, your neighbor could probably do it.

It’s easier to develop biological weapons. The biotechnology industry, unlike almost all other industries, is information, rather than, capital-intensive. As with chemical weapons, the published literature is so widespread that it’s available to almost anyone. Also, and more importantly, it only requires a modestly sophisticated pharmaceutical industry. That is, nearly all of the equipment needed for large-scale production of pathogens and toxins is dual-use, equipment that can be used for legitimate uses, such as vaccines, as well as for illicit ones, and is available widely on the international market.

Q: Assuming that Iraq, recently, produced chemical weapons but destroyed them, could they still be detected?

A: It depends upon which type of chemical weapon was destroyed and under which conditions they were preserved. Mustard and nerve agents, for instance, leave long-lived chemical residues that can persist for weeks, and sometimes years, after production. An instrument known as a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer can detect telltale chemicals at levels down to a few parts per trillion.

Q: What munitions did Iraq have? That is, what delivery systems did Iraq have to disperse WMDs?

A: “They developed a number of different delivery systems, including artillery shells and rockets for chemical weapons and aerial bombs and missile warheads for both chemical and biological weapons. They also developed s drop tank sprayer for chemical and biological weapons,” answered Johnathon Tucker. Also, it should be noted, in Colin Powell’s presentation at the U.N., he claimed that Iraq’s unmanned aerial vehicle, in a circular test, could travel 500 kilometers, but this claim hasn’t been confirmed.

Q: Why can’t all of the chemicals and production tools to make WMDs simply be internationally banned?

A: The problem is that some intermediate chemicals that have legitimate industrial uses can also be used to make chemical weapons. For instance, for the production of nerve agents, a chemical weapon, are common chemicals such as ammonia, ethanol, isopropanol, sodium cyanide, yellow phosphorus, sulfur monochloride, hydrogen flouride and sulfur. These chemicals, which are commodity chemicals for many products, are sold by the hundreds of tons each year. It’s impossible to monitor them. Also, and more importantly, these chemicals have legitimate industrial uses. For instance, the same chemicals that can make a nerve agent, can also make flame retardants, hydraulic fluids, insecticides, plastics, and silicon.

Q: Why isn’t possible to just ask where the WMDs are?

A: Defectors can of course be of great value in finding WMDs. However, in this war, according to Jonathan Tucker, their reliability is unproven. “They can be helpful but their information is of questionable reliability. Many defectors have an ax to grind or a political agenda or are seeking asylum and tend to exaggerate or elaborate. And that appears to be the problem in the recent Iraq war, in terms of the reliability of defector’s information...I think the intelligence community has learned that defectors are a double edged sword.”

Q: Couldn’t a weapon’s inspector just know if a plant was producing a WMD? Isn’t there something unique about the plant layout or isn’t there something that could give away that there was an intention to produce WMDs?

A: There are at least three ways of detecting, upon inspection of a chemical plant, if it’s producing chemical weapons. Those five ways are: internal production signatures, corrosion-resistant materials, safety and pollution control equipment, and waste treatment and disposal. Each method will be briefly explained.

Internal production signatures refers to the chemical plant’s layout and design. There are subtle changes that can signal that the plant may be producing chemical weapons. For instance, some changes may be made that may not make engineering or economic sense. A plant that is designed to work with highly toxic materials may have double seals and other safety measures, which probably won’t be found in most chemical plants. Also, in many chemical plants, steam-clouds are a common feature of chemical plants. In a plant, however, that was producing nerve agents, which react explosively with water, heat-exchange fluids are and heating oil, both of which require cooling towers, would have to replace the steam vents, which generate the steam-clouds.

The problem with the latter explanation is that there are legitimate plants that don’t generate steam-clouds. Those, for instance, that use organic solvents or mineral oils rather than steam or water. Also, it’s of course possible to simply generate steam-clouds, to make it appear as if it is a conventional chemical plant.

Corrosion-resistant materials are an important part of generating WMDs. The chemicals, such as nerve agents, are so corrosive that they easily damage almost all equipment that’s not corrosion-resistant. The most common type of this equipment, called Hastalloy, is difficult to get because of export controls. However, because some chemical plants use Hastalloy as a cost-effective means to avoid changing equipment, and because it’s possible to use, say, stainless-steel temporarily, the use of corrosive-resistant equipment is not a signal that chemical weapons are likely being produced.

Because chemical weapons are much more toxic than conventional chemicals, it’s usually necessary to add safety and pollution control equipment to a chemical plant. For instance, the pressure in parts of the plant might be negative, to prevent it from releasing outside of the plant, rather than positive, to promote the circulation of fresh air throughout the plant. Also, because chemical weapons are so dangerous, there may be a room that’s operated by remote control or robots and that has special equipment, such as piping and computer systems, to prevent leaks. However, there are many exceptions to these rules. For instance, in some plants it’s relatively easy to change the air pressure. Increasing environmental concern and regulation, also, make it more likely that chemical plants are going to use similar environmental conventions found in plants that produce chemical weapons. Finally, a ruthless dictator, who doesn’t care about the concern of his citizens, could just ignore the safety concerns.

Q: Let’s say that Saddam had a plant a year ago, or two or more years ago, that produced chemical weapons. Is it possible to detect that they had been produced?

A: When a chemical is produced, it leaves behind a trace of its existence, called a chemical signature. Using sensitive equipment, usually a combined gas chromatography/mass spectrometry, on places such as the waste stream of a chemical plant on rubber seals and gaskets, which are too expensive to change regularly, and on the concrete floor, the telltale chemicals can be detected.

In addition, one of the most common chemical signatures, of nerve agent production is the phosphorus-methyl bond. According to Johnathan Tucker, “It’s at least diagnostic of that nerve agent or a closely related pesticide. It is a difficult bond to produce. It requires a lot of energy or lots of highly corrosive chemicals. It’s also difficult to destroy.” That is, because this bond is very difficult to destroy, it’s difficult to remove and could point to nerve agent production.

Q: What are biomarkers and how can they be used to detect WMDs?

A: Biomarkers are toxic chemicals that accumulate in the natural ecosystem around a chemical plant. In organisms that live around a chemical plant, including humans, small amounts of chemicals accumulate in their tissues. These chemicals, sometimes, are enough to be detected, indicated chemical weapon production, in measurable quantities. For example, biomarkers can be found in animal fur, urine, blood, feces, plant leaves, flowers, fruit, or roots.

Q: Which chemicals have chemical signatures that are similar to nerve agents?

A: There are three common products that are similar, flame retardants, plastics, and fuel additives. This would make it easy to claim production of one of these products, while still producing a nerve agent.

Q: Which instruments dp weapon’s inspectors use to detect illicit chemicals?

A: The primary instrument that a weapons inspectors uses is a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer. This instrument, however, is often combined with many others. For instance, a flame photometric detector can identify the presence of sulfur or phosphorus. Or, an electron-capture detector can identify fluorine and phosphorus-containing compounds. There are many other instruments that can also be used.

Q: Is it possible that an instrument could detect a chemical and be wrong?

A: Yes, it’s possible. It’s called a false-positive. Often, because a degradation production is detected, such as a phosphorus-methyl bond, this doesn’t necessarily mean that a nerve agent has been detected. It could, instead, only mean that a legitimate product, with the same degradation product as a nerve agent, such as an organophosphate pesticide, has been detected.

Q: Why are biological weapons harder to find than chemical ones?

A: There are three reasons why biological weapons are harder to detect. First, a biological weapon is a living microorganism. It breeds and multiplies quickly. So, all you need is a small amount of it, maybe just a few kilograms to attack a large area. Unlike with chemical weapons, which have to be delivered in multi-ton quantities to kill large numbers of people. This, of course, allows the biological weapon to be more easily hidden. Second, all biological weapon’s production is dual-use. It’s difficult to tell from a visual inspection alone, if the plant is producing a legitimate product or a weapon. Unlike chemical weapons, where visual inspections sometimes are revealing of what a plant is capable of producing.

Q: How quickly could Saddam’s Iraq, or any other nation, produce a biological weapon?

A: All biological agents, including weapons, can be created with a fermenter in a stainless steel tank. So, biological products from yogurt, beer, to anthrax can be produced with the same device. Starting from a small amount of bacterium in a test tube, then, thousands of liters of biological agents could be produced in a week or so.

Q: DNA tests are commonly used, say, in murder trials to identify blood. Can DNA tests be used on biological weapons?

A: Yes they can. It depends, however, on which condition the DNA was in. “If the bacterial DNA was exposed to [sunlight], it would decay rapidly,” notes Jonathon Tucker. If, however, the DNA was inside a fermenter tank, say, associated with a rubber gasket, it would be likely to survive. Tucker added that if Anthrax DNA was preserved under these conditions, it’s possible to detect it years afterwards.

Q: If Iraq was producing an Anthrax vaccine, does mean that they were producing Anthrax as a biological weapon?

A: “Iraq had a legitimate need for the Anthrax,” answered Jonathan Tucker. Anthrax, according to Tucker, is an endemic disease in Iraq. Developing the vaccine, therefore, could be explained for this purpose. Also, there are many strains of Anthrax vaccine. Some can be used for as a weapon and some can’t. It would depend on what type of strain of Anthrax they were using.

Q: What’s a freeze-dried culture and how easy would it be to hide?

A: “It’s extremely easy to hide a freeze-dried culture,” answered Tucker. Because it would be in a small plastic vial, it has no risk, regardless of what the substance is. So, because it’s small, it could be hidden anywhere, from a pant pocket to a suitcase.

Q: Which biological weapons is Iraq suspected of having?

A: Iraq was suspected to have anthrax spores as a liquid slurry, botulinium toxin and aflatoxin, although it had never before been developed as a biological weapon. According to Tucker, however, it’s believed that the claim about alfatoxin may have been a cover for the production for another toxin. Iraq also produced smaller quantities of gangrene bacteria and ricin toxin.

Q: Did Iraq have genetically modified biological agents?

A: Genetic engineering, or some gene-splicing techniques, can be used to make biological agents resistant to standard vaccines and antibiotics. It’s highly unlikely, however, that they developed these techniques. Tucker answered, “There’s absolutely no evidence that Iraq developed GM agents. Iraq had some primitive genetic engineering capabilities, but there’s no evidence they developed genetically modified pathogens. They were doing some preliminary experiments in that area but they didn’t appear to be successful.”