

# Waltzing Cyclops and the Role of Congress in Post-Cold War Sino-American Relations

Patrick Belton<sup>1</sup>

## *1. Introduction*

I'd like to take our time together this afternoon to explore a topic at the heart of understanding America's relations with the rest of the world, and one, furthermore, which I think to be fun, interesting, and incredibly underexplored.

And the way I'd like to begin doing that is, of course, to turn to Bronze Age Greece and read a selection from Book IX of the *Odyssey*.

It's not easy being Polyphemus. You have to deal with the constant depredations inflicted by visiting Ithacans who want to torment you, the rejection in love by the lovely sea nymph Galatea, and derision of your Cyclopes friends because of your predilection for screaming "nobody is trying to kill me" early in the morning, when the other good residents of your Sicilian island are sleeping off their giant-sized hangovers. And all just because you want to eat. Whose fault is it that human flesh is so tasty, or that Odysseus happened to stumble into your cave the day before to take a gawk at your one, handsome big eye? In wanting good food, the respect of your Cyclopes colleagues, and the affections of a comely sea nymph, Polyphemus isn't that different from many political scientists. In fact, I'd like explicitly to compare Polyphemus *to* political scientists.

Odysseus and his men, of course, after tormenting and blinding poor Polyphemus with a sharpened olive branch (the latter a wonderful IR metaphor if there ever was one), then escape from his Mediterranean cave by hitching a ride out clinging to the bellies of the poor Cyclops's rams, when he lets them out to graze. Poor benighted Polyphemus, having read his Kenneth Waltz, can do no better than assume rams are unitary, opaque black balls, and can't even contemplate the possibility that inside those ram-units so pleasantly sauntering out of his cave are also to be found his hated wily Odysseus and his men, also known as breakfast, hitching a ride out with them.

Now political scientists may feel some discomfort in being compared to Polyphemus. And this is not, in my opinion, a bad thing. Because in failing with their one blind eye to peer inside the units they study, and content merely to brush their hands on those units on their way out of their Platonic cave, they too may find themselves out of luck, out of love, and out of breakfast when it comes to explaining how those units then behave.

To switch classical cultural referents, political scientists are like, too, the blind man in the parable of the 11<sup>th</sup>-century Song Dynasty lyricist Su Shi, who asks his fellow Chinese villagers to explain what the sun is. What they tell him is of course unfailingly correct: the sun is something that is shaped like a copper plate and gives out light like just like a candle. After banging on a copper plate and holding a candle, the blind man then decides

---

<sup>1</sup> Trinity College, Oxford. As presented in the Nuffield Political Science Workshop, Friday 5 December, 2003. Please do not cite without the author's permission, or at least his grudging tacit acquiescence.

that the clanging temple bell and the cylindrical flute must likewise be the sun. Like contemporary academics who for some perplexing reason have found it of interest to construct an entire discipline dedicated to the Jesuitical question of whether counterfactual nations, shorn of domestic politics, political culture, or history, would seek to maximize their absolute or their relative interests. Perhaps they, like Polyphemus, simply have a great deal of lonely spare time to fill on their Friday nights. But like both poor Polyphemus and the blind villager of the Song Dynasty, they are unlikely with such assumptions to be able to understand or predict much that is useful about how the entities they study will behave.

I would like to present an argument this afternoon that the actions of the United States in its most important bilateral relationship of the last decade simply cannot be satisfactorily understood, or even understood at all, without reference to the fact, known to every high school civics student but not apparently to most political scientists, that *all legislative powers herein granted are vested in a Congress of the United States*. I will furthermore deplore and rant against the current state of scholarly understanding of how Congress behaves in foreign policy, and principally for my purposes today, when Congress tends to matter in American foreign policymaking. Given the current prominence of the United States on the world stage, understanding how its domestic constitutional arrangements influence its policy stances toward its sister states would, I take it, be a good thing. I'd also like to make a case that this is a fairly fun topic to address, which is interesting because of its normative implications for the role of representative democracy in foreign policy, and is one in which the current scholarly *tabula rasa* allows us to quite easily make substantive, architectonic contributions. After culling several as-yet untested hypotheses out of a rather nascent, virginal, and principally anecdotal literature on the topic, we will then consider the seven episodes that I would like to put forward as having greatest importance in the Sino-American relationship in the first post-Cold War decade, and against these seven episodes, we will test the hitherto alluded to four hypotheses, and draw conclusions with regard to their relative predictive and analytical power. All in ten minutes, or your money back (for which point I'll refer you to Oisin and Nic).

## 2. Review of literature

Beginning with the literature review, while most literature in congressional foreign policy scholarship is anecdotal and unsystematic, methodologically consisting of the fairly arbitrary selection of incidents to instantiate the author's favoured generalizations, there have been several good initial efforts in the field upon which we might draw. One of the two most prominent strains in congressional foreign policy scholarship is convinced, with Harold Koh, that the president "(almost) always wins" in foreign policy- with the almost in parentheses<sup>2</sup> At times situating themselves within a vein of "decline of Congress"

---

<sup>2</sup> Harold Hongju Koh, "Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs," *Yale Law Journal* 97 (1986): pp. 1255-1342. See also the noteworthy claim of Rourke and Farnen that the struggle between president and Congress over war powers is over, and the president won. John T. Rourke and Russell Farnen, "War, Presidents, and the Constitution," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 18 (1988): pp. 513-22.

literature which antedated the Vietnam war,<sup>3</sup> they dismiss Congress's period of vigour in the mid-1970s as an aberration within an otherwise unwavering tale of decline.<sup>4</sup> They often suggest causes for this waning they perceive in congressional influence. Robert Dahl, in a classic study,<sup>5</sup> implicates the lack of leadership and party unity in Congress, and increases in the resources available to the executive branch. Rieselbach is one of many citing executive advantage in intelligence and technical proficiency.<sup>6</sup> Sundquist, making an argument based on electoral risk, claims members of Congress are unwilling to risk anything going wrong in foreign policy that may redound to their harm in future elections.<sup>7</sup> Shepsle sees a deeper conflict, between "representative impulses inside the legislature" and the legislature's "ability to maintain its separateness, its independence, and hence its influence in the larger political system," that is, between representativeness and governance. Congress may indeed succeed in influencing policy, but only, perversely, by doing damage to its constitutional role as an organ of democracy.<sup>8</sup> Paul Peterson draws on Peter Gourevitch's "reversed second-image" exploration of the international system's effects on domestic politics, to argue that as the world environment becomes more dangerous for the United States, Congress is constrained by fears of damaging the nation's interests from challenging the president as much as it might otherwise desire.<sup>9</sup>

Other standard references for the executive dominance brief are either atheoretical, like Wildavsky or Hinckley, or unacademic, such as the work of Destler, Gelb, and Lake.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> e.g., Samuel P. Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century," pp. 7-31 in Ronald C. Moe, ed., *Congress and the President: Allies and Adversaries* (Pacific Palisades, Ca.: Goodyear, 1971), James A. Robinson, *Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative* (New York: Dorsey, 1962).

<sup>4</sup> James L. Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), Thomas E. Cronin, "A Resurgent Congress and the Imperial Presidency," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds., *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), Harold Koh, "Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs," Gordon Silverstein, "Judicial Enhancement of Executive Power," in Paul E. Peterson, ed., *The President, the Congress, and the Making of Foreign Policy*.

<sup>5</sup> Arguing that "the President proposes, and the Congress disposes," with Congress often not even having the chance to dispose: Robert Dahl, *Congress and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), see p. 58.

<sup>6</sup> Leroy N. Rieselbach, *Congressional Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 179.

<sup>7</sup> James L. Sundquist, *The Decline and Resurgence of Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981).

<sup>8</sup> Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Representation and Governance: The Great Legislative Trade-Off," *Political Studies Quarterly* 103 (1988), no. 3: 461-84, esp. p. 482.

<sup>9</sup> Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization* 32 (Autumn 1978): pp. 881-912. Paul E. Peterson, "The International System and Foreign Policy," chapter in Peterson, ed., *The President, the Congress, and the Making of Foreign Policy* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), pp. 3-22. See especially p. 6.

<sup>10</sup> Barbara Hinckley, *Less Than Meets the Eye: The Myth of the Assertive Congress* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), esp. pp. 13-19. I.M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). Hinckley argues that the post-Vietnam conception of an assertive Congress is a myth; but neither is it the case that an active executive is dominating Congress, most of the time, a "default pattern" takes place in which neither the president nor Congress are innovative and both support past programmes or fail to enact anything. Hinckley sees genuine congressional assertiveness only in the War Powers debate of 1973 and the Lebanon

Aaron Wildavsky's "two-presidencies" thesis, which became a standard footnote in support of the executive dominance thesis, was less a theory than a description of interbranch relations at the particular point in time of the early Cold War. (Wildavsky himself later admitted as much.<sup>11</sup>) Also, Wildavsky only observed support in roll-call votes for presidential proposals, neglecting other avenues of congressional influence. On the other hand, he also contributes the concept of a "self-denying ordinance"—a norm of deference by which members of Congress do not exercise their constitutional foreign policy powers because they do not believe it to be their job to dispute presidential foreign and security policy—and fruitful drawing attention to the president's greater prestige and respect in foreign affairs; how the quick tempo of tactical-level foreign policy decision-making favours the more quickly-moving executive branch; and how the comparatively weak, unstable, and thin interest group structure in foreign affairs impedes congressional activism in foreign policy.<sup>12</sup>

On the other hand, the second major strain of scholarship comprises a series of authors believing Congress's influence in foreign policy is considerable, and perhaps even more at present than ever. Rohde draws attention to party cohesiveness, speculating that increased partisanship leads (and has led) parties to become internally more homogenous as well as more different from each another; during times of divided government, a more cohesive and partisan congressional majority can then succeed more easily in determining policy over the president's objections.<sup>13</sup> Rohde also argues that diverging presidential and congressional electoral coalitions have increased the distance between the two branches, at the same time that congressional reforms during the 1970s increased distance between the committees and the membership on the floor. Thus, with presidents and committees moving farther apart even as the gap widened between committees and backbenchers, committees were both less likely either to support the president, or to be capable of delivering their body's backing to him even when they did.<sup>14</sup> An important mechanism for presidential control of the Congress thus largely disappeared. Barbara Sinclair and Steven Smith also explained the effects of party cohesion in determining Congress's influence on the world stage. Sinclair notes party leaders are more active, involved, and visible on foreign policy than their backbenches, but they can only impact

---

debate of 1983. The 1993 debate over Somalia she is unsure of how to classify, viewing the ground rules as having been set in advance. Other than these, all battles are symbolic, with the two branches colluding in avoiding tough issues. See *Less Than Meets the Eye*, p. 79; also, Stephen R. Weissman, *A Culture of Deference: Congress's Failure of Leadership in Foreign Policy* (New York: Basic Books, 1995). Wildavsky found congressional approval of presidential proposals on foreign policy, exclusive of immigration and refugees, was roughly 70 percent compared with 40 percent for domestic proposals during the early Cold War years 1948-65. He is cited below.

<sup>11</sup> Duane M. Oldfield and Aaron B. Wildavsky, "Reconsidering the Two Presidencies," *Society* 26 (1989): pp. 54-59.

<sup>12</sup> Aaron Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies," *Trans-Action* 4 (1966): pp. 7-14, especially p. 9.

<sup>13</sup> David W. Rohde, "Partisanship, Leadership, and Congressional Assertiveness in Foreign and Defense Policy," pp. 76-101 in David A. Deese, ed., *The New Politics of American Foreign Policy* (New York: St Martin's, 1994).

<sup>14</sup> Rohde believes the presidential advantage persists but is diminishing with time. David W. Rohde, "Presidential Support in the House of Representatives," in Paul E. Peterson, ed., *The President, the Congress, and the Making of Foreign Policy* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), pp. 101-128, esp. pp. 101-102.

national foreign policy to the degree they can generate support among the latter.<sup>15</sup> Smith's argument follows similar lines.

Other scholars have proposed hypotheses based on the changing relationships between the president, Congress, and the public. James Robinson gives attention to which branch initiates a policy battle: considering 22 foreign policy decisions from 1933 to 1961, he determines the executive won 16 of the 19 cases it initiated, and Congress all of the three it began.<sup>16</sup> Stockman, in the course of a favourable (thus somewhat heterodox<sup>17</sup>) assessment of Congress's ability to formulate strategic policy, generalises from his case study of the first post-Cold War years that, during times when the international situation has changed but the president has not moved to revise U.S. policy, Congress will be likely to have success in its attempt to fill the resulting policy "vacuum."<sup>18</sup> Tierney makes a familiar claim that increased interest group activity spurs greater congressional activism.<sup>19</sup> Also playing upon the public responsiveness theme, Blechman argues Congress will be most assertive when the president is out of step with public opinion, or intransigent in the face of vocal opposition.<sup>20</sup> Moe and Teel, in a helpful work written in 1971, argue Congress's role will be greater in programs that require appropriation, such as foreign aid; by extension, Congress's position in the foreign policy process will be more important when these programs are more significant.<sup>21</sup>

A fourth group of authors, among them James Lindsay, Jerel Rosati, and I.M. Destler, dwell on ways in which subject matter determines the degree of Congressional influence. These scholars tend to offer different typologies of foreign policy, and rank Congress's influence across them. Rockman, for instance, ranks one typology of issue areas in increasing order of congressional influence—with least influence in intelligence, and

---

<sup>15</sup> Barbara Sinclair, "Congressional Party Leaders in the Foreign and Defense Policy Arena," pp. 207-31 in Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, eds., *Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill*. Steven S. Smith, "Congressional Party Leaders," pp. 129-57 in Paul E. Peterson, ed., *The President, the Congress, and the Making of Foreign Policy*.

<sup>16</sup> James A. Robinson, *Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative* (New York: Dorsey, 1962), pp. 65-68.

<sup>17</sup> Although Stockman is in Lindsay's company in conceding to Congress a large role in fashioning national strategy.

<sup>18</sup> Paul N. Stockton, "Congress and Defense Policy-Making for the Post-Cold War Era," chapter 10 in Ripley and Lindsay, eds., *Congress Resurgent*, pp. 235-259. Also, Rosner has a final category of issues favouring the dominance of the executive, i.e., ones "where the president takes an early and determined stance."

<sup>19</sup> John T. Tierney, "Interest Group Involvement in Congressional Foreign and Defense Policy," pp. 89-111 in Ripley and Lindsay, eds., *Congress Resurgent*; also, "Congressional Activism in Foreign Policy: Its Varied Forms and Stimuli," pp. 102-30 in David A. Deese, ed., *The New Politics of American Foreign Policy*.

<sup>20</sup> Barry M. Blechman, "The New Congressional Role in Arms Control," pp. 109-145 in Thomas E. Mann, ed., *A Question of Balance: The President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990).

<sup>21</sup> Ronald C. Moe and Steven C. Teel, "Congress as Policy-Maker: A Necessary Reappraisal," pp. 32-53 in Ronald C. Moe, ed., *Congress and the President* (Pacific Palisades, Ca.: Goodyear, 1971); Lawrence H. Chamberlain, *The President, Congress, and Legislation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946).

incrementally increasing power in strategic policy, trade, foreign aid, ethnic intervention, and issues involving human rights.<sup>22</sup>

The problem is that few of these authors have sought to operationalize and test the relationships they put forth, and none of which I'm aware have attempted to test competing proposed relationships against one another to judge their relative power.

**Figure 1. Synopsis of independent variables various authors have offered to predict change in the dependent variable, congressional influence:**

- The quality of leadership available to Congress and the president; the resources each branch can access; party unity in Congress (Dahl)
- Which branch instigates a battle to change the policy status quo (Robinson)
- The balance of access to intelligence and technical proficiency between the branches (Riselbach)
- The amount of risk to members of Congress presented by challenging the President (Sundquist)
- The degree of security threat facing the United States (Peterson)
- Party homogeneity, cohesion, and partisanship (Rohde, Sinclair, Smith)
- The extent of interest group activity (Tierney)
- The degree to which president is out of step with public opinion, or intransigent before vocal opposition (Blechman)
- Issue area (Moe and Teel, Rosner, Rosati, Rockman)
- Whether an issue is critical, strategic, or structural (Lindsay and Ripley)
- A policy vacuum (Stockman)
- The rise of a "critical issue" (Henehan)

### 3. Hypotheses

In scrutinizing this list, a number of common themes appear to link several of these proposed independent variables, and there is substantial room to advance our understanding of congressional foreign policy by selecting hypothesized relationships between these variables and the dependent variable of who governs U.S. foreign policy.

I'd like to suggest four: which branch initiated. Issue type and tempo. Relative strength of the branches in the country as a whole (as indicated through polling data) and within Washington (as indicated, among other things, by the heterogeneity of the caucuses in Congress and the margins by which they govern). Risk in confronting the president (degree of security risk).

### 4. Operationalizations and data sets

---

<sup>22</sup> Bert A. Rockman, "Presidents, Opinion, and Institutional Leadership," pp. 59-74 in David A. Deese, ed., *The New Politics of American Foreign Policy*, see esp. pp. 60-64.

The most easily scrutinable operationalizations of these hypothesized independent variables are displayed for you in the handout sheet -

The true dependent variable is in a way political will. Congress's constitutional power, if it chooses to invoke it, is quite supreme – it can, both by law and by use of the appropriations power, dictate U.S. policy in external conflicts and peacetime relations quite precisely if it so chooses, as it did in the mid-1970s with regard to the dénouement of American involvement in South Vietnam and with respect to U.S. clandestine involvement in Laos and Angola. Congress is limited only by its members' desire to influence policy, or conversely, their unwillingness to embarrass the president.

I'm as interested in seeing how these numbers turn out as you are, actually, since I've just revised several of my data sets this morning, and I'm rather curious how they've turned out.

### *5. Seven episodes*

I'd like to put forward the claim, which I'll argue for in greater depth in my dissertation, that the Sino-American relationship in the 1990s can be analyzed into seven principal episodes. These are Tiananmen Square (July 1989 to January 1990), the struggle over whether to link China's Most Favored Nation trading status with its human rights record (June 1990 to May 1994), a visa for President Lee of Taiwan (May 1995), the fight over imprisoned Chinese-American human rights activist Harry Wu (June to July 1995), the Taiwan Straits crisis of March 1996, the ill-fated Taiwan Security Enhancement Act of February to April 2000, and extension of Permanent Normal Trading Relations, or PNTR, to China in March to May 2000 as part of China's accession to the World Trade Organization.

For each of these episodes, we can try to approximate the extent to which the policy finally taken by the United States falls closer to the president's preferences, Congress's preferences, or somewhere in the middle by assigning each a value from 1 to 5, in which 1 represents a total presidential victory (as is the case for the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act episode in February 2000), 5 a total congressional victory (as in the issuance of a visa to Taiwanese President Lee in May 1995), 3 indicates a policy which is a fair split between congressional and presidential preferences (such as the extension of Permanent Normalized Trade Relations to China in May 2000), and 2 and 4 indicate, in turn, instances where the final policy of the U.S. was closer to one or the other, while incorporating some aspects of compromise (such as policy in the wake of Tiananmen Square and Harry Wu's detention, both of which were closer to Congress's than to the president's preferences, or policy in the Taiwan Straits, which was the reverse.)

### *6. Results and conclusions*

In the final section of the appendix matter, which is to say, the punch line, I've graphed the comparative predictive value of the competing dependent variables. This is, I should caution, very much an initial statistical analysis, so initial in fact that I only actually came



up with it last night, so there is incontestably great room for further sophistication in these results, which I will for the moment file under the heading of “coming attractions.” But for my first, tentative awards of comparative strength: there are two independent variables which correlate quite strongly with the dependent variable, and with Pearson coefficients, squared, of greater than 0.35. These are what I’ve called “initiative” and the gap between presidential approval and disapproval on foreign policy, with  $r$  squared strengths of 0.347 and 0.466, respectively. With intermediate ranges of correlation we have issue type and tempo, the margin of votes in the Senate, and down a bit, congressional approval and the gap between congressional approval and disapproval showings. Showing minimal importance, interestingly, are generalized presidential approval, increments in the defence budget (either absolute or relative to gnp). Whether government is divided or not, and how severely, shows up as fairly weak too, indicating, perhaps, that presidents can expect as firm opposition from congresses dominated by their copartisans as their political opponents. The strong and trumping role of public support for the president’s foreign policy in determining the extent to which Congress succeeds in shaping American foreign policy positions is quite pronounced and worthy of further study and elaboration. Who moves first – the variable here termed “initiative” – and the type of issue – whether appropriations or immigration, say – emerge respectively the third and fourth most powerful indicators of how likely Congress is to have its say. I’d propose to take this last result further a bit by attempting to study how much success Congress can have in redefining, say, a human rights or military issue as an appropriations or immigration matter, one in which its constitutional competence relative to the president is quite strong.

So this afternoon we have together successfully braved Cyclops and interstraits warfare, not to mention Beltway partisan politics. We have also succeeded in doing something which, to my knowledge, has never been done before, which is to look with some initial measure of analytic rigour at the degree of congressional influence in an important bilateral strategic relationship, and put forward grounded results toward the crafting of generalizations. Now I’ll look forward to taking your questions and advice, as well as discussing the topic less formally after. Thank you very much.




Appendices, Charts, Graphs, and Other Miscellany


1. Charts of independent variables




### Defence appropriations, as percentage of GNP




### Presidential approval, 1988-2000




### Public opinion of China, 1967-1999



### Public Approval of Congress, 1988-2000






## 2. Episodes in the case study and values on the dependent variable

Episode	Month/Year	DV
Tiananmen	6/89 to 1/90	4
MFN	6/90 to 5/94	2
Visa for Lee	May-95	5
Harry Wu	6/95-7/95	4
Straits	Mar-96	2
TSEA	2/00 to 4/00	1
PNTR	3/00 to 5/00	3

Key for values of the dependent variable: 1=president's unadulterated preferences become U.S. policy; 2=final U.S. policy lies closer to the president's than Congress's preferences; 3=U.S. policy is equally close to president and Congress; 4= U.S. policy is closer to Congress's than the president's preferences; 5=Congress's preferences become U.S. policy

### 3. Relative predictive strengths of independent variables



### 4. Chart of correlations

Episode	Month/Year	Pres approv	Pres approval-disapproval	Pres fp approval	fp approval-disapproval
Tiananmen	6/89 to 1/90	70.5	53.375	63	10.40
MFN	6/90 to 5/94	54.9361702	12.37554.3636364	64	8.33
Visa for Lee	May-95	51	7	40	
Harry Wu	6/95-7/95	47.5	10.5	42	
Straits	Mar-96	54	9	49	
TSEA	2/00 to 4/00	62.6666667	3.66666667	51	
PNTR	3/00 to 5/00	60.6666667	4.66666667	51	
r		-0.2151465	0.33158259	-0.3119872	-0.68
r <sup>2</sup>		0.04628803	0.109947010	0.09733603	0.466

Congress approval	Congress approval-disapproval	Unity of House Majority	Unity of Sen majority	Unity of both majorities
24		-44	86	80.5
24		-44	87	84
34		-23	93	91
35		-20	93	91
35		-22	90	91
51		9	90	90
39		-13	90	91
-0.4330395	-0.3988432	0.35276684	-0.0410338	0.11316517
0.18752317	0.15907586	0.12444444	0.00168377	0.01280636

Divided government index	House margin	Sen margin	Joint con margin	increment in def budget	inc in def budget rel to gnp
3	9.89%	5.00%	0.14885057	-1.3	3.1
1.8	10.27%	6.00%	0.16268199	-5.14	4.62
3	2.99	2	4.99	-0.9	3.7
3	2.99	2	4.99	-0.9	3.7
3	4.6	4	8.6	-2.2	3.5
3	1.15	5	6.15	1.4	3
3	1.15	5	6.15	1.4	3
0.31180478	0.14357172	-0.443745	-0.2206575	0.0283891	0.01636128
0.09722222	0.02061284	0.1969096	0.04868973	0.00080594	0.00026769

issue type	issue tempo	initiative
2	3	1.5
1	1	1
1	2	1
2	3	1
3	3	2
3	1	2
1	1	2
-0.5239368	0.47140452	-0.5892557
0.2745098	0.22222222	0.34722222

### Strength of prediction of independent variables

