I knew something unusual was in the air when I first
entered the Congress Centre, the hub of the World Economic Forum. Prominently
positioned just before the security screening stations were signs emblazoned
with the shocking message, �Ties Forbidden.� This is unheard of in formal
European conference circles � to say nothing of the special ambience of Davos.
Borrowing a page straight out of the final days of America�s
dot-com mania, the World Economic Forum had reinvented the rules. The
intellectual debate was quick to follow suit.
The mood this year at Davos is vastly improved from a
year ago. Back then, the world had the prewar jitters, and there was an
uncomfortable sense of angst that filled the halls of the World Economic Forum.
Anti-Americanism was rampant, and the prognosis for the global economy and
world financial markets was grim, to say the least. Yet time, that great
healer, has done its trick again. The war has come and gone, the global economy
has reawakened, and financial markets are on a tear. As always, the crowd at
Davos personified the market sentiment of the moment � there is a growing sense
of conviction that this is the start of something big and lasting.
Not surprisingly, my view ran very much against the
grain of the hopes and dreams of this year�s crowd at Davos. In the opening
economics session, I had the audacity to make the argument that imbalances
matter. A one-engine world, in my view, is utterly incapable of providing a
sustainable growth dynamic for a $36 trillion global economy. That�s the case
even if that engine is America �
the unquestioned global hegemon that rescued the world economy from the brink
of last year�s feared abyss. That�s especially the case if the engine is
constrained by historic imbalances � a record shortfall of net national saving,
a record current-account deficit, record household sector debt loads and
sharply elevated debt-service burdens, and near-record budget deficits. And
it�s even more the case if the engine is sorely lacking the traditional fuel of
job creation and income generation that has driven every cyclical recovery in
the past. While I conceded the near-term outlook to the momentum crowd, I dug
in my heels on what I continue to believe is the key bone of contention in the
macro debate � sustainability.
The response was right out of the script of the late
1990s. One new paradigm after another was offered as explanations as to why
this global recovery is for real. The Davos crowd embraced the notion that
US-centric global growth was sustainable indefinitely. Drawing support from
recent pronouncements by Alan Greenspan, the related view was expressed that
there would be no problem in financing the extraordinary external imbalances
that were spawned by such lopsided global growth (see Greenspan�s January 13,
2004 remarks before the Bundesbank Lecture 2004 in Berlin). As he did at the
end of the equity bubble, Greenspan seems to be making a special effort to
portray old concerns in a new light. Last time, it was a productivity
breakthrough; this time, it�s the nimble financing of a new globalization.
The Davos consensus was quick to agree. With the
entire world perceived to be on a de facto dollar standard, America�s
rapid build-up of external dollar-denominated debt was not perceived to be a
problem. After all, Asia is funding the bulk of the new increments to that debt, and most
were utterly convinced that nothing could break the �daisy chain.� As long as America
continued to buy Asian-made products, Asian investors would continue to buy
American-made bonds � thereby avoiding the lethal back-up in real interest
rates that such imbalances would normally spawn. One participant characterized
this arrangement as �a massive Asian export subsidy program.� Another cited the
artificially depressed US interest rates that fall out of this arrangement as a foreign
subsidy to the spendthrift American consumer. Either way, no one could conceive
of any circumstances that would cause Asian investors � private or official �
to change their mind on the funding of America�s
massive external imbalance. And so the Davos crowd believes the music will
continue to play on.
Quite honestly, none of this really surprised me �
these are precisely the assumptions that ever-frothy financial markets must be
making in order to sustain asset values at current levels. If imbalances were
perceived to be the problem I suspect they are, markets would be in a very
different place. As predictable as this response was, I was totally unprepared
for what hit me immediately after the conclusion of this opening session. Two
of America�s leading academics rushed the stage � one a renowned economics
professor and the other the president of a top university � and loudly
proclaimed that the traditional macro of saving shortages and current-account
deficits is a scam. America was not in any danger whatsoever, they argued vociferously. The
imbalances that I worried about are simply the logical and entirely rational
manifestations of a New Economy.
Seems to me I had heard that one before. But I held my
tongue and pressed for more. The New Paradigm in this case is that America
has now become an asset-based, wealth driven economy. As such, it need not
worry about scaling its imbalances by national income � instead they need to be
judged against economy-wide net worth. On that basis, debt loads � either
internal or external � can hardly be characterized as worrisome when measured
against the elevated wealth of the US
economy. Sure, that wealth took a �bit� of a hit when the equity bubble popped
in 2000. But the baton of the US wealth
creation machine was quickly passed on to property markets, and the US
economy never even skipped a beat.
This argument bears serious consideration, but I am
convinced it is wrong. For starters, it makes the critical presumption that
asset appreciation is permanent. When I pressed this point with my adversary,
he bristled in response, claiming that permanently rapid rates of financial
asset appreciation were entirely justified by the productivity breakthroughs of
recent years. He went on to add that property cycles had all but been abolished
� that the American home was a lasting store of ever-rising value. Needless to
say, if that�s the case, then I�m the one who�s dead wrong. Ever-rising asset
values would then qualify as permanent sources of saving � obviating the need
for consumers to rely on traditional income-based saving strategies. Quite
frankly, I couldn�t believe what I was hearing. Here we are, just a few years
after America�s most devastating post-bubble carnage, and the apostles of the New
Economy were back with a vengeance.
This debate cannot be taken lightly. It underscores
the important distinction between an income-based and an asset-driven economy.
In my opinion, beginning in the mid-1990s, the US
economy did, indeed, adopt many of the behavioral characteristics of an
asset-driven economy. I know of no other way to explain the sharp decline in
income-based national saving that occurred during the late 1990s. Moreover,
it�s continuing to the present day, with well-maintained personal consumption
growth occurring against the backdrop of an unprecedented $350 billion
shortfall of real wage income growth over the 25 months of this recovery. Nor
do I expect this transformation to be unwound for as long as the Fed remains in
its highly accommodative post-bubble, anti-deflation policy stance (see my
January 9, 2004 dispatch, �Fed Hubris�).
But have we truly learned nothing from the Great
Bubble? As was the case in the late 1990s, the sustainability of a
wealth-driven US economy is critically dependent on the permanence of asset
appreciation. Yet bubbles are, by definition, the antithesis of such
permanence. The Fed, through its extraordinary monetary accommodation, is doing
its best to keep the magic alive. Unfortunately, that only underscores the
dangerous moral hazard implications of a post-bubble containment strategy �
massive liquidity injections and rock-bottom interest rates that ultimately
lead from one bubble to the next.
Davos is always one of the highlights of my year. It
offers a spirit of engagement and open debate that cannot be found at any other
gathering in the world. It forces you think well outside your comfort zone. It
is a forum that is always filled with surprises. For me, the big surprise this
year was the prompt and aggressive comeback of the New Paradigm crowd. As for
me, I never did take off my tie.
Policy
adjustment tailored to currency market intervention
The BoJ decided with a majority vote at
the Monetary Policy Meeting (MPM) on January 20 to raise the current-account
balance target to �30��35 trillion, as we anticipated. Proceeding with
additional easing at the same time as raising the economic assessment is clearly
a contradiction, and even the media have been somewhat critical. However, this
was merely a timing issue, with the Bank taking action to defuse a build-up of
political pressure heading into the MPM scheduled for February 4�5 right before
the G-7 meeting. While we are not impressed by the move, it can be understood
as a pragmatic response or cosmetic gesture unlikely to have negative
repercussions.
The consensus view of the policy change
holds that it is nothing more than a gesture aimed at the currency market. Yet
there is some benefit. Higher settlement volume in yen and foreign currencies
from roughly �6 trillion in yen-selling intervention since the start of 2004
has burdened the settlement system. Without trying to defend the Bank, the
policy decision is likely to facilitate the MoF�s currency intervention by
reducing settlement system burden somewhat. The Bank might also have been
trying to give the impression (though denied at the official level) that a
portion of the capital from yen-selling intervention is unsterilized by raising
the target by �3 trillion soon after a massive �6 trillion intervention.
Currency
rate influencing the policy duration effect
BoJ Governor Fukui�s �early-action�
approach has improved the Bank�s previous negative image of being too slow.
Excessive use of the �unusual� measure of raising the current-account balance
target as an �ordinary� policy tool, however, is complicating a future exit
strategy. Quantitative easing has steadily replaced short-term market functions
with each addition to the balance, expanding the downside in a policy retreat.
The BoJ has obviously become an integral component of government reinforcement
of the financial and corporate safety net, and it cannot risk the potential
damage from removing its support. We expect the Bank�s latest upward revision
of the balance target to help restore the policy duration effect, which
faltered temporarily in 2003, for the time being. Furthermore, the combination
of moderate yen appreciation with no end in sight and heavy intervention is
ideal from the perspective of maintaining and reinforcing the policy duration
effect.
Yet the Bank�s decision to ease in
response to currency market developments effectively subjects monetary policy
to currency rates and the MoF�s intervention strategy. While the BoJ managed to
surprise the market this time, future increases are unlikely to do the same,
since investors will be anticipating new easing measures when strong yen
pressure builds and the MoF is trying to reverse the trend with heavy
intervention.
If the dollar does reverse course on
concerns about a policy change in the upcoming G-7 statement, market
expectations for the policy duration effect might also be reversed. Since the
policy duration effect is a strategy of encouraging medium- and long-term
yields to stabilize at low levels by making a firm commitment that extends
beyond market expectations, it might be destabilized by closer correlation of
policy to the currency market. This means the market may begin discounting a
policy exit if the yen weakens and stock prices continue rising.
Basis
for reassurance even if strong yen trend reverses
However, we have doubts about the
viability of stock-market gains following reversal of the strong yen trend. The
dynamic of Japan�s fiscal and monetary authorities shoring up the dollar with
sustained, heavy intervention and effectively funding the US twin
deficits cannot last forever. We expect an adverse impact on US asset markets
flush with liquidity from Japan if
the strong yen trend reverses after the G-7 statement or other actions, and Japan
halts heavy, sustained currency intervention, for example. Likewise, there is a
chance that the dollar will autonomously rebound, discounting the possible US
slowdown in the latter half of this year or the decline of the US twin
deficits after the presidential election. In this case, however, the US asset
market is unlikely to react positively. Since Japan�s
stock market might not continue advancing in this scenario as the yen weakens,
the policy duration effect is likely to be safe.
Additional
point: A thought experiment on the exit policy dynamic
While the timing of an end to
quantitative easing is still in the distant future, we can consider possible
paradigms for an exit strategy, which the Bank has put off-limits for
discussion, particularly procedures and methods. We offer a basic conceptual
scenario.
The policy duration effect relies on a
firm commitment that extends beyond market expectations, as explained above.
However, we expect the policy duration effect to automatically shorten once
monetary policy authorities specifically mention an exit strategy. Bond-market
disruption following the release of the MPM minutes in mid-August 2003 is a
good example. The procedure for implementing an exit strategy is hence likely
to start with a strong suggestion of an exit strategy being under review.
The market expectation-formation
mechanism will naturally point toward higher yields and prompt steepening of
the yield curve when this happens, in my view. The BoJ will encounter
undersubscription of its liquidity-provision operations for term issues if
investors expect term rates to move higher. We therefore anticipate an
automatic decline in the current-account balance held at the Bank, regardless
of BoJ plans, amid expectations for rising term rates. Gradual hikes in the
unsecured, overnight call rate target should come after the market fully
discounts the policy exit. These adjustments will have almost no additional
impact and simply raise the unsecured call rate. We think the exit process will
largely proceed on its own merely from the suggestion that an end is near,
rather than involving a proactive role for the Bank of incrementally lowering
the current-account balance and raising the deposit reserve ratio or charging
interest on current-account deposits (banks� reserves), as some observers
propose.
The real issue is how to cushion the blow
from a sharp decline in the bond market. I believe investors should be ready
for carnage similar to that of summer 2003 during the few months of
undersubscribed operations due to expectations for higher term rates. One
possible measure is swapping JGBs held by financial institutions with
non-marketable JGBs, as sometimes occurred prior to the accord between the US
Treasury Department and the Fed. Another idea is neutralizing the duration risk
exposure of private-sector banks by setting up BoJ fixed-rate receive swap
transactions between private-sector financial institutions and the Bank.
Duration risk could even be removed for both private-sector financial
institutions and the Bank if the latter enters into BoJ fixed-rate pay swap
transactions with the MoF. The economic effect is equivalent to the replacement
of medium-/long-term JGBs with variable-rate or short-term bills.
This is just a mental exercise, and we do
not expect an early exit strategy. Our fundamental position is that
quantitative easing should stay in place during 2004 as well as 2005,
considering the pace of recent CPI improvement, the extent of progress in restoring
the health of the financial system, and the presence of certain
non-manufacturing industries unable to withstand the burden of higher yields.
In the CzechRepublic we expect
both GDP growth and inflation to accelerate this year, but the CNB to remain
reluctant to raise interest rates. Progress on fiscal reform has been
better than we expected, while Eurobond issuance and eventual privatisation will
limit pressure on the domestic market. However, even after the recent
currency weakening and local spread widening, risks to domestic yields remain
on the upside, we think.
GDP growth to rebalance. GDP growth
has been gathering pace after a long period of anaemic activity. In 2003,
private consumption growth, which reached 7.3% year on year in real terms in
3Q, was the main driver of output as lower-than-expected inflation drove sharp
rises in real wages. Anticipation of consumption tax rises in 2004 may
also have brought forward purchasing plans. This year's tax rises and
higher headline inflation mean that such gains are unlikely to be
repeated. The outlook for smaller domestic corporates
remains weak, with credit growth still slow and legal reform making only
limited progress. However, the rapidly growing construction sector is
likely to continue to benefit from a VAT rise due in 2007. Above all, we
continue to expect recovery in Germany
to boost the export sector (see also Central Europe: A Brighter Growth Outlook, January 9, 2003). Foreign-controlled enterprises already account for 49% of
industrial production, and export sales for 47% of total industrial
sales. Like other central European economies, the CzechRepublic is a
particularly strong beneficiary of an appreciating EUR/USD, exporting
overwhelmingly into Euroland while importing
commodities from outside the region. We are raising our GDP growth
forecast for this year marginally to 3.6%.
Higher inflation to boost
lending but not rates.EU entry and
fiscal reform imply sharp rises in inflation over the next few months.
Headline CPI has already accelerated rapidly out of deflation territory, driven
mainly by regional food prices for now. The agricultural PPI was up 8.0%
year on year in December. More significantly, we expect rises in excise
taxes and a shift of several items onto the higher VAT rate to add around 2.0
percentage points to headline CPI in the first half of this year. This is
likely to push short-term interest rates into negative territory and provide a
further boost to accelerating household borrowing. However, with
inflation expectations still subdued and real wage growth slowing, we expect
inflation to decline again in 2005. We do not see significant risk to the
upside of the current inflation target, 2–4% by the end of 2005.
The Bank will set a longer-term inflation target in 2Q, likely to be in the
region of 2.5%, extending to the date of euro adoption. Having undershot
its target range in five of the last six years, we expect the Bank to surprise
on the cautious side in raising rates. We do not expect policy rates to
be above 2.5% at year-end.
CZK to weaken slowly. The CNB
also appears to remain comfortable with the prospect of a weaker koruna.
Recent CZK depreciation has been slightly more rapid than we expected, with
EUR/CZK already close to our December forecast of 33.0. While there may
be some over-shooting in the very short term, with short-term interest rates
likely remaining low and possibly falling behind ECB rates in the near term, we
expect slow depreciation pressure on the CZK to continue. Although the
current-account deficit is likely to shrink as GDP growth picks up, we expect
FDI inflows also to slow. A favourable geographic position and strong
reinvested earnings have maintained inflows through the Euroland
slowdown, but we continue to expect Slovakia's
more competitive wage and tax levels to attract the bulk of new greenfield projects. The small weight of foreigners in the domestic bond
market, and the CNB's €21.3 billion of
reserves, argues against any rapid depreciation. In the longer term, a
resumption of large-scale privatisation could see the CNB resuming sterilised
intervention. Over the next year, however, we expect regional funding
trades to resume, boosted by continuing tentative foreign investment by local
asset managers. We are raising our year-end EUR/CZK target slightly, to
33.5.
Fiscal outlook improving
modestly. On the fiscal side, the Ministry of Finance has at least been more
effective than its Hungarian and Polish counterparts in managing
expectations. Final budget data for 2003 have yet to be released, but we
think that the 2003 general government deficit is likely to have been around
5.0% of GDP on a GFS cash basis, against a government forecast of 6.6%.
Including transfers to CKA, in line with ESA-95 methods, would take the 2003
deficit to around 6.0% of GDP. The revenue impact of stronger growth and
over-ambitious spending targets by extra-budgetary funds appear the main
reasons for the undershoot. Having squeezed a
welcome first round of fiscal reform through parliament, the government appears
to have a strong chance of surviving until 2006 and approving a second wave of
reforms. The official deficit target of 4% of GDP by 2006 is set in GFS
cash terms, but under current plans, CKA transfers will be negligible after
2004, and the institution will be closed by 2007. The main risk comes
from government guarantees. Outside the state financial institutions,
which appear to be adequately provisioned, these amount to around 11% of
GDP. On a risk-adjusted basis the Ministry estimates around CZK 100
billion, 3.8% of GDP, will be called in 2004–06. At least half of
these are not included in the current fiscal tightening schedule, posing upside
risks to the state budget deficit.
Non-domestic financing
still significant. The
government does, however, still have significant potential financing resources
outside of the domestic market. After the recent widening of local bond
spreads, the case for foreign currency issuance is much clearer. We
expect the Ministry of Finance to go ahead with a first Eurobond issue of
around €1 billion this year, the proceeds of which are likely to be
hedged. Domestic T-bond issuance would then fall from around CZK 139
billion to around CZK 124 billion. Privatisation revenue remains another
significant resource. The only sale likely to be completed this year is Unipetrol, worth about CZK 12 billion according to comments
from bidders in the press. However, in the longer term there is still
scope for more significant revenue from Cesky Telecom
and CEZ. The Cesky Telecom sale process is
under way but unlikely to be completed before early 2005. Current market
prices point to a valuation in the region of CZK 50 billion. In the
longer term the government is likely to re-attempt the sale of some of its 68%
stake in CEZ and regional power distributors, for which it demanded CZK 200
billion in 2001, currently 8% of GDP. However, with the emphasis for now
on regional consolidation, this is currently looking unlikely before the 2006
elections.
But yields still likely to
rise. Although we expect the
CNB to be slow to raise rates, and domestic liquidity remains abundant, we
remain moderately bearish on local market spreads. We expect the Ministry
to continue swap market operations to extend the maturity of its local debt,
targeting a modified duration of around 3.8 years compared with the current 3.3
years. The share of debt of less than one-year maturity is targeted to
fall to below 30% from the current 42%. Although fiscal policy is making
progress and eventual privatisation revenue should limit coming rises in debt
to GDP ratios, political risks remain significant. The president reflects
a Eurosceptic wing in Czech politics that is strong
by regional standards. With CNB board members appointed by the president,
and the ODS currently looking likely winners of the 2006 elections, the path to
Euro entry may not be a smooth one. Without the prospect of renewed rapid
currency appreciation, which we would expect the Bank to resist, Czech interest
rates still do not look an attractive risk.
--------------F24308576CF5C3E018FE9006-- Important Disclosure Information at the end of this Forum
Disclosure Statement
Morgan Stanley does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research
reports. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making
their investment decision.
Important US
Regulatory Disclosures on Subject Companies
The information and opinions in this report were prepared by Morgan Stanley
& Co. Incorporated and its affiliates (collectively, "Morgan Stanley").
The research analysts, strategists, or research associates principally responsible
for the preparation of this research report have received compensation based
upon various factors, including quality of research, investor client feedback,
stock picking, competitive factors, firm revenues and overall investment banking
revenues.
ANALYST STOCK RATINGS
Overweight (O). The stock's total return is expected to exceed the average total
return of the analyst's industry (or industry team's) coverage universe, or
the relevant country MSCI index, on a risk-adjusted basis over the next 12-18
months. Equal-weight (E). The stock's total return is expected to be in line
with the average total return of the analyst's industry (or industry team's)
coverage universe, or the relevant country MSCI index, on a risk-adjusted basis
over the next 12-18 months. Underweight (U). The stock's total return is expected
to be below the average total return of the analyst's industry (or industry
team's) coverage universe, or the relevant country MSCI index, on a risk-adjusted
basis over the next 12-18 months. More volatile (V). We estimate that this stock
has more than a 25% chance of a price move (up or down) of more than 25% in
a month, based on a quantitative assessment of historical data, or in the analyst's
view, it is likely to become materially more volatile over the next 1-12 months
compared with the past three years. Stocks with less than one year of trading
history are automatically rated as more volatile (unless otherwise noted). We
note that securities that we do not currently consider "more volatile"
can still perform in that manner.
Ratings prior to March 18, 2002: SB=Strong Buy; OP=Outperform; N=Neutral; UP=Underperform.
For definitions, please go to www.morganstanley.com/companycharts.
ANALYST INDUSTRY VIEWS
Attractive (A). The analyst expects the performance of his or her industry coverage
universe to be attractive vs. the relevant broad market benchmark over the next
12-18 months. In-Line (I). The analyst expects the performance of his or her
industry coverage universe to be in line with the relevant broad market benchmark
over the next 12-18 months. Cautious (C). The analyst views the performance
of his or her industry coverage universe with caution vs. the relevant broad
market benchmark over the next 12-18 months.
Stock price charts and rating histories for companies discussed in this report
are also available at www.morganstanley.com/companycharts. You may also request
this information by writing to Morgan Stanley at 1585 Broadway, 14th Floor (Attention:
Research Disclosures), New York, NY, 10036 USA.
Other Important Disclosures
For a discussion, if applicable, of the valuation methods used to determine
the price targets included in this summary and the risks related to achieving
these targets, please refer to the latest relevant published research on these
stocks. Research is available through your sales representative or on Client
Link at www.morganstanley.com and other electronic systems.
This report does not provide individually tailored investment advice. It has
been prepared without regard to the individual financial circumstances and objectives
of persons who receive it. The securities discussed in this report may not be
suitable for all investors. Morgan Stanley recommends that investors independently
evaluate particular investments and strategies, and encourages investors to
seek the advice of a financial adviser. The appropriateness of a particular
investment or strategy will depend on an investor's individual circumstances
and objectives.
This report is not an offer to buy or sell any security or to participate in
any trading strategy. In addition to any holdings that may be disclosed above,
Morgan Stanley and/or its employees not involved in the preparation of this
report may have investments in securities or derivatives of securities of companies
mentioned in this report, and may trade them in ways different from those discussed
in this report. Derivatives may be issued by Morgan Stanley or associated persons.
Morgan Stanley is involved in many businesses that may relate to companies
mentioned in this report. These businesses include specialized trading, risk
arbitrage and other proprietary trading, fund management, investment services
and investment banking.
Morgan Stanley makes every effort to use reliable, comprehensive information,
but we make no representation that it is accurate or complete. We have no obligation
to tell you when opinions or information in this report change apart from when
we intend to discontinue research coverage of a subject company.
Reports prepared by Morgan Stanley research personnel are based on public information.
Facts and views presented in this report have not been reviewed by, and may
not reflect information known to, professionals in other Morgan Stanley business
areas, including investment banking personnel.
The value of and income from your investments may vary because of changes in
interest rates or foreign exchange rates, securities prices or market indexes,
operational or financial conditions of companies or other factors. There may
be time limitations on the exercise of options or other rights in your securities
transactions. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance.
Estimates of future performance are based on assumptions that may not be realized.
This publication is disseminated in Japan by Morgan Stanley Japan Limited;
in Hong Kong by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Asia Limited; in Singapore by Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter Asia (Singapore) Pte., regulated by the Monetary Authority
of Singapore; in Australia by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Australia Limited A.B.N.
67 003 734 576, a licensed dealer, which accepts responsibility for its contents;
in certain provinces of Canada by Morgan Stanley Canada Limited, which has approved
of, and has agreed to take responsibility for, the contents of this publication
in Canada; in Spain by Morgan Stanley, S.V., S.A., a Morgan Stanley group company,
which is supervised by the Spanish Securities Markets Commission (CNMV) and
states that this document has been written and distributed in accordance with
the rules of conduct applicable to financial research as established under Spanish
regulations; in the United States by Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated and
Morgan Stanley DW Inc., which accept responsibility for its contents; and in
the United Kingdom, this publication is approved by Morgan Stanley & Co.
International Limited, solely for the purposes of section 21 of the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000 and is distributed in the European Union by Morgan
Stanley & Co. International Limited, except as provided above.Private U.K.
investors should obtain the advice of their Morgan Stanley & Co. International
Limited representative about the investments concerned. In Australia, this report,
and any access to it, is intended only for "wholesale clients" within
the meaning of the Australian Corporations Act.
The trademarks and service marks contained herein are the property of their
respective owners. Third-party data providers make no warranties or representations
of any kind relating to the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of the data
they provide and shall not have liability for any damages of any kind relating
to such data. The Global Industry Classification Standard ("GICS")
was developed by and is the exclusive property of MSCI and S&P.
This report or any portion hereof may not be reprinted, sold or redistributed
without the written consent of Morgan Stanley.
Additional information on recommended securities is available on request.