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July
23, 2003
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July
26, 2003
A Short History
The
Global Economy Since 1800
By M. SHAHID ALAM
This is a short history of the global economy
since 1800. It is about the system of global capitalism that
took shape once the British economy went 'underground' and began
to draw its energy and, increasingly, its raw materials from
mineral resources.
The progressive substitution of minerals
for plants, as the economy's source of energy and raw materials,
transformed the dynamics of capitalism. It opened up vast new
sources of energy and raw materials, freeing the economy from
the narrow resource constraints of an organic, plant-based economy.
The new cheaper, more abundant energy produced dramatic reductions
in the costs of transportation; a growing volume and range of
goods could now enter into long-distance and international trade;
and this rapidly created the basis for an international division
of labor. But the resource substitution also deepened the logic
of uneven development. On the one hand, the mineral-based economy
created several positive feedbacks that strengthened the already
existing tendency towards the division of trading areas into
Core and Periphery, or concentrations of high and low value-added
activities. In addition, it augmented the military power of the
states that pioneered these new technolgies. Together, these
tendencies-markets, energy substitution, and force-created the
modern global economy, increasingly integrated but also deeply
divided into a Core and Periphery.[1]
The history of the new mineral-based
global economy falls into three phases, defined with reference
to the degree of global centralization of power. The first phase,
lasting from 1800 to 1913, concentrated power-and, with it, capital,
technology, science and manufactures-in a small number of Core
areas, notably Britain, France, United States, and Germany. Conversely,
the greater part of the Periphery-nearly all of Asia and Africa-lost
its sovereignty to a few Core countries, was forced to open their
economies to Core capital, specialized in primary goods, and
scarcely experienced any improvements in the living standards
of the indigenous population. The global economy slowly entered
into a second phase in the late 1940s, although this process
was initiated earlier with the Russian Revolution of 1917, when power was decentralized
from the Core to the Periphery. On the level of the economy,
this decentralization reversed the earlier concentration of manufactures
in the Core countries, and produced dramatic acceleration of
growth in the dependent Periphery. Starting in the 1980s, however,
power was again re-centralized in the Core countries. Already,
by the mid-1990s, this re-centralization had exceeded the previous
peak in the global centralization of power attained during the
late nineteenth century. This paper will examine these three
movements of the global economy, though the emphasis will be
on analyzing the dynamics of the third movement.
Two Economic Logics
It is important to begin by laying out,
if only briefly, the different logics underlying the organic,
land-based economy that held center stage before 1800 and the
inorganic, mineral-based economy that has been developing since
that date.
In the old agrarian system, two factors
perennially constrained its capacity for economic growth. This
system drew nearly all its energy from plants, the source of
our food, fuel, fiber and other raw materials; this constrained
the supply of energy since the land necessary for growing plants
was available only in finite quantities. In addition, this system
only used organic instruments, men and animals, for converting
the energy captured by plants into mechanical energy. These organic
instruments did not favor growth since their upkeep required
large amounts of land, and their efficiency at converting energy
could scarcely be improved upon. As a result, once all accessible
land had been brought into use, the agrarian system grew by improving
the organization of work, primarily through division of labor;
inventing machines that enhanced the efficiency of work; or improving
the quality of existing lands. The division of labor offered
the best prospects for growth, though this was limited-as Adam
Smith so famously noted-by the extent of the market, or transportation
and institutions of exchange. Most importantly, once all the
land was in use, the limits on growth pressed harder. It was
land, or its ability to fix solar energy through plants, that
appeared to impose the final constraint on growth in this organic
economy.
The new inorganic economy that developed
after 1800 transcended the dual limits that constrained growth
in the organic economy. It drew its energy and raw materials
increasingly from stocks of minerals, and since these
stocks were quite large relative to the rate at which they could
be drawn down, this virtually lifted the cap on energy flows
available to the economy. More importantly, the energy from fossil
fuels was converted to mechanical energy by machines: the steam
engine and, later, internal combustion engine. Once these machines
outstripped the organic instruments for converting energy to
work, they found growing applications in transportation, manufacturing,
and, eventually, agriculture. In time, the cheaper energy, when
combined with advances in science and technology, produced cheaper
inorganic substitutes for organic raw materials. This was in
addition to the uses of fossil fuels, which began at an earlier
date, in heating homes, lighting and smelting.
This energy revolution created a variety
of positive feedbacks. First, the fossil fuels freed land from
producing fuels and fodder; the development of inorganic substitutes
for organic raw materials had the same effect. In other words,
even as the new economy expanded, it released land that could
be used for producing more food and organic raw materials, and
we can expect this to reduce the industrial economy's propensity
to imports of food and raw materials, at least during the early
stages of this development. Second, the cheaper energy reduced
the costs of manufacturing and transportation; in turn, the cheaper
transportation produced cumulative cost reductions in manufacturing
through wider markets, greater division of labor, technology
spillovers, and other linkages. These cumulative cost-reductions
and, in part, their localized effects, created a tendency to
concentrate the world's manufactures in countries-the Core countries-that
took an early lead in harnessing the new energy. Conversely,
the rest of the world, the Periphery, specialized in producing
food and raw materials, still using the old source of energy.
Finally, the new energy per se stimulated endless innovations
in production technology. Since large and increasing amounts
of energy could now be concentrated at one point in space, this
led to the development of larger, faster, and more powerful machines
for use in transportation, manufacturing, mining, construction
and, eventually, agriculture. This constituted a third source
of cumulative growth in the industrial economy.
The energy revolution had created a new
economic dynamics. Unlike the muscle-driven, plant-based, land-constrained
agrarian economy, the industrial economy increasingly drew upon
minerals for its energy and raw materials, employed engines to
convert fossil fuels to mechanical energy, and used this energy
to mechanize work in manufacturing, transportation, construction,
and agriculture. The productive capacity of the industrial economy
was not constrained by energy, as in the old agrarian economy,
but by its ability to deploy machines that converted energy to
work. The engine of growth in this economy was capital accumulation,
since this determined how fast it could expand the stock of energy-converting
and energy-using machines available to the economy. As a result,
capitalists replaced landlords as the central actors in the new
industrial economy.
These profound changes created new classes
and class conflicts. The new energy-converting and energy-using
machines downgraded the workers in the manufacturing even as
they pushed this sector to the center of the economy. Of course,
the workers were still needed, but the new machines diminished
their importance. Now the workers could not own their machines,
which were too expensive compared to what they were able to save
individually. The craftsmen, artisans, and even peasants, became
labor, hired by capitalists to tend to the machines, fix them
when they broke down, or perform tasks that had not yet been
mechanized. The machines-and their capitalist proprietors-now
employed the workers. In addition, since the new energy created
concentrations of factories, it also assembled great masses of
workers in one workplace. These conditions favored the growth
of class consciousness on both sides of the production process.
The industrial economy deepened the polarizing
tendencies in the agrarian system. Formerly, due to the greater
economies of scale in manufactures compared to primary goods,
there was a tendency for manufactures to be concentrated in countries
which acquired the biggest markets, whether by chance or force.
By reducing the costs of manufactures and transportation and
creating mineral-based substitutes for raw materials, the energy
revolution strengthened this tendency. In addition, both directly
and indirectly, the energy revolution added to a country's military
power by stimulating prosperity, reducing the cost of arms and
armaments, and improving military technology as inventors drew
upon the general advances in the economy's technical capabilities.
In time, the development of steamboats, better prophylactics
against tropical diseases, and the development of rapid-firing
weapons sealed the fate of Africa and Asia; they were colonized
or converted into open-door countries. [2] The white-dominated
Periphery in Europe and Latin America had the protection of membership
in the European family of civilized nations. [3]
The first countries to adopt the new
energy system would have a near-lock on the global economy. It
created a set of cumulative forces that concentrated manufactures,
capital, technology and power in the countries that took a lead
in the energy revolution-the Core countries. Simultaneously,
the new energy system created a Periphery, economic regions that
were restructured by Core capital to supply food, agricultural
raw materials and minerals to the Core. In varying combinations,
military force, markets and racist ideologies brought about this
restructuring. It is the story of this global economy that we
narrate in these pages.
Karl Marx and Class
Contradictions
In his Wealth of Nations, Adam
Smith (1776) does not once refer to any of the early signs of
an industrial revolution-the harnessing of waterpower, the use
of steam engine in mines, or the rise of factory production.
Although he was greatly impressed by the power of division of
labor in manufacturing, he believed that diminishing returns
to capital and labor, in the presence of fixed amounts of land,
would eventually lead the economy into a stationary state. This
remained the vision of classical economists even as late as the
middle of the nineteenth century.
Amongst classical economists, Karl Marx
(1848) alone took serious notice of the industrial revolution.
In graphic passages, he describes the quickening pace of history,
the tremendous expansive power of capital, its constant search
for new markets and new technologies, and how this was pushing
small-scale producers into the ranks of workers, and unleashing
profound changes in the economic and social landscape of pre-capitalist
societies everywhere. These transformations had produced two
great classes, capitalist and workers, constantly at odds with
each other. At the global level, this expansive dynamic was destroying
pre-capitalist societies and binding them into a single system
of global markets. Although Marx did not worry too much about
the origins of capitalism-he saw its precursors in the burghers
of medieval towns, the growing commerce stimulated by the discoveries,
and the system of Atlantic trade-he was reasonably certain that
the system he was describing was fully developed or nearly so.
Indeed, it was ready for another epochal transformation, and
he might even live to see that happen in his own lifetime. As
it was, Marx underestimated the durability of the system he was
analyzing.
Class contradictions are central to Marx's
analysis of capitalism. The two great classes spawned by industrial
capitalism, capitalists and workers, had opposite interests.
The capitalists were driven by competition to accumulate, innovate,
and expand their market shares; this produced concentrations
of capital and deepening business cycles. By the same logic,
they sought to drive down wages and lengthen the workweek; this
pauperized the workers. At some point, Marx predicted, even in
his own lifetime, these two tendencies would produce a proletarian
revolution. Led by the communist party, the workers would overthrow
the capitalists, abolish markets, socialize ownership and production,
and lay the foundations of a new social formation.
History did not oblige Karl Marx. There
would be no proletarian revolutions in the advanced industrial
countries, where capitalist contradictions were most ripe for
the overthrow of capitalism. The workers stirred in less likely
places, but were easily suppressed. On the whole, the class contradictions
were contained, as capitalist growth created a middle class,
and rising labor productivity began to translate into higher
wages for production workers. In time, when the workers organized,
it was not to overthrow the system but to demand higher wages
and better working conditions. Slowly, capitalists acceded to
these demands, as unionized power expanded, workers gained voting
rights, and labor parties gained ground at the ballot. The emergence
of the Soviet Union, the first worker's state, pushed Core capital
towards greater accommodation with their working classes. In
addition, since there was little industrialization in the Periphery
yet, their concessions to labor did not dampen the international
competitiveness of Core capital. Finally, with help from compulsory
schooling and the media, the system succeeded in socializing
the workers as citizens, endowed with rights and the illusion
that they were free to move up the social ladder through education,
thriftiness and hard work.
Imperialist Rivalry
The challenges to Core capital came from
two sources not anticipated by Karl Marx: the rivalry of countries
seeking entry into the Core, and attempts by the Periphery to
overthrow the Core's hegemony.
The outward expansion of Core capital
was a central result of Karl Marx's analysis of capitalism. He
never worried that anything short of a proletarian revolution
could reverse this expansion; it would penetrate all parts of
the world, and transform and launch them on development trajectories
similar to those traveled by the Core countries. Karl Marx had
not foreseen that the global expansion of Core capital, in and
of itself, might generate contradictions that would reverse for
several decades the capitalist penetration of the Periphery.
We are indebted to Vladimir Lenin and the neo-Marxists for drawing
out attention to these contradictions.
Contrary to the mythical accounts of
orthodox economists, we observe an intimate connection between
the capital and the state at least in the rise of capitalism
in Western Europe. In the new age heralded by the energy revolution,
capital in the Core countries would use the expanded powers of
the state to try to acquire exclusive control over markets and
resources in the Periphery. Starting in the nineteenth century,
this produced a new wave of direct colonization of societies--in
Asia, Africa and Caribbean--that did not have the protection
of membership in the Western "family of nations." At
least for a while, the parceling of the world into colonies proceeded
quite smoothly. There was plenty of real estate for everyone.
The first challenge emerged when powerful
new entrants into the Core--Germany, Italy and Japan--were seized
with empire envy. The old timers, Britain, France and Netherlands,
had appropriated all the real prizes in Africa and Asia. Miffed,
the newcomers decided that their best chance of gaining an empire
was to take it from those who had one. In time, as Britain's
hegemonic control weakened, this produced two fratricidal World
Wars, fought mostly amongst Western countries at the Core. According
to an African proverb, when elephants fight, the grass gets trampled
on. In this case, whether by good or ill luck, the grass would
have a chance to grow.
Core-Periphery Contradictions
Industrial capitalism spawned powerful
cumulative processes-operating through markets, military power
and racist ideologies of domination-which concentrated capital,
manufactures, technology and power in the Core countries. The
dependent Periphery in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, regions
that lost their sovereignty, specialized in the production of
primary goods for export.
The centralizing tendencies of Core capital
acted strongly and quickly. By 1913, according to Bairoch (1982:
296, 304), two-thirds of the world's manufactures were concentrated
in four Core countries: Britain, United States, Germany and France.
In 1750, their combined share had stood at less than a tenth.
At the same time, the Core countries reduced vast areas of the
world-nearly all of Asia, Africa, Central America and the Caribbean-to
colonies, open-door countries or dependencies, which were converted
to the production of primary exports. Those parts of the Periphery
that enjoyed various degrees of political autonomy were luckier.
By 1950, many of them had developed indigenous capital, skills
and manufactures.
The contradiction between the Core and
dependent Periphery was on display, most transparently, in the
widening gap between the living standards of the two economic
areas. According to Bairoch (1981), Britain had roughly the same
per capita income as Asia in 1800; but, in 1950, it had gained
a lead of close to six to one. Africa suffered a similar decline
in its relative position. On an average, the sovereign parts
of the Periphery did not face a decline in their relative position
during this period.
Once again, history had dashed the great
hopes of Karl Marx. Core capital had penetrated the Periphery-in
fact, its political penetration of the dependent Periphery was
nearly complete-but failed to transform its productive potential.
Instead, the global expansion of Core capital had polarized the
world, dividing it into two unequal moieties, the Core and the
Periphery, connected by the disequalizing impact of trade, imperialism
and racist ideologies. In the words of Andre Gunder Frank, capitalist
development at the Core produced underdevelopment in the Periphery.
It is important to note that this inverse dynamic was strongest
in the relations between the Core countries and the dependent
parts of the Periphery.
The prospects for growth in the dependent
parts of the Periphery were dim as long as they could not structure
their economic relations with Core capital. Yet, the system itself
offered a break. Help came when the elephants got into fights-big
fights, better known as World Wars. These wars battered the strength
of the elephants, creating opportunities for indigenous capital
in the Periphery. When these wars directly involved major countries
in the Periphery-Russia in the First World War, and China in
the Second World War-they created openings for the emergence
of radical political movements. Thus was born the October Revolution
of 1917, amidst the chaos of Russian defeat during the First
World War, producing the first systemic challenge to Core capital.
Ironically, the challenge had come from the Periphery.
The October Revolution of 1917 began
a temporary reversal in the global concentration of capital,
power and manufactures. It gave an impetus to liberation movements-in
the colonies and open-door countries-that were already challenging
this concentration, even pushing some towards radical solutions.
The Soviet Union stood as the vanguard, the one great ally, of
liberation movements seeking to roll back the colonial empires
and weaken the polarizing dynamic of global capital. When the
elephants fought again twenty years later, these decentralizing
movements were poised for major victories.
Most importantly, the Second World War
battered the major colonial powers, those who won no less than
those who lost. Of course, the defeated powers, Italy and Japan,
instantly lost all their colonies. The victorious colonial powers,
Britain, France, Belgium and Netherlands, found that they had
lost too much of their former strength to successfully defend
their empires, especially as the liberation movements gathered
steam. In most cases, they decided to pull out of their colonies
before the anti-colonial movements turned violent; this also
offered the best opportunity of preserving their economic interests
and influence in the former colonies. A massive decentralization
of power followed, larger, more dramatic and deeper than the
one that marked the dismantling of Spain's American empire in
the 1820s.
This was a window of opportunity for
the Periphery, especially the former colonies and open-door countries
who were now free to restructure their relations with Core capital.
Several tried collective ownership and planning, and insisted
on a radical break from global markets. By the 1970s, nearly
a third of the world's population lived in communist countries.
Many more did not reject markets as such, but adopted a variety
of interventionist measures to develop indigenous capital, manufactures
and skills. Starting in the 1950s, the former colonies jettisoned
the colonial doctrines of laissez faire, free trade, balanced
budgets, and private ownership. In their place, they introduced
interventionist policies to accelerate the pace of development.
This decentralization produced some dramatic
results. The share of the Periphery--Africa, Latin America, and
Asia minus Japan--in world manufacturing output had shrunk
to 6.5 percent in 1953 from a dominant share of 73 percent in
1750. After two centuries of decline, this share began to increase
in the 1950s, and rose to 12 percent in 1980. In addition, the
growth rates in the Periphery accelerated dramatically. The per
capita income in the largest colonies and quasi-colonies, containing
some 50 percent of the world's population, grew at an average
annual growth of 0.5 and -0.27 percent over 1900-1913 and 1913-1950;
the same growth rates for the sovereign countries in the Periphery
were 1.61 percent and 1.34 percent. Over 1950-1992, the growth
rates in the former colonies and quasi-colonies had jumped to
2.96 percent, ahead of the 2.58 percent recorded for the always-sovereign
countries in the Periphery. [4]
Re-Centralizing Power
The retrenchment of Core capital would
not last. Starting in the 1980s, the IMF and World Bank began
to dismantle the developmental states as their mounting international
debts pushed them closer to bankruptcy. A decade later, the communist
regimes began their transition to markets. In 1994, the creation
of WTO institutionalized the interests of Core capital.
It is tempting to take the position that
this recentralization was inevitable. An underdeveloped Periphery
could not long resist the expansive power of the Core countries
once the latter had recouped their war losses and regained their
growth momentum. Yet, the communist revolutions and the liberation
movements in the Periphery came quite close to dislodging global
capitalism. On closer examination, the argument that revolutions
in the Periphery were incapable of overthrowing Core capital
is not as watertight as it appears. In this case, Core capital
had geopolitical luck on its side.
The challenge from the Periphery was
quite massive. The Soviet Union, which mounted the systemic challenge
to global capitalism, was a great power itself. Its industrial
and military strength expanded rapidly in the decades following
the Revolution, and, at the end of the Second World War, it had
emerged as one of the two superpowers dominating the world. In
1950, the communist regimes in Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and
China stretched continuously from the Danube and the Balkans
to the Pacific, together controlling the upper half of the Eurasian
landmass; they also contained nearly a third of the world's population.
In addition, communist parties were active in many Third World
countries. At this point, many fully expected the tide of communism
to roll westward into a Europe devastated by war, and southward
into impoverished Asia and Africa. If, instead, Core capital
successfully blocked the communist advance and the Soviet Union
itself collapsed in 1990, there was nothing inevitable about
these outcomes.
If Core capital overcame the communist
challenge, this was, at least in part, a fortuitous outcome of
the system of nation states. The fact that United States was
the hegemonic power during this crucial period was a geopolitical
accident; there was nothing in the logic of capitalist system
per se that produced this result. Yet, this accident was
of vital importance to the outcome of the contest between Core
capital and the communist regimes and nationalist liberation
movements in the post-war years. Imagine this contest with Britain
still as the leading Core country.
United States brought several vital advantages
to this contest. The most important was size. It had vastly greater
resources than its predecessor, Britain, had at its height. United
States produced 44.7 percent of the world's manufacturing output
in 1953 and 27 percent of the world's output in 1950; compare
this to Britain's peak share of world manufacturing output of
20 percent in 1860, and a share of 8.5 percent in world output
in 1870. [5] American capitalism too was in some ways unique;
it had a huge industrial working class but they possessed little
class-consciousness. As a result, organized American labor joined
enthusiastically in the fight to undermine workers' movements
overseas. Capitalism-'free enterprise,' in the American lingo-occupied
a place in this country's emotional life that normally belongs
to religion, inseparable from its national existence and history.
The communist challenge evoked very strong emotional defenses.
Finally, the great distance of United States from the theatres
of war in Europe ensured that it would emerge from the two World
Wars with all its industrial assets in one piece.
The American strategy for containing
communism required the commitment of massive resources. The first
component of this strategy was to put the war-devastated economies
of Western Europe and Japan back on their feet; some of these
economies had lost more than half of their pre-war production
capacities. The Marshall Plan was the centerpiece of these efforts.
The United States injected $11.8 billion into Western Europe
between 1948 and 1952, equal to $120 billion in 1997 prices.
[6] In the words of Duignan and Gran (1997), this amounted to
the "greatest voluntary transfer of resources from one country
to another." This injection of capital financed technology
transfers and the import of vital machinery, spare parts, and
raw materials, all of which put Western Europe's industries back
on their feet by 1952. In addition, the Marshall Plan pushed
Western Europe towards economic and political cooperation, helping
to lay the foundations of a united Europe. United States played
a similar role in the recovery of Japan.
The second focus of America's containment
strategy was a massive military buildup. During the Cold War,
the military spending of United States remained roughly proportional
to its share in the global economy. In 1986, this share was 28
percent of the world total and 65 percent of the NATO total.
It is even more remarkable that the Soviet Union, according to
CIA estimates, outspent the United States. In 1986, the military
expenditures of United States and Soviet Union were $365 billion
and $374 billion respectively. [7] Since the Soviet GDP was only
38 percent of the US GD in 1986, this must have placed their
civilian economy under considerable strain. [8] Many experts
maintain that this was an important factor in the eventual collapse
of the Soviet Union.
The containment strategy had a third
focus. On the one hand, it consisted of massive efforts to install
anti-communist governments in the Periphery, prop them with military
and economic assistance, and use them to eradicate radical movements
in their own countries. The White House led these efforts with
support from several agencies including the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID). The Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) carried out the opposite task of overthrowing or
destabilizing governments that were 'unfriendly' to United States.
A single statistic bespeaks better than many tomes the power
of this Agency: it spent $26.6 billions in 1997. [9]
The vast economic and military resources
of United States allowed it to maintain a firm hegemonic grip
over the global capitalist system. On the one hand, it created
the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) to institutionalize
its military dominance over the Core countries in Western Europe.
In a similar move, Japan was converted into a military protectorate.
In the economic arena, United States sought to stimulate economic
growth in Western Europe and Japan by providing them relatively
free access to its own vast markets. In other words, the United
States employed its dominant hegemonic position to eliminate
military conflicts among Core countries and, in addition, replaced
their economic rivalries with various cooperative arrangements,
including the European Common Market (ECM) and the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Freed from their
old conflicts, with declining trade barriers, and better management
of business cycles, the Core countries went on to experience
a golden period of growth between 1950 and 1973.
Core capital slowly regained its intellectual
confidence and political muscle as it grew and expanded, at home
and abroad. On the economic front, this was visible in the assault
by neoclassical economists on Keynesian macroeconomic policies,
the regulation of industries, the welfare state and social security
programs. Politically, Core capital gained control over the levers
of power with the election of Prime Minister Thatcher in 1979
and President Ronald Reagan in 1980, two right-wing warriors.
The conditions were now ripe for Core capital to stage a comeback.
We can agree on the factors that contributed
to the collapse of communism but still disagree on their relative
importance. First, and I think foremost, there was the geopolitical
luck that placed the vast resources of the United States in the
fight to contain communism. This not only stopped the spread
of communism: it pushed the Soviets into a debilitating military
rivalry even as they failed to match the growing affluence offered
by the Core countries. In addition, the communist states were
disadvantaged in their ideological battle against Core capital.
The Core countries captured the high ground on democracy and
freedoms, even while they sterilized the impact of these rights
with money-driven elections, media manipulation, and schooling.
On the other hand, the communists practiced inflexible planning,
rejected political competition, and stamped out dissent with
police methods. They denied workers a sense of ownership in their
workplace, and when they also failed to deliver prosperity, they
had no chance of surviving. It was too late when the Soviets
undertook reforms in the late 1980s; this only deepened the feeling
that the system was indeed rotten, and hastened its collapse.
China avoided this catastrophic end by starting early on their
economic reforms and delivering rapid economic growth. However,
their reforms too led to the same destination: the dismantling
of communism.
The end of developmental states came
about differently. They had created hothouses for the growth
of indigenous capital in the Periphery, a prospect that could
not have pleased the Core countries. Since Core capital could
not block the progress of developmental states, they sought to
penetrate them with official loans, military agreements, private
investments, technical assistance, and access to the best graduate
schools in the Core countries. In time, this would produce results.
Core capital penetrated the key sectors of the developmental
states, integrated their elites into the lower rungs of the Core
hierarchy, and oriented their most talented graduates into Core
labor markets. Once started, this process worked by undermining
the developmental states.
Several forces inside the developmental
states produced similar results. In their anxiety to deliver
growth on the cheap-without painful reforms-the nationalists
would seek loans from the Core countries, regardless of the hidden
costs, until their debt servicing placed them at the mercy of
the lenders. In their search for easy profits, the indigenous
bourgeoisie forged links with Core capital-as subsidiaries, suppliers,
and distributors-and, once these ties multiplied, they would
lobby for the removal of barriers against the penetration of
Core capital. Finally, as some developmental states created the
infrastructure and skills that would make them increasingly competitive
in manufactures-threatening the Core countries with competition
in their own markets-this would invite predatory investment from
Core capital, eager to ensure that they owned the new industries
developing in the Periphery. The strikes against developmental
states were mounting.
The dismantling of developmental states
began in the early 1980s, well before the end of the Cold War.
It was triggered by the cumulative impact of the two oil crises
of 1974 and 1979. Unable to pay their higher import bills, the
oil-importing developmental states took out variable-interest
loans from foreign banks secured by sovereign guarantees. When
interest rates rose in 1981, and some of these countries faced
bankruptcy, the IMF and World Bank-the watchdogs of Core capital-stepped
into the breach, offering new loans to stop them from defaulting
on their old ones. At first, the borrowers were required to stabilize
their economies, which translated into cuts in their social spending.
This was the thin end of the wedge. In time, the conditionalities
were expanded into "structural adjustment programs"-a
code word for eviscerating the developmental states-which required
eliminating trade barriers, freeing exchange markets, privatization,
and national treatment of foreign investments.
The age of neoliberal economics had arrived.
This was the new consensus forged in the 1980s by a cohort of
orthodox economists, many connected to the World Bank and IMF.
For several years, they had been developing a doctrinaire neoclassical
critique of developmental states-supported by several generously
funded, country-by-country assessments of the inefficiency of
interventionist policies in the developmental states. Their vision,
appropriately dubbed the "Washington Consensus" by
John Williamson (1994), would tilt the playing field in the Periphery
to favor Core capital. In this new regime, the reformed states
would guarantee national treatment to Core capital, enforce property
rights-effectively, those of Core capital-balance their budgets,
and help in the provision of human capital. Core capital would
step in to capture the commanding heights-the financial sector,
utilities, communications-and any industry that offered handsome
profits.
The end of the Cold War produced a push
to institutionalize the interests of Core capital in a new global
framework. In 1994, this led to the creation of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), which bound all its members to a single
set of rules-neoliberal rules-on trade, exchange markets, foreign
investments, government procurements, property rights and investments.
The WTO forced all countries to accord "national treatment"
to imports and foreign capital in every sector of the economy,
including services, thereby preparing the ground for rolling
back the gains of developmental policies. All this was a signal
departure from the General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)-the
trade regime displaced by WTO-which granted developing countries
the right to impose protectionist trade and payments regimes.
By the late 1990s, Core capital had reversed
much of the decentralization of power that had occurred since
1917. At no period during the past two centuries did Core capital-not
even during its previous peak in the late nineteenth century-operate
with so much freedom in nearly every country of the world, or
make deeper inroads into the Periphery. In effect, the WTO bound
the Periphery to the old open-door treaties minus extraterritoriality;
though in other respects the WTO was more invasive than the open-door
treaties, especially in the enforcement of property rights, the
penetration of services, and opening up government contracts
to foreign bids. In addition, the private agglomerations of Core
capital in the 1990s were now incomparably greater-compared to
most countries in the Periphery-than they were a hundred years
back. This increased the capacity of Core capital to crowd out,
co-opt and absorb indigenous capital in the Periphery. Was this
the Valhalla of Core capital, the dream of the prophets of laissez
faire?
Recentralization:
Economic Consequences
Contrary to the grandiose claims made
by the ideologues, the neoliberal, open-door economic regimes
imposed on the Periphery by Core capital--starting in the 1980s--have
produced no economic miracles. Instead, these economic regimes
have brought economic ruin or, at best, lack-luster performance
to the countries they have touched most deeply.
In order to identify the failure of neoliberal
economics, we will compare the growth record of the Periphery
in the two decades before and after 1980. First, consider the
two decades preceding 1980 when nearly all countries in the Periphery
protected their manufactures, regulated their currency markets,
engaged in deficit spending, and their governments took on entrepreneurial
roles. By the norms of neoliberal economics, they violated all
the rules of good economic housekeeping. Yet, they recorded quite
impressive growth rates under these interventionist regimes.
The GDP of low-income countries grew at average annual rates
of 4.6 and 4.5 percent during the 1960s and 1970s; the corresponding
figures for the middle-income countries were 6.0 and 5.6 percent.
There were no strong regional variations in the growth record
for this period. Although growth in Sub-Saharan Africa faltered
during the 1970s, there were nine countries in this region whose
average annual growth rates exceeded 5.0 percent during this
decade. [10]
Over the next two decades, as the World
Bank and IMF forced neoliberal policies upon them, the growth
rates in the Periphery declined in proportion to their embrace
of these policies. The neoliberal policies took their first toll
in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Both regions suffered
a precipitous decline in their GDP growth rates to 1.7 percent
during the 1980s, producing declining per capita incomes. The
growth rates in Latin America recovered during the 1990s to 3.4
percent per annum, though this was significantly below their
pre-1980 levels. The growth rate for Sub-Saharan Africa improved
only marginally during the 1990s, and it was unable to stem the
decline in its per capita income. [11]
The collapse of Eastern Europe and Central
Asia came next, with their rapid integration into global capitalism
starting in the 1990s. Their economic decline was striking. Although
the growth performance of these economies had been weakening
for some time, they still managed to log an annual growth rate
of 2.4 percent in their GDP during the 1980s. However, their
precipitate transition to markets produced catastrophic results.
During the 1990s, their GDP declined at an annual rate of 2.7
percent, more than wiping out the gains of the previous decade.
It is doubtful if any economic region of comparable size has
experienced a similar decline in its output. Soon, their fertility
rates fell significantly below replacement levels, producing
a declining population. [12]
The economic decline of the Middle East
and North Africa since the 1980s has been nearly as steep as
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Their GDP growth rates in the two decades
after 1980 were significantly below those for the two preceding
decades. As a result, the region's per capita income declined
between 1980 and 2000. This was not due to declining oil prices
alone. The non-oil economies in this region shared in this decline;
their GDP had grown at 2.9 percent annually between 1950 and
1980, but this declined to 1.5 percent in the two decades after
1980. This decline occurred at a time when the non-oil economies,
barring Syria, were liberalizing their trade and payments regimes.
[13]
Most countries in East and South Asia,
which had made striking progress in the transition to neoliberal
economic regimes, followed the same pattern. Their growth rates
in the two decades after 1980 were visibly lower than in the
two preceding decades. Notably, this group includes the most
advanced countries in the region-Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore,
Hong Kong, Thailand and Malaysia-as well as the poorer countries:
Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Philippines and Pakistan.
There were few countries in the Periphery
that escaped the declining trend in growth rates in the post-1980
period. India and China, the two largest countries in the Periphery
with more than one-third of the world's population, nearly doubled
their GDP growth rates in this period compared to their record
in the three previous decades. Although both countries enacted
market reforms since 1980, they were still amongst the most illiberal
economic regimes in the world, whether one examines the extent
of state ownership in their industries or their trade and payments
regime. [14] A second group of countries-Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam-experienced
dramatic upturns in their growth rates during the 1990s, without
the benefit of a liberal regime.
These results should surprise no one
but the historically myopic. In the hundred years before 1950,
the colonies and open-door countries performed poorly compared
to the sovereign countries in the Periphery-those that were generally
free to choose interventionist policies. [15] During the post-war
interlude lasting into the 1970s, when most of the former colonies
and open-door countries practiced strongly interventionist policies,
they experienced a dramatic acceleration in their growth rates.
It is scarcely surprising that the forced return to open-door
policies in the Periphery, since the 1980s, has repeated the
results from the past. It is not clear how long India and China,
the two major countries that have not yet surrendered their economic
sovereignty, can resist conversion to neoliberal economic regimes.
The re-centralization of power by Core
capital that began in the 1980s was quite swift and mostly non-violent,
unlike the centralization that reached its peak in the last decades
of the nineteenth century. Perhaps, this is not surprising. The
first centralization was a pioneering movement: it involved the
creation, extension and deepening of core-controlled systems
of transport, trade, finance, investment, cultural instruments,
and subordinate classes in the Periphery. It took centuries to
establish this system, often involving wars. However, when the
colonial powers departed from their colonies, in most cases,
they did not fully liquidate these long-established systems of
control. While they terminated direct political controls, and
ended their military presence, many of the economic and social
linkages, though weakened, persisted in most former colonies;
only the communist countries severed nearly all their linkages
with Core countries. This is what made the second re-centralization
easier.
The Core countries began to reinforce
their informal systems of control as soon as they lowered their
flags over their former colonies. The reinforcements took many
forms, including foreign aid, military assistance, joint military
exercises, training programs, and foreign investments. When Core
countries, now working in unison, articulated their new determination-through
IMF, World Bank and the OECD-to impose neoliberal regimes on
the former colonies in the 1980s, there was little resistance.
For the most part, the elites in the Periphery had already been
integrated into the hierarchy of power emanating from the Core;
they also understood that resistance carried unacceptable costs.
There was no popular resistance because re-centralization did
not affect the visible symbols of sovereignty. The communist
countries too were re-integrated without firing a shot. They
were overthrown from within, since they failed to deliver prosperity,
freedom or a sense of ownership.
Concluding Remarks
The swift and easy recentralization of
the global economy created a paradoxical situation. United States
still commanded a massive military force while the combined military
strength of its main adversaries was less than a third its former
size.[16] This led to calls to downsize the military, an intolerable
prospect for the industries whose profits depend on military
contracts. This had to be remedied.
The refurbished power of Core capital
was creating some domestic problems too. On the one hand, Core
capital was eroding the social gains made by workers, consumers,
and environmentalists since the 1930s. More importantly, the
labor force in the Core countries was beginning to face competition
from the growth of industrial production and advanced skills
in some countries at the Periphery. They were also losing jobs
as Core capital relocated to the Periphery, a process being accelerated
by the internet revolution. In addition, Core capital was using
its muscle to import cheaper skilled workers into the markets
of Core countries. Faced with a sustained decline in their living
standards-the first in the history of industrial capitalism-a
growing number of people in the Core countries were gravitating
towards anti-Corporatist, anti-globalization movements. This
too had to be remedied.
These problems would be solved by inventing
new enemies. It was in this context that Bernard Lewis (1990)
first invented the "clash of civilizations" between
the West and Islam. He argued that the Islamist opposition in
the Middle East represented "a mood and a movement far transcending
the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue
them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations--the perhaps
irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against
our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide
expansion of both in 1990, that the West was engaged in a veritable
clash of civilization with Islam." Three years later, Samuel
Huntington (1993) generalized this thesis into a historical principle.
At the end of the Cold War, he prophesied, the world is entering
a new age, whose conflicts will occur along the fault lines of
civilizations, mostly between the West and Islam, and the West
and China.
The Clash thesis set up the military
machine for capture by powerful special interests and voting
blocks within United States. Quickly, the Israeli lobby, Christian
fundamentalists, the oil interests, and military contractors
joined forces. Each would pursue its specific goal-eliminating
threats to Israel's hegemony, Christianizing Islamic societies,
capturing oil profits, resisting military cuts-by mobilizing
America's redundant military to re-colonize the Middle East.
It was not hard selling this imperialist project to Americans.
The Arab regimes were easily painted into a corner. They were
tyrannies, they possessed weapons of mass destruction, they were
an imminent threat to American lives, they opposed Western values,
and they threatened Israel. A great nation, the greatest there
has ever been, would have little difficulty manufacturing a clash
of civilizations when it needed one.
M. Shahid Alam
is Professor of Economics at Northeastern University. His last
book, Poverty from the Wealth of Nations, was published
by Palgrave in 2000. He is a contributor to Cockburn and St.
Clair's new volumen, The
Politics of Anti-Semitism (AK Press). He may be reached at
m.alam@neu.edu.
Visit his webpage at http://msalam.net.
Footnotes:
[1] The terms, organic and mineral-based
economy, are borrowed from Wrigley (1988: 12).
[2] Headrick (1981).
[3] Strang (1996)).
[4] The data in this paragraph are from
Alam (2000): 151, 169.
[5] The data on shares of manufacturing
output are from Bairoch (1982: 296, 304), and the data on shares
in world output are from Maddison (1994): 182-3, 227.
[6] The data are from Duignan and Gran
(1997).
[7] The data on military expenditures
are from Conetta and Knight (1997).
[8] Maddison (1995): 183, 187.
[9] Levin (1997).
[10] World Bank (1983): 150-51.
[11] World Bank (2001): 295.
[12] World Bank (2001): 295, 297.
[13] Sevket Pamuk, The
Middle East and North Africa in the age of globalization, 1980-2000
(Paper presented at the 13th IEHA Congress at Buenos Aires, August
2002).
[14] Wacziarg and Welch (2002) maintain
that India and China remained closed economies as of 2000-India
more than China-when judged in terms of their average tariffs,
non-tariff-barriers, and exchange-rate premiums. In addition,
state-ownership remained dominant in heavy industries in India;
in China, this included the financial sector as well.
[15] The average annual growth rates
of PCI in the sovereign countries were 1.00 percent for 1870-1900,
1.61 percent for 1900-1913, and 1.34 percent for 1913-1950. The
corresponding figures for the colonies and open-door countries
were 0.59, 0.50 and -0.27. Alam (2000): 151.
[16] In 1994, according to Conetta and
Knight (1997) US military expenditure was $288 billion, while
that of Potential Threat States was $167 billion; in 1986 the
corresponding figures were $365 billion and $550 billion.
References:
Alam, M. Shahid, Poverty from the
Wealth of Nations (Houndsmill, UK: Macmillan, 2000).
Bairoch, Paul "The main trends in
economic disparities since the Industrial Revolution," in:
Paul Bairoch and Maurice Lévy-Leboyer, eds., Disparities
in economic development since the Industrial Revolution (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1981).
Bairoch, Paul, "International industrialization
levels from 1750 to 1980," Journal of European Economic
History 11, 2 (Spring 1982): 269-333.
Conetta, Carl and Charles Knight, Post-Cold
War US military expenditure in the context of world spending
trends (Project on Defense Alternatives: January 1997): http://www.comw.org/pda/bmemo10.htm#2.
Duignan, Peter and Lewis H. Gran, "The
Marshall Plan," Hoover Digest 4 (1997): http://www-hoover.
stanford.edu/publications digest 974 duignan.html
Headrick, Daniel R., The tools of
empire: Technology and European imperialism in the nineteenth
century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
Huntington, Samuel, "The clash of
civilizations?" Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993).
John Williamson, eds., The political
economy of policy reform (Washington, D. C.: Institute for
International Economics, 1994).
Levin, Duncan, "The CIA and the
price we pay: Law-suit response puts the figure at $26.6 billion,
Baltimore Sun (October 19, 1997): http://www.gwu.edu/~cnss/secrecy/dloped.html.
Lewis, Bernard, "The roots of Muslim
rage," Atlantic Monthly (September 1990).
Smith, Adam, The wealth of nations:
An inquiry into the nature and causes (Modern Library: 1776/1994).
Strang, David, "The social construction
of sovereignty," in: Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber,
eds., State sovereignty as social construct (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Wacziarg, Romain and Karen Horn Welch,
"Trade liberalization and growth: New evidence (Palo Alto:
Stanford University, November 2002): http://www.stanford. edu/~wacziarg/
down loads/ integration. pdf.
World Bank, World Development Report,
1983 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983): 150-51.
World Bank, World Development Report,
2000-2001 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
Wrigley, E. A., Continuity, chance
and change: The character of the industrial revolution in England
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
© M. Shahid Alam
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