Noam Chomsky's set up a blog. Consider yourselves warned.
- posted by Andrew @ 7:08 PM

 
Blade Nzimande is offering us a 'Marxist analysis' of the alliance between the DA and IFP.

Apparently the alliance is a, 'marriage between an IFP elite and sections of a white petite bourgeoisie.' Whilst we should hardly be terribly impressed by the degree of insightfulness demonstrated here, we should at least be entitled to expect that Nzimande gets his basics correct. The IFP is a lot of things, but an elite organisation it is not. To adopt one of those much vaunted 'Marxist tools of analysis' I think it makes a lot more sense to see the IFP as an organisation of the rural proletariat. Its power lies in the cohesiveness of the peasantry and its ability to communicate that strength into a sense of cultural and political unity. Hence the fact that it rallys its support by invoking the monarchy and traditional authority and by looking to an age before the onset of industrialisation when life was simpler and more authentic - pre-capitalist to use a well-worn Marxist phrase.

Does this make sense? Depends on how much credence you give to Marxist analysis. But if you are going to see the world through that lense then it makes a damn sight more sense than Nzimande's assertion that the IFP is an elite organisation. Still, if Nzimande was intent on remaining true to his intellectual beliefs he wouldn't be able to make the political argument that he does. And were would the fun be in that?
- posted by Andrew @ 5:36 PM

 
The Freedom Front Plus (btw what's the 'plus' all about) protested against Sanlam Bank on Thursday because of its decision to donate money to South Africa's political parties in proportion to the number of votes that they receive. The ANC thus ended up with R700 000 with the FF+ getting a mere R10 000.

I'm not sure what other formula they have in made that could have made things any fairer. Perhaps the truth of the matter is revealed by FF+ leader Piet Mulder's comment that, 'Sanlam was largely built on Afrikaaner sentiment.' Presumably he thinks that this entitles the FF+ to a bigger share of the booty. However, given that the FF+ still appears to be campaigning for the break up of the Republic, Sanlam was perhaps well advised to limit the cash flow.
- posted by Andrew @ 5:13 PM

 
Some philosophy
Be warned, if philosophy is not your thing, then stop now... Some time ago, I posted some comments endorsing the idea of gay marriage. One of the chief arguments advanced by people who disagreed with me was that allowing gays to marry would amount to a redefinition of the institution. This argument was made by Peter Cuthbertson in our exchange on the issue and also by a friend who asked me what marriage is -- what is entailed by the concept -- if not a certain tradition, a tradition that has always precluded same-sex unions. This, of course, is a rather philosophical point about the nature of concepts. And, originally, I tried to get around it by arguing that marriage had been redefined before (by allowing for inter-racial marriage and equal rights for women) without doing any apparent harm to the institution. Still, I was left with a nagging sense that I hadn't got to the bottom of the problem. What I really wanted to say is that the institution can be redefined without necessarily being undermined or fundamentally changed. But that sounded too much like a paradox.

Recently, as part of my research, I've been re-reading some material by one of my favourite legal philosophers, Ronald Dworkin, which I think holds the key to this issue (see Law's Empire in particular). Dworkin draws a distinction between two types of concept: those that are criterial and those that are interpretive. A concept is criterial if its meaning is exhausted by the rules for its use that are followed by members of our linguistic community. That sounds horribly abstract so let me try to clarify what I mean. Consider, for example, the concept "table." If I want to know what this concept means, the trick is to observe how other people use the term. The way that the majority of people apply the word "table" defines the concept. It would make no sense for me to adopt a minority position regarding what tables are. I couldn't argue that a tennis ball is a table, for instance. People would think that I was talking nonsense.

Dworkin's insight is that certain concepts, which he calls interpretive, seem to be different in that they allow for disagreement. One example is the concept of justice. It goes without saying that we frequently disagree about what is just and unjust, in a way that we don't disagree about what constitutes a table. With interpretive concepts, there's also no problem with holding minority positions -- positions that diverge from the linguistic rules followed by the majority of our community. One can, for example, consistently say that the death penalty or taxation or whatever are unjust despite the fact that a majority of people think otherwise. One can't do the same with tables.

Another example of an interpretive concept is courtesy. Our society has always recognised the concept of courtesy but it goes without saying that, over the years, the rules of courtesy have changed. For example, it was, for a long time, accepted practice that men should open doors for women. Now, at least some feminists object to this practice on the grounds that its sexist. An accepted rule has, in other words, been challenged. The fact that the challengers probably occupy a minority position doesn't matter. There's something about the concept of courtesy that allows for disagreement, that allows us to understand what they're saying, even if we're think they're wrong. Concepts such as "table" don't seem to allow for this.

So, what is this elusive element that distinguishes interpretive concepts from criterial concepts? For Dworkin, the key is that interpretive concepts are perceived as having a value, purpose, or point. The point of courtesy, he suggests, is respect. By agreeing on this, we are able to disagree about whether our current rules of courtesy adequately reflect that value. Some can, for example, argue that opening doors for women is an expression of respect. Others can take the view that this practice is the antithesis of respect. The rules for the use of the concept "courtesy" are, in other words, up for debate, in light of our understanding of the fundamental point or value of the institution.

Now, to get back to the original issue, it occurs to me that marriage is an interpretive concept. We shouldn't be debating whether we will "redefine" the institution by allowing gays to marry. We should, instead, be considering why, fundamentally, we have the institution, and whether the prohibition on gay marriage is consistent with that understanding. It my original post, I suggested that the following understanding of the fundamental point of marriage:

To my mind, marriage is, fundamentally, a loving partnership that is formally, and publicly, entered into, and which also has a range of legal consequences that facilitate a life-long relationship (such as qualifying for a spouse's passport).

This, I argued, doesn't preclude gay marriage; indeed, it shows us that our current restrictions on the institution are artificial, and that our rules for the use of the word "marriage" should be adjusted accordingly. Others, of course, might want to take the view that marriage is fundamentally about having children, which does preclude same-sex unions. But my point is that this is the debate that we should be having. We shouldn't try to forestall it at the outset by worrying about issues of redefinition. That misunderstands the type of concept that marriage is.
- posted by Murray @ 12:14 PM

 
One of the things that surprised me about Patricia de Lille was her decision to form a new party rather than to join the DA. In fact, if this report is to be believed, the DA made a considerable effort to woo her over but was stymied by her insistence that she be rewarded with either the Premiership of the Western Cape or Mayor of Cape Town.

So, is the formation of the Independent Democrats simply part of an extended courtship? If de Lille manages to win a respectable share of the vote, she'll become even more attractive to the DA (not to mention a considerable threat) and might therefore be in a position to extract major concessions from them. Not a bad strategy, really, but the problem is that after all the rhetorical abuse that has flown between the DA and IDs recently, I'd imagine that there are a number of people, on both sides, who'd be deeply opposed to any putative alliance or amalgamation. The DA may yet live to rue the day that they let de Lille get away.

This points, of course, to the problem with opposition politics in South Africa - it is largely driven be ego and personality. Think of Peter Marais, Buthelezi, Bantu Holomisa, de Lille, Leon etc etc. With the exception of Leon, all of these people are larger than the parties that they lead. Their media profile and presence on the national stage depends upon their independence and ability to be their own person. But if opposition politics is really going to take off in SA, the 'personalities' are going to have to bow to party principle and accept a lower profile role. Is this likely or even possible? On the basis of the emergence of the ID's I'd have to answer in the negative. As long as the Holomisa's and de Lille's of the world are able to float the mirage of an opposition able to take on the ANC and as long as the South African electorate displays the sort of political immaturity that it has by supporting such chimaeras, there will be an incentive for high profile figures to go their own way whenever they feel that they are not getting what they want. And of course the problem really is that none of these people are actually expanding the size of the opposition vote, they're simply competing with each other to carve it up differently.
- posted by Andrew @ 4:26 PM

 
Tony Leon asks the question that, I think, a lot of us would like to know the answer to, namely, why is Trevor Manuel not being touted as a possible Deputy President and future leader?

"Mr Manuel, as we all know, has been quite competent and he has brought down the national debt."

"On top of that, at the last ANC conference he was elected in the top position to the [ruling party's] national executive. And unlike our current deputy president [Jacob Zuma], there is no Scorpions' investigation in progress against Mr Manuel."

"So why is it that he is rarely ever mentioned as a possible deputy president, indeed as a successor to Thabo Mbeki?"

Leon continued: "Some speculate that it is because "he is only a 'so-called coloured'." I would hope that is not true. But if it is true, it is a disgrace."
- posted by Andrew @ 3:58 PM

 
According to the M&G;:

In a hard-hitting address to thousands of African National Congress supporters in Rustenburg, President Thabo Mbeki on Monday told them not to vote for "silly parties" like the New National Party...

Looks like the ANC/NNP alliance is in good shape, and that the NNP is an equal and respected partner!
- posted by Murray @ 9:44 AM

 
As Andrew has noted, its become fashionable to express dislike of Tony Leon. Leon, it is said, is too combative, critical, aggressive and opportunistic. He opposes just for the sake of it, and would do better to press his criticisms more constructively, in the spirit of the African tradition of consensus politics. I agree with this up to a point; it would be nice if our politicians were always balanced and fair. But why do we think that Leon alone is guilty of conducting himself in this way? I refer you to recent press statements from the ANC and ANC Youth.

On 24 February 2002, the ANC Youth released a press statement claiming:

The truth is that Leon's is an arch-racist, neo-liberal and pro-imperialist organisation that supports the maiming of the Palestinian as well as the Iraqi people.

Hmmm, that's constructive, balanced and fair. The ANC itself is not much better. The following statement was released on 17 March 2004:

If DA supporters are indoctrinated with Tony Leon's politics of racial intolerance, it is hardly surprising that right wing bigots in DA strongholds would resort to these desperate and uncivilised displays of criminal behaviour to "Keep the ANC out."

An example of African consensus politics? And on 23 February 2004:

The ANC requests the DA Fuhrer to make an unequivocal statement on this [that he should resign].

McIntosh [placed relatively low on the DA list] will remember that during the last DA caucus meeting when the Fuhrer made a joke, McIntosh did not laugh loud enough. Those DA members who laughed their lungs out are on top of the DA national and provincial lists.

Apart from being ad hominem, there's something more sinister going on here. Referring to a Jew as the "Fuhrer" is crass and insensitive. Lest anyone think this is a careless oversight, I remind you that in the past the ANC has referred to Leon's wife as "Israel."

Finally, lest anyone think that the DA has somehow provoked this, and has therefore been singled out for special treatment, I quote Thabo Mbeki's recent, and rather outrageous, statement on the ACDP:

He [Mbeki] said if ever his sister was to arrive home and tell him that she was in love with ACDP leader Kenneth Meshoe, he would have to beat her.

Nevertheless, none of this should surprise us (excepting perhaps Mbeki's advice to beat supporters of other parties). This is politics, after all, and politics is a rough and tumble affair, often unfair and frequently personal. What worries me, however, is that the ANC has succeeded in developing the idea of consensus politics in such a way that it applies to its chief opponent but not to itself. And people, very intelligient people, buy this! There might be good reasons not to vote DA and also not to like Leon personally (I'm not going to go into these here). But objecting to his rhetoric, and not to that of the ANC, amounts to a double standard.
- posted by Murray @ 6:13 PM

 
Who-Ho, recognition by dead tree media at last. Er, South Africa Computer Monthly has an article on blogging in South Africa that includes a link to us. First SACM, then the world .
- posted by Andrew @ 4:08 PM

 
Nick's fallen for that old chestnut that Africa is special and therefore needs a special kind of politics. Not for us the bruising encounters characteristic of Western political systems nor the sharply differentiated ideological positions that cause them. We're not special of course, although the rhetoric suggesting that we are trips off the tongues of the kleptocrats, dictators and genocidal maniacs that Africa often endures. The idea is useful when you are oppressing your people and undermining democracy.

I really shouldn't have to point this out, but the reason that in open democracies the political system typically divides along similar lines is not because there is something unique to the West. It is because in normal societies there are usually no more than 3 or 4 major cultural, social and political cleavages. Hell, if you like Marx then there is only one. This holds as much for SA as for Britain. Conservative vs liberal, socialist vs free-market, left vs right. Get the picture? These schisms assuredly exist in South Africa, they just tend to get subsumed by that other major divide in SA, black vs white. We need to keep our eyes on the prize. We need to make sure that we don't fall for this stuff. When people start believing that there is something about their country which makes normal democratic politics difficult they've conceded a major principle to those who have no respect for democracy.
- posted by Andrew @ 1:08 AM

 
A Long and Winding Road
Yesterday whilst reading Peter C's latest entry I stumbled across a debate in his comments section about the role of tariffs in Britain's industrialisation. I posted a response to this comment which then prompted this, this and this by way of a flurry of rejoinders. I'd intended to post a short response this evening but..well, the short response turned into the longest blog article I've ever written. Far too long for Peter C's comments section, so I've pasted it here. Having spent the better part of the last 4 hours writing this, I'm afraid that I'm in no mood to edit or add links now. So you'll just have to be patient. I accept full responsibility for all errors (factual, grammatical and otherwise) of which I expect there to be many..

A long response addressing Alan's point about the importance of protectionism. Please bear with me.

The first thing that you need to bear in mind is that it doesn't make sense, logically, to argue that Britain used tariffs to aid the industrialisation process. Why? Because at that point (mid 18th century) no other country had experienced an industrial revolution. Using tariffs to protect weak industries and promote growth implies an intentionality predicated upon an understanding of where one is now and where one would like to get to. But if you don't have the example of other industrialised countries to look to (because such examples do not exist), you simply don't know where you are going. The first country to industrialise had to do so 'blind'. Britain bootstrapped itself into an industrial revolution by building, subconsciously, on a whole host of favourable factors. And no, Alan, despite the sources you quote I'm afraid that I remain unconvinced that tariffs played much of a role in this process. So lets say you grant me my argument that the first country to industrialise could not do so consciously, you then have to explain why Britain did in fact industrialise. Other countries have had tariffs at various points and did not industrialise and this suggests that there was something more going on in Britain. So, tariffs seem not to be a sufficient condition, otherwise the first country to industrialise would have been the first to use tariffs to protect its home industries. But it appears that they are not a necessary condition either?

Two questions, which go to the heart of the discipline: Why Britain? Why then? As a first cut I should point out that the notion that Britain only began to exhibit the signs of incipient industrialisation in the late 18th century is, by now, discredited. I point you to MacFarlane's excellent, 'The Origins of English Individualism' for the classic argument suggesting that England possessed functioning, active markets for the trading of land as far back as the 12/13th centuries. This means, of course, that feudalism in England was different to that practised elsewhere. Power was more dispersed, there were greater levels of freedom and, consequently, it was less likely that a parasitic state would emerge. Obviously this is important when looking at the causes of England's industrial revolution. Another important work is Wrigley's 'Continuity, Chance and Change' which suggests that over the 200 years up to 1780, and industrial lift off, England experienced a remarkable rise in agricultural productivity. The consequences of this were to create a pool of surplus (and increasingly urban labour), and to generate surplus capital with which to invest in new methods.

What caused this productivity improvement? The answers are not at all clear, I'm afraid. England at this stage was improving internal transport links and creating bigger domestic markets and it was also undergoing beneficial institutional changes (see North and Thomas 'The Rise of the Western World' for a good summary of the 'institutional' view). But the improvement may have come down to something as esoteric as the fact that England's stock of draft horse per capita of human labour increased substantially over the period. The result: the opportunity cost of agricultural labour went up and it switched out of agriculture into other areas - cottage industry, for example. Horses were not only more productive, but they were also the major source of fertiliser. More horses = more horse dung = higher crop yields. It sounds silly, but when trying to explain why an economy suddenly defies all historical experience and starts to grow, these explanations take on a peculiar weight.

But other countries had experienced gains in agricultural productivity and yet failed to industrialise. China had famously been through more than one such cycle. So what gives? And is the missing variable tariffs? Well, it bears making the obvious point that China had implemented a variety of tariffs of varying degrees of severity. This culminated in the Ming Emperor's issuing of the various decrees that lead to the abandonment of long range trade and the shipping industry that went with it. (An aside: what a wonderful counter-factual raises it's head here viz. could the Chinese have rounded the Cape before Diaz and Magellan et al if not for the Ming inspired turning in?)

The answer of course has nothing to do with tariffs and everything to do with rational individual responses to prevailing incentive structures. As any good neo-classicist will tell you. As Smith, Ricardo, Malthus etc told us whilst laying the ground work for the discipline. To wit: as a country experiences agricultural productivity gains, surpluses are generated which might be thought to be the basis for an industrial revolution. In fact, as Elvin (The Pattern of the Chinese Past) argues, what normally happens is that the increased output is eaten up by increased child birth. In the brutal pre-industrial world, population levels are determined by the amount of available food. Malthus knew this. But Malthus is decried as a doom-monger, a quack, maybe a charlatan, nowadays. He wasn't. When food output increases, population goes up. But of course, without the benefits of industrial technology, there are only so many things that you can do to improve agricultural productivity. Once you've laid down a road, improved the axles of horse-drawn carts and created efficient internal markets, you're pretty much stuck for further improvements. If by this stage you haven't taken off, you're trapped. A very large population, agriculture which is very efficient (it has to be to support the population) and no prospect of further gains. Elvin called this the 'high level equilibrium trap' and it explains China and most of the rest of pre-industrial human history. But it doesn't explain England in the 18th century. Why not?

Perhaps here, at last, we find the place for Alan's tariffs. Or perhaps not. Consider, it is the second half of the 18th century and England is travelling down a path that China has been down already. We have few reasons to believe that our intrepid little island is going to do any better. In fact, if we are betting men, we’re probably going to place our money on those good Dutch burghers across the North Sea. But jolly old England has a few aces which might allow it to escape Malthus and achieve the impossible: sustained economic growth that is rapid enough to outpace population increases.

What are these aces? Well, coal is the first. Both Wrigley and more recently, Pomeranz ('The Great Divergence') have stressed the importance of England's deposits of high quality and fortuitously positioned coal fields. Why are they important? Before coal, the economy depended upon organic fuel power, wood (relatively scarce and thus relatively expensive) and such power as could be gained from water mills, dung etc. This might sustain a small, feudal economy but not one which is preparing to go where no economy has ever been before. If wood is the only source of fuel you need to plant trees. But trees take up land and land is scarce and better devoted to agriculture. Coal allows England to side-step this issue, it is in effect an infinite stock of potential energy as opposed to the limited flow of wood and dung energy that powered the organic economy. Suddenly all those marginal forests can be cut down and the land devoted to other uses and some of those surplus labourers (remember them?) can be sent down the mines to haul up yet more of the stuff. The organic era ends and England is the first to usher in an economy based upon inorganic energy.

But there is more to it than this. You're not going to explain the most important event in economic history with one variable. What else? Well, here the importance of England's access to the Atlantic economy plays a role. By importing food, sugar etc. England was again able to relieve the pressure on her already over-utilised domestic lands. Ever heard the phrase, 'sheep eating men'? Until the development of the Atlantic Economy, the most important of the early integrated trading networks, every additional head of sheep really did impact on the country's ability to feed, house, clothe etc itself. No surprises here, sheep and men compete for much the same resources in order to survive. Once the trade routes had been established, the pressure was relieved and Malthus was fought further back. But the population of the British Isles was still going up and although Atlantic trade and the discovery and systematic exploitation of coal was delaying the onset of a Malthusian population crisis, that increase was going to eliminate surplus. Just as it had done everywhere else. Just as it had always done, in fact. But here is where Britain finally diverged from history and achieved take off to something new and unknown.

The Atlantic economy and coal prolonged the surpluses generated by that earlier improvement in agricultural productivity long enough for a class of men to emerge whose genius would create the frame-work for industrialisation. The tinkerers, the experimenters, the men of science. Thousands of them. Thousands of them who, unlike their ancestors, found that they didn't need to spend their lives in the fields producing food. In the rapidly expanding towns and cities, ideas were generated and exchanged, techniques refined. Britain was open to the outside world. Foreigners and their ideas arrived at the White Cliffs and added spice to an already heady broth. The basis for the steam engine was established, the iron furnace was developed and refined, the looms that powered the textile industry were invented and so on and so forth. The effects were electric. Productivity in the textile industry improved by hundreds and then thousands of percent, the steam engine changed man's ideas about what could be achieved in the field of manufacturing. Indeed it created the idea of manufacturing - large combines of workers and machines as opposed to small family owned cottage industry.

The exact processes that underlie technological innovation (see Mokyr, 'The Lever of Riches' and Landes, 'The Unbound Prometheus' for two of the best efforts to wrestle the beast) are still only imperfectly understood although, at the risk of appearing flippant, it is obvious that the spinning jenny was not invented and perfected as a result of a state lead effort to industrialise. It is obvious too that tariffs played no role in this. How could they? The process of technological break through was small scale, cumulative and accompanied by endless trial and error. This is not Germany in 1860 using tariffs to protect the industries being created by importing British technology. Britain had nobody to import from, Britain didn't have the example of an already existing industrial economy to look to for ideas about how to achieve her own revolution. To see this another way consider that the generations living after the mid 18th century in Britain were only dimly aware of the importance and meaning of the great changes going on around them. The revolution was an unconscious process. Elsewhere and later, change was a conscious process, usually self-directed. In the case of Germany and the US 100 years later, it makes sense to speak of govt policy aimed at industrialisation, it makes sense to argue that governments used tariffs to aid this process. Interestingly at this stage, the first to industrialise was still more circumspect. The first had not needed tariffs and for the most part she saw no reason to change her mind. For more on how technology changed industry I point you to one of the more interesting accounts, that of Mann and Wadsworth, 'The Cotton Trade and Industrial Lancashire'. They discuss the importance of institutional factors (of which more shortly), the effect of imports of raw cotton (replacing linen), the effects of trade with India, transfers of technology from other parts of Europe and the long process of experimentation that eventually lead to mechanised spinning. Incidentally, Patrick W, I'm afraid that I can’t endorse your recommendation of Landes, 'The Wealth of Nations'. I think his earlier 'Unbound Prometheus' is by far the better work and although it draws on cultural explanations is not quite as ham-fisted as 'Wealth' when it does so.

But what of the Corn Laws, a tariff and only repealed at the end of the 1840s. I'm afraid that I give short shrift to those who argue that the Corn Laws somehow amount to a necessary condition for the revolution. They're best explained as the outward manifestation of a political contest between land owners and the newly emerging class of industrialists. The fight for the Corn Law represented a reactionary effort to protect what was, in effect, a dying way of life. Land was once again becoming relatively expensive - massive urbanisation and industrial expansion had seen to that. The only way the under-utilised estates (underproductive in fact) could remain viable was by artificially inflating the price of the goods produced. But note that if this is true then the tariff was a massive drain on the economy (tariffs always are of course) and in this case you can't even argue that they were being used to protect an infant industry. Revolutions always lead to changes in the prevailing social order, this slow incremental one no less. The victims were the landed aristocracy, the winners were the industrialists, the bankers and merchants.

What of the other variables? I've already mentioned institutional factors but it bears mentioning them again in a bit more depth. The important point here is not private property per se (although this becomes an issue as industrialisation really gets under way) but predictability in the distribution of rights relating to property and tax. You are not going to industrialise if you have a state in control which arbitrarily seizes property and which sets tax levels with no reference to the ability of the payee to actually stump up the cash. Likewise, if traders cannot be sure that their goods will not be seized or looted you are going to battle to lay the groundwork for an efficient trade system. Think of the Indian Moghuls plundering their merchants (and see Bayley, 'Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars' for more). These are all simple points and yet in many historical cases, the state was predatory, tax was arbitrary, the rule of law weak. And consequently the prospects for a sustained increase in growth were weak if not non-existent.

But to really explain the genie's emergence we have to go a little deeper and consider the emergence of such institutional agents as the Joint Stock Company which pools risk and facilitates the expansion of foreign trade. Co-incidentally, empire too. The Joint Stock Company really required an efficient financial system and its no accident that as Britain girded herself for the great leap, she found that her financial industry was the most highly developed in Europe. We might note in passing the importance of intellectual property rights (patents) and the role they played in allowing inventors to secure monopoly profits in the short to medium term. This kind of incentive is important. Yeoman farmers will only abandon their fields and invent the steam engine if they think they'll get rich doing so. Why does all this happen? Hard to say. Perhaps we have to rest with Macfarlane's argument about English Individualism. Perhaps geography plays a role. An island has less fear of invasion, its people therefore gear up to enrich themselves and create the institutions required to do so. Without the spectre of Mongol, Moslem, Prussian or French invasion (a real worry on the continent) to threaten its people with, the British state found it harder to justify repression. Geography is an exogenous factor, yes, but it makes people, it shapes them and it directs their energies.

So lets return to the issue which set this folly in train, namely Alan's belief that tariffs were a necessary condition for industrial revolution. In the post that I initially responded to Alan said:

'If there hadn't been that earlier two centuries of protectionism, there wouldn't have been a British industrial revolution in the first place - or, at least, it wouldn't have developed to Britain's advantage in nearly the same way. This is the problem with having too Panglossian a view of free trade. Yes, once a nation's industrial base is established, it can take advantage of free trade conditions: but it has to create that base first.'

I hope I've pointed out the problem with this argument. It ascribes intentionally where none existed, indeed where none could exist. For Alan's argument to work he has to convince us that prior to the industrial revolution, there existed a concept of industrialisation. Only if we accept this can we then take the additional step and buy his argument that the state deliberately set out to industrialise. This is obviously nonsense. The concept didn't exist, indeed the idea of change itself was only very shakily accepted or even understood.

Perhaps though, Alan means that mixed in with all the other random factors that ultimately did lead to industrial growth were tariffs. These tariffs were much the most important of those random factors constituting no less than a 'necessary condition'. I'd be interested to hear why he favours tariffs above the other factors, since my reading of economic history suggests that there are different routes to industrialisation. Some have industrialised without tariffs, some with, some with a strongly interventionist state, some without. Indeed, it is hard to swallow the line that any one variable is a necessary condition for industrialisation. The problem is that if we accept the necessity of tariffs we are left to wonder why industrialisation didn't happen centuries earlier than it did. Why not in some of the early city states? Why not China at various points in its long history? Or India? Or the Romans? The answer of course is that there are many factors, many conditions which need to be fulfilled. But many conditions suggests substitutability. You don't have coal in your country, and we know that coal was a necessary condition of Britain's industrialisation. I suppose this means that your country's not going to industrialise. You see how preposterous this is. There is nothing vital about tariffs. They've played a role in the industrialisation of some countries (although I have my doubts about the efficacy of tariff led industrialisation) but not in others. In Britain they played a negligible role. Industrialisation was the result of a fortuitous combination of institutional change, geographical luck, an emerging international trade system, openness to new ideas etc. I've offered a comprehensive, multiple variable analysis that sets the historical context whilst allowing for the role of accident and contingency. And for all that Alan trumpets the state and tariffs, the very source that he quotes admits that tariffs were seen as a means of raising revenue rather than promoting industrial growth. A through back to that old mercantilist nostrum about the importance of accumulating specie. Remember how it goes, 'trade is a zero sum game, we need to protect ourselves and our stock of specie by making trade difficult for our rivals.' You can see this economic fossil emerging in Alan's comments about the need to 'compete' and to 'protect' etc. And of course if trade really is a zero sum game then his argument makes sense. But it isn't. As most of us know.

Finally, (finally!) I should add that Mathias (whom Alan quotes) is a respected academic and has made a name selling his ideas about Britain (which are not as extreme as they appear when quoted out of context). But he really is trying to slip something big past us if he is suggesting that Britain's textile industry relied on state intervention and tariffs to prosper. It didn't, it relied on the fact that it was several orders of magnitude more productive than the majority of its rivals. So too if we are to belief that the preventing of artisans from emigrating played an important role in Britain's industrialisation. It might have hindered industrialisation elsewhere but it assuredly did not in Britain. I'd like to point out too that if you look hard enough at something as complex as industrialisation you can always find examples to support your contention. But you need to keep things in perspective, you heed to ask yourself how important the variable is. Frankly' the quotes from Mathias don't amount to much. I'm sure the stuff he mentions happened, I'm sure they had an impact. But it was marginal stuff. It doesn't carry explanatory weight. And were it is not, he paints with such broad strokes that one is left to wonder how he sees the processes that he mentions actually happening. So, who do you believe? Did Britain industrialise because of a wise, interventionist state which was an eager proponent of the judicious use of tariffs to foster the development of industry? Or did it industrialise for the reasons I've mentioned? Less clear cut, more haphazard, more contingent on luck and geography? If you think about it, this really is the only way that the very first industrialisation, ever, could have happened.
- posted by Andrew @ 12:41 AM

 
Farrel has some tips for Tony Leon, including that he should learn a black language instead of giving speeches solely in "Durban accented English." While the advice seems sound, I object to Farrel's characterisation of Tony's accent! As a born and bred Durbanite, I can confirm that Tony definitely speaks in Joburg accented English.
- posted by Murray @ 3:58 PM

 
Richard's got some comments on a recent joint DA/IFP rally in Cape Town. Particularly interesting for his observations on Tony Leon's electioneering style. I get the impression that Leon may be a little too sophisticated for the South African voting public. Or a little too cynical. Time will tell, I suppose.
- posted by Andrew @ 11:14 PM

 
Via the good 'ol boys at Commentary: a piece by one 'Strawdog' at Live Journal about why you shouldn't vote for the Independent Democrats. For those too lazy to follow the link I've copied the main points below.

1. It is a cult of personality party with no depth. Essentially, it's Patricia de Lille and a fax machine.

2. Patricia de Lille has a worse Parliamentary attendance record than Winnie Mandela. So much for her supposed "integrity."

3. Her track record for inconsistency and idiocy makes John Kerry look steadfast (I can provide examples if anyone is interested), which is hardly surprising when you consider that...

4. She is an ex-member of the PAC - South Africa's party of reason - and jumped ship when she was by-passed for leadership. This all smacks greatly of Kortbroek-style political opportunism. Need I remind anyone what the PAC stands for? Perhaps De Lille's views have changed after a road to Damascus experience, but that's certainly not a chance I will take with my vote.

5. Her policies are airy-fairy, populist, and impractical. I read the ID's manifesto and I understand they're against crime, poverty, abuse of women and children and so on, but it's not clear what they plan to do about it. I can understand why her stance on women and children has such resonance for women in particular, but the fact is that the DA's policies also address that issue even though they haven't made it a centrepiece of their campaign.

6. A strong DA/IFP alliance is the best chance of rallying together an opposition that will control the Western Cape and Kwa-Zulu Natal, and have a significant enough voice to be heard in Parliament. (The fact that the DA's MPs occasionally attend Parliament is a bonus).

Having had a look through the party's policies, I can attest to No 5. The ID's present a hodge-podge of ideas culled from the ANC and the DA without offering anything new or startling. Of more interest is that on major issues eg the economy, they don't even go as far as describing specific policy actions. Rather splendidly they commit themselves to, 'integrating the unemployed into sustainable and dignified work to create a virtuous growth cycle that draws on improved demand and consumption, which in turn will stimulate employment.' But, apart from a vaguely worded pledge to implement a public works programme, they offer no real clue as to how this will be achieved.

This problem is apparent throughout the various policy documents that they've issued. Lots of high minded rhetoric and very little substance. Of course the reason for this is because the party is essentially a vehicle for Patricia de Lille, as Strawdog points out. You vote for the ID's because you think parliament will be better for her presence. Personally, I hope that de Lille gets into parliament, she was very effective in attacking the ANC, particularly over the arms issue, but I hope she doesn't get any more than the bare minimum of necessary votes. They would, assuredly, be wasted votes.
- posted by Andrew @ 5:33 PM

 
To what extent is the DA a centre-right party, comparable to, say, the US Republicans, the British Tories or the German Christian Democrats? This question has been intriguing me ever since I read Laurence's post which characterises it as such, and which cites this as a reason why the DA should embrace the death penalty (it would bring the DA in line with other centre-right parties world-wide). There's no doubt that the DA is business friendly, which of course places it in the same camp as the parties that I've just mentioned. But, like Andrew, my impression of the DA has always been that it draws primarily upon the tradition of classical liberalism which owes a great deal to JS Mill. Mill famously endorsed the "harm principle", the idea that peoples' choices should not be interfered with unless they cause harm to others. This, of course, places a great deal of distance between Mill's descendants and parties such as the Republicans, which are all for a paternalistic attitude in relation to matters such as sex before marriage, homosexuality and drug use. As Andrew puts it, Democrats might interfere in the boardroom, but Republicans interfere in the bedroom. For this reason, I'd tend to compare the DA's intellectual roots with those of, say, the Free Democrats of Germany, who espouse economic and social liberty. This strand of liberalism, while admittedly on the right of the political spectrum, is, I think, less wedded to ideas such as the death penalty, outlawing abortion, curbing homosexuality and pre-marital sex etc. In other words, I don't think that the DA's political orientation requires that it adopt for the death penalty for reasons of consistency.

While on the subject of the DA, there's a further complication. Increasingly, the DA is espousing policies such as the basic income grant, free antiretrovirals and, at least while in government in the Western Cape, free water up to a point. In other words, in addition to fostering a business friendly environment, it seems to me that the DA is increasingly coming round to the view that there is a role for the state in addressing social problems such as poverty and AIDS. It goes without saying that this is an interesting, and rather idiosyncratic, combination (the basic income grant is also advocated by Cosatu). Personally, I welcome this development, which I think shows the limitations of libertarianism in a developing country such as South Africa. But, once again, it should caution us against drawing easy comparisons between the DA and right-wing parties in the US, UK or Germany, which would presumably regard these as matters for the private sector or community self-help.
- posted by Murray @ 11:20 AM

 
Tony Leon supporting the death penalty? I wasn't even aware of this until Nick brought it to my attention. But I have to say that its an exceptionally stupid move. I've said this before but it bears repeating that in S v Makwanyane, the case in which the death penalty was declared unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court found that it infringes the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, and hinted very strongly that it also infringes the rights to life and dignity. In other words, for the death penalty to be reintroduced, all of these provisions would have to be amended. This, I'm sure most would agree, would set an exceptionally negative precedent. Its in all of our interests that the Bill of Rights not be tampered with. That Leon should campaign against the ANC in part on the basis that it should not be allowed to get a two-thirds majority, which would allow it to change the Constitution, while also taking a view that he knows would require constitutional change, strikes me as the height of hypocrisy.
- posted by Murray @ 10:39 AM