

MADRID BOMBING FALLOUT

**CSIS Analysts to Assess Effect on
Transatlantic Relations, War on Terrorism**

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March 16, 2004

Mr. Cronin: Good morning and welcome to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS. I'm Patrick Cronin. I'm the Director of Studies and Senior Vice President here at CSIS. I want to welcome you to a special roundtable discussion to assess the fallout of the Madrid bombings last week.

The human tragedy brought about by the March 11 attacks in Madrid are shocking in and of themselves. Empathy around the globe was immediately felt around the world for the Spanish people. Yet at the same time the election of an anti-war Socialist Prime Minister to replace one of America's staunchest allies in the campaign against terrorism in general and the effort in Iraq in particular, raises a variety of strategic and political questions.

One of the questions is what this portends for terrorism itself. Will apparent success beget further attacks? Did we somehow neglect warnings from previous bombings such as those in

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Turkey and Morocco? Where does al Qaida, the network, more of a movement than a group, strike next? Is it seeking its own coalitions of the willing? And where does the March 11 attack leave the European sense of threat regarding terrorism?

A second set of questions concern the future of the transatlantic relationship. How did we go from the editorial in *Le Monde* shortly after September 11 that said "We are all Americans now," to an election where being pro-American is equated with being anti-European? Will Europe pull together more tightly after this attack? Where does it leave other U.S. allies such as the United Kingdom, Poland, Italy, to name a few? Is there room for greater complementarity of U.S. and European policies in fighting terrorism in the months and even years ahead? Can we ultimately, for instance, divide the transatlantic divide over such large strategic issues as containing radical political Islam and seeking democratic reforms in the greater Middle East?

A third question is the future of the effort to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. Is it possible to fail in Iraq and still agree on the objectives in the campaign against international terrorism? Is the potential withdrawal of one percent of the foreign troops in Iraq overblown?

Finally, what does the Spanish rebuke of the ruling party indicate for other upcoming elections, namely the one in the United States? And what does it also say about popular concerns about how governments are being held accountable and not seen as forthcoming in information on the war on terrorism? After all, the election in Spain was decided in part because of the way the Spanish government dealt with attributing the attacks of March 11th to ETA and seemingly dismissing al Qaida. These are just some of the broad and specific kinds of questions that we want to have our distinguished panel discuss today.

I want to introduce our first speaker and turn over the microphone to him for the next ten minutes. He is Professor Simon Serfaty who is the Director of the CSIS Europe Program. He is also holder of the distinguished Brzezinski Chair in Global Security here at the Center. He's the author of many books. His newest, this past month, *Visions of America in Europe, September 11, Iraq, and Transatlantic Relations*.

Over to you, Simon.

Mr. Serfaty: This is quite a wonderful panel and I for one am looking forward to listening to my colleagues on my left and on my right, physically if not ideologically.

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Let me just make four quick points. First about the nature of the election and what it tells us about the state of public opinion in continental Europe. That the outcome of the election was a stunner is beyond doubt. Not only did all of the polls over the past eight weeks, four weeks, point to a likely overwhelming victory on the part of the majority party, but also to an extent in the context of what the government had achieved over the past eight years with regard to the management of the economy and the continued transformation of Spain. This was by all standards and by any standard a remarkable performance, having a creation of 4.2 million jobs over the past eight years; the economy had grown about 65 percent; the drop in unemployment from 23 to 11 percent. Some of you may have heard that speech by Prime Minister Aznar and indeed it was a compelling speech and pointed to the effectiveness of some of the policies pursued over the past eight years.

Clearly the election was hijacked by the Iraqi issue about which Spanish public opinion had been fairly hostile by levels going up to 85 to 90 percent. Yet I think it would be premature to conclude from the outcome of the election that in fact this was a vote that went against the participation of Spain in the war against terrorism or that it was an up and down vote on the war in Iraq only.

I think what impacted that vote as well was the perception of management by the government of the immediate aftermath of the events of March 11, the sense that the government was attempting to cover the way in which those events had unfolded and the large turnouts that took place on Saturday and Sunday therefore, the day of the election, was not merely a vote against the war but also a vote against the way in which those events had been presented by the government after March 11.

This is not the first time that national elections on the European continent were affected by the aftermath of September 11. I think we should all remember that the elections in Germany in September of 2002, to an extent the elections in France in May of 2002 were always impacted by those events and I suspect there will be other such cases over the next couple of years.

A second point is that the most immediate impact, in my judgment, of the change of government in Spain is not so much of the U.S.-European relationship as it is over inter-European relations. I think there is no question in my mind that the dynamics within the EU have been profoundly transformed, profoundly transformed by the change of the government in Madrid. There was within the EU an axis of discontent, if you will, or an

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arc of discontent primarily at the periphery -- the UK, Spain, Italy, Poland, which seemed increasingly dissatisfied with the ways in which the EU was [inaudible] and increasingly dissatisfied with the reality of the perception of the Franco-German axis of control within the EU. And Spain was a main participant in that arc.

Now the new Prime Minister or soon to be new Prime Minister has made it clear that he wanted to restore a better working relationship with the French, the Germans. My guess is that the agenda now that the [inaudible] is facing including possibly the development of the constitution for the EU and its members may be unlocked and there will be better opportunity, so to speak, for the EU states to return to the pace which they had set for themselves in order to achieve finality.

A state that has been very much affected by this transformation of the dynamics, the political dynamics within the EU is Poland because of course Poland had in fact developed a special relationship of its own with Spain and it may be left a bit dangling as itself attempts to restore a better relationship with some of its senior partners within the EU.

A third transatlantic relationship. Here too we can start with something that is very self-evident. Spain was the most willing of the willing partners in my judgment within the coalition of the willing. This was not just about 9/11. Aznar had sought a special relationship with the United States from the moment he came to power, displayed its willingness to participate in U.S. effort during the Kosovo War when it was really a leading voice among the Europeans for pursuing that war [inaudible], including the possible use of ground forces, and he was of course the first person that President Bush went and visited in June of 2001. There was a personal affinity in the bilateral relationship there second to none in continental Europe. Thus the decision on the part of this nation, not only a state that was willing but also a state that was capable and not all willing allies are capable, let's face it. The loss of that state is significant.

But this does not mean that Spain is dropping out of the war against terrorism. It is simply dropping out of the [front] in transatlantic for reasons which a number of other Europeans and a number of people on this side of the Atlantic actually share.

Will there be some consequences from this remains to be seen. It remains to be seen. It's too early to tell, quite frankly, whether there will be an upgrading or downgrading of U.S.-European relationship in the context of this whole event.

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Fourth and finally, what does it tell us about terrorism? Tony Cordesman will be able to say much more than I could about this but there is one thing that disturbs me about what took place. Seemingly those groups, whomever they are, were able to pick a specific date and act accordingly. This is very novel. They determined that March 11 had plenty of significance -- either symbolically, six months to the day after September 11; or on the even of a national election. They picked that time, they picked their site, and they acted. This scares me because it means there might be now some groups looking at the agenda for the next several months and determining what will be a good site, what will be a good time, what will have a good impact, and develop action of some fashion over the next several months. This is scary. I think this is novel, this is new. This is unprecedented. They did not even have to kill themselves in the process of killing others. I expect therefore that Europe indeed has uncovered over the past several days that the threat of September 11th is not only real but it's urgent. It is urgent because the long term has run out of time and it is therefore imperative to act in some fashion against it.

Thank you.

Mr. Cronin: Our next panelist is the author of a number of books, in fact more than 30, and some of his most important writing I would argue has been done just recently. His insights into asymmetric warfare, into the lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq in particular, and he is the holder of the CSIS Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy, Anthony Cordesman.

Mr. Cordesman: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Let me make just a few quick points and I'd like to make them largely from the perspective of al Qaida because often we talk about these attacks from the viewpoint of Europe and the United States.

The attacks do remind us of some things which sometimes we forget. This is a global movement. It is an ideological movement. It is willing to take actions which are designed to divide the West and the Arab world, almost regardless of the cost to the Arab world and indeed to al Qaida. Martyrdom is acceptable if it achieves these kinds of results. And certainly the polarization of the Arab and Islamic worlds from a secular West and indeed from secular Arab regimes is one of the major goals. Casualties are a way of getting there.

I think it is clear that the fact this movement is ideological does not mean it is irrational. This is I think one of the most dangerous assumptions that Americans tend to make. Often the base it I think on things like tapes or the more

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obvious propaganda statements of movements like al Qaida, but these are often people with considerable education, often broad background in the West. They know what Western vulnerabilities and symbols are. They have more than 20 years, more than 40 years of experience to draw on in terms of how terrorism can be conducted and what attacks matter.

We often give them credit for brilliance when they do the obvious, when they execute a simple operation well. When they can read the calendar and read it with some sophistication. The problem with this approach is that this is a movement like many other movements in this region which can do all of these things and it doesn't make it brilliant and it doesn't make it exceptional, nor is it difficult to repeat the experience, whether it's in our election or in some other political moment like the transfer of power in Iraq. They will read the calendar and as Simon says, the calendar is going to be dealt with in terms of symbols again and again.

I think too we need to remember that because it's an umbrella organization it doesn't really ultimately matter that much whether bin Laden is captured or al Qaida's key cells and leadership are destroyed. This movement will reemerge and mutate again and again. It will be seen over a period of a decade or more and the forces inside this region are forces that will not go away.

It's interesting to note that we keep using the term al Qaida. It's not clear the brigade that claimed responsibility for the attack is responsible. It's claimed responsibility for things like the power outages in New York. But it's also interesting that rather than referring to itself as directly part of al Qaida it now puts al Qaida in brackets. We see similar trends in Iraq. These organizations are to some extent separating themselves while remaining affiliates.

I think the other point I would raise is from al Qaida's perspective they can make a claim that they are in fact winning, not losing, the war on terrorism. The victory we have won in Afghanistan is tenuous at best. It is more Kabulstan than Afghanistan. The fighting goes on. The United States is tied down there. The problems of Central Asia continue.

As a result of 9/11 the United States has been pushed away from its traditional Arab allies. There are great tensions between the United States and the Arab Islamic world, partly as a result of our reaction to those crises.

Even the kinds of pressures we put on al Qaida like shutting

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off its direct financing may simply lead it to find more sophisticated ways of getting the financing.

From al Qaida's viewpoint Iraq is by any standard not an American victory as yet. We have seen a contained secular movement replaced by deep divisions within the Islamic world and Islamists emerging as a serious threat within Iraq. Al Qaida has so far done more to dominate the Arab media than the United States. The U.S. effort to win the information battle and hearts and minds has been sufficiently inept so it gets condemned even in the Jerusalem Post. We need to be very careful about what has happened there. We have found our calls for democracy and reform often seen in the Arab world and not without support from or encouragement from al Qaida and imperialism, as trying to dominate the region, as overthrowing the regime. We have seen what are often good initiatives twisted and turned into what appears to be the U.S. enforcing its own dual standard.

Obviously we've seen divisions between the United States and Europe as Simon has pointed out. And from al Qaida's viewpoint does having the United States tie down most of its forces that it can actively deploy in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that the United States can win asymmetric wars? Well not yet.

What we have seen is instead an ongoing campaign where day by day the struggle does not end. In some ways it intensifies.

This does not mean we are losing the war on terrorism and al Qaida's perspectives are not the perspectives we have in the United States and the West. But I think it is very important in looking at what is happening here to see not only how al Qaida may view this but other Salafi Islamists and other extremists and terrorist groups throughout this region.

I should mention one last point. The Arab-Israeli conflict remains an open wound amid all of this. A wound that divides us from Europe as well as from the Arab world. A wound which threatens Israel. And it is a wound which more and more if you look at Islamist extremists is one which they have picked up. On 9/11 it seems fair to say that the Arab-Israeli conflict was largely ignored by these movements and it was also seen at best as a secondary priority. Since that time they have capitalized on that as they have on Iraq.

So these are the forces we have at work and Spain I think, as Simon pointed out, is only one sort of milestone in what is likely to be a continuous process of attack and challenge as long as these movements exist.

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Mr. Cronin: Thank you, Tony, we'll come back in questions and answers but let's move on to our third panelist, Arnaud de Borchgrave who had a distinguished career and still has a distinguished career as a journalist including 25 years as the Senior Editor of Newsweek Magazine. Here at CSIS he directs the Transnational Threat Initiative and he focuses in particular on the web of connections tying terrorist, criminal and state networks. Arnaud?

Mr. de Borchgrave: I'm sorry, it's very difficult to disagree with the impeccable logic of Tony Cordesman. Let me add a few points of my own.

Madrid, it seems to me, is bound to convince terrorist masterminds that they can affect Western general elections and topple leaders they regard as enemies through acts of politically calculated terror. Most Western European leaders, as I think we all would agree with the notable exception of Tony Blair are convinced that one, Iraq has nothing to do with the global war on terror; two, Iraq was a war based on untruths about weapons of mass destruction and alleged links between Saddam Hussein and Usama bin Laden.

Bin Laden has now proved yet again to his followers and sympathizers he can strike the enemies of Islam in the West with the worst terror attack Spain has experienced since the civil war ended 65 years ago. Al Qaida has also demonstrated it can materially change the outcome of a general election in a great democracy.

Until now, al Qaida's catalog of terror, atrocity and horror has only succeeded in uniting the societies they attacked against them. The mauling of the Pentagon and the destruction of the Twin Towers didn't come close to destabilizing the Bush Administration. Similarly, the wave of Palestinian suicide attacks that killed almost 1,000 Israeli civilians including a high proportion of women and children never came close to weakening Ariel Sharon's coalition government.

Spain, however, changes al Qaida's calculus. Bin Laden and his many followers around the world can see major and lasting political and strategic results for their cause.

What the Soviet Union failed to do during the Cold War, al Qaida has done and that is to detach a key European ally from the anti-terrorist alliance built by President Bush. In Spain the terrorists have succeeded in breaking the weakest link in the coalition's chain. Britain and Italy whose Prime Ministers stood resolutely by President Bush in Iraq are now obvious targets for

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mega-strikes.

The 1938 Munich Syndrome is alive and well. The European Union's President Romano Prodi says it's now clear that using force is not the answer to resolving the conflict with terrorists. Thank you, Neville Chamberlain.

Until now the conventional wisdom inside the Beltway was that an October surprise such as the capture or killing of Usama bin Laden and the Taliban's Mullah Omar a few weeks before the November presidential vote would clinch it for Mr. Bush, but now our national defense strategists, it seems to me, must face the grim possibility that bin Laden and his al Qaida network may well be planning an October surprise of their own of a very different kind.

What difference would bin Laden's death or capture make in the terrorist scheme of things? I submit very little. He is not directing worldwide operations from a cave in the Hindu Kush Mountain range that straddles the Afghan-Pakistani border. Al Qaida's top gun in Saudi Arabia was killed yesterday and there will be others to take his place. Al Qaida, like McDonalds, is a franchise network of sympathetic extreme Islamist groups around the world. In Europe they are people like you and me -- lawyers, bankers, accountants, computer scientists, computer engineers, and millions of impoverished Moslems who live in slums on the outskirts of major European cities. In France alone some six million under-privileged North African Moslems for the most part live, again, on the outskirts of these cities and bin Laden for them has much the symbolic value of a previous generation which looked up to Chez Guevara.

During the Cold War we knew absolutely everything there was to know about our enemies, from the KGB's agents in the West to the private lives of Soviet and East European leaders to the numbers of ICBMs targeted against us, but we know comparatively little about our new enemy's agents living in our midst. General James Jones, who is the NATO Supreme Allied Commander is responsible for 93 countries including all of Africa except for the Horn of Africa. He returned recently, and I spoke to him, from a swing through Western Sub-Saharan Africa. He saw firsthand the emerging failed and failing states that contain huge ungoverned areas that have become the latest breeding grounds and sanctuaries for radicalized Islamist clerics to recruit a new generation of jihadis.

Nigeria with 130 million people whose average age is 18, half of them Moslem, is a failing state according to Jones. And that is despite the two million barrels of oil they pump every

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day. Jihadi militants who demand more volunteers have occupied some of the Moslem north's larger towns and federal authorities kindly oblige by staying out of their way.

Al Qaida's breeding grounds stretch from the Madrasas in Mindanao in the Philippines to identical to Koranic schools in Indonesia and Pakistan, to the shantytowns on the outskirts of Casa Blanca. Everyone seems to have access in these villages to 24x7 satellite television. And the Mullahs and Imams and other religious prosthetizers tell their illiterate flocks they are poor because of what the heathen Christians and Jews have stolen from them in their war to destroy Islam.

The Bush Administration rejects any correlation between the grinding subhuman poverty of large parts of the developing world and transnational terrorism. A new geostrategic vision of a democratized Middle East does not begin to address the problem and unless the Bush Administration's grand design for the region generates a peaceful and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, Moslem extremism will continue to flourish.

The Bush Administration has yet to show the world it can be even-handed between Israelis and Palestinians. Contrary to the Administration's prediction that victory in Iraq would spawn a peaceful settlement of the Middle East, the occupation of Iraq has given al Qaida a new lease on life following its defeat in Afghanistan. The Bush Administration has said time and again that two-thirds of al Qaida's leadership has been killed or captured. Madrid proves that these body counts are no more significant than they were in Vietnam.

Thank you.

Mr. Cronin: Thank you, Arnaud.

Fourth and finally we turn to Dr. Robin Niblett who is the Executive Vice President here at CSIS. He's also a Senior Fellow in our Europe Program and the former Director of the Atlantic Partnership Project here at the Center. Robin?

Dr. Niblett: Thank you, Patrick. As I'm the last to go I want to add a few comments of value. I'm just going to make six points focusing primarily on the Spanish side and European relations, to pick up on some of the points that Simon made and a couple of concluding points picking up on what Tony and Arnaud said.

Firstly, in terms, all of the comments I want to make really are to do with toning down the rhetoric. If one reads the papers

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today, the last couple of days, both here in the United States especially and somewhat in Europe the rhetoric of accusation and of overloading impressions of the impact of this election I think are having a very negative impact and could actually carry as much damage to the transatlantic relationship and relationships within Europe as the actual attacks themselves. So let's just turn and dissect a little bit some of these acts.

The first thing has been the reason for the swing in the vote in Spain. Some very tough words have been issued today about cowardice on the part of the Spanish Electorate and an impression that these are a people that could be swung at the last minute by these types of attack. There's no doubt that the terrorist attacks were in the end the reason for the swing, but the reason for the swing was not, I believe, a Spanish fear in terms of terrorism, it was to do much more with what Simon talked about which is the sense of arrogance that this particular government demonstrated in its turn very quickly towards the ETA as the perpetrators of the attack and in a sense, in essence built on perhaps three to four years of impression, of some manipulation by the Spanish government of their information to do with the reasons for going into war in Iraq and some other aspects of arrogance in their relationship.

So this is not a public that is afraid of fighting against terrorism This is a public that was supporting the [pafula populad] in its war against ETA but it's a public that when the particular events of these last few days turned on them it really drew home back to them the reason for abandoning pragmatism and economic pragmatism and a reason to vote with their hearts.

So I think we need to understand this is a public not afraid of a war against terror, but it is a public that's going to punish a government that appears to have reached out beyond where the public support was.

A second point, removing troops from Iraq. Mr. Zapatero has made some very strong comments yesterday about what he believed was the illegality and the pointlessness of the attack in Iraq. That being said I think we should look ahead to June 30th, July 1st when the Spanish were meant to take over command of forces in Iraq. There are several months to take place between now and then. If there's any possibility of getting the UN engaged in playing an actual role in Iraq it is possible in my mind that the Spanish government may find a role to be able to alter their view in terms of those troops there. So let's not just go on the language, what's being said the day after the election, let's also consider the dynamics that might play out over the next two to three months.

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Thirdly, on changes in Spain. Again, this appears to be a revolutionary swing, a swing that's going to change the whole nature of Spanish politics. Let's not forget that the Socialist government was the government that took Spain into a modernizing era ahead of the arrival of [Hosim Areathnad]. They've already picked some very technocratic people for their government and I believe that in that sense though the change may be radical in terms of [entry] or peer relations they may not be as radical within Spain themself.

In terms of the U.S.-Spain relationship which obviously is causing a lot of concern as well, I would again point to the point that the Socialist government was the one that established the new transatlantic agenda back in 1995. There's been a long tradition in Spain of reaching out to the United States, reaching out transatlantically. This was not simply the politics of the right or the [pafula populad], and I think that with people like [Millena Angel Moritinos] who is predicted to be the new Foreign Minister, and even Javier Solana who came also from the Socialist side, again, you've got a very strong pair of hands and a strong tradition of looking across the Atlantic even if right now obviously the rhetoric is very high.

The one place where the change will be dramatic and I completely agree with Simon, is in relationships within Europe and I don't want to repeat the points that he made excellently a few minutes ago about the changed balance between Old Europe and New Europe. Nonetheless, we better be careful about jumping to conclusions about what's going to happen to Tony Blair or what's going to happen to particular leaders in the next few months. A very different political context in each of those countries and I think we should consider them individually.

Certainly in the UK it would be hard to make a jump from the Labor Party, the conservative party, as a result of this type of event, even if Tony Blair's position individually has obviously been weakened.

Finally in terms of the relationship transatlantically, my one conclusion on this, and it really draws out of what Simon said about the changes in Europe, is it will be much more difficult for the United States looking to the future to be able to construct coalitions of the willing. The one reality of a division between a New Europe and an Old Europe was that it gave the United States the ability to pick and choose. Spain's potential turning and I think inevitable turning back to a more traditional policy towards Europe, of being tied in more closely with France and Germany, is going to make that potential much

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harder. The United States is probably going to deal with a somewhat more united Europe, although a united Europe is always a very relative term in terms of its foreign policy.

Finally in terms of the terrorist attacks and where we're going, Simon has made the point recently that the attacks in Casa Blanca were to a certain extent a premonition of what's been happening here. Certainly the attacks in Istanbul, there seems to be a gradual movement from the periphery out of the Middle East towards Europe, and with the Muslim societies that exist there the possibility for terrorist cells who after all used Europe as their front line, in essence, for the attacks of September 11th, we clearly have much to fear in Europe in the future. I'd say in the UK in particular. The fact that this election was turned is certainly going to encourage terrorists to want to use opportunities as might arise in the UK elections in a year's time or in other particular countries, to treat these as targets in the future.

Thank you.

Mr. Cronin: Thank you, Robin. We have some time for questions to our panelists and I would invite the audience to please ask a question.

Question: I'm Al Millican, affiliated with Washington Independent Writers.

Will this Madrid bombing fallout shed further light on the foreign leaders John Kerry has been communicating with behind the scenes? Would it be fair to say that the new Spanish leadership is one, and not just the old Haitian leadership?

Mr. Serfaty: It would be fair to say that Aznar was not one of the heads of state of government whom Kerry was thinking about, but that's about it.

I think this is a speculation. Without much imagination you can determine a couple of heads of state of government in Europe who do hope that there will be a change of Administration in Washington next January. But frankly, I find this irrelevant. If this kind of serious issue is going to be dealt with primarily let alone exclusively on the basis of personal affinities, then I feel even more gloomy about the future than is the case at this time.

Question: Andrew Schneider with The Kiplinger Letter.

Later this week [Bertie Hern] of Ireland said he was going

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to convene a meeting among some of the other European leaders to try and work out a common strategy for intelligence sharing. Do you see any possibility of some sort of a uniform homeland security effort among the European powers as a result of this?

Mr. Cordesman: I'm sure Arnaud will comment, but there has been major progress in sharing intelligence, but I think we need to be realistic about this. When you talk about counterterrorism and internal security you're talking about the crown jewels of sensitivity in intelligence. And it is not true, even within Europe that one man's terrorist is another man's terrorist. There are always going to be sensitivities over ETA, over the IRA, over various movements in Greece, Turkey and elsewhere that simply do not lead to perfect transparency.

As Simon and Robin have pointed out, a lot more can be done and should be done and things are steadily improving, but the idea that there's going to be some quick, sudden creation of a common approach, well, let's take this country. We have programs underway in the homeland security office that are going to take half a decade to implement. They're unified and they're under central direction. A lot of them are very constructive. And it's far from clear that trying to rush them any further would make them any more successful so we have to understand this is a slow, evolutionary process and bringing together different countries with real effectiveness rather than political slogans takes a lot of time, patience and leadership.

Mr. de Borchgrave: Just as it takes a lot of time to train a whole new school of intelligence officers. The ability to penetrate some of these networks around the world takes a new kind of agent, someone we didn't even have during the Cold War and I would say that's at least a five year proposition.

Dr. Niblett: Very quickly, as you know the European Union's been undertaking cooperation in Home and Justice Affairs for over a decade right now, and after September 11th, as Tony pointed out, there was a considerable increase. But you're not going to see, even as a result of this summit, some dramatic move institutionally. It's simply not possible to do this overnight in Europe given its system of governance, councils of ministers which are made up of the individual Home and Justice Affairs and other interior ministers are going to jealously guard their prerogative in this area. And even the creation of a czar or of a central figure along the Solana model which I don't think is likely in the near term is not going to change the fact that in the end Europe, it's going to take time. Time and practice are going to be the only yardsticks and potential ways of changing what will be a very slow process of intelligence cooperation.

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Question: Tom Boore with ARD German Television.

I have one question for Mr. Cordesman, one for Mr. Serfaty, if you'll allow me.

Mr. Cordesman, what are the chances, you made the distinction between the war on terror and the Iraq campaign. What are the chances that in transatlantic relations both sides will leave the who was right and who was wrong behind and refocus the energy on the war on terror? Meaning energy, resources, but also consensus.

And Mr. Serfaty, given the fact that regardless of what the government's positions were the Iraq war has provoked the first pan-European identity feeling which is to a large part anti-American. What are the chances -- or at least anti-Bush. What are the chances of mending that and getting Europe back on track with an integration that is not founded on an anti-American sentiment?

Mr. Cordesman: To begin with your question for at least the last millennium Europe has been living proof that those who remember the past are condemned to repeat it. I think the chances of suddenly forgetting all of the differences between European countries and between European countries and the United States are non-existent.

Is this a warning which over time may lead governments to step up as Robin said, the process of moving toward better cooperation on counterterrorism? I would hope so. Is it clear that if the West remains divided over Iraq as it moves towards sovereignty it is going to compound the problems there even further? I think that's true as well. And I think it is important to point out that we are at this point in time headed for a transfer of power on June 30th where we are about as well prepared and about as uncertain as we were prepared to deal with the security problems and nationbuilding problems on May 1st of last year. That is a situation for which the West as a whole had better move towards unity. Whether it does or not is up to the leaders of the West.

Mr. Serfaty: This is neither about anti-Americanism nor even about anti-Bushism. Over the past 50 years there has never been a newly elected U.S. President the Europeans liked. Every newly elected U.S. President set new standards of unpopularity upon his election. Then somehow evolved as he came to grip with the limits of his office and the limitations of American power. We tend to not recall, but in June of 1993, in June of 1981, in June of 1977, Bill Clinton, Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, were worse off

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than George W. Bush upon returning from his first trip to Europe in June of 2001. Anti-Americanism, whatever it is, has been with us forever. In fact I believe that Europeans are anti-anti-Americans rather than anti-Americans whom I find in other places of the world.

Something happened on September 11 of 2001 which was fundamentally distinctive in terms of America history as well as in terms of history. In terms of American history it's beyond question. America became a nation like any other to the extent there was a pattern of territorial vulnerability that had never existed before. All the more since it was repeatable, or so we felt. And President Bush very simply said hey I wasn't brought into the White House to preside over such vulnerability at a time when American power looms invincible and I have to act urgently in order to deny this new normalcy to take hold. And the Europeans, following the embrace said you know, that's life. Great powers are born to endure pain. We've got to move on. This is not as sharp a departure as you say historically. And I believe therefore that even though the Europeans understood the threat, they denied the urgency which prompted the Administration to act quickly and if needed preemptively. Now that the urgency is settling on the European continent there may in fact be a potential for returning to the basics and sharing the strategic understanding of what September 11, 2001 means in terms of each nation's security within this kind of evolving international envelopment.

Mr. de Borchgrave: Very quickly, Dr. Brzezinski whose chair you now occupy, Simon, wrote a book just recently, just published, called *The Choice: American Domination or American Leadership*. In this book he points out that in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis former Secretary of State Dean Atchison was dispatched to Paris by President Kennedy to explain what was happening in Cuba and he even said to General deGaulle, "I have brought photos with me." And deGaulle replied, "I am not interested in those photos. The word of the President of the United States is good enough for me."

Well I don't think that would happen again today.

Question: One of you invoked Neville Chamberlain in your remarks. If Mr. Prodi, his comments about violence is not the solution to dealing with terrorism, is there any sentiment among European leaders to find a way to negotiate or open dialogue with leaders of Islamic movements? And who would they negotiate with? You're not negotiating with a foreign minister or head of state. How would that process work if it were possible at all?

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Mr. de Borchgrave: I don't believe that there is anyone to negotiate with on the other side, even if theoretically it would be possible after capturing Usama bin Laden to initiate negotiations with him, it would be inconceivable that these would be followed. If it produced any results, that these results would be followed anywhere in the world by people who sympathize with the al Qaida movement.

Mr. Cordesman: I think Arnaud's perfectly correct. When you talk about Salafi Islamists, whether they're al Qaida or their successors, it is a non-negotiable position. Not because of the Western approach but because their ideology is essentially one which rejects that totally.

But I think we need to be very careful here. The overwhelming majority of victims of Islamic extremism are in the Islamic world. They are not in the West. People are being killed every day and in some cases in Algeria and elsewhere they have been killed for decades.

The problem of negotiation I think is not so much the issue as rather how the EU and the United States can interface with the Arab world, help secular and moderate Islamist leaders move towards reform, deal with the economic and demographic problems that Arnaud highlighted. We cannot solve the problems for that area, but we can certainly help. The EU has had a dialogue, like the Mediterranean dialogue, for some 15 years. As one of its leaders said to me, the end result of the 15 years of dialogue so far is 15 years of dialogue. But that is not where it has to end because there is the option of serious economic reform, of aid, of really working with these countries. That is a study of the EU right now, it is a study within the Arab League, incidentally, and it is a study which could be part of President Bush's Greater Middle East Initiative. So in that sense if that's negotiation there is a great deal we can do.

But a peaceful approach to bin Laden strikes me as more than a contradiction in terms. It strikes me as totally hopeless.

Dr. Niblett: You've got to take a little bit of context also with Prodi's comments and I think it points out a point I made earlier on. Prodi made that comment and Prodi may be going back to Italy, and Bellasconi is suddenly looking very vulnerable. And so a comment of that nature is not just targeted at a U.S. audience, it's targeted at an Italian domestic audience as well and it draws let's say a sharper line or reinforces the line that exists between Bellasconi and Prot vis-à-vis the Italian electorate.

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In terms of what Tony Cordesman just mentioned, the EU has been 15 years. This isn't just called a Mediterranean dialogue, this is the Barcelona process. The Spanish have been intimately involved in the process of trying to open up over the long term a political and obviously an economic perspective through to North Africa. Considerable amounts of aid are going into that direction. So the EU in its own slow and deliberate way is certainly seeking to try to enter into economic improvement over there, but ultimately the political dimension they'll push hardest is the Arab-Israeli process. The difficulty we have here is a Greater Middle Eastern Initiative that tries to set the Arab-Israeli process to one side and a European electorate at least that says you can't have a Greater Middle Eastern process without putting the Arab-Israeli question at its center.

Question: Sorry, probably my question's going to overlap a lot with the previous ones, but before the war I was hearing a lot particularly from French, Germans about concerns that the war in Iraq was going to increase al Qaida's ability for recruits and I wonder if in retrospect now you see that they were right. I know the previous question was we want to get beyond the who's right or who's wrong, but I'm wondering if you think they're right, did the war in Iraq take important resources away from this war on terrorism? Fight it in a different way.

Mr. Cordesman: I think the problem honestly is we would have faced major challenges regardless, and Iraq certainly became a focus for al Qaida and Islamic extremism.

When we talk about it being a definitive focus, I mean we have gone through I think at this point over 17,000 interrogations and we've ended up with some 300 foreigners. The Islamist movements that we have found to date in Iraq have been dominated largely by Iraqi Sunnis who in some ways are moving away from the former regime and the Ba'ath to create their own issues and ideology. That doesn't mean that the outsiders aren't dangerous because they're often more skilled attackers particularly in bombings we think, but I think it's dangerous to assume that Iraq did or did not act as somehow a magnet for all of this.

Again, you look at the map of the Middle East, there is no country of the Middle East that today does not have a problem with Islamic extremists. We have seen in Saudi Arabia since last May one sign of that, but all of the Gulf countries are quietly having problems with Islamic extremists. All of North Africa has largescale arrests. In Morocco those have taken very low-level almost police type operations but in Tunisia there have been sweeping arrests; in Libya there is fighting in the Green

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Mountain area; in Algeria you have a prolonged civil war; you have crackdowns in Jordan; you still have low-level fighting in Egypt and so on. This is something we really need to understand. It isn't going to go away with or without Iraq.

Mr. de Borchgrave: On the other hand if I could add that in the Madrasas of Pakistan where I have spent a fair amount of time the clerics tell these young jihadis or would-be jihadis that Iraq is yet another part of the evidence that they've been inculcating to these kids that the West led by the United States is at war with Islam. It started with Afghanistan, it went onto Iraq, and these same clerics are telling them today that Pakistan is next.

Mr. Serfaty: It's just too early to deal with any such question to tell you the truth. It's as if you were to attempt to do a history of World War II in June of 1940 or in July of 1941. Even for that matter in May of 1944. You've got to allow the issue to play itself out a bit and the war to play itself out, not just the war in Iraq but the totality of this phenomenon we have come to uncover in mid to late 2001. Moreover, irrespective of the [miss-sending] of the post-war conditions within Iraq, there have been a number of positives that have come out of this situation that are or are not related to the use of force in Iraq. Libya is a case in point. To what extent was Qadafi's thinking influenced or accelerated by circumstances in Iraq is an open question. There are I think a number of positives that can be identified while waiting time to provide its verdict on actually what happened there. It's too early. Be patient.

Question: -- Symington, an attorney here.

Two year ago at a meeting Secretary Rumsfeld was asked if he thought given the nature of the warfare we were beginning to engage in, young Americans coast to coast should be given some kind of training in triage and things they could help with with their energies, and then older people in accordance with their abilities also. In effect a mobilization of that kind to prepare for the kind of things that people have had to go through both in New York and in other parts of the world, Washington here.

Is the panel satisfied -- Oh, his response was that's not a bad idea, but it's not the hat. I don't wear that hat. So we know who does. I'm just wondering if the panel feels that enough is being done to prepare our countrymen for the kinds of things that could lie ahead in that respect.

Mr. Cordesman: I think quite frankly that any one solution, whether it's aid, training people to try to detect terrorist

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devices, or all the rest that tried to reach the entire American people first presents the problem of cost, and second it presents the problems of false alarms and all kinds of actions which could probably do more harm than good. I can't argue with training people in sort of medical aid, it would probably help large numbers of people who are not the result of terrorist attacks. But in reality until you see a much clearer pattern you have to be very careful. A lot of recommendations people make about dealing with terrorism could actually increase casualties in mass terrorism as people rush in to situations they don't understand, people become exposed to agents, and so on.

I think that what you raise is a question that has to constantly be asked, but until we see clearer patterns we can respond to what we're doing now I think is reasonably adequate.

Question: -- with Piper Rudnick. First a comment then a question.

The comment on Mr. Cordesman's response to the question about a diversion of resources, my comment is that I think there are any number of senior military leaders who privately now would agree that Iraq has been a distraction of resources and I think the case in point is the failure on a collective basis to mount a coherent anti-Hezbollah attack. I just think there's no question about that in my judgment, but more important in theirs.

The question goes back to something Mr. Niblett said and that is the need for Toning down the rhetoric. It seems to me that at the moment, and this is the question for the panel, is don't you think the highest leveraged beneficial act at the moment, given the range of rhetoric even in today's two Washington papers, would call for a responsible statement by a European leader, a major European leader, on the need to not lose sight of the difference between the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq. We are generally united in the war against terrorism and this event in Madrid could divert us from that without strong leadership and I think the most credible source at the moment is Europe, but I would welcome your comments.

Mr. Serfaty: I think that makes a great deal of sense. Whether a message of this kind would be heard here remains to be seen because quite frankly my sense is it has been said many times before from many capitols in continental Europe, that disagreement in and over Iraq does not mean a disagreement over the need to pursue the war against global terrorism jointly.

I was on a C-SPAN call-in show this morning and one caller made the best suggestion I've heard to date in this connection.

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He said hey, why don't we tell the new Spanish Prime Minister to send some of his forces in Iraq to Afghanistan where there is in fact unity in the willingness on the part of both sides of the Atlantic and others to attend to that conflict. I see Tony making a face, but I thought actually it was a cute suggestion. But indeed, agreements, were they to be heard here remains to be seen.

Mr. Cordesman: If even half the pledges in countries like Afghanistan to provide things like support and police forces had been met I'd be more confident of the level of unity. And I think quite honesty that's my response to your question.

Robin pointed out, I think all of us have pointed out it isn't going to take a statement, it's going to take a lot of negotiation, a lot of practical effort, over time. Most of this is in professional areas like counterterrorism where you can make all the statements you want and pass all the resolutions you want and nothing happens that actually makes any difference. It is finding milestones for substantive real progress that is going to determine the outcome.

One of the questions we really have to start asking ourself if we're ever going to succeed is not what happened in Madrid or in Istanbul or even in New York on 9/11, but where is the West going to be in five or ten years and what does it really need to do, and having set some goals, persistently pursue them, because other than that, we're just going to overreact to one headline after another, slack off, and the end result is going to be we'll be unready for the next series of events.

Mr. de Borchgrave: It seems to me, Tony, for that to succeed the U.S. would need a global grand design animated by the same kind of spirit that moved us at the end of World War II.

Dr. Niblett: A quick finally comment on Lloyd's point. The EU Summit next week may offer an opportunity for such a statement I would be surprised if something was not said.

Personally I think the timing of a strong statement now at a time when people perceive the European governments perhaps more united than they were before will be more important than it would have been, than the previous statements have been where everyone's known that Europe has been riven by a difference between governments let's say that were taking a more pro-U.S. line and those who were taking a less pro-U.S. line. So the timing of a statement, although I agree with Tony it doesn't change anything, it doesn't achieve anything, but at least in helping tone down the rhetoric and giving politicians on both

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sides of the Atlantic some cover around which to gather would definitely be of value.

I think the impact of such a statement now would definitely be greater than before.

Mr. Cronin: This has been a rich set of insights we've heard today from Simon Serfaty, Anthony Cordesman, Robin Niblett and Arnaud de Borchgrave. I want to thank the panelists. I want to thank our external affairs office, Jay Ferrar, Mark Sheff and others, and I want to thank all of you for coming to CSIS for this assessment today. Thank you.

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