



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

Beyond Goldwater-Nichols:
Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era
Phase 1 Report

As part of its transformational efforts, the Department of Defense (DoD) must adapt not only to the post-Cold War, post-9/11 security environment but also must cope with many “hidden failures” that, while not preventing operational success, stifle necessary innovation and continue to squander critical resources in terms of time and money. Many organizational structures and processes initially constructed to contain a Cold War superpower in the Industrial Age are inappropriate for 21st century missions in an Information Age.

We have taken a broad view of defense reform, as is necessary in the new strategic era. No longer can defense reform be confined simply to the institutions and functions of the Pentagon. Rather, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols* recognizes that for the United States to fully seize opportunities and confront dangers in the 21st century, both DoD and its partners in the U.S. government (USG) must adapt to new strategic circumstances. Below is a brief summary of the major Phase 1 recommendations:

I. Rationalizing Organizational Structures in DoD

- Most of each Service Secretariat should merge into a single, smaller integrated staff that reports to both the Service Secretary and the Chief of Staff. An integrated staff will reduce friction-generating coordination mechanisms, increase the coherency of Service positions, and provide clearer lines of accountability.
- We recommend the integration of military and civilian staffs with respect to managerial functions and retaining as separate organizations those Joint Staff directorates that are most directly within the Chairman’s military purview. For the personnel and logistics functions, an integrated civilian and military office should be created under a military deputy who reports directly to its respective Under Secretary.
- The armed forces are increasingly waging joint and interdependent combat operations, yet, DoD is still failing to acquire and field joint interoperable command and control (C2) capabilities. Therefore, the Secretary of Defense should create a joint task force for Joint C2, from former J-6 and DISA assets, with SOCOM-like budgetary and acquisition authorities.
- Oversight for this critical function would be provided by a new Under Secretary of Defense for C3I, which would be made by elevating the C3 function to the Under Secretary level and combining it with Intelligence.
- OSD should renew its focus on policy formation and oversight, resist the temptation to manage programs and consolidate housekeeping functions under an Assistant Secretary.

II. Joint Procurement of Command & Control Capabilities

- The armed forces are increasingly waging joint and interdependent combat operations, yet, DoD is still failing to acquire and field joint interoperable command and control (C2) capabilities. Therefore, the Secretary of Defense should create a joint task force for Joint C2, from former J-6 and DISA assets as appropriate, with SOCOM-like budgetary and acquisition authorities.

III. Toward a More Effective Resource Allocation Process

- We recommend building capacities in the Combatant Commands for a stronger role at the front-end of the resource allocation process.
- The Secretary of Defense should build a strong Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) capable of providing independent analysis to the Secretary on broad strategic choices facing DoD.
- The Secretary of Defense should create an independent, continuous policy implementation/execution review process under an office linked directly to OSD.

IV. Strengthening Civilian Professionals in Defense and National Security

- Congress should establish a new Defense Professionals Corps to attract the best and brightest civilians to serve in DoD and to provide greatly expanded opportunities for professional development and career advancement.
- Training, education, and required interagency rotations for senior-level career appointments should become centerpieces of the new personnel system.
- To fully support professional development opportunities, Congress and DoD need to invest in a relatively small number of additional billets to allow for a personnel "float" analogous to the float that exists in the military personnel system.

V. Improving Interagency and Coalition Operations

- The President should give greater organizational emphasis to this issue by designating the Deputy Assistant to the President on the NSC staff as having lead responsibility for integrating agency strategies and plans and ensuring greater unity of effort among agencies during execution, and by establishing a new office in the National Security Council with this mandate.
- We further recommend that the Secretaries of all agencies likely to be involved in complex operations abroad set up small, proprietary planning offices to lead the development of agency plans and participate in the interagency planning process.
- For each contingency operation, the president should designate one senior official to be in charge of and accountable for integrating U.S. interagency operations on the ground.
- Congress should establish a new Agency for Stability Operations, which will organize, train and equip civilians for complex operations; and have the authority to rapidly deploy civilian experts and teams to the field.
- To facilitate this overall effort, Congress should also establish a new Training Center for Interagency and Coalition Operations, to be jointly run by DoD's National Defense University and the State Department's National Foreign Affairs Training Center.
- Congress must devote increased funds for programs that enhance peacetime opportunities for civilian planners and operators to work with their counterparts from various countries. It should

also increase U.S. funding for programs that support building the operational capabilities of allies and partners in priority task areas in complex operations.

VI. Strengthening Congressional Oversight

- To create the conditions for reinvigorating Congressional oversight of the Defense Department, we urge Congressional leadership to establish a process similar to that created for the base realignment and closure (BRAC). Congress could establish an independent group (of former Congressional leaders from both Houses and both parties) to assess current committee membership, structures and jurisdictions and to make recommendations on how to enhance Congressional oversight.
- While the BG-N study team believes that the Armed Services committees should be encouraged to elevate their focus on strategic and policy issues and should be reduced in size, only Congress can decide how to reform itself.

The Phase 2 Agenda

Below are the six working groups that will comprise Phase 2 of the BG-N study:

1. Adapting to 21st Century Missions and Warfare
2. Organizing for Global, Regional, Country and Functional Operations
3. Designing a United States Government Appropriate for 21st Century Challenges
4. Building a New Defense Acquisition Process
5. A Zero-based Assessment of the Defense Agencies
6. Assessing Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education

Phase 2 is scheduled to begin in April and will last one year.

Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Study
Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006
Contact: Josiane Gabel
Tel: (202) 887-0200
E-mail: jgabel@csis.org



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

Quotes from Dr. John Hamre and the principal authors on key aspects of the *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols* Phase 1 Report:

- On improving the way DoD does its business:

"The original Goldwater-Nichols legislation created a fundamental seam between the Military Services and the Combatant Commanders when it comes to allocating resources. While the Services, at the end of the day, provide the most integrated and coherent programs and budgets, certain critical enterprise-wide functions call out for a different solution." --John Hamre

- On rationalizing organizational structures:

"In making its recommendations, we believed it was essential to give organizations the capacity to carry out new mandates and not simply exhort a better performance from all relevant parties. As a rower on the Oxford crew team, our coxswain would often say "Row better, Oxford!" when it appeared we were falling behind the Cambridge boat. But telling an existing organization to "Do better" or "Act differently" without providing it capacities consistent with its new responsibilities is a recipe for failure – or, at best, old wine in new bottles." --Kurt Campbell

- On revamping the resource allocation process:

"The Secretary of Defense, as the ultimate authority in the Department, needs a means for determining how well current policy is being implemented and current programs are being executed. DoD needs to gather all existing authoritative and directive guidance to establish a single, unified statement of the strategies, policies and programs to be followed, implemented and executed. Tough decisions never bear full fruit unless you have a means for enforcing them." --Clark Murdock

- On improving U.S. interagency and coalition operations:

"The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq war have served to remind us that post-conflict reconstruction operations are an inherent rather than optional part of winning a war. However "decisive" the combat phase of a war, it will invariably stop short of achieving our broader strategic objectives. To get to the final goal, one needs follow-on civil-military operations to win the peace. It is high time that the United States develop and institutionalize the civilian and military capabilities it needs to be successful in such complex operations." --Michèle Flournoy

- On strengthening Congressional oversight of defense:

"The U.S. Congress is the place where ideas become the nation's plans and commitments. Yet, diminishing expertise and few truly national debates in Congress prevents an enduring foundation for new directions, including significant defense reform. The BG-N study team believes that it is critical to the health of both institutions to strengthen Congressional oversight of the Department of Defense." --Chris Williams