Operation Anaconda: Win-win, lose-lose


	March 22, 2002	atimes.com

Central Asia/Russia

Operation Anaconda: Win-win, lose-lose
By Mushahid Hussain

ISLAMABAD - The results of the just-ended 16-day Operation Anaconda, the biggest and most important military engagement of US forces in Afghanistan, are richer in statistics than in substance.

Eight US fatalities, two MH-47 Chinook helicopters disabled, and no "enemy" soldiers captured since they adamantly refused to surrender were among some of the supposed achievements of the mission when it concluded this month. But notwithstanding the claim of killing "hundreds of al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters", there was no word that the elusive "VIP fugitives" Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar were among them.

A week into the campaign, on March 8, US President George W Bush grudgingly admitted, "These people evidently don't want to give up. And that's okay, if that's their attitude, we'll just have to adjust, and they'll have made a mistake." At the conclusion of the campaign, the comments of General Tommy Franks, the commander-in-chief of the US Central Command, which oversees the Afghan theater of operations, were apt. He termed the security situation in Afghanistan "murky and troublesome".

Operation Anaconda involved about 1,000 US troops, including Special Forces, 200 commandos from allies including Canada and Australia, and a couple of thousand Afghan forces, including a thousand-man detachment of the Afghan interim government. It took place 50 kilometers from the Pakistani border, and the fighting was 150km south of Kabul, with anonymous "US officials" telling the Associated Press last Saturday that "numerous al-Qaeda fighters fleeing the battles are believed to have escaped into Pakistan".

Given this context, it is no accident that soon after distributing medals for bravery in action to US soldiers in Afghanistan and formally proclaiming the end of Operation Anaconda, Franks flew into Pakistan for an unscheduled visit on Sunday. Presumably the purpose of his journey was to seek President General Pervez Musharraf's continued cooperation in mopping up the remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, should any have escaped the Pakistan Army's dragnet and managed to enter Pakistan covertly.

The daunting task that lies ahead was made more evident on the very day of Franks' arrival, which saw a major act of terrorism directed against a church congregation in Islamabad's diplomatic enclave, just 365 meters from the US Embassy. The attack last weekend resulted in five fatalities, including the wife and daughter of an American diplomat. That the attackers managed to strike so close to the embassy, one of the country's most guarded installations in ostensibly Pakistan's most secure city, is an indication of the gravity of the threat posed by the fallout of the Afghan War on both the Americans and the Musharraf military regime.

In fact, within the past month, there has been a "hat trick of terror" in terms of the timing of striking at sensitive targets.

On February 21, American journalist Daniel Pearl's macabre videotaped murder was announced soon after Musharraf's US visit. On February 26, worshippers at a mosque were gunned down in the vicinity of the Pakistan Army's General Headquarters (GHQ), and then came last Sunday's attack on the heavily guarded church near the citadel of symbolism and power, the US Embassy in Islamabad.

Given that the security situation remains "murky and troublesome", as Franks put it, what are the larger lessons to be drawn from Operation Anaconda? Three are particularly relevant.

First, an insight into the historical context of America's Asian military adventures is necessary. At the height of the Vietnam War in 1968, the Viet Cong launched the "Tet Offensive" coinciding with the Vietnamese New Year, which the United States won militarily but lost politically over the longer term. It was then that an American general made his famous comment on how to exit from Vietnam: "We should simply declare we have won and just get the hell out of Vietnam." Now, a similar refrain, albeit on a smaller scale, is being felt in Afghanistan, given the resilience of the resistance, which refuses to surrender, and the failure to capture or kill either bin Laden or Mullah Omar. The interview on Monday of Osama's half-brother, Sheikh Ahmad, who told CNN that his brother is "alive and well", is certain to throw another spanner into the works of the US game plan.

Second, as Israel is discovering in dealing with the Palestinians or as the United States did in Vietnam, military might alone is not enough to defeat a determined enemy even if it is dispersed. Politically, the extended use of force can be counterproductive. This what the United States is discovering in Afghanistan, since there are Afghan sources who dispute claims that "only al-Qaeda is being targeted" and say there are recurring reports of civilians also being killed by US bombing.

Third, if the United States gets bogged down in Afghanistan, the entire capacity of Washington to expand its war on terrorism, for instance to Iraq, will be called into question.

The results of Operation Anaconda, which was declared a "victory" by the US, was followed by a day later by another attack on US bases and Afghan allied forces on Wednesday in Khost in eastern Afghanistan, a stark reminder of the limitations of US military power. These limitations also adversely affect US political and diplomatic clout, as evidenced in the conclusion of Operation Anaconda, which coincided with the end of Vice President Dick Cheney's 10-day Middle East journey, a trip that resulted in virtually unanimous opposition to any military action against Iraq.

Thus, more second thoughts are bound to emerge as to the direction of both the American war in Afghanistan and the war against terrorism.

(Inter Press Service)