Society & Economy

Society & Economy

شنبه، 11 آبان، 1381

Demographical profile of the Iranian community in the United States based on the 1990 US census


From a small beginning of perhaps no more than 15,000 individuals in 1965, the Iranian population of the United States grew rapidly to 121,000 in 1980. Current estimates are between 800,000 to 1,100,000.
The marked increase in immigration can be explained through two important events. First due to the substantial wealth of the country prior to the 1979 revolution, many families and the government chose to send students abroad for higher level education. By 1977, Iran had more students abroad than any other country in the world at 227,497. By 1979 in the US alone, there were 51,310 college students, ranking first amongst foreign nationalities. Second, after the revolution in 1979, not only did many of these students opt to remain in the US, but many of their relatives also decided to join them, later becoming naturalized citizens (or residents).
Based on the 1990 census figures, one can draw a fairly accurate portrait of this community:
Although coming from a non-English speaking country, 84% of Iranian-Americans speak fluent English.
46% have a bachelors degree or higher, which ranks the group not only higher than any other recently arrived immigrant group, but also higher than natives in terms of educational achievement.
This high academic achievement has undoubtedly contributed to the high occupational and financial accomplishment of Iranians as well. 43% of Iranians are in professional and managerial positions, 35% in technical and administrative, 10% are in various services and the balance are spread over farming, craft and laborers.
48% of the Iranian-American community are dual income earners and 22% own their own businesses.
Median family income is $55,501 (substantially above the national average of $35,492) and per capita income is $18,040.
92% of Iranians have a mortgage.

References: Demographic data of Iranians in the US


 
يكشنبه، 28 مهر، 1381

Suicides and political parties

The study on suicide as a vehicle through which to explore sociological theory was significant in a number of ways. It was significant because it leads us to a systematic reappraisal of the work of Emile Durkheim – whose own study of suicide in 1987 had represented an attempt to cast the new discipline of sociology as a positive, objective science of society. It was significant also because, as Durkheim had recognized, the study of suicide exposes a fundamental theoretical task of sociological inquiry. That tasks to reveal how a social science which deals with social forces, social structures and social action can understand an event that, commonsensically, appears intensely personal and private. A third way in which the problem of suicide was significant was that some social theorist such as Gidens addresses a radical division within sociology between two apparently opposed and mutually exclusive approaches to the study of a common problem – the ‘positivist’ approach and the ‘phenomenological’ approach – representing two distinct sociologies inhabiting the post-war academy (1)
The positivist approach, drawing on Dukheim’s methods and guidance, attempts to show the objective correlations between rates of suicide and various external factors such as urban isolation (2). The phenomenological approach, drawing on the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, investigated how the event of a death is given the subjective meaning of ‘suicide’, under what circumstances and with what consequences. Whilst the positivist view accepts official data on suicide rates as presenting, more or less, an accurate picture of its social reality, the phenomenological view undermines this idea by showing that cultural and subculture factors influence whether any particular death will or will not be classified as suicide either officially or otherwise (3). The ‘two sociologies’ division, in relation to the suicide problem, can be summed up in the form of two contrasting questions: is the sociological concept of suicide equivalent only to what is officially recorded as suicide by coroners and other functionaries? Alternatively, is it the task of sociology to probe the cultures and subcultures in which people understand and give personal significant to deaths suicidal events? (4)
The following research is based on positivist approach. It attempts to show the objective correlations between rates of suicide and the political policy of Western political parities. The main question is that whether Conservative governments drive you to suicide or not? Researchers from the UK and Australia have confirmed that people feel more like ending it all when the Tories are in power.
Under Conservative governments during the 20th century, the UK's suicide rate rose 17 per cent, while in the Australian state of New South Wales it was 17 per cent higher for men and 40 per cent higher for women, according to independent research carried out at Bristol University and the University of Sydney.
The two sets of findings, published on Thursday in the Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, analysed suicide statistics in the UK and in New South Wales since 1901 and compared them with the political regimes at the time.
The century began with a Conservative government in London and a suicide rate of one in 10,000. That quickly fell as the Liberals, elected in 1906, enacted progressive social legislation. Suicides reached an all time low during the first world war.
Following the armistice, the number of suicides rose again under a succession of Tory administrations. The researchers admit the findings could be linked to high unemployment during recessions, which have tended to coincide with periods of Tory rule.
However, suicide rates were also above average when "Britain never had it so good" under the Tories in the 1950s, they say.
"Suicide is not just about people's individual circumstances such as unemployment. It is also affected by the social fabric of society," says Mary Shaw, a sociologist at Bristol University.
Suicide reached an all time low during the second world war, which Dr Shaw puts down to the spirit of the blitz and an uncharacteristically interventionist Conservative government.
"When people feel more socially connected, whether that is to their family and friends or society in a broader sense they are less likely to contemplate this individual act [suicide]," she says.
It is not all black for the Tories. Suicides peaked from 1931 to 1935 under the coalition of Ramsay MacDeonald, who left the Labour Party in 1931.
Different shades of conservatism also seem to have an effect on the nation's mood. Suicide rates fell when Margaret Thatcher was ousted by the less strident John Major in 1990.
But the researchers say that perceptions of what governments stand for play a more significant part in the decision to end it all that the actual policies of the day.
Despite a significant narrowing of the differences between the policies of the Australian Labor Party and the conservative party over the last 20 years, the difference in suicide rates under each government remained largely unchanged.
"Even if you look at the policies on paper, which are more similar than they ever used to be, people still have a polarised view of what living under the different types of governments is like," Dr Shaw says. The 35,000 people who committed suicide between 1901 and 2001 - two for every day the Conservatives held power - would not have done so if Labour had been in government, according to the report.
But Conservative Central Office was quick to dismiss the credibility of the research.
"This sounds to me like one of those studies that finds eating bananas causes cancer, but ignores the fact that everyone was smoking twenty packets of cigarettes," a Conservative party spokesman said.
Dr Shaw admits the UK findings may not be watertight, but says they are backed up by the more rigorous Australian study, which took account of the effects of war, drought and the availability of sedatives.
1) Dawe, A, 1970, The Two Sociologies, British Journal Of Sociology, Vol. 21, Pp 207-18
2) Sainsbury, P., 1955, Suicide In London, London, Chapman And Hall
3) Douglas, J., 1967, The Social Meanings Of Suicide, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
4)Pierson, C, 1998, Conversation With Giddens, U.K , Polity, Pp 19-23
5) FT, 19 September 2002



 
شنبه، 20 مهر، 1381

'Glorious' Revolution 1688 and the British political parties

'Glorious' Revolution 1688

What these days are happing in Britain are consequences of what happend in 1688. William of Orange landed in Britain on 5 November 1688. Although he claimed he was only there to support parliament, it soon became clear that a different agenda was operating. William marched unopposed to London as James fled (dumping the Great Seal of the realm in the Thames as he went). By the end of 1688, it was clear that William would accept nothing less than the English crown, if parliament wished for him to remain and defend Protestantism.James II left the country and made an end to Sturat dynesty. He could not replace consitutional monarchy to absolute one.

Although the revolution was long considered 'Glorious' and bloodless, this was only from a narrow English point of view. Catholics and Jacobite Protestants in Scotland and Ireland, who died for King James between 1688 and 1690 would have considered the revolution neither Glorious nor bloodless.


 
شنبه، 20 مهر، 1381

Rural Development in Iran

THE STATE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN, written by Ali Shakoori, LONDON, PALGRAVE, 2001, ISBN 0-333-77613-5, Pp217, price?


Since the 1979 Revolution the Islamic state has grappled with the problems of running the rural economy inherited from the Shah’s regime. Criticizing the Shah’s agrarian reform and rural policies as a conspiracy of the United States to bring on the decline of agriculture production and the dependency of the country on American grain and foodstuffs, which led to pauperization of peasants and their exodus to urban areas, the Islamic state set out to revitalize the agrarian sector and to increase agriculture production so as to achieve self-sufficiency. Although the villagers, comprising about half the country’s population, remained either indifferent to the uprising the Islamic revolution in the cities or participated in counterrevolutionary actions during 1977-1979, the Islamic revolution, as a modern-urban revolution, led to a number of broad, significant social and political changes in rural Iran, and the Islamic state espoused socio-economic justice and equality more for the rural areas by putting the rural development at the centre-piece of the state political agenda.

Ali Shakoori’s book provides a comprehensive account of the post-revolutionary rural development policies and their impact on rural life at the macro and micro levels. It is designed in six chapters. Chapter one builds a theoretical framework to explain the process of rural development and the nature of change in rural society discussing concepts and definitions of modernization theory, and debating on the meaning of development and rural development in a historical context. Chapter 2 examines mostly a historical background of agricultural modernization in the pre-Revolutionary era. The author argues that the land reform of 1962 had political goals as well as the socioeconomic goal of adapting the structure of society to capitalist requirements. The old regime tried to strengthen the political role of the state in rural communities mainly by substituting traditional leverage such as headman of the village (kadkhoda), who served as an institutional connection of the government and the villages, by a variety of new organizations controlled by government agencies, penetrating the village life and agrarian relations. Shakoori concludes this chapter arguing that the land was unequally distributed among the peasants, and the wealthier peasants benefited this program. ‘The land reform and other rural development policies did not substantially increase the supply of food to urban centers, and neither did overall agricultural productivity rise relative to the rapidly growing population.’(p.59)

Chapter 3 analyses the agricultural policies after the Islamic revolution. The Islamic state policies were mainly a reaction against the pre-Revolutionary, which were modernistic with a strong emphasis on mechanized and capital-intensive farming. The main post-revolutionary policies was the implementation of land reform, the creation of Jihad-e Sazandegi (later converted into a ministerial system), mosha cooperatives and the establishment of Islamic rural councils. The chapter points out that these policies were a prime response to pressure from a number of socioeconomic forces to deal with the rural problems such as the rural poverty, social inequality and widening gap between city and village. The author argues that in spite of the great emphasis on reform of the state’s agricultural and rural organizations, they have far from achieved their objectives. For instance Jahad, as a revolutionary administrative system, which enjoyed a generous supply of financial resources failed to combat rural deprivation. The author suggests that this organization never had a coherent strategy based on scientific study for rural development. ‘The post-revolutionary administrative organizations went through a period of competition and duplication of responsibilities, rather than cooperating with each other and coordinating their efforts.’ (p.165) The land reform was another significant event in the post-revolutionary rural life, which had significant differences with the Shah’s land reform.

Chapter 4 discusses the effects of the government’s agricultural policies and other factors on agricultural output. Unlike the Shah’s agrarian policies, the post-revolutionary rural policies focused more on strengthening the small and medium-sized farms. Its policies were based on the assumption that agriculture was the ‘axis’ of development and consequently the five-year plans gave the agricultural sector top priority. The ultimate aim of the government was to achieve self-sufficiency within a decade mainly by investing indirectly in agricultural infrastructure, and populist economics policies such as supplying inputs, granting loans, subsidies and pricing policy. Nevertheless, despite all these measures capital formation in the sector remained low due to weak private sector participation in this sector’s investment and low productivity. The impact of rural development programs on the process of change in rural life at the micro level is examined in Chapter 5 in terms of income, wealth, social mobility, participation and the well being of the sample households. The empirical research on the selected villages in terms of the Gini coefficients indicates that in spite of the state’s rural distribution policies, inequality was greater in the villages where the maximum number of rural programs were carried out than in those which received fewer or no programs. ‘The decile distributions show clear differences in respect of income, wealth and well being between richest and poorest groups. Although some of the programs were targeted at the poor and benefited the lowest social groups, on the whole it was the upper classes who gained most from the rural efforts.’ (P.163)

As a whole the book succeeds in delivering informative discussions on many of the pre- and post-revolutionary land policies. However, the discussions provided for some of the important changes are not very convincing. For instance, in Chapter 2 the fall of old landowning class from the state's structure of power and destruction of traditional organization of production such as the boneh teamwork system, and the rise of big agricultural bourgeoisie and commercial farmers after the land reform of 1962 have not been paid in-depth attention. Another shortcoming of the book is to analyze the socio-economic obstacles to the implementation of an efficient rural program. One of these issues is extend to which a reform should be radicalized. In both pre- and post-revolutionary programs, deviations from the Islamic principles of the sanctity of private proprietorship led to the protest movements of the ulama. The post-revolutionary rural policies, particularly the land reform, were initiated from the middle, primarily by the young urban intelligentsia, to radicalize the whole revolutionary movement. It unleashed the covert group conflict and led to a new struggle over land. The radicalization of the reform policy – imposing a ceiling on the size of landownership- acted as a major obstacle to the reform since the sanctity of private property in Islamic jurisprudence received the emphatic support. The debate on the question of the legality and legitimacy of the main part of land law, Clause C, divided the ulama into opposing camps. Most of Ayatollahs such as Golpayegani, Marashi, Ruhani, Qumi and Shirazi, who seemed to have constituted the core of the high clerical opposition to the land reform, strongly believed that Clause C of the reform was in direct violation of Islamic principles, and defended the sanctity of property. Others such as Ayatollah Montazeri, an ardent supporter of land reform, considered land ownership un-Islamic and illegitimate, arguing that, like air and water, land belongs to God alone. Finally Imam Khomeini left the final decision to the Majlis. Although the Majlis ratified a modified version of the law, the conflict between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians remained for years, and the issue had the significant impact in the process of establishment of the Council for Expediency of Interest of the System. Nevertheless, the post-revolutionary rural policies led to the fall of the big agricultural bourgeoisie and the survival of middle-size commercial farmers. It resulted in the decline of agricultural output, despite of increasing the state financial support. Thus, the nature of program led to a much greater control by the state over rural areas than the Shah’s regime. However, to some extend, the magnitude of land concentration in large holdings was decreased.

Furthermore, many significant pre-revolutionary rural debates do not investigate in the book. For instance, whether the acceleration of rural-urban migration was resulted from the land reform of 1962 or the growing the urbanism itself, which started earlier. New studies likewise claim that there was a net financial inflow into Iranian agriculture after the Shah's land reform, and thus contrary to the common belief, the agricultural sector was not financially squeezed on account of the old regime's industrialization bias.

Despite its shortcoming, this book is a very welcome addition to the limited set of writing on the post-revolutionary rural policies. Written in a lucid style, the book is accessible to general readers while also providing the data and documentation and analysis demanded by specialists.

Ali Saeidi
Published in Muslim News December 2001


 
جمعه، 19 مهر، 1381

The Economy of Iran

THE ECONOMY OF IRAN: THE DILEMMA OF AN ISLAMIC STATE, Edited by Parvin Alizadeh. I.B.Tauris, LONDON. 2000. Pp.viii, 303. ISBN 1-86064-464-3. Price HB £39.50

The Islamic state has been grappling with the problems of running the economy inherited from the Shah’s regime since the 1979 Revolution. Criticizing the machinery of the old regime as being in the line of the capitalist mode of production, an instrument of dependence and establishing a rentier economy, the Islamic state has tried to create an Islamic economic framework on the basis of independence, self-sufficiency and distributional justice in practical terms. In doing so, it has encountered numerous problems. This book is to provide a comprehensive account of these problems in the Post-revolutionary period. The volume is arranged in three parts. The chapters in Part 1 build and expand the analysis of macroeconomic policies and performance of the Iranian economy, while part 2 deals with factors influencing economic performance; and part three examines the women’s participation in the Iranian labor market.

Part 1 mostly examines how, after the initial turmoil on the 1979 Revolution, the Iranian economy faced a large budget deficit, unstable exchange policies, price distortion, and badly designed and implemented fiscal and monetary policies. The papers generally discuss the extent of the dilemmas confronting the Islamic government. Hakimian and Karshenas suggest that the emergence of a new state interventionism by confiscation and nationalization of banks, insurance companies and large-scale industries in the first decade after the Revolution was an inevitable consequence of the revolution. Comparing the growth performance of Iran with Turkey and Korea over the past four decades, they point out the dramatic retrogression of the performance of Iranian economy during the 1980s in terms of per capita income and per capita GDP. They argue that ‘Iran’s first post-revolutionary foray into market liberalization met with a foreign debt and inflation crisis which tarnished its initial successes’ (p.59). They argue that problems of slow growth and high inflation in the Iranian economy cannot be resolved without contemplating more fundamental institutional changes and a reform of the system of governance. Behdad also argues that the Iranian economic crisis has been a crisis of the post-revolutionary type, when the revolutionary state has negated the old economic order and tried to define a new social order. To do this, the Islamic government has oscillated between two main types of economic orders: Islamic populist economics and liberalist policies. Behdad distinguishes three phases in the post-revolutionary era, namely revolutionary disruption, Islamic populism, and liberalism of the post-Khomeini era, in order to show these types and elaborate the crisis. Behdad, Hakimian and Karshenas point out the consequences of the implementation of populist economic policies which emphasizes income (re) distribution, and forces the government to rely on a large budget deficit, de-emphasize the risk of inflation, avoid devaluation, bring property rights into question and ambiguity, and push aggregate demand beyond existing economic bounds, which caused consumption to go beyond investment. Behdad also pointes to the degenerative effects of political instability on private capital accumulation.

Pesaran observes that ‘ the relationship between money supply growth, inflation and output has been adversely affected in the post-revolutionary period’ (p. 5). He also provides an overall evaluation of the economic adjustment program (the third phase in Behdad’s term), within the First Five-Year Economic Plan, and examines its economic objectives and rationales. By emphasizing on the government’s stabilization and liberalization programs, he argues that the Iran liberalization program was rather ambitious, and attempts at achieving it have led to substantial balance of payments deficits and - given Iran’s unfavorable international position- have created serious external financing difficulties for the government. The implications of the economic liberalization program forced the government to take steps by stabilize the economy and alleviate the country’s external financing difficulties. Nevertheless, all these measures, while essential for the economy, were likely to be at the expense of the real economy, and could lead to substantial loss of production and increased unemployment without necessarily reducing inflation.

Among other causes diverting the economic reforms to the populist policies, the role of the para-governmental organizations is particularly significant. The initial nationalization and confiscation of large-scale private property after the 1979 Revolution and the eight years war with Iraq created a large para-governmental sector. This factor has been studies by Maloney in part 2. Although the overt function of these organizations (bunyads) has been to serve the poor and vulnerable covertly, they have been operating more like giant private monopolies, and have been major beneficiaries of the populist economic policies, such as the multi-exchange rate system, budgetary transfer, large bank credits with implicit and explicit subsidies. Maloney suggests that the existing operation of these organizations is major obstacle to the rationalization of the economic policies, and Behdad concurs. In the next chapter, Afghah also emphasizes that non-economic factors have been more influential than economic ones in the process of production in Iran (pp. 204-5). He suggests that ‘a lack of practical sympathy towards economic progress among policy makers, and the existence of an anti-production government system, and a general culture that is more concerned with socio-cultural affairs than increasing production, are the main factors responsible for many productivity failures in the production projects’ (p.228).

Part 3 examines the place of women in the Iranian economy. Its main objective is to argue that the socio-economic transformations in the post-revolutionary period have reduced the share of women’s employment in the labor market. In the first chapter, Moghadam highlights the obstacles to increasing the share of female employment during this period, particularly in the rural areas. Exploring ‘the close relationship between the process of nation building and women's social participation’ on the one hand, and its close relations to the specific role of women as transmitters of culture, tradition, and education of children on the other, she shows a decline in the share of female employment and increased occupational sex segregation. Nevertheless, Moghadam suggests that the increase in the women’s unemployment has been a general function of the declining economic growth, resulting from generally lower oil revenues, and lack of investment. Besides the ideological orientation of the Islamic state towards the socio-economic position of the women particularly in 1980s, she points out that the high total fertility rate during 1980s and 1990s, and the population growth rate of above three percent during 1980s are two main factors affected the declining economic growth and increasing unemployment.

Although the volume neglects to cover some major politico-economic dilemmas of an Islamic state - such as the lack of legal-rational political authority, the economic implication of political factionalism, and the implications of the application of Islamic banking system in the capital and money markets, it brings together a wealth of data and analysis on the significant economic factors. In brief, the book can be recommended as a valuable collection of articles with some very good contributions.


Ali A. Saeidi
The center of Near and Middle East Studies, SOAS

Published in Journal of Islamic Studies, Book Review, Vol. 13, No.1, pp 87-89


 

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