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Today's
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November 11, 2003
David Lindorff
Bush's
War on Veterans
Stan Goff
Honoring
Real Vets; Remembering Real War
Earnest McBride
"His
Feet Were on the Ground": Was Steve McNair's Cousin Lynched?
Derek Seidman
Imperialism
Begins at Home: an Interview with Stan Goff
David Krieger
Mr. President, You Can Run But You Can't Hide
Sen. Ernest Hollings
My Cambodian Moment on the Iraq War
Dan Bacher
The Invisible Man Resigns
Kam Zarrabi
Hypocrisy at the Top
John Eskow
Born on Veteran's Day
Website of the Day
Left Hook
November 10, 2003
Robert Fisk
Looney
Toons in Rummyworld: How We Denied Democracy to the Middle East
Elaine Cassel
Papa's Gotta Brand New Bag (of Tricks): Patriot Act Spawns Similar
Laws Across Globe
James Brooks
Israel's New War Machine Opens the Abyss
Thom Rutledge
The Lost Gospel of Rummy
Stew Albert
Call Him Al
Gary Leupp
"They
Were All Non-Starters": On the Thwarted Peace Proposals
November 8/9, 2003
Kathleen and Bill Christison
Zionism
as Racist Ideology
Gabriel Kolko
Intelligence
for What?
The Vietnam War Reconsidered
Saul Landau
The
Bride Wore Black: the Policy Nuptials of Boykin and Wolfowitz
Brian Cloughley
Speeding Up to Nowhere: Training the New Iraqi Police
William Blum
The Anti-Empire Report:
A Permanent Occupation?
David Lindorff
A New Kind of Dancing in Iraq: from Occupation to Guerrilla War
Elaine Cassel
Bush's War on Non-Citizens
Tim Wise
Persecuting the Truth: Claims of Christian Victimization Ring
Hollow
Toni Solo
Robert Zoellick and "Wise Blood"
Michael Donnelly
Will the Real Ron Wyden Please Stand Up?
Mark Hand
Building a Vanguard Movement: a Review of Stan Goff's Full Spectrum
Disorder
Norman Solomon
War, Social Justice, Media and Democracy
Norman Madarasz
American Neocons and the Jerusalem Post
Adam Engel
Raising JonBenet
Dave Zirin
An Interview with George Foreman
Poets' Basement
Guthrie, Albert and Greeder
November 7, 2003
Nelson Valdes
Latin
America in Crisis and Cuba's Self-Reliance
David Vest
Surely
It Can't Get Any Worse?
Chris Floyd
An Inspector
Calls: The Kay Report as War Crime Indictment
William S. Lind
Indicators:
Where This War is Headed
Elaine Cassel
FBI to Cryptome: "We Are Watching You"
Maria Tomchick
When Public Transit Gets Privatized
Uri Avnery
Israeli
Roulette
November 6, 2003
Ron Jacobs
With
a Peace Like This...
Conn Hallinan
Rumsfeld's
New Model Army
Maher Arar
This
is What They Did to Me
Elaine Cassel
A Bad
Day for Civil Liberties: the Case of Maher Arar
Neve Gordon
Captives
Behind Sharon's Wall
Ralph Nader and Lee Drutman
An Open Letter to John Ashcroft on Corporate Crime
November 5, 2003
Jeffrey St. Clair
Just
a Match Away:
Fire Sale in So Cal
Dave Lindorff
A Draft in the Forecast?
Robert Jensen
How I Ended Up on the Professor Watch List
Joanne Mariner
Prisons as Mental Institutions
Patrick Cockburn
Saddam Not Organizing Iraqi Resistance
Simon Helweg-Larsen
Centaurs
from Dusk to Dawn: Remilitarization and the Guatemalan Elections
Josh Frank
Silencing "the Reagans"
Website of the Day
Everything You Wanted to Know About Howard Dean But Were Afraid
to Ask
November 4, 2003
Robert Fisk
Smearing
Said and Ashrawi: When Did "Arab" Become a Dirty Word?
Ray McGovern
Chinook Down: It's Beginning to Look a Lot Like Vietnam
Woodruff / Wypijewski
Debating
the New Unity Partnership
Karyn Strickler
When
Opponents of Abortion Dream
Norman Solomon
The
Steady Theft of Our Time
Tariq Ali
Resistance
and Independence in Iraq
November 3, 2003
Patrick Cockburn
The
Bloodiest Day Yet for Americans in Iraq: Report from Fallujah
Dave Lindorff
Philly's
Buggy Election
Janine Pommy Vega
Sarajevo Hands 2003
Bernie Dwyer
An
Interview with Chomsky on Cuba
November 1 / 2,
2003
Saul Landau
Cui
Bono? The Cuba Embargo as Rip Off
Noam Chomsky
Empire of the Men of Best Quality
Bruce Jackson
Midge Decter and the Taxi Driver
Brian Cloughley
"Mow the Whole Place Down"
John Stanton
The Pentagon's Love Affair with Land Mines
William S. Lind
Bush's Bizarre Korean Gambit
Ben Tripp
The Brown Paste on Bush's Shoes
Christopher Brauchli
Divine Hatred
Dave Zirin
An Interview with John Carlos
Agustin Velloso
Oil in Equatorial Guinea: Where Trickle Down Doesn't Trickle
Josh Frank
Howard Dean and Affirmative Action
Ron Jacobs
Standing Up to El Diablo: the 1981 Blockade of Diablo Canyon
Strickler / Hermach
Liar, Liar Forests on Fire
David Vest
Jimmy T99 Nelson, a Blues Legend and the Songs that Made Him
Famous
Adam Engel
America, What It Is
Dr. Susan Block
Christy Canyon, a Life in Porn
Poets' Basement
Greeder, Albert & Guthrie
Congratulations
to CounterPuncher David Vest: Winner of 2 Muddy Awards for Best
Blues Pianist in the Pacific Northwest!
October 31, 2003
Lee Ballinger
Making
a Dollar Out of 15 Cents: The Sweatshops of Sean "P. Diddy"
Combs
Wayne Madsen
The
GOP's Racist Trifecta
Michael Donnelly
Settling for Peanuts: Democrats Trick the Greens, Treat Big Timber
Patrick Cockburn
Baghdad
Diary: Iraqis are Naming Their New Babies "Saddam"
Elaine Cassel
Coming
to a State Near You: The Matrix (Interstate Snoops, Not the Movie)
Linda Heard
An Arab View of Masonry
October 30, 2003
Forrest Hylton
Popular
Insurrection and National Revolution in Bolivia
Eric Ruder
"We Have to Speak Out!": Marching with the Military
Families
Dave Lindorff
Big
Lies and Little Lies: The Meaning of "Mission Accomplished"
Philip Adams
"Everyone is Running Scared": Denigrating Critics of
Israel
Sean Donahue
Howard Dean: a Hawk in a Dove's Cloak
Robert Jensen
Big Houses & Global Justice: A Moral Level of Consumption?
Alexander Cockburn
Paul
Krugman: Part of the Problem
October 29, 2003
Chris Floyd
Thieves
Like Us: Cheney's Backdoor to Halliburton
Robert Fisk
Iraq Guerrillas Adopt a New Strategy: Copy the Americans
Rick Giombetti
Let
Them Eat Prozac: an Interview with David Healy
The Intelligence Squad
Dark
Forces? The Military Steps Up Recruiting of Blacks
Elaine Cassel
Prosecutors
as Therapists, Phantoms as Terrorists
Marie Trigona
Argentina's War on the Unemployed Workers Movement
Gary Leupp
Every
Day, One KIA: On the Iraq War Casualty Figures
October 28, 2003
Rich Gibson
The
Politics of an Inferno: Notes on Hellfire 2003
Uri Avnery
Incident
in Gaza
Diane Christian
Wishing
Death
Robert Fisk
Eyewitness
in Iraq: "They're Getting Better"
Toni Solo
Authentic Americans and John Negroponte
Jason Leopold
Halliburton in Iran
Shrireen Parsons
When T-shirts are Verboten
Chris White
9/11
in Context: a Marine Veteran's Perspective
October 27,
2003
William A. Cook
Ministers
of War: Criminals of the Cloth
David Lindorff
The
Times, Dupes and the Pulitzer
Elaine Cassel
Antonin
Scalia's Contemptus Mundi
Robert Fisk
Occupational Schizophrenia
John Chuckman
Banging Your Head into Walls
Seth Sandronsky
Snoops R Us
Bill Kauffman
George
Bush, the Anti-Family President
October 25 / 26,
2003
Robert Pollin
The
US Economy: Another Path is Possible
Jeffrey St. Clair
Outsourcing US Guided Missile Technology to China
James Bunn
Plotting
Pre-emptive Strikes
Saul Landau
Should Limbaugh Do Time?
Ted Honderich
Palestinian Terrorism, Morality & Germany
Thomas Nagy
Saving the Army of Peace
Christopher Brauchli
Between Bush and a Lobotomy: Killing Endangered Species for Profit
Laura Carlsen
Latin America's Archives of Terror
Diane Christian
Evil Acts & Evil Actors
Muqtedar Khan
Lessons from the Imperial Adventure in Iraq
John Feffer
The Tug of War on the Korea Peninsula
Brian Cloughley
Iraq War Memories are Made of Lies
Benjamin Dangl
and Kathryn Ledebur
An Uneasy Peace in Bolivia
Karyn Strickler
Down
with Big Brother's Spying Eyes
Noah Leavitt
Legal Globalization
John Stanton
Hitler's Ghost Haunts America
Mickey Z.
War of the Words
Adam Engel
Tractatus Ridiculous
Poets' Basement
Curtis, Subiet and Albert
Website of the Weekend
Project Last Stand
October 24, 2003
Kurt Nimmo
Ashcroft's
War on Greenpeace
Lenni Brenner
The Demographics of American Jews
Jeffrey St. Clair
Rockets,
Napalm, Torpedoes and Lies: the Attack on the USS Liberty Revisited
Sarah Weir
Cover-up of the Israeli Attack on the US Liberty
David Krieger
WMD Found in DC: Bush is the Button
Mohammed Hakki
It's Palestine, Stupid!: Americans and the Middle East
Harry Browne
Northern
Ireland: the Agreement that Wasn't
Hot Stories
Alexander Cockburn
Behold,
the Head of a Neo-Con!
Subcomandante Marcos
The
Death Train of the WTO
Norman Finkelstein
Hitchens
as Model Apostate
Steve Niva
Israel's
Assassination Policy: the Trigger for Suicide Bombings?
Dardagan,
Slobodo and Williams
CounterPunch Exclusive:
20,000 Wounded Iraqi Civilians
Steve
J.B.
Prison Bitch
Sheldon
Rampton and John Stauber
True Lies: the Use of Propaganda
in the Iraq War
Wendell
Berry
Small Destructions Add Up
CounterPunch
Wire
WMD: Who Said What When
Cindy
Corrie
A Mother's Day Talk: the Daughter
I Can't Hear From
Gore Vidal
The
Erosion of the American Dream
Francis Boyle
Impeach
Bush: A Draft Resolution
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for More Stories.
|
November
12, 2003
Unsolicited Advice
A
Reply to Rumsfeld's Memo
By Col. DAN SMITH (Ret.)
TO: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
CC: Gen. Dick Myers, Paul Wolfowitz,
Gen. Pete Pace, Doug Feith
FROM: Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.)
Senior Fellow on Military Affairs Friends Committee on National
Legislation
SUBJECT: Your October 16, 2003 Memo Re:
Global War on Terrorism
A copy of subject Memo came to my attention
even though I am not on the "To" or "CC"
list. Obviously, you or a senior member of your staff anticipated
that I would be able to provide a thoughtful, practical reply
based on independent, unbiased research. My responses follow
each of your queries.
Have we fashioned the right mix of rewards,
amnesty, protection, and confidence in the U.S.?
No. Rewards are insufficient to accomplish
one of the most basic requirements of post-conflict reconstruction:
disarming the various factions and even individuals. The latter
may be more significant in Iraq than in countries ravaged by
civil war where large numbers of fighters are arrayed against
each other in some form of military or paramilitary organization.
When the leaders of the contending groups agree to end armed
conflict, one of the goals is to disarm the fighters as part
of the general demobilizing and reintegrating effort. But in
Iraq, the conditions for demobilizing factions do not pertain.
This connects to three other problems:
a lack of personal security for Iraqis, both private citizens
and high-profile individuals assisting the CPA (although the
latter, particularly members of the Governing Council and state
ministers, do have security details); the large numbers of weapons
held by former Iraqi soldiers who simply melted away to their
homes as the coalition armies advanced toward Baghdad; and the
easy availability of weapons and ammunition in the large numbers
of munitions dumps that are still not under coalition guard.
While the latter deficiency is slowly
being remedied through contracts for securing and destroying
excess and old munitions, until better and visible control is
established, confidence in the U.S. will remain low. Incidents
such as the October 26th rocket attack on the Al Rashid hotel,
the multiple car bombings on October 27th, the downing of the
Chinook helicopter November 2nd, and even the frequency of daily
attacks against western military forces, civilian contractors,
UN, ICRC, and other relief workers, feeds this lack of confidence.
What would help restore confidence that
the U.S. means what it says about returning sovereignty quickly
to Iraq--and at the same time put an "Iraqi face" on
security--would be to recall Iraqi soldiers and officers up to
and including lieutenant-colonel rank and reconstitute their
old units through battalion level. Carefully vetted more senior
officers could form an Iraqi Army Headquarters reporting to an
Iraqi civilian authority operating under the Governing Council.
A parallel procedure should be used to recall police units to
operate under councils of elders and other local leaders.
The inescapable reality is that more
professionally trained and culturally sensitive security people
are needed quickly if the U.S. has any hope of retaining the
neutrality of, let alone improved cooperation from, the general
Iraqi population. Troops and police advisers from European countries
may have the training, while those from Islamic nations would
be more culturally attuned. But governments are not offering
significant help to relieve U.S. forces.
Does DoD need to think through new ways
to organize, train, equip, and focus to deal with the global
war on terror?
Definitely. The first step is to declare
the end of the global war on terror. Next, the Pentagon should
shift from lead to supporting agency, with State becoming the
new lead. Justice would assume a more prominent supporting role
in keeping with the emphasis that terrorist incidents are criminal
acts.
Al Qaeda has been dealt a blow and the
regime that was most visible in its support of global terror,
the Afghan Taliban, has been replaced. This is not to say that
those Taliban and al Qaeda loyalists still at-large pose no residual
threat, either to Afghanistan or, through other, loosely affiliated
groups, to other governments. But these groups seem less interested
in pressing a global jihad than in achieving specific goals within
the countries in which they are operating. (This is true even
in Iraq, where the U.S. presence acts as a magnet for jihadists.)
They of course will always accept money, equipment, and training
from any source, al Qaeda or not.
At least part of the current U.S. dilemma
stems from an inability to see simultaneously the two levels
of terror in the 21st century. The administration's emphasis
on "global war" masks the reality that all terrorist
acts are local. This suggests that the effort to stop or at least
control acts of violence directed against non-combatants should
remain at the local--or no more than a regional--context. Were
this done, DoD would be able to re-form its plans and organization
to support the police and justice systems when these civilian-oriented
agencies determine they do not have the resources to track, apprehend,
or where necessary, fight and defeat those committing acts of
terror. Such cases generally will occur in failed or failing
states.
This is a key point, for it goes right
to the central questions of why military forces are needed and
how they should be employed to achieve the stated goals.
In the ideal world, disputes and misunderstandings
would be resolved without recourse to the threat of or actual
use of armed conflict. In the obvious absence of this ideal,
military organizations exist to provide the same sense of security
from external attack that police forces provide on the national
and local levels. This deterrent/defensive orientation is reinforced
by various international conventions that seek to regulate and
minimize war's effects. More significantly, the UN has as its
primary mission "to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war," a continuing endeavor that involves first
and foremost employing non-military measures.
The UN Charter does acknowledge that
some threats to international peace and security will not be
remedied by non-violent interventions. This reality points to
the question of how military force should be used. The UN Charter
calls for Member States "to unite our strength to maintain
international peace and security" so as "to ensure,
by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods,
that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest"
as this is determined by the UN Security Council. Thus, in addition
to their deterrent role, which contributes to avoiding the scourge
of war, armed forces acting under UN mandates engage in peacekeeping,
peace monitoring, and peace making, roles that enhance international
security through cooperative actions in support of international
law.
Currently in the U.S. military, there
is a mismatch between the demands inherent in these roles and
resources and capabilities to implement these roles. The Pentagon--and
the entire U.S. government--seems trapped organizationally and
conceptually in what might be termed the "cold war time
warp." Tanks and armored troop carriers, the mainstays of
classic warfare, send all the wrong signals to populations whose
main security concerns are looting, murders, kidnappings, robberies,
and car bombs.
Ironically, the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq have slowed efforts to transform the U.S. military into
a lighter, more agile, and flexible force that could effectively
participate in UN peace operations, including stabilization of
failed states. Changes that have been made include:
the Army's shift to the Stryker Brigade
Combat Team, a new combat grouping that relies on speed and agility
to perform its mission; the Air Force plan to organize wings
that mix various aircraft types (as well as Reserve and active
duty component personnel), giving combatant commanders the full
range of capabilities in one well-trained operational package;
and the Navy's new "sea base" proposal and existing
cooperative engagement capability (CEC) system are prototypes
for what could be a shared joint command and total battlespace
awareness system.
The one area that ultimately has to remain
globally centralized is intelligence collection, analysis, and
dissemination, with the latter being tailored for and directed
to commanders at all levels from unified combatant commanders
to platoon level. This structure must truly be "all source"
both in terms of collection methods and sources, including open
source information. Moreover, given the power inherent in organizations
charged with interpreting and disseminating information on which
national policy is based, continuous review of intelligence activities
and the rationale supporting intelligence community conclusions
is required.
Are the changes we have and are making
too modest and incremental? My impression is that we have not
yet made truly bold moves, although we have made many sensible,
logical moves in the right direction, but are they enough?
In two words, "Yes" and "No."
Changes to date have been too slow in
reacting to the post-1991 and then post-September 11th, 2001
security environments. This is not just a DoD problem, where
it is particularly evident in the training and equipping of ground
forces. Primarily, needed changes in overall U.S. national security
(foreign and defense) policy have been too slow, resulting, since
1991, in a general failure to organize international backing
to slow, stop, and eliminate the root causes for continued violence
in the developing world that then generates unilateral or multilateral
interventions. In short, the U.S. has not placed enough weight
behind the fundamental concept of war prevention--unless one
believes (illogically) that making war prevents wars.
The demise of the state in the internecine
warfare that engulfed the republics of the former Yugoslavia
in the 1990s was a harbinger of the challenges that were emerging
around the world in the post-cold war era. But the assaults by
various factions on human security, human rights, and civil liberties
that drew condemnation and eventually military intervention in
Southeast Europe were not connected (or not publicly connected)
to the same plight of millions on other continents. Only when
a particularly significant atrocity such as the mass killing
of Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda became known was there
international intervention--and by then the intervention (including
military assets) invariably would be directed toward the need
for immediate humanitarian relief.
Even in the current general context of
peaceful competing nation-states, the vast majority of countries
find it prudent to retain national military establishments. And
while the primary purpose of regular military units remains "to
kill people and destroy things," an emerging, equally important
requirement in the post-cold war and post-September 11th, 2001
environments is the ability to act quickly, under the aegis of
the UN (or a regional security organization and, in extremis,
unilaterally until the UN Security Council acts) to preclude
or halt war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. A
further emerging need is for a stand-alone, international civilian
police formation, modeled on the Italian caribineri that can
be dispatched under UN auspices to help provide physical security
for a threatened population and to contribute to reconstituting
local police and other traditional security structures.
A bold move by DoD would be the conversion
of one or two current active duty ground divisions into a "heavy"
caribineri force to be used in situations such as Iraq today
where heavy armored divisions lack the proper equipment and psychological
orientation for interacting with and gaining the trust of key
segments of the Iraqi population. These U.S. forces are, to borrow
a phrase, "fit to kill," but for the most part this
is not the orientation that will be effective in either Afghanistan
or Iraq. The U.S. should also press other countries to create
similar forces to allow for true multinational operations under
the UN.
Creation of these self-sustaining units
is not the only possible move, but it would provide the president
with an option to employ regular military formations in those
situations where the display of raw military power would send
the wrong message to a population that needs the reassurance
of physical security and eventual justice.
Today, we lack metrics to know if we
are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing,
killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day
than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training,
and deploying against us?
Focusing on the madrassas and other institutions
that promote narrowly focused viewpoints, whether directed against
the U.S., the West, their own government, or international organizations,
misses the crux of the problem. (Were this a problem in auto
mechanics, the solution to eliminating harmful emissions will
not be found at the output end--the tailpipe--but at the input--the
engine combustion chamber.) It misses because the real problem
is the repression of human and civil rights and liberties, often
in the name of "security," in countries whose regimes
have been supported or condoned by the U.S. and other western
nations.
The question does pertain to the problem
only to the extent that any narrowly focused system of instruction
invariably demands that its interpretation of life be accepted
unequivocally. As a result, those who hold that valid alternative
systems and explanations exist are easily demonized and become
marked for extermination.
Changing this system per se is not within
the capability of DoD. Killing or capturing those who commit
terrorist acts cannot be used as a metric of success, as demonstrated
by the "promotion" of mid-level al Qaeda operatives
when senior persons are caught or killed. As the Pentagon learned
in Vietnam, body counts are essentially meaningless when the
number comprising the enemy force cannot be ascertained.
What is within DoD's purview is ensuring
that statements or actions by Pentagon civilians, uniformed persons,
or individuals working under contract to the Pentagon avoid denigrating
other cultures and belief systems and respect the customs and
traditions of indigenous peoples with whom there is contact.
Examples of unhelpful incidents include the president's July
3rd, 2003 "Bring them on" challenge, remarks by LTG
Boykin, and the detention of three elderly Iraqi women in an
apparent attempt to force the surrender of one of the women's
son suspected of attacking U.S. forces in Iraq.
In Iraq itself, two provisional metrics
might be the level and trend in the number of terror incidents
and the geographic spread (or contraction) of the attacks. On
a wider, regional scale, the number and extent of attacks that
occur or that are thwarted could also be a rough metric. Over
the mid-term, valid metrics of success include: tax collections
flowing to the central government, a steep and sustained drop
in assassinations of mayors and Iraqi police, and the number
and geographic spread of government-paid teachers.
Does the U.S. need to fashion a broad,
integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The
U.S. is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan,
but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop
terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is
billions against the terrorists' costs of millions.
See first paragraph in above answer.
An integrated U.S. plan would include a large-scale foreign education
effort, including re-opening U.S. cultural centers throughout
the world and using U.S. government-funded foreign broadcast
and other information media to discuss and explain the foundational
principles underlying the U.S. system of governance. Other, complementary
programs might include increased opportunities for foreign students
to study in the U.S. and changes in U.S. trade policies and foreign
aid (including debt cancellation) that would help create conditions
for improving the living conditions in developing countries.
Not to be overlooked is the reciprocal
necessity to educate U.S. officials and ordinary citizens about
non-Western cultures. This suggests that any U.S. effort would
be more effective were it part of a broader, multilateral, multicultural
strategy to break down barriers between peoples, which those
who practice terror try to exploit.
The rationale for this admittedly long-range
plan is to undercut the narrow and frequently complete misunderstanding
(or purposeful misinterpretation) of the principles of democracy--its
rights, privileges, and responsibilities. The objective should
not be to convince but to sow the seeds of inquisitiveness and
a desire to learn more about what, in a number of countries,
is an alternative to current conditions. This would be a less
costly alternative in blood and treasure to trying to prevent
terrorist attacks through military action or to the need to rebuild
societies destroyed by warfare. It would also serve to close
the gap between the rhetoric of U.S. policy "intentions"
and the programs and activities that are actually implemented
(e.g., rhetoric of multilateralism versus unilateral action).
Do we need a new organization?
No, at least not a new superstructure.
Recombining existing organizations to produce truly joint forces
that can react to imminent threats in support of UN principles
and creation of a stand-alone caribineri police contingent may
be warranted. But as indicated previously, what would be most
useful is a large increase in "soft power" capabilities
the U.S. could bring to bear.
How do we stop those who are financing
the radical madrassa schools?
This is a development, not a "security,"
question. DoD's contribution to this effort, which properly belongs
to the State Department and the Treasury, would be information
gleaned through communications intercepts and exploitation of
documents and computer files that come into DoD's possession.
Other than information, DoD's role would
seem to be to avoid giving new cause for individuals to provide
funds in reaction to something said or done by Pentagon representatives.
Is our current situation such that "the
harder we work, the behinder we get"?
In a sense, Yes. The insistence on dominating
the security, political, and economic reconstruction of Iraq
leads to unintentional cultural gaffes and operational mistakes
that inhibit the development of trust between U.S. personnel
and the indigenous population. A more prominent role for the
State Department among U.S. agencies and for the UN among international
and intergovernmental agencies would relieve the pressure on
DoD to implement programs with which it has little modern practical
experience. Granted, such a reorientation would entail increased
coordination, but it would free DoD to concentrate on what it
does best--developing better security through training indigenous
forces and, where necessary, taking direct action against those
committing terrorist acts. Such a shift would also lead to greater
participation by Iraqis in overall decisionmaking.
It is pretty clear that the coalition
can win in Afghanistan and Iraq in one way or another, but it
will be a long, hard slog.
Agreed. The question is: will the U.S.
prevail "badly"? That is, will the long-term end state
of the Afghan and Iraqi people be better than it was in the 1990s
before the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes were ousted? Unfortunately,
the early results are mixed, particularly given the low level
of international financial support evinced at recent donor conferences
($4.5 billion for Afghanistan and $13 billion for Iraq).
Perhaps a more important question is:
Will the U.S. and the world be safer as a result of these two
(and potentially other) interventions? History will be the judge,
but at the moment, the weight of criticism suggests that these
two interventions have increased U.S. insecurity, endangered
global instability, and increased terrorist recruitment.
Does CIA need a new finding?
Not being privy to classified information
about the content of current findings and Executive Orders, this
is difficult to answer. However, from what has been reported
by the media in terms of the reaction to September 11th, 2001
(e.g., the USA PATRIOT Act), the reported activities of CIA operatives
in Afghanistan and CIA presence in Iraq, and information contained
in government documents such as the unclassified National Intelligence
Estimate of October 2002, it would appear the CIA has sufficient
leeway to carry out its mandate. In fact, some revisiting of
legislative changes may be in order, particularly if abuses are
discovered in the exercise of new authorities.
Should we create a private foundation
to entice radical madrassas to a more moderate course?
No. This idea suggests--and would be
seen as confirmation of--an insensitive mirror-imaging of U.S.
consumerism and lust for material riches. While a few madrassa
majority must be regarded as principled believers in what they
preach and teach. Attempts to bribe them would more likely inflame
already existing passions.
A better course is making available through
alternative means information about democracy, human rights,
and civil liberties.
What else should we be considering?
Worldwide, the Pentagon should proceed
with plans to restructure forces and re-base units. Specifically,
Germany-based ground units should be brought back to the U.S.
A six-month schedule of unit rotation for training with European
allies should be inaugurated, with equal time given to warfighting
and peacekeeping (Chapter VI and Charter VII) operations. Re-basing
USAF combat wings should also be considered. Naval deployments
(carrier battle group and amphibious ready group) should be made
on the basis of anticipated or existing conditions where a U.S.
presence would contribute to reducing tensions or for scheduled
training with allied navies rather than by rote schedule.
Plans for reconfiguring U.S. ground forces
in East Asia should be further developed. As diplomatic progress
is made in resolving the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons,
plans for re-positioning U.S. forces in Korea (including eventual
withdrawal) and then in Japan can be implemented.
To head off the rise of new anti-U.S.
sentiment (or further inflaming existing sentiment), the Pentagon
should curtail economic and military aid to countries with repressive
regimes or countries in which the military effectively controls
the powers of the state.
Transfers of arms, spare parts, and ammunition
to repressive regimes should be stopped. DoD should throw its
weight behind an Arms Trade Treaty that would bind all countries
from supplying such regimes with arms and armaments. These measures,
addressing the "supply-side" of the arms trade, would
not solve the problem of spending scarce resources on weapons,
but would make acquiring weapons more difficult.
DoD could continue training, as part
of a multilateral, UN sanctioned program, select units controlled
by regional security organizations to perform peacekeeping missions
when authorized by the Security Council. Africa presents a viable
prototype for this activity.
Finally, in addition to forgiving loans
for non-military needs in developing countries, the U.S. should
strike a bargain with developing countries that owe money to
the U.S. for past purchases of military equipment: the debt will
be apportioned over a number of years, with a percentage of the
debt and interest forgiven each year, on condition that the sums
forgiven are applied to basic human needs and services benefiting
the people of the debtor nation--e.g., health clinics, schools,
fresh water developments, improved sanitation, etc.
Copy of the October 16th memo
Dan Smith
is a military affairs analyst for Foreign
Policy In Focus is a retired U.S. army colonel and Senior
Fellow on Military Affairs at the Friends Committee on National
Legislation. He can be reached at: dan@fcnl.org.
Weekend
Edition Features for Nov. 8 / 9, 2003
Kathleen and Bill Christison
Zionism
as Racist Ideology
Gabriel Kolko
Intelligence
for What?
The Vietnam War Reconsidered
Saul Landau
The
Bride Wore Black: the Policy Nuptials of Boykin and Wolfowitz
Brian Cloughley
Speeding Up to Nowhere: Training the New Iraqi Police
William Blum
The Anti-Empire Report:
A Permanent Occupation?
David Lindorff
A New Kind of Dancing in Iraq: from Occupation to Guerrilla War
Elaine Cassel
Bush's War on Non-Citizens
Tim Wise
Persecuting the Truth: Claims of Christian Victimization Ring
Hollow
Toni Solo
Robert Zoellick and "Wise Blood"
Michael Donnelly
Will the Real Ron Wyden Please Stand Up?
Mark Hand
Building a Vanguard Movement: a Review of Stan Goff's Full Spectrum
Disorder
Norman Solomon
War, Social Justice, Media and Democracy
Norman Madarasz
American Neocons and the Jerusalem Post
Adam Engel
Raising JonBenet
Dave Zirin
An Interview with George Foreman
Poets' Basement
Guthrie, Albert and Greeder
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