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November
8, 2003
Intelligence for What?
The
Vietnam War Reconsidered
By GABRIEL KOLKO
There is nothing happening today, either in regard
to Iraq and weapons of mass destruction, Afghanistan, or elsewhere,
that in principle did not also occur after 1950 under a succession
of presidents--whether they were conservatives, liberals, or
whatever description fits the murky and contradictory American
political environment. Lies, distortions, cynical manipulation
but also self-delusions have always been endemic to the way key
foreign policies were and are articulated. What is called "intelligence"
is far less a solution to the problem of ignorance than an integral
aspect of it. We can rarely believe we are being told the truth,
if only because those who proclaim it often are themselves mystified
by illusions. If true it is something of an atypical accident.
The CIA could defend its reputation for
gathering intelligence expertly and impersonally until the mid-1970s
House and Senate investigations. Before then, its critics confirmed
its failures mainly by deduction, but the Congressional investigations
portrayed an organization that was not merely malevolent but
also simply incompetent on many critical matters. It did not
anticipate the Korean War, the Czech crisis of 1968, the October
1973 Mideast War, the 1974 Portuguese upheaval, India's explosion
of a nuclear device in 1972, the fall of the Shah in 1979--and
much else that took the U.S. by surprise. The CIA's analytic
deficiencies and errors on yet other questions, above all Vietnam,
are well known and documented; and that policy determines what
its analysts' report has been conventional wisdom for decades.
This said, there is still a great deal
to know, and George W. Allen's memoir is surely one of the handful
of books that is required reading on the entire Vietnam experience
from 1949 onward, when Allen joined the Pentagon's intelligence
network and immediately became involved with the French effort
to retain their Indochina colonies. In 1963, scandalized by
the American military's myopia and mores, he moved to the CIA
and soon became its leading Vietnam analyst. He met  innumerable
decision-makers in this capacity. When he retired from the CIA
in 1979 he worked for them on contract for the next 15 years
and it cleared this book manuscript. It is therefore an "official"
account, at least insofar as the analysts saw the Vietnam War.
It is scarcely the only book on intelligence and the Vietnam
War, and others are also very informative, but it is by far the
most detailed and most important. [None
So Blind: a Personal Account of Intelligence Failure in Vietnam
by George W. Allen (Chicago: Ivan R Dee, Inc.., 2001) AND
CIA AND THE VIETNAM POLICYMAKERS: THREE EPISODES 1962-1968,
by Harold P. Ford (Washington, DC: C
I A Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998)]
Indeed, in 1998 the CIA released Ford's
detailed account of three major episodes during 1962-68 and both
books can be read in tandem. They come to the same conclusion,
to cite Allen, "that our leaders tended toward self-delusion."
There are no basic new revelations in either of these works;
McGeorge Bundy emerges as a villain and cynical manipulator,
and Robert McNamara as confused but committed to the war, a pathetic
character. And on some crucial questions Allen suffers from
analytic myopia. But his intimate account of meetings and confrontations,
revealing the mindset of men hell-bent on the path of destruction
and defeat, makes Allen's memoir unique.
There is a very substantial list of first-hand
accounts by disgruntled CIA employees as well as those who worked
for various branches of the government on a variety of Vietnam
subjects. The land and peasant question in Vietnam, scarcely
mentioned in the Allen memoir, was studied in detail by Robert
L. Sansom and Jeffrey Race, both of whom had official sponsorship
and published books well before the war ended. Both asserted
that the land question was critical to the successful pursuit
of an anti-Communist political mobilization in the South, and
both were ignored. Race described how Washington's "policy
was founded on and protected by deception and outrageous lies,"
and how a general told him that to identify America's errors
in Vietnam was off bounds and the Pentagon "cannot permit
such subjects to be discussed." That there were structural
reasons for peasant supported the Communists "simply couldn't
get through" to the men at the top. [Jeffrey Race, "The
Unlearned Lessons of Vietnam," Yale Review, LXVI (1976),
163-66, 173] There were articulate skeptics within the Pentagon
who thought Vietnam was a futile war, and its Systems Analysis
Office published a very informative report every six weeks or
so which the Joint Chiefs of Staff several times sought to close
down or restrict. Many critics of the war effort and its assumptions
worked at the Rand Corporation, which was why Rand employees
ultimately leaked The Pentagon Papers to the public . There
was, in short, plenty of good, accurate information available--for
those who wanted to read, believe, and use it. It simply made
no difference because the gap between reality and policy is irreconcilable.
But critics of how the CIA treated facts
have scarcely been restricted to the Vietnam War. Willard C.
Matthias was one of the chief analysts of Soviet policy and intentions,
and in America's
Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and National Security
Policy, 1936-1991 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 2001), he describes how error after error was made in
regard to the Soviet Union as well as innumerable other nations--often
quite cynically simply to justify greater military spending.
Facts, in Matthias' experience, were tailored to suit "a
political-bureaucratic arena dominated by the military services
and anti-Communist ideologists." William Casey's appointment
as head of the CIA in 1981 was the culmination of this process,
and Casey often ignored his analysts' views and gave his own,
purporting that his opinions were theirs. Information did not
inform policy nearly so much as the reverse; what was "true"
depended in large part what senior officials wished to hear.
The CIA has produced many unhappy people who had access to much
more information than policy critics but who came to identical
conclusions. Anyone who reads the CIA 's unclassified version
of Studies in Intelligence knows there are a significant number
of them and they are quite candid, describing "much of the
information" the CIA gets, "to be blunt, is garbage."
[Steven R. Ward in Studies in Intelligence, vol. 46, no. 3,
2002] Other memoirs, dealing with not only the CIA's action
section but also with the Pentagon's special operations forces,
describe endless ineptitude and confusion. Screwing up covert
efforts is so common that it is practically the rule rather
than the exception. [see, for example, John T. Carney and Benjamin
F. Schemmer, No
Room for Error: The Covert Operations of America's Special Tactics
Unites from Iran to Afghanistan (New York: Ballentine Books,
2002), and Robert Baer, See
No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War
on Terrorism (New York: Crown Publisher, 2002).]
Allen's memoir is among the most informative
of this genre, and it is the most important because the Vietnam
War was the most important American effort of the post-1945 period
to impose its will on a nation--and it lost catastrophically.
I am impressed by the insight and accuracy of Allen's and the
CIA skeptics' analyses. Successive presidents and their chief
advisers had plenty of good information before them--and ignored
it.
Allen began with the French war in Indochina
after 1950 and he recounts how Eisenhower and Dulles strongly
opposed France following what the Americans were doing in Korea--signing
a cease-fire agreement and making a settlement with their enemies
after being stalemated on the field on battle. They wanted the
French to fight harder and longer, which France refused to do.
The U.S. opposed the Geneva Accords and "basing their views
on a set of  assumptions that we believed were entirely
unrealistic," it took over a French mission in the region
that had failed catastrophically. The Eisenhower Administration
prevented the Geneva Accords' conditions on reunification elections
from being implemented and violated its military provisions.
The history of the rest of the decade is well known, but every
step of the way the CIA analysts accurately predicted what would
go wrong--and it did.
The Ford account published by the CIA
picks up the story in 1962, and it complements and corroborates
Allen's memoir. It makes it perfectly clear that Secretary
of Defense Robert McNamara's later complaint that there were
no "Vietnam experts" to whom he could turn is simply
false. They existed but he refused to heed their advice whenever
they warned against the series of disasters which Allen describes.
Among the main failures were the American failure to understand
Communist military doctrine or estimate their numbers accurately--the
"order-of-battle" which became a central issue between
the CIA and Pentagon. In addition, the Johnson Administration
leaned heavily toward the venal and corrupt Nguyen Van Thieu
becoming a virtual dictator and ending the chronic political
instability that followed the American-endorsed assassination
of Ngo Dinh Diem. The level of corruption that permeated Thieu's
entire system, from the state to the army, was well known and
tolerated in Washington; Allen provides additional details.
And all Washington administrations trained and equipped the
Saigon army to fight conventional war according to official American
doctrine. It was, of course, mainly a guerrilla war.
The so-called Tonkin Gulf crisis of
August 1964 "astonished" Allen because he was aware
that covert Saigon and American missions were taking place in
the gulf and the North Vietnamese would investigate them. At
first he thought that a branch of the American military did not
know what another was up to, "but I did not realize how
eagerly the administration was seeking a pretext for a major
escalation" in the hope of shoring up the Saigon regime.
The same was true of the Pleiku incidents of early 1965 which
became an excuse for "a retaliation waiting for something
to happen; the Pleiku attacks were a convenient trigger for intended
escalation." It was used as an excuse for permanently bombing
North Vietnam.
The myths of progress in the war were
conscious falsehoods, carefully nurtured, and when Allen and
CIA analysts like him objected they were told to "get on
the team" and go along with them. He recounts numerous
instances of issuing false data, some, like the hamlet evaluation
statistics, well known. At no time was truth given a higher
priority than political convenience or the lies both the politicians
and generals propounded. The military intelligence and CIA were
constantly struggling with each other for analytic domination,
and the CIA lost most of these bureaucratic turf wars. And while
some politicians, military, and CIA action people--those whose
hawkish policies were already predetermined--deluded themselves
and undoubtedly really believed these fairy tales, most knew
that their careers depended on being optimists.
Manipulating public opinion and politics
dictated how the war was justified, triggering a series of falsehoods
and myths which CIA analysts such as Allen were compelled to
accept despite the fact they knew what was really happening.
The most serious consequence of this
protracted, convoluted system of deceptions was the so-called
order-of-battle controversy before the Tet Offensive in February
1968. The lower the numbers the more progress the American military
could claim, and so they refused to count the various local forces--roughly
300,000 men disappeared because admitting their existence, to
quote General Creighton Abrams in August 1967, would produce
a "gloomy conclusion."
The CIA objected to a point but eventually
had to accept the distortions and both Allen and Ford are very
detailed on this controversy. Ultimately, General William Westmoreland
unsuccessfully sued CBS for allowing a leading CIA specialist
on the order-of-battle to expound his views. But the Communists
during the Tet Offensive had far larger military forces than
most American officials believed and changed the politicians'
and, even more ominous, public perceptions of reality. The
Tet defeat, Allen insists, was much greater because of the "overblown
psychological campaign in the fall of 1967," which was
also essential for Lyndon Johnson's reelection ambitions. The
falsified data, in the end, was believed by those seeking initially
to manipulate public opinion, and the Tet defeat was the beginning
of the end for the protracted American effort to win the Vietnam
War.
Allen is simply wrong when he attributes
the Saigon army's final demise in 1975 to the failure of American
firepower, especially aviation, to come to its rescue. The U.S.
gave the Saigon army a huge quantity of advanced equipment and
trainers, and they had a major superiority to Communist forces
in tanks, artillery, combat troops, and especially airpower,
over which they had a monopoly.
They had plenty of munitions. What they
utterly lacked was morale. The Communists believed this material
advantage meant something and they thought up to two years were
required to win a final victory. But not only Allen has no conception
whatsoever of the political nature of Thieu's army, which was
designed to maintain his grip on power but nothing else; neither
did the Communists. Sociologically, the army was exceedingly
fragile and simple material equations utterly fail to capture
this reality.
I was in South Vietnam at the end in
1973 and tried to discuss these questions with Communist leaders,
arguing that the war would last two years longer--already too
cautious--and that the scenario they should expect was much more
like the Kuomintang defeat in China, when the Communists won
power for sociological reasons having nothing to do with the
balance of military equipment and forces. In February 1975 I
told the future foreign minister in Geneva that the war would
soon be over, and two months later, when I spent five weeks in
Hanoi and was in the south when the war ended, he told me he
had thought in February that I was "crazy."
Although they should not have been, the
Communists were as surprised as the Americans at their sudden
victory, for which they were psychologically and logistically
utterly unprepared. They discarded much of their most advanced
military equipment because it slowed them down and they had no
need for their missiles, which I saw abandoned on the sides of
roads. I was in Hué when the war ended and heard the
news first and shouted it to nearby cadres. One shook his head
and said he did not understand how they won the war--they simply
had made one error after another. The Communists were scarcely
supermen, as Allen would have it, and they did not so much win
the war as the American-backed Saigonese had lost it. This
is at least a partial explanation of Communist behavior after
1975 and why Vietnam today looks much more like another capitalist
nation.
Allen's analytic skills cease on even
more important issues. He attempts to explain why the war occurred
in the first place, which he attributes far too much to inadequate
bureaucratic mechanisms for dealing objectively with information
and the potential consequences of the options for foreign policy
alternatives for the national interest--which he never defines
. His comprehension of the reasons for the Vietnam War is banal,
and he does not mention the credibility of American military
power once. He is indispensable on details but, like many people
in intelligence, he cannot deal with the larger picture. Had
he utilized The Pentagon Papers his explanations would have
been more subtle.
Allen has written another insider's account,
much more insightful than the vast bulk of them, and we are sure
to have similar revelations on the war in Iraq and elsewhere.
It is, notwithstanding his banal conclusions, full of new detailed
information. Indeed, such books, such as Milt Bearden's The
Main Enemy on Afghanistan or Robert Baer's book on Iraq, have
already appeared. Leaving aside the large part of intelligence
services devoted to covert action to implement policies, there
is still an immense analytic organization which is designed to
be objective and inform policymakers of crucial information before
they takes actions, many of which have irrevocable consequences.
What do these accounts, useful on details, tell us in the largest
sense about the nature and function of organized intelligence
services in the formulation of foreign policies?
Lies became the rule. The public had
to be led along and, a Allen recounts, "On many occasions
the truth was grotesquely and deliberately distorted in order
to make a point." But Vietnam was only one of many examples
of how foreign policies were formulated. "our policies tend
to be excessively dominated by aggressive individuals or organizations,
or by the interplay of bureaucratic politics, rather than by
rational deliberation of national interests." So much
for intelligence guiding policy. After 30-odd years in this role,
Allen became disillusioned.
There is no evidence, either from the
many first-hand memoirs or the practice and conduct of post-1945
American foreign policy, that grand policy options or goals are
influenced or defined by information--nominally, analytic intelligence--that
as truthfully as possible approximates reality in all its dimensions.
Were this the case, there would be far fewer defeats and failures
for Washington to confront, one mess after another, and it would
be far more modest regarding its global interventions and ambitions.
For respect for the parameters of reality involves decisive
constraints on policy choices, and there is simply no evidence,
historical or otherwise, that the U.S. has chooses policies this
way. So what is the use and function of what is termed "intelligence"
in the analytic meaning of that word?
The large technical and ideological cadres
that purvey intelligence, rather than becoming a source of rationality
and clarity, burden the already insupportable complexity of
foreign policy formulation with worthless data, and accurate
information becomes worthless as soon as it fails to reinforce
what America's political and military leaders wish to hear.
Intelligence functionaries accept the constraints of the system
quite willingly because it pays their salaries. These personnel
transform themselves into peddlers of just one more economic
activity and they never transcend the policy limits that the
non-technocratic ruling elites impose. This is just as true
in all areas of domestic affairs as in foreign policies.
The state's intelligence mechanisms are
constrained by a larger structural and ideological environment
and by the inherent irrationality of a foreign policy which foredooms
any effort to base action on informed insight to a chimera.
Even when the insight is exact, and knowledge is far greater
than ignorance, political and social boundaries usually place
decisive limits on the application of "rationality"
to actions. The political and ideological imperatives and interests
define the nature of "relevant" truths. Intelligence's
pretension to being objective is a hoax because those parts of
it that do not reconfirm the power structure's interests and
predetermined policies are ignored and discarded. There are
innumerable reasons we must conclude this, not the least because
there is a growing number of memoirs like Allen's to cite. Even
more important is the entire experience with Iraq and the U.S.'
failed confrontation with the Islamic world for over half a century.
To expect the U.S. to behave other than as it has is to cultivate
serious illusions and delude oneself.
The system, in a word, is irrational.
We saw it in Vietnam and we are seeing it today in Iraq.
Gabriel Kolko
is the leading historian of modern warfare. He is the author
of the classic Century
of War: Politics, Conflicts and Society Since 1914 and
Another
Century of War?. He can be reached at: kolko@counterpunch.org.
Weekend
Edition Features for Oct. 25 / 26, 2003
Saul Landau
Cui
Bono? The Cuba Embargo as Rip Off
Noam Chomsky
Empire of the Men of Best Quality
Bruce
Jackson
Midge Decter and the Taxi Driver
Brian Cloughley
"Mow the Whole Place Down"
John Stanton
The Pentagon's Love Affair with Land Mines
William S. Lind
Bush's Bizarre Korean Gambit
Ben Tripp
The Brown Paste on Bush's Shoes
Christopher Brauchli
Divine Hatred
Dave Zirin
An Interview with John Carlos
Agustin Velloso
Oil in Equatorial Guinea: Where Trickle Down Doesn't Trickle
Josh Frank
Howard Dean and Affirmative Action
Ron Jacobs
Standing Up to El Diablo: the 1981 Blockade of Diablo Canyon
Strickler
/ Hermach
Liar, Liar Forests on Fire
David Vest
Jimmy T99 Nelson, a Blues Legend and the Songs that Made Him
Famous
Adam Engel
America, What It Is
Dr. Susan Block
Christy Canyon, a Life in Porn
Poets'
Basement
Greeder, Albert & Guthrie
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