The Wayback Machine - http://web.archive.org/web/20040924224513/http://urphilosophy.blogspot.com:80/
blog*spot

Monday, April 12, 2004

WE'VE MOVED 

http://cif.rochester.edu/~philgrad

If you're a member of this site, I have a username and password set up for you on the other site.

Sunday, April 11, 2004

Annoying Blog Movement 

hey, y'all. Sorry that this is annoying, but we're moving the blog here. Please click here if you are not redirected within the next five years. We promise not to move anymore. Sorry again. (Pretty please update your links.)

Saturday, April 10, 2004

Unnecessary Identity 

Yesterday Andre Gallois gave a very interesting (and impressive) talk during which he raised doubts about the necessity of identity. (His paper includes much more than just this, but this was unfortunately all that he had time to discuss.) (Quote of the night: Gallois saying, ‘No, no, no—a is not a *counterpart* of b; that’s not *real* identity!’) Consider the following familiar Kripkean argument for the necessity of identity (‘a’ and ‘b’ are Millian proper names; treat them as you would variables under an assignment; ‘/\’ is supposed to be lambda):

(1) a = b
(2) [](a=a)
(3) /\x([](a=x))a
(4) Therefore, /\x([](a=x)b, by Leibniz’s Law
(5) Therefore, [](a=b).

Gallois denies (2). His complaint about (1-5) is that (2) is unsupported. He suggested that the following argument might be given for (2):

(6) Any expression of ‘a=a’ must be true.
(7) If (6), then (2).
(8) Therefore, (2).

(6-8) is, of course, a terrible argument. Gallois happily concedes (6), but denies (7). He explains that one might think that (7) is true since ‘a=a’ tends to pragmatically convey the same information that it semantically expresses. But this is not a good reason to think (7) is true. For were I speaking to you, my utterance of ‘I am speaking’ would convey the same thing it expresses, but is clearly not necessarily true. Likewise, being an S such that S is true whenever it is expressed or uttered in no way guarantees that the proposition expressed by S is necessarily true; ‘I am here now’ is such an S, and is not necessarily true. So, we should all agree that (6-8) fails.

Are there any good arguments for (2)? We thought that the good ‘ol Leibniz’s Law argument from the possible distinctness of a and b to the actual distinctness of a and b was pretty good…Gallois accepts (unrestricted) Leibniz’s Law, but countered that the argument is invalid, which seems to be exactly the right response for a defender of contingent identity.

It was also pointed out that ‘Ax(x=x)’ is a logical truth; this provides an impetus for supposing that it is a necessary truth. Unfortunately, ‘Ex(x=x)’ is also a logical truth, but we do not take it to be a necessary truth. So this line of reasoning won’t quite get us what we want.

So what do we proponents of (2) have to say for ourselves? Do we just dogmatically insist that (2) is true? Is there an argument out there for (2) that would move someone who was ambivalent or even hostile toward (2)? (Gallois did not argue that (2) is *false*, but he alluded to the existence of such arguments. I take it that this puts us in a poor position, epistemically speaking, to continue to endorse (2) without argument.) What do you guys think?

[](a=a); blackbox? 

Here’s a stab:

Williamson (2000) notes that, in standard model theory, we cannot give absolutely unrestricted quantified sentences their intended interpretations; it turns out, on the intended interpretation, ‘There are absolutely infinitely many things’ is logically false (its negation is logically true), since it says that there are too many things to form a set, while domains in model theory are set-sized (McGee points out this problem in (McGee 1992)). But it is true that there are absolutely infinitely many things, since there are (lots and lots of) sets but there is no set of all sets, as Cantor has shown (apologies to Greg F’s nominalism here). What to do?

Williamson proposes that we rectify the problem for standard model theory by adopting a model theory that is not restricted to set-sized domains, assuming that there is some suitable entity that can play this role (Rayo and Uzquiano (1999) argue that pluralities are such entites; note, too, that classes are poor candidates, since they prohibit unrestricted quantification—thus allowing an analogue of the problem that McGee raised to re-emerge).

In addition to beefing up our domain, we need to beef up our quantifiers, since ordinary quantifiers are restricted to quantification over set-sized domains. We can, following Williamson, define unrestricted quantifiers by dropping the restriction. (So an unrestricted analogue of ‘E’, which we might write as ‘Eu’, would look like this: EuxS is true under interpretation I iff for some d, S is true under I[x/d], where x is a variable and S is a wff. Finally, we should not restrict the extensions of n-place predicates to n-tuples of its *members*, for this would prohibit there being any properties had by all d’s. If we want to retain ‘Aux (x=x)’ as a logical truth (where ‘Au’ is the dual of ‘Eu’), we should allow into the extension of ‘=’, whether or not d e dom(I).

Finally, let’s add ‘[]’, and let the fun begin. We give it the usual semantics: []S is true at w under I iff for all w* e W, a is true at w* under I. We modify ‘Eu’ accordingly: EuxS is true at w under I iff for some d, S is true at w under I[x/d]. Finally, we modify ‘=’ accordingly; for every I, w, the extension of ‘=’ w.r.t I and w contains for every individual d, and nothing else.

On this characterization, if a=b w.r.t world w (and we could add time t), then a=b simpliciter, since ‘=’ “looks at” what’s going on anywhere to determine whether ‘a=b’ is true, our attention is not restricted to w (and t). If a=b, then it is not possible to go to any world where it’s the case that ~(a=b). If a=b at one world, then a=b everywhere, so to speak (that’s how we get that []Ax[]Ey(x=y), below). So according to this characterization, not only is ‘a=a’ a logical truth, but it is a necessary truth. So (finally!) (2) is true.

(Williamson 2000 is from Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100:1, 117-139.)

Reid on Conceivability and Possibility 

I thought that this might be of interest to both history of philosophy types and all us others:

In Chapter 3 of Essay IV of his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Thomas Reid offers five arguments against the biconditional:
x is conceivable iff x is possible.
In particular, he offers four arguments against the conceivability to possibility direction, and one argument against the possibility to conceivability objection. In this post I will formulate each of these arguments.

First argument against conceivable->possible:
1. To conceive a proposition is simply to grasp its meaning.
2. I grasp the meaning of the proposition that any two sides of a triangle are equal to the third.
3. Therefore, I conceive the proposition that any two sides of a triangle are equal to the third.
4. For all S and x, if S conceives x, then x is conceivable.
5. Therefore, the proposition that any two sides of a triangle are equal to the third is conceivable.
6. If (5), then: [if (if x is conceivable, then x is possible), then it is possible that any two sides of a triangle are equal to the third].
7. Therefore, if (if x is conceivable, then x is possible), then it is possible that any two sides of a triangle are equal to the third.
8. It is not possible that any two sides of a triangle are equal to the third.
Conclusion: Therefore, it is not the case that: if x is conceivable, then x is possible.

Second argument against conceivable->possible:
1. There are some necessary propositions that are conceived.
2. Necessarily, for all propositions p, if p is conceived, then ~p is conceived.
3. If (1) and (2), then there are some impossible propositions that are conceived.
4. Therefore, there are some impossible propositions that are conceived.
5. If (4), then it is not the case that: if x is conceivable, then x is possible.
Conclusion: Therefore, it is not the case that: if x is conceivable, then x is possible.

Third argument against conceivable->possible:
1. If (it is the case that: if x is conceivable, then x is possible), then mathematicians try to prove that something is possible on the basis that it is conceivable.
2. Mathematicians do not try to prove that something is possible on the basis that it is conceivable.
Conclusion: Therefore, it is not the case that: if x is conceivable, then x is possible.

Fourth argument against conceivable->possible:
1. If any reductio arguments show us the impossibility of something, then we can conceive the impossible in order to show that it is impossible.
2. Some reductio arguments show us the impossibility of something.
3. Therefore, we can conceive the impossible in order to show that it is impossible.
4. If we can conceive the impossible in order to show that it is impossible, then it is not the case that: if x is conceivable, then x is possible.
Conclusion: Therefore, it is not the case that: if x is conceivable, then x is possible.

Only argument against possible->conceivable:
1. If (it is the case that: if x is possible, then x is conceivable), then mathematicians try to prove that something is impossible on the basis that it is inconceivable.
2. Mathematicians do not try to prove that something is impossible on the basis that it is inconceivable.
Conclusion: Therefore, it is not the case that: if x is possible, then x is conceivable.


Greg F.

Animals 

Animals that are internally and externally viviparous are more abundantly supplied with blood than the sanguineous ovipara.

Aristotle

Friday, April 09, 2004

3rd Biennial University Of Rochester Graduate Epistemology Conference 

It is time to announce the 3rd Biennial University of Rochester Graduate Epistemology Conference.

The dates are now set: September 24-25, 2004.

We are pleased to announce that Timothy Williamson has just accepted our invitation to deliver the keynote address. Richard Feldman will be the commentator.

The Call For Papers will be coming out shortly. Keep checking in here and at the conference website for more information.

The deadline for submission will be sometime in August.

Motion 

That there is no other form of motion contrary to the circular may be proved in various ways. In the first place, there is an obvious tendency to oppose the straight line to the circular. For concave and convex are not only regarded as opposed to one another, but they are also coupled together and treated as a unity in opposition to the straight. And so, if there is a contrary to circular motion, motion in a straight line must be recognized as having the best claim to that name. But the two forms of rectilinear motion are opposed to one another by reason of their places; for up and down is a difference and a contrary opposition in place.

Aristotle

An Argument Against the "Straightforward Semantics" 

According to what Chris has called the "straightforward semantics" in his responses to my post on disjunctive properties, the semantic content of a predicate is a corresponding property. This component of the straightforward semantics is often associated with the theory of meaning commonly called "Millianism", "Russellianism", "the Naive Theory", and "the 'Fido'-Fido Theory".

Although I am strongly inclined to accept something like the theory of meaning referred to by these different names, I think that the following statement is false:
(SCP) For any predicate F, if x has a semantic content, then there is a property P such that P is the semantic content of F.
But this seems to be just that component of the straightforward semantics that Chris drew our attention to before. So why do I think that (SCP) is false?

The reasons that I take (SCP) to be false are (broadly speaking) metaphysical reasons. For suppose that someone introduces the predicate "is a schmarber" into English by offering the following definition:

x is a schmarber =def x is a barber who shaves only those who do not shave themselves.

I think that it is clear that "is a schmarber" has a semantic content. (It certainly seems meaningful, at least.) Hence, if (SCP) is true, then there is a property that is the semantic content of "is a schmarber". But if there is a property that is the semantic content of "is a schmarber", then that property is necessarily uninstantiated. However, there are no necessarily uninstantiated properties. So, there is no property that is the semantic content of "is a schmarber". Therefore, (SCP) is false.

Clearly, this argument employs a premise that is not uncontroversial-- namely, that there are no necessarily uninstantiated properties. Although I am inclined to think that this is true (as a necessary consequence of my inclination to think that there are no uninstantiated properties at all), I realize that others may disagree, and will be inclined to admit even such properties as being a round square into their ontology. I am disinclined to do so, although I might be talked into it. But then that's what the responses section is for.

Thursday, April 08, 2004

More Truth from Aristotle 

Aristotle

Man perfected by society is the best of all animals; he is the most terrible of all when he lives without law, and without justice.


Wednesday, April 07, 2004

Divine Command Theory 

So I’m thinking about some Divine Command Theory stuff. I just read one of Ed’s papers. It’s pretty good. His aim is not to argue for Divine Command Theory, but rather to formulate a version of Divine Command Theory that is immune from the traditional objections.

I’m going to sketch his theory, and then present some of the objections. I thought some people might be interested in talking about this.



Divine Command Theory (DCT):
(P1) For all acts A, A is obligatory iff God commands A; and if A is obligatory then by commanding A God makes it the case that A is obligatory.

(P2) For all acts A, A is wrong iff God forbids A; and if A is wrong then by forbidding A God makes it the case that A is wrong.

Some qualifications:
• ‘Makes it the case’ is not causal. It represents some asymmetric dependence relation.
• Commands are not to be thought of as assertive demands made by God. ‘Command’ is a technical term. Try this: A is commanded by God iff God wills or wants A to happened. Even iff that’s not the best way to formulate it, I think the idea is clear enough.
• This is a theory about act-tokens not act-types. We would have to add some theses to get this to apply to act-types. I won’t do that here.

I’m going to post the objections first, in reverse order so that each objection gets its own comments thingy. I’ll post this thing last (hopefully it will appear first)

Enjoy thinking about the objections. There's a link to Ed's paper at the end of them.

The Terrible Things Could Have Been Obligatory Objection (Divine Command Theory) 

Consider your favorite really evil action. Call that action E. Now suppose God were to command Chris to perform that action. DCT seems to entail that it is possible for that action to be obligatory for Chris.


(1) If DCT, then if God were to command Chris to perform E, then it would be obligatory for Chris to perform E.

(2) If [if God were to command Chris to perform E, then it would be obligatory for Chris to perform E.], then it is possible that it is obligatory for Chris to perform E.

(3) It is not possible that it is obligatory for Chris to perform E.

(4) Therefore, not-DCT

The For Believers Only Objection (Divine Command Theory) 

(1) If DCT, then only religious believers, or person’s informed of God’s commands can tell what is right or wrong.

(2) It is not the case that only religious believers, or person’s informed of God’s commands can tell what is right or wrong.

(3) Therefore, not DCT

No ‘Ought’ From ‘Is’ Objection (Divine Command Theory) 

(1) If DCT, then it is possible to derive an ought-statement using only is-statements.
(2) It is not possible to derive an ought-statement using only is-statements.
(3) Therefore, not-DCT.


Leibniz’s Deprive God of Goodness Objection (Divine Command Theory) 

(That Leibniz shout out is for you Patterns)

Leibniz’s claim: ‘those who believe that God establishes good and evil by an artbitrary decree . . . deprive God of the designation good. . .”

Ed’s interpretation:
Leibniz thinks DCT entails one of the following.

(8) For any act A, If God were to do A, then A would be right.
(9) For any act A, if God were to command A, then A would be right.

The Argument
(1) If DCT, then (8) [or (9) depending on how we interpret Leibniz]
(2) If (8) [or (9)], then there is no reason to praise God.
(3) If a being is good, then there is a reason to praise that being.
(4) Therefore, If DCT, it is not the case that God is good.


A Bad Objection From Utilitarianism (Divine Command Theory) 

Evidently, some utilitarians think that the moral status of an action can change over time. If you thought that, and you thought that God was immutable (could not change), then you’d have an argument against Divine Command Theory.


(1) If DCT, then the moral status of actions cannot change over time.
(2) The moral status of actions can change over time.
(3) Therefore, not-DCT.

The End (Of Divine Command Theory Posts) 

Well, that's it for the objections. Remember Ed's goal was not to argue for this theory, but rather to show that traditional objections to Divine Command Theory fail. I'm not posting his responses now. I will probably post his responses in the comments section under each argument later.

I thought these arguments would be interesting to think about.

If you want to read Ed's paper - here is the JSTOR link

Wierenga, Ed "A Defensible Divine Command Theory"

Metaphysics and Mathematics 

Consider the following two line segments, (a) and (b):

(a) ______

(b) ____________ .

Line segment (b) is longer than line segment (a). In fact, it is twice (a)'s length.

However, Cantor showed that the number of mathematical points that make up the two line segments is equal.
[To see why, construct an isosceles triangle with (b) as the base. Then place (a) parallel to (b) such that each of (a)'s endpoints touches a side of the triangle. Finally, notice that for any line drawn from the angle directly across from (b) to a point on (b) also intersects a point on (a). Hence, the points on (a) and the points on (b) are in a one-one corresondence.]
In fact, Cantor showed this result in general. That is, he showed that for any two line segments x and y, x and y have the same number of mathematical points.

Now for the metaphysics:
(A) What should we say about the points that make up a particular line segment? Could they have made up a longer or shorter line segment?
(B) If the points that make up an arbitrary line segment--call it "L"--could have made up a longer or shorter line segment, would that line segment still have been "L"?
[Notice here that some (i.e., van Inwagen) have argued that if we accept unrestricted mereological composition, we should accept that x and y are identical iff x and y have all of their proper parts in common. So, if we accept unrestricted mereological composition, think that the points that make up "L" could have made up a longer or shorter line segment, and accept that the relation a point bears to the line segment it is on is the part-whole relation, then we should accept that even if the points that make up "L" could have made up a longer or shorter line segment, that line segment would still have been "L". All of which leads to the third question.]
(C) What is the relation that a point on a line segment bears to the line segment itself? In particular, does it bear the part-whole relation to it?
(D) Finally, assuming that we accept that any line segment, L, could have been longer or shorter than it in fact is, what should we say about what makes it the case that L is the length it in fact is? Is L n units long:
(i) because of a monadic property had by L?
(ii) because of the monadic properties of its points?
(iii) because of certain relations obtaining between L's points?
(iv) because of certain relations obtaining between L's points and L itself?
(v) because of some combination of (i)-(iv)?
or:
(vi) for some other reason entirely?
[Actually, notice that a question like (D) can be raised as soon as one says that the very same points that make up some particular line segment with length n could have made up a longer or shorter line segment. As as one says that, it becomes a question why it is the case that, in the actual world, those points make up a line segment with length n as opposed to some greater or lesser length.]

Personally, I am inclined to think that (A) is true. However, I don't know what to say to (B)-(D) (especially (D)). What do the rest of you think?

This one is for all you action theory folks 

All human actions have one or more of these seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reason, passion, and desire.

Aristotle

Blackbox

Tuesday, April 06, 2004

Where are the history folks? 

I feel like I'm the manager for the Tone-Loc/Biz Markie 2004 Tour. Where are the rest of the history folks?

History of Philosophy 

OK, further to Rod's post, this is something I'd like to hear from others about: what are we doing when we do history of philosophy? Why do we do it? Should we do it? Here are some possibilities, in no particular order, (this is not meant to be exhaustive):

(a) History of Philosophy is just History, end of story. We're in the wrong department.
(b) Well, it's useful history - we can learn from the mistakes of past philosophers
(c) We try to interpret the philosophers of the past correctly (at last!) - specialised exegesis.
(d) We pore over texts to see if there's anything relevant to current debates in philosophy.
(e) Look, these guys were smarter than most of us will ever be - they're worth a listen
(f) Well, if we examine how Philosopher X arrived at view Y we may become more critically aware of how we arrive at our views; surely this is a worthy exercise? I'm thinking in particular here of how the smart dead dudes engaged with the science of their time and what we can learn about how we should approach science today. For example, what should we say about Kant's attempt to derive Newton's 3 laws of motion a priori?
(g) Cos it's fun!
(h) Cos it pisses Chris off!

I like (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g). I'm especially drawn to (f); it is an interesting issue, for instance, whether metaphysicians should hold their tongues in the presence of the mighty physicist. Should we abandon a metaphysical view just cos it is (or seems to be) incompatible with modern-day physics? (We've talked a little about this in our Time reading group - Presentism is one view that is in danger of such dismissal.)

Anyway, what do people think? Please legitimize my interest in the history of philosophy, or at least point out the error of my ways.


Thoughts, Arguments and Rants 

If you're coming from TAR, welcome to the unofficial University of Rochester Graduate Student weblog.

We haven't been running long, but here are the four big topics that have come up so far:

Functional Role Semantics

Necessarily, Everything Necessarily Exists

Disjunctive Properties

Gettier Problems

We'd appreciate any thoughts or comments.

Lynne Rudder Baker at UB 

Lynne Rudder Baker will be at UB next Friday, April 16. She'll also be at Canisius reading a paper on "Everyday Concepts as a Guide to Reality" the day before. She will be reading a paper on mental causation on the 16th. I'll be going on the 16th.

Spelling Names Correctly 

No, this is not the title of a new film about a person whose competence as a father is under question because of substandard intelligence (although the person posting this message may have substandard intelligence, he is not a father). Who is responsible for listing my name as 'Andre'? I'm not French. I am named after my father, who is Russian. A Russian male does not share all of the same properties as a French male (even if they both have some bizarre property like being French or Russian--but no such property exists, in fact, real properties don't exist), so my father could not be identical to a French male. So I was named after someone with a Russian name, viz., 'Andrei'. I, however, as Patrick has pointed out when asked a question about the fetal rights of humans who will develop into persons such as himself by our always missed yet loved James "Steel-toed Soccer Playing Loonie" Messina, have yet to pick a culture. So while I tolerate and even sometimes pronounce my name as Andre, it is Andrei. Yes I am anal. Yes I am just testing this thing and thought I'd act as I usually do (without using any expletives or potty jokes).

Knowing is half the battle 

Here’s a question for the epistemologists in the hizzie:

What, if anything, is the relevant difference between these cases:

(1) Suzie reads in her fourth grade textbook that Paris is the capital of France. Suzy has no reason to think that Paris is not the capital of France. However, it turns out that Suzie’s textbook is the only one in the class that does not contain a misprint; the other 49 books all say that Paris is the capital of Italy.

(2) Andy’s watch reads 1:30. On this basis, Andy comes to believe that it is 1:30. And he is right. It really is 1:30. But, since we’re talking about epistemology, his watch has stopped; it’s read 1:30 for the last couple of days.

(3) Joshua tricks Greg into thinking that Joshua owns a Ford. He is always brandishing Ford paraphernalia and whatnot. But the paraphernalia is fake, and the Ford that Joshua drives is rented. Joshua was trying to make everyone believe he owns a Ford because he thinks Ford-owners have more fun. Unbeknownst to Joshua and Greg, Joshua has just won a Ford five seconds ago in one of those mall giveaways.

I believe that orthodoxy would have it that Suzie knows and Andy and Greg do not.

But why?

The cases seem relevantly similar to me. They all involve some amount of luck, but it seems somehow like the same amount. (If it does not seem that way to you, modify the stories so that it does. Also, I don’t know how to measure quantities of luck; Joshua suggested that there are luckatrons, and I could simply count how many are present in each case. This strikes me as an interesting research program and I hope I can get a grant to pursue that project in the future. . .) In each case the belief is true, properly based on evidence, and well-supported by that evidence. What I wonder is what, if anything, justifies judging the cases differently? And if they should not be judged differently, then do all three know or do all three not know? (I think this one’s easy; if it’s all or none, it should be that all of them know.) If that answer to the easy question is correct, what (if anything) does this tell us about Gettier cases? And, finally, why should luck matter at all? Isn’t there a pretty clear sense in which any given justified true belief we have is lucky?

On a serious note 

I am TA'ing Earl's class (approximately 160 students). If those of you who are teaching this summer want to put together a flyer listing your courses and possibly their descriptions, I will stick them inside of the exams that will be returned to them next week.

More Aristotle 

All paid jobs absorb and degrade the mind.

Aristotle


I used this last night when I told Lisa that I would not be working this summer.

Monday, April 05, 2004

You don't know what you have done to yourselves 

Humor is the only test of gravity, and gravity of humor; for a subject which will not bear raillery is suspicious, and a jest which will not bear serious examination is false wit.

Aristotle

This page is powered by Blogger. Isn't yours?

Weblog Commenting and Trackback by HaloScan.com