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Noun and Verb?



rob-georgia.zip

So, what or who is rob-georgia?

When you interview voting system officials, you spend twice as much time following up on their dodgy answers as you do asking the questions in the first place. Flip back to the end of Chapter 10 and take a look at Joe Richardson, who I believe you might also find in *Webster's Dictionary* defining the word “stonewall.” Compare him with Rob’s straight-talking interview.

Harris: “What was your position with Diebold in Georgia?”

Rob: “I was a server technician and then Product Deployment Manager for the Georgia project.”

Harris: “What was the FTP site for?”

Rob: “One of the problems we had was an issue with the GEMS database. They had to do an update to it, so they just post the update to the Web site.”

Harris: “What was rob-georgia?”

Rob: “I believe what that file was for, I did a — well, there were a ton of holes with the programs on those machines. When they all came into the warehouse, I did a quality check; this was something I did on a Saturday. I found that 25 percent of the machines on the floor would fail KSU testing —”

Harris: “What is KSU testing?”

Rob: “Kennesaw State University. We knew basically what they would be testing and the trick was to make sure the machines would pass the testing. So I went and checked a pallet and found it was bad. And I checked another, and another, and I knew we had a problem. ...

“I’d come in on a Saturday, I had two of my sons with me, and I thought, ‘I’m going to just look,’ and it was bad. Then first thing Monday morning I raised the question, I said ‘hey guys, we’ve got a problem — there’s 20-25 percent of the machines that are palletized that are failing ...’ ”

Harris: “What kind of problems were you seeing?”

Rob: “...One of the things we had wrong was the date wasn’t sticking in the Windows CE. The real time clock would go to check the time on the motherboard, and it would have an invalid year in it, like 1974 or something. ...

“They had to do an update in [Windows] CE to fix all those dates. So the way we did that in the warehouse was, they would post whatever the update was on the FTP site. James [Rellinger] would go get the file and put it on the [memory] cards. Because you load everything through the PCMCIA cards. You boot it up using the card and it loads the new software. ...

“I went over to Dekalb [County]. We updated 1,800 machines in basically a day and a half. I still remember ol’ Rusty, down at the warehouse, we ended up touching every single machine off the pallet, booting ’em up, update it, we had a couple hundred machines done when in comes a new update over the phone ... They’d say ‘oh, no, no, the way we had you do, that’s not going to work, here’s another thing to do.’ Okay, we just did a few hundred machines, now we gotta do it this way. ...”

For some reason, the techs were told to use their own laptops to download files from the Diebold FTP site. According to Rob, he was instructed by Diebold not to discuss anything with Georgia’s voting-machine examiner (Dr. Brit Williams) or other state officials. This was awkward because Dr. Williams was working alongside Rob at times, and when Dr. Williams asked questions, Rob made the mistake of answering. This infuriated Diebold managers.

Rob: “They used my laptop. It was not secure, either. They just

used the laptop to repro the cards. Diebold never gave us anything [any laptops] with a PCMCIA slot. Then they'd tell us 'go download this,' so we'd have to get out our own laptop to do it."

Harris: "Who instructed you about the FTP site? Was it a Diebold employee?"

Rob: "It was Diebold."

Harris: "Was it the people in Ohio or the people in Texas?"

Rob: "The people in McKinney [Texas]."

Harris: "Who were some of the Diebold people? Do you remember any names?"

Rob: "One of the main guys we dealt with was a guy named Ian. He was actually involved in the design of the motherboard. He was very much involved in trying to figure out how to fix the problems..."

Ian Piper was a stockholder in the company acquired by Diebold, Global Election Systems. The staff directory lists him as Manufacturing Manager, Research & Development division.

Harris: "As I understand it, they send the system to Wyle labs for certification and also to Ciber to test the software. But from what you are describing, I can't understand how the machines got through what they are telling us is 'rigorous testing.' "

Rob: "From what I understand, they ended up figuring out that the cards that we were loading, that fix that Diebold provided for us, well, they were never tested. They just said 'oh, here's the problem, go ahead and fix it.' "

Harris: "So what is your opinion about the certification testing?"

Rob: "No, it's not just that. *Nobody* even tested it. When I found that out — I mean, you can't not test a fix — I worked for a billing company, and if I'd put a fix on that wasn't tested I'd have gotten fired. You have to make sure whatever fix you did didn't break something else. But they didn't even *test* the fixes before they told us to install them."

(Time out.) Dr. Brit Williams told us this is not possible. "*After state certification any change to either the Microsoft operating system or the Diebold election system voids the state certification,*" Williams wrote. "*The revised system must then go back through the entire ITA Qualification and State Certification.*"¹

Rob: “Look, we’re doing this and 50 to 60 percent of the machines are still freezing up. Turn it on, get one result. Turn it off and next time you turn it on you get a different result. Six times, you’d get six different results.”

Harris: “Can you give me an example of different results?”

Rob: “Meaning the machine does something wrong different each time you boot it up. One time and it would freeze on you, next time it would load the GEMS program but have a completely different type of error, like there’d be a gray box sitting in the middle of it, or you couldn’t use a field.”

Harris: “Was this all due to the clock?”

Rob: “I don’t know for sure. They [the machines] were not originally doing it. Then they fixed the real time clock, and it was supposed to make it work normal. It fixed the clock problem — the clock problem had caused it to come up and not show the battery at one point. ... I mean, you don’t have the machine plugged in, you boot it up, and it starts, and says it ‘has no battery.’ That’s like saying ‘this morning I got out of bed and I stood up and I had no brain.’ ”

A memo from Talbot Iredale dated July 2, 2002, confirms the clock problem. “*The new WinCE 3.00 release is now on the FTP site,*” it says. The memo directs the user to get a file called WCE300-020702.zip and says that the purpose of installing this modification is to “*fix problem with getting and setting persistent Real Time Clock values,*” among other things.

Not only was this modification to Diebold’s customized version of Windows CE not certified, but Iredale also indicates at one point that he wants to avoid letting Wyle (the certifier for the touch-screen firmware) look at Diebold’s special Windows source code at all. In a memo dated April 15, 2002, Iredale writes:

“We do not want to get Wyle reviewing and certifying the operating systems. Therefore can we keep to a minimum the references to the WnCE 3.0 operating system.”

Whatever was on the special Windows system cooked up by Iredale and others at Diebold, it didn’t seem to work very well.

Rob: “And then when we loaded the software to fix that, the machines were still acting ridiculous. I was saying ‘this is not good! We need some people that know what this stuff is supposed to do, from McKinney, *now*. These machines, nobody knows what they’re doing, but Diebold, you need some people to fix them that know what’s going on.’ They finally brought in guys, they ended up bringing in about four people. ...”

You’d think that with such troubles, someone might follow standard company procedure and write up a “bug report.”

“*All bugs ever reported have bug numbers,*” wrote Ken Clark in a memo dated Jan. 10, 2003, pointing out that the whole collection can be found in “Bugzilla.” So I went looking for Bugzilla reports from Georgia. My goodness. They weren’t there.

Bugzilla report numbers 1150–2150 correspond with June–October 2002, but although hundreds of these bug numbers are mentioned in memos and release notes, I only found 75 Bugzilla reports for this time period, none from Georgia. Strange. I was looking forward to reading the explanations about how computers can get up in the morning and announce that they have no brain.

Aha! Here’s a memo about missing Bugzilla files. It’s dated 8 July 2002, from principal engineer Ken Clark: *Subject: bugzilla down, we are working on it.*

“We suffered a rather catastrophic failure of the Bugzilla database,” he writes. He warns that recovery of the bugzilla reports “will be ugly” and adds that “there will be a large number of missing bugs.”

In a follow-up note on July 16, Clark says, “Some bugs were irrecoverably lost and they will have to be re-found and re-submitted, but overall the loss was relatively minor.”

To understand the significance of these two e-mails, you must realize that among programmers, people are fired for not performing a daily system backup. One wonders what happened to their backup. By my estimation, almost a thousand bug reports are missing, including all the Georgia bugs.

Rob: “We assembled the machine and we ran it through a series of tests. We’d check the power cord, boot up the machine, check the printer, bar-code it, update Windows CE, then send it on to Brit. He

did the KSU testing. The L&A [Logic & Accuracy] was done at the county level, right before the election.”

Harris: “So ... the L&A was not done at acceptance testing?”

Rob: “It got so there wasn’t time. They did it before the election.”

Now, supposedly, this L&A testing procedure is kind of a “mock election,” which you do by entering practice votes. I pictured people pushing the touch screen and wondered how many test votes you push before your finger gets really tired. Not that many, apparently.

Rob: “The L&A testing — you would just enter, like, one vote and — you just choose one — you don’t need to be specific on which one.

I see. One vote. But then I found out that some of their L&A test involves no touching at all:

6.1. Test Count

- performing a manual Logic and Accuracy Test
- performing an automated Logic and Accuracy Test




Figure 6-2: Test Ballots Screen

Ballot Station Users Guide: “The automatic L&A test, on the other hand, allows a pre-determined combination of ballots to be automatically selected and marked, according to the voting options selected.”

Rob: “I worked there from mid-June to mid-July. The whole time they were upgrading the software and doing some sort of fix to it. ...

“ ‘You’ve gotta go take care of this JS [junk shit] equipment,’ I told them. Finally, I raised it as high as you go. I raised it to Bob

Urosevich. He's the head of it. [Urosevich was president of Diebold Election Systems]. I told him personally 'this is bad. I don't see us putting an election on with these machines.'

"That's where they finally assembled the teams. They got some big ol' vans; we loaded up as many people as could fit in."

Who paid for the vans? Diebold? Who paid for the people piling into the vans?

Because now I'm having a hard time understanding why Diebold says it had no indication that these patches were done at all.

Rob: "... And then you know, ironically, later on, right before I exited, they were scrambling for a date. They were trying to get us, the teams, into Fulton County to do Fulton County's 1,900 machines.

"They were in the most horrific spot. The place they warehoused them was like 1,900 machines in a little office space. ... I'm talking to this guy ... him and I were scheduling this, figuring it out how to get to these machines and do the update before KSU has to test them. We cannot be doing this at the same time as KSU. ...

"I go back to the office. Brit [Dr. Britain Williams] was there, and he says 'what's it look like for Fulton?'

"I said 'there's no way we're going to be able to get to Fulton County by Thursday.' I said we could probably be out there by Friday or Saturday. He said 'there's no way we can do it at the same time. You know that. ...' "

But Dr. Williams, when interviewed by Kim Zetter of *WiredNews*, "denied that Rob ever mentioned patches to him and said, to his knowledge, no uncertified patches were applied to the machines. He said he would be very concerned if this happened."²

The scenario that Dr. Williams describes just does not correspond with what we are learning from Rob. Williams writes:

"... there must be in place well defined and strictly enforced policies and procedures that control who has access to the system, the circumstances under which they can access the system, and the functions that they are allowed to perform on the system."

I must have missed the section of the operating manual that describes people piling into vans and driving around updating voting programs with uncertified patches, using cards they made on their laptops.

“Finally, there must be in place physical security; fences, doors, locks, etc.; that control and limit access to the system.”

Well, at least they have our voting machines under lock and key.

Rob: “They were actually swapping parts out of these machines that were on site. They’d cannibalize a machine with a bad printer or whatever, they’d grab the screen off of that to put on another machine with a failing screen, they’d retest it. They were not just breaking them down, they were taking pieces off and putting it back together.

“Even the machines that are updated, that had the right release of the software, exactly like the company wanted it, you’d boot it up and all kinds of crazy things would happen. That led to my belief that when voting took place, there would be problems.”

Harris: “Do you remember what release number it was?”

Rob: “Release — I don’t remember the number because what they did was it was always the date. ...

“The date was ... let me see ... June 28. No, the last one, the date that was supposed to be on there was July 5. There was about three updates, the CE software, the date that would come up would be the last. After that they came up with another fix; that’s the August one at that point.”

The more you examine this “electronic patch” thing, the more out of control it looks. From the memos, it appears there were so many patches that the garment might have changed color altogether:

From Talbot Iredale, 13 Jun 2002: “The new WinCE 3.00 and bootloader are on the ftp site. The file is WCE300-020607.zip...”

From Talbot Iredale, 2 Jul 2002: “The new WinCE 3.00 release is now on the ftp site. The file is WCE300-020702.zip...”

From Talbot Iredale, 4 Jul 2002: “The new WinCE 3.00 release is now on the ftp site. The file is WCE300-020704.zip ...”

From Talbot Iredale, 5 Jul 2002: “ ... This is fixed in the July 05, 2000

(sic) release which is now on the ftp site ...”

From Talbot Iredale, 8 Aug 2002: “The WCE300-020802 release is on the ftp site ...”

From Ian S. Piper, 9 Oct 2002; Subject: AV-TS R6 Bootloader and WinCE version numbers: “... another method for determining the version number of the install files, prior to installation, is to view the creation date of the file on the flash memory card and compare it to the list below. (Unless you trust that someone has labeled the flash card correctly.) ... I’ve created a list of the file creation dates, and their versions...

Bootloader (filename “fboot.nb0”)

Mar. 14th, 2001 Rev 1.00

Jan. 28th, 2002 Rev 1.01

Jun. 7th, 2002 Rev 1.02

Windows CE Image (filename “nk.bin”)

May 25th, 2001 WinCE 2.12

Jan. 28th, 2002 WinCE 3.0

Jun 7th, 2002 WinCE 3.0

Jul. 2nd, 2002 WinCE 3.0

Jul. 5th, 2002 WinCE 3.0

Aug. 8th, 2002 WinCE 3.0

“... Someone with the BallotStation install file archives can create a list of BS [Ballot Station software] versions if they want to bother.”

There were more patches — the “clockfix.zip” patch is a little addition dated July 7, 2002. According a memo dated Aug. 6, 2002, Kansas may have caught a few bugs from Georgia:

“Steve, it was believed that only units built for Georgia would be affected. However, Lesley had 38 units shipped to Johnson County around the same time, so she was affected as well. There should be no others (famous last words) ...”

The techs were stitching new updates into the voting machines right up to Nov. 5, 2002 — Election Day.

Rob: “This guy came in from McKinney; he was about the second in command. He’s a good friend of Bob Urosevich. About sec-

ond to Bob, at least now, he got a promotion. Greg? Something like that. He flew in and I went to DeKalb County and I tested and together we went through, and we wrote down every single error, and he booted them himself and was looking at the results and seeing how sporadic they were. ...

“Greg Loe is his name. [Greg Loe, controller] I drove him out there. Brit [Dr. Britain Williams] was there; KSU was doing their testing. They were bombing these machines out left and right.

“I’m telling him ‘they’re all like this.’ ... We couldn’t get enough from the factory because so many were bad. You’d get a shipment of 300, but 75 were bad; they couldn’t put them out fast enough to replace all the defects. ...

Harris: “I understand they did a big demonstration during the summer with the machines.”

Rob: “I was there when they told me I needed 1,100 machines for a demo. I thought ‘the trick is coming up with 1,100 machines that actually work.’ ”

Harris: “Do you know who was writing the fixes?”

Rob: “He had a weird name. He came out of Canada. ... That’s it, Talbot Iredale, [he] would actually fix it and say ‘oh, here’s the problem,’ and stick it on the FTP site. We’d grab it, stick it on the card and make a bunch of copies and use it.

“They produced it and got it to us in 24 to 48 hours. If I’d known they hadn’t tested it, I simply wouldn’t have installed it. My background tells me that’s a no-no.”

On the concept of locks, keys, fences and warehouse security:

Harris: “How secure were the machines, from what you saw?”

Rob: “I’ll tell you something else — we didn’t have badges. People could just walk right in and get to the machines.”

Harris: “Do you think anybody could have tampered with a machine, if they wanted to?”

Rob: “Well, when we did the quality-control check, we’d open it up. They have a little box for the printer. We would find the key still in the printer. Someone could literally take that. We found cards left in the machine. [Voter cards activate the vote; memory cards store the votes.] I wondered what would happen if the wrong person got it. ...”

Harris: “Were there any protections to keep you from duplicating memory cards, or to have them serial numbered or whatever?”

Rob: “The memory cards, you can just duplicate them. You have to have the proper info on the card for the machine to boot up, but you can just make copies of the cards.”

If what Rob is describing sounds pretty slipshod to you, you’re not alone. In a September 2003 letter from a member of the Georgia Elections Board to Secretary of State Cathy Cox, we learn that voting-machine security is rather lacking.

“A missing DRE [touch-screen voting machine] for the State Board of Elections is tantamount to a missing ATM for a bank,” J. Randolph Evans states in his letter. He then goes on to report that voting machines have been found in hallways, stairwells and trunks of cars.³

Now every good fiasco has a little shoutin’ and lyin’. This one has it all — office politics, regular politics and people scrambling to protect the company checkbook.

Harris: “When I asked Diebold if there was anyone named Rob in Georgia, they said no. Did they know about you?”

Rob: “They knew me and they knew me well. I met Bob Urosevich [president of Diebold Election Systems] a couple different times, and Ian, and then Greg Loe, he got promoted, he was basically Bob’s right-hand man.

“You know, one of the main things that really just made me so upset, they were just, like ‘this Brit guy, don’t even speak to him, it’s a political game, you’ve gotta play the politics.’ Well, he walks in and says ‘what are you guys doing?’

“I said ‘we’re putting in an update.’ He said ‘will it change what it does?’ We said ‘just do your normal test, we’re supposed to get the machines ready for you.’

“He tells someone at the office and they freaked out. They were like ‘what the heck are you doing?’

“I wasn’t supposed to talk to him at all, I guess. The guy had a flannel shirt on; he was kicking it and he was very genuine and open and there we are in the same room together, but because I actually spoke to him I got reprimanded. They said ‘if they ask you any question, you gotta say, “Talk to Norma, to one of us. ...” ’”

Harris: “What did you say to him, anyway?”

Rob: “He [Williams] said he wanted to talk to me, so I met him in this little side office and [he] asked me what was going on. I basically said I was updating the machines, doing a quality check making sure the machines are the same, making sure they had the right release of Windows.

“Essentially, when I got back there was a meeting called. Urosevich was in it with a conference call. I went in, la-dee-dah, thinking I’d been doing a great job, and it caught me by surprise. It just totally blew me away that they would be so incensed and just absolutely angry about something so frivolous as the basic information I gave Dr. Williams. I’ve never been told to shut up so many times by so many people.”

Harris: “You mean, ‘Shut up in this meeting,’ or shut up by not talking to other people?”

Rob: “I’ll tell you exactly, I’ll give you a quote — this came from Urosevich: He said ‘we don’t need you airing our dirty laundry.’

“It was during that meeting the details came to light for me about patches and certifying them. I wasn’t aware of that before. There was this big discussion about what needed to be certified. In the course of trying to determine whether they needed to be certified, they were saying ‘what do we tell Kennesaw State?’ Everybody went around and gave opinions except for James Rellinger, who didn’t know. Wes [Krivanek], Norma [Lyons], Darrell [Graves], Bob [Urosevich] on the phone, each gave opinions on how it should be spun as to what we were trying to do. During the course of the conversation I said ‘can’t we just tell them? What’s wrong with that?’

“[They said] ‘No you can’t do that, it may be a certification issue.’ We were sitting around tables with Urosevich on speaker phone, trying to decide whether to tell the truth, half the truth, or a complete lie.”

Georgia had just ordered up \$53.9 million in voting machines, and the ink on the check wasn’t quite dry.

“If they started erring in mass quantities, Kennesaw State’s going to raise a red flag, the secretary of state’s going to raise a red flag and Diebold wouldn’t get paid,” Behler told Kim Zetter of *WiredNews*.

Certification Requirements Summary

Governing Entity	Certification Required	Need NASED #	Need Wyle Cert	Need CIBER Cert	Modification Requires Recertification	Submission Form Required	Technology Escrow Required
Alabama	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Alaska	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Arizona	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Arkansas	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
California	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Colorado	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Connecticut	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
District of Columbia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Florida	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Georgia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Diebold officials knew they weren't supposed to modify programs without certifying the changes. This was found in a file in the Diebold memos.

“I understand if a company has information they need to keep under tight lip. But when you sit around discussing lying to a client in order to make sure you're getting paid ... it's an ethics issue.”

Rob: “The rumor around the office was that Diebold lost maybe \$10 million on the Georgia thing. I mean, they only sold the machines for, what, \$2,000 or \$2,500, and then you have to build them and then you're paying people \$30 an hour and you are out touching 22,000 machines *four times* — there's no way they didn't lose money on this deal. ...

“The gist of the conversation was, you screw around with this and they might decide not to pay us.”

How credible is Rob Behler?

Dr. Brit Williams told *WiredNews* that Behler was a disgruntled employee who was fired by Diebold and Automated Business Systems and Services. Rob's personnel records discredit this assertion.

“ ‘He was released because his part of the project was completed,’ ” [ABSS's vice president for the southwest region, Terrence] Thomas told *WiredNews*, explaining that there was no performance issue with Behler's work.”

James Rellinger, a Diebold contractor who worked with Rob, also rejects Williams' interpretation of events. Rellinger told *WiredNews* that both Diebold and ABSS seemed happy with Rob's work.

But there are additional reasons to believe Rob.

I spoke with Rob in March 2003. He had no way of knowing which files were sitting on the Diebold FTP site in January 2003 since he had not worked for the company in months — yet in his interview, he mentions specific files, and I found the files he mentioned among those on the Diebold FTP site. The file dates matched exactly, and the information in the accompanying release notes supports Rob's story.

Rob could not know that internal memos from Diebold would surface. He recalled that people with the names "Talbot Iredale" and "Ian" were involved with the fixes. Now we know that memos written by Talbot Iredale and Ian Piper reveal patches exactly like those reported by Rob. These 2002 memos, which were leaked on July 29, 2003, contain 13-character passwords that open files found on the Diebold FTP site in January — files which had never been opened because they were locked with complex passwords.

I interviewed Rob in March 2003. Kim Zetter from *WiredNews* interviewed him in September 2003. I interviewed him again in October. He never evaded questions, and his answers stayed consistent over this six-month period.

Rob was told to download information to his laptop. He has saved several files. He has the notes taken while demonstrating problems to Greg Loe and has provided a copy of his notes (and a videotaped deposition) to James Penland, a lawyer who is working on a case with Roxanne Jekot and other Georgia citizens.

Rob: "... I went into this Diebold thing with no real knowledge of the voting industry. When I left, I not only had a complete grasp, but I had a complete disrespect for these machines.

"And with the folks in the office who were so — you know, 'I'm the political person; you have to know how the system works' — they were so much more concerned about their own self-importance, they were losing track of do the machines count the vote properly.

"Because that's what the people in Georgia need.

"And I'm one of them."

Rob jeopardized his employment future by stepping forward to tell us what really happened in Georgia. He has never asked for anything. This is especially impressive when you learn about a method that citizens like Rob can use to enrich themselves (albeit at the expense of the public interest).

In cases in which a government agency has spent taxpayer money based on fraudulent claims, the first citizens to file a *Qui Tam* lawsuit can collect as much as 30 percent of the money misspent by the agency in question — in this case, for Georgia, nearly \$54 million. The catch? The case must be filed under seal. In most cases, the information revealed in the case is also kept under seal, and the period of time this information is withheld from the public can be extended over and over. No congressional investigation, no public disclosure, just a secret filing that may or may not get unsealed.

But citizens need to know the details about these voting machines. There are bills pending in Congress and states considering purchase as of this writing. Time is of the essence. Secreting the evidence away just seems wrong.

I told Rob about *Qui Tam* and suggested that he consult someone for guidance to decide whether to pursue this path. He did.

He consulted the Bible. He looked up what the Proverbs have to say and shared their wisdom with me.

“I’m not interested in it,” he decided. Now, Rob Behler is a man who is raising seven children with little material wealth. He could probably use 30 percent of \$54 million. Instead, he has chosen to protect the security of your vote by telling the truth publicly.

In Rob Behler we meet the kind of quiet, patriotic citizen that makes us proud to be Americans.

* * * * *

Harris: “Do you remember when you got this job back in June?”

Rob: “Yes. Late June.”

Hmm. To the best of Rob’s recollection, he began work in mid- to late June. Yet the date on the rob-georgia files is June 4. It appears that rob-georgia was created weeks before Rob was hired.

So who — or what — is “rob-georgia?”