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Ron Jacobs
The
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August 21, 2003
Robert Fisk
The US
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Virginia Tilley
The Quisling Policies of the UN in Iraq: Toward a Permanent War?
Rep. Henry Waxman
Bush Owes the Public Some Serious Answers on Iraq
Ben Terrall
War Crimes and Punishment in Indonesia: Rapes, Murders and Slaps
on the Wrists
Elaine Cassel
Brother John Ashcroft's Traveling Patriot Salvation Show
Christopher Brauchli
Getting Gouged by Banks
Marjorie Cohn
Sergio Vieira de Mello: Victim of Terrorism or US Policy in Iraq?
Vicente Navarro
Media
Double Standards: The Case of Mr. Aznar, Friend of Bush
Website of the Day
The Intelligence Squad
August 20, 2003
Robert Fisk
Now No
One Is Safe in Iraq
Caoimhe Butterly
Life and Death on the Frontlines of Baghdad
Kurt Nimmo
UN Bombing: Act of Terrorism or Guerrilla War?
Michael Egan
Revisiting the Paranoid Style in the Dark
Ramzi Kysia
Peace
is not an Abstract Idea
Steven Higgs
NPR and the NAFTA Highway
John L. Hess
A Downside Day
Edward Said
The Imperial Bluster of Tom Delay
Jason Leopold
Gridlock at Path 15: the California Blackouts were the "Wake
Up Call"
Website of the Day
Ashcroft's Patriotic Hype
August 19, 2003
Jeffrey St. Clair
Blackouts Happen
Gary Leupp
"Our Patch": Australia v. the Evil Doers of the South
Pacific
Sean Donahue
Uribe's Cruel Model: Colombia Moves Toward Totalitarianism
Matt Martin
Bush's Credibility Problem on Missile Defense
Juliana Fredman
Recipe for the Destruction of a Hudna
John Ross
Fox Government's Attack on Mexican Basques
Sasan Fayazmanesh
What Kermit Roosevelt Didn't Say
Website of the Day
Tom Delay's Dual Loyalities
August 18, 2003
Uri Avnery
Hero in War and Peace
Stan Goff
The Volunteer Military and the Wicked Adventure
Cathy Breen
Baghdad on the Hudson
Michael Kimaid
Fight the Power (Companies)!
Jason Leopold
The California Rip-Off Revisited: Arnold, Milken and Ken Lay
Matt Siegfried
The Bush Administration in Context
Elaine Cassel
At Last, A Judge Who Acts Like a Judge
Alexander Cockburn
Judy Miller's War
Harvey Wasserman
The Legacy of Blackout Pete Wilson
Website of the Day
Fire Griles!
Congratulations
to CounterPuncher Gilad Atzmon! BBC Names EXILE Top Jazz CD
August 16 / 17, 2003
Flavia Alaya
Bastille
New Jersey
Jeffrey St. Clair
War Pimps
Saul Landau
The Legacy of Moncada: the Cuban Revolution at 50
Brian Cloughley
What Has Happened to the US Army in Iraq?
William S. Lind
Coffins for the Crews: How Not to Use Light Armored Vehicles
Col. Dan Smith
Time for Straight Talk
Wenonah Hauter
Which
Electric System Do We Want?
David Lindorff
Where's Arnold When We Need Him?
Harvey Wasserman
This Grid Should Not Exist
Don Moniak
"Unusual Events" at Nuclear Power Plants: a Timeline
for August 14, 2003
David Vest
Rolling Blackout Revue
Merlin Chowkwanyun
An Interview with Sherman Austin
Adam Engel
The Loneliest Number
Poets' Basement
Guthrie, Hamod & Albert
Book of the Weekend
Powerplay by Sharon Beder
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Peter Phillips
Inside
Bohemian Grove: Where US Power Elites Party
Brian Cloughley
Charlie Wilson and Pakistan: the Strange Congressman Behind the
CIA's Most Expensive War
Linville and Ruder
Tyson
Strike Draws the Line
Jim Lobe
Bush Administration Divided Over Iran
Ramzy Baroud
Sharon Freezes the Road Map
Tom Turnipseed
Blowback in Iraq
Gary Leupp
Condi's
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Website of the Day
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The Heavy Cost of Empire
Standard Schaefer
Experimental Casinos: DARPA and the War Economy
Elaine Cassel
Murderous Errors: Executing the Innocent
Ralph Nader
Make the Recall Count
Alexander Cockburn
Ted Honderich Hit with "Anti-Semitism" Slur
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Dean's Constitutional Hang-Up
Wayne Madsen
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Relax,
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Uzma
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Impeach
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August
23, 2003
Insults to Intelligence
It's
Not too Late to Speak Out
By Veteran Intelligence
Professionals for Sanity
MEMORANDUM FOR: Colleagues in Intelligence
FROM: Veteran Intelligence Professionals
for Sanity
SUBJECT: Now It's Your Turn
Sixty-four summers ago, when Hitler fabricated
Polish provocations in his attempt to justify Germany's invasion
of Poland, there was not a peep out of senior German officials.
Happily, in today's Germany the imperative of truth telling no
longer takes a back seat to ingrained docility and knee-jerk
deference to the perceived dictates of "homeland security."
The most telling recent sign of this comes in Friday's edition
of Die Zeit, Germany's highly respected weekly. The story, by
Jochen Bittner holds lessons for us all.
Die Zeit's report leaves in tatters the
"evidence" cited by Secretary of State Colin Powell
and other administration spokesmen as the strongest proof that
Iraq was using mobile trailers as laboratories to produce material
for biological weapons.
German Intelligence
on Powell's "Solid" Sources
Bittner notes that, like their American
counterparts, German intelligence officials had to hold their
noses as Powell on February 5 at the UN played fast and loose
with intelligence he insisted came from "solid sources."
Powell's specific claims concerning the mobile laboratories,
it turns out, depended heavily--perhaps entirely--on a source
of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Germany's equivalent to
the CIA. But the BND, it turns out, considered the source in
no way "solid." A "senior German security official"
told Die Zeit that, in passing the report to US officials, the
Germans made a point of noting "various problems with the
source." In more diplomatic language, Die Zeit's informant
indicated that the BND's "evaluation of the source was not
altogether positive."
German officials remain in some confusion
regarding the "four different sources" cited by Powell
in presenting his case regarding the "biological laboratories."
Berlin has not been told who the other three sources are. In
this context, a German intelligence officer mentioned that there
is always the danger of false confirmation, suggesting it is
possible that the various reports can be traced back to the same
original source, theirs--that is, the one with which the Germans
had "various problems."
Even if there are in fact multiple sources,
the Germans wonder what reason there is to believe that the others
are more "solid" than their own. Powell indicated that
some of the sources he cited were Iraqi emigrés. While
the BND would not give Die Zeit an official comment, Bittner
notes pointedly that German intelligence "proceeds on the
assumption that emigrés do not always tell the truth and
that the picture they draw can be colored by political motives."
Plausible?
Despite all that, in an apparent bid
to avoid taking the heat for appearing the constant naysayer
on an issue of such neuralgic import in Washington, German intelligence
officials say that, the dubious sourcing notwithstanding, they
considered the information on the mobile biological laboratories
"plausible."
In recent weeks, any "plausibility"
has all but evaporated. Many biological warfare specialists in
the US and elsewhere were skeptical from the start. Now Defense
Intelligence Agency specialists have joined their counterparts
at the State Department and elsewhere in concluding that the
two trailer/laboratories discovered in Iraq in early May are
hydrogen-producing facilities for weather balloons to calibrate
Iraqi artillery, as the Iraqis have said.
Perhaps it was this DIA report that emboldened
the BND official to go public about the misgivings the BND had
about the source.
Insult to Intelligence
What do intelligence analysts do when
their professional ethic--to tell the truth without fear or favor--is
prostituted for political expedience? Usually, they hold their
peace, as we've already noted was the case in Germany in 1939
before the invasion of Poland. The good news is that some intelligence
officials are now able to recognize a higher duty--particularly
when the issue involves war and peace. Clearly, some BND officials
are fed up with the abuse of intelligence they have witnessed--and
especially the trifling with the intelligence that they have
shared with the US from their own sources. At least one such
official appears to have seen it as a patriotic duty to expose
what appears to be a deliberate distortion.
This is a hopeful sign. There are indications
that British intelligence officials, too, are beginning to see
more distinctly their obligation to speak truth to power, especially
in light of the treatment their government accorded Ministry
of Defense biologist Dr. David Kelly, who became despondent to
the point of suicide.
Even more commendable was the courageous
move by senior Australian intelligence analyst Andrew Wilkie
when it became clear to him that the government he was serving
had decided to take part in launching an unprovoked war based
on "intelligence" information he knew to be specious.
Wilkie resigned and promptly spoke his piece--not only to his
fellow citizens but, after the war, at Parliament in London and
Congress in Washington. Andrew Wilkie was not naÃve enough
to believe he could stop the war when he resigned in early March.
What was clear to him, however, was that he had a moral duty
to expose the deliberate deception in which his government, in
cooperation with the US and UK, had become engaged. And he knew
instinctively that, in so doing, he could with much clearer conscience
look at himself in the mirror each morning.
What About Us?
Do you not find it ironic that State
Department foreign service officers, whom we intelligence professionals
have (quite unfairly) tended to write off as highly articulate
but unthinking apologists for whatever administration happens
to be in power, are the only ones so far to resign on principle
over the war on Iraq? Three of them have--all three with very
moving explanations that their consciences would no longer allow
them to promote "intelligence" and policies tinged
with deceit.
What about you? It is clear that you
have been battered, buffeted, besmirched. And you are painfully
aware that you can expect no help at this point from Director
George Tenet. Recall the painful morning when you watched him
at the UN sitting squarely behind Powell, as if to say the Intelligence
Community endorses the deceitful tapestry he wove. No need to
remind you that his speech boasted not only the bogus biological
trailers but also assertions of a "sinister nexus"
between Iraq and al-Qaeda, despite the fact that your intense,
year-and-a-half analytical effort had turned up no credible evidence
to support that claim. To make matters worse, Tenet is himself
under fire for acquiescing in a key National Intelligence Estimate
on "weapons of mass destruction" in Iraq that included
several paragraphs based on a known forgery. That is the same
estimate from which the infamous 16 words were drawn for the
president's state-of-the-union address on January 28.
And not only that. In a dramatic departure
from customary practice, Tenet has let the moneychangers into
the temple--welcoming the most senior policymakers into the inner
sanctum where all-source analysis is performed at CIA headquarters,
wining and dining Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State
Colin Powell, National Security Assistant Condoleezza Rice, and
even former House Speaker Newt Gingrich (now representing the
Pentagon) on their various visits to make sure you didn't miss
anything! You have every right to expect to be protected from
that kind of indignity. Small wonder that Gingrich, in a recent
unguarded moment on TV, conceded that Tenet "is so grateful
to President Bush that he will do anything for him." CIA
directors have no business being so integral a "part of
the team."
Powell, who points proudly to his four
day-and-night cram course at the CIA in the days immediately
prior to his February 5 UN speech, seems oblivious to the fact
that personal visitations of that frequency and duration--and
for that purpose--are unprecedented in the history of the CIA.
Equally unprecedented are Cheney's "multiple visits."
When George H. W. Bush was vice president, not once did he go
out to CIA headquarters for a working visit. We brought our analysis
to him. As you are well aware, once the subjects uppermost in
policymakers' minds are clear to analysts, the analysis itself
must be conducted in an unfettered, sequestered way--and certainly
without the direct involvement of officials with policy axes
to grind. Until now, that is the way it has been done; the analysis
and estimates were brought downtown to the policymakers--not
the other way around.
What Happens When
You Remain Silent?
There is no more telling example than
Vietnam. CIA analysts were prohibited from reporting accurately
on the non-incident in the Tonkin Gulf on August 4, 1964 until
the White House had time to use the "furious fire-fight"
to win the Tonkin Gulf resolution from Congress--and eleven more
years of war for the rest of us.
And we kept quiet.
In November 1967 as the war gathered
steam, CIA management gave President Lyndon Johnson a very important
National Intelligence Estimate known to be fraudulent. Painstaking
research by a CIA analyst, the late Sam Adams, had revealed that
the Vietnamese Communists under arms numbered 500,000. But Gen.
William Westmoreland in Saigon, eager to project an image of
progress in the US "war of attrition," had imposed
a very low artificial ceiling on estimates of enemy strength.
Analysts were aghast when management
caved in and signed an NIE enshrining Westmoreland's count of
between 188,000 and 208,000. The Tet offensive just two months
later exploded that myth--at great human cost. And the war dragged
on for seven more years.
Then, as now, morale among analysts plummeted.
A senior CIA official made the mistake of jocularly asking Adams
if he thought the Agency had "gone beyond the bounds of
reasonable dishonesty." Sam, who had not only a keen sense
of integrity but first-hand experience of what our troops were
experiencing in the jungles of Vietnam, had to be restrained.
He would be equally outraged at the casualties being taken now
by US forces fighting another unnecessary war, this time in the
desert. Kipling's verse applies equally well to jungle or desert:
If they question why we died,
tell them because our fathers lied.
Adams himself became, in a very real
sense, a casualty of Vietnam. He died of a heart attack at 55,
with remorse he was unable to shake. You see, he decided to "go
through channels," pursuing redress by seeking help from
imbedded CIA and the Defense Department Inspectors General. Thus,
he allowed himself to be diddled for so many years that by the
time he went public the war was mostly over--and the damage done.
Sam had lived painfully with the thought
that, had he gone public when the CIA's leaders caved in to the
military in 1967, the entire left half of the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial would not have had to be built. There would have been
25-30,000 fewer names for the granite to accommodate.
So too with Daniel Ellsberg, who made
the courageous decision to give the Pentagon Papers on Vietnam
to the New York Times and Washington Post for publication in
1971. Dan has been asked whether he has any regrets. Yes, one
big one, he says. If he had made the papers available in 1964
or 65, this tragically unnecessary war might have been stopped
in its tracks. Why did he not? Dan's response is quite telling;
he says the thought never occurred to him at the time.
Let the thought occur to you, now.
But Isn't It Too Late?
No. While it is too late to prevent the
misadventure in Iraq, the war is hardly over, and analogous "evidence"
is being assembled against Iran, Syria, and North Korea. Yes,
US forces will have their hands full for a long time in Iraq,
but this hardly rules out further adventures based on "intelligence"
as spurious as that used to argue the case for attacking Iraq.
The best deterrent is the truth. Telling
the truth about the abuse of intelligence on Iraq could conceivably
give pause to those about to do a reprise. It is, in any case,
essential that the American people acquire a more accurate understanding
of the use and abuse of intelligence. Only then can there be
any hope that they can experience enough healing from the trauma
of 9/11 to be able to make informed judgments regarding the policies
pursued by this administration--thus far with the timid acquiescence
of their elected representatives.
History is littered with the guilty consciences
of those who chose to remain silent. It is time to speak out.
/s/
Gene Betit, Arlington, VA
Pat Lang, Alexandria, VA
David MacMichael, Linden, VA
Ray McGovern, Arlington, VA
Steering Group
Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity
The VIPS can be reached at: rmcgovern@slschool.org
Weekend
Edition Features for August 16 / 17, 2003
Flavia Alaya
Bastille
New Jersey
Jeffrey St. Clair
War Pimps
Saul Landau
The Legacy of Moncada: the Cuban Revolution at 50
Brian Cloughley
What Has Happened to the US Army in Iraq?
William S. Lind
Coffins for the Crews: How Not to Use Light Armored Vehicles
Col. Dan Smith
Time for Straight Talk
Wenonah Hauter
Which
Electric System Do We Want?
David Lindorff
Where's Arnold When We Need Him?
Harvey Wasserman
This Grid Should Not Exist
Don Moniak
"Unusual Events" at Nuclear Power Plants: a Timeline
for August 14, 2003
David Vest
Rolling Blackout Revue
Merlin Chowkwanyun
An Interview with Sherman Austin
Adam Engel
The Loneliest Number
Poets' Basement
Guthrie, Hamod & Albert
Book of the Weekend
Powerplay by Sharon Beder
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