Iran Leader Slams Caretaker Government in iraq

Iran's supreme jurisprudent, Ali Khamenei, spoke out Thursday against the new Iraqi government, saying that it was filled with puppets of the Americans, who remained in charge. He said that American home invasions and other irregularities only came about because the Shiite learned men had fallen silent. He thus implicitly challenged grand ayatollah Ali Sistani. Sistani rejects clerical activism except in what he calls "social issues," as opposed to "national" or "political issues." In short, he rejects Khomeinism. So far the Iranians have been tacitly backing Sistani, but that could change, and they have enormous resources to funnel to his opponents among the more radical clerics.

Iraq as failed State

The Fund for Peace has an important new study on Iraq that warns it has become a failed state. . Newsday says:

' Dr. Pauline H. Baker, author of the report, describes a failed state syndrome as a condition in which a number of trends reinforce each other to produce spiraling conflict that the country has little or no independent capacity to stop. The report concludes that, a year after the invasion, Iraq is as shattered as it was the day that Saddam Hussein was overthrown, the main difference being that organized militias and terrorist groups have gained a foothold they did not have before.

"We have to get the facts straight before we can get the policy straight," said Dr. Baker. "Currently, there are three major fictions that are being used to describe the transition in Iraq. The first is analytical - that Iraq could become a failed state, when, in fact, it already has failed. The second is legal - that the occupation will end on June 30, when, in fact, the occupation will end when foreign troops are withdrawn and capable Iraqi security forces take over. And the third is political - that after June 30, the sovereign government of Iraq and the people will be allied with the United States. In fact, the interim government will not have full sovereignty and the people are increasingly fearful and resentful of the U.S. presence." '

Clancy on Wolfowitz

I just heard Tom Clancy on Deborah Norville's show. She asked him about some persons he had met in the Defense Department. When she brought up Paul Wolfowitz, and asked his impression, Clancy said "Is he working for our side?" Clancy said he was involved in a red team exercise in the Pentagon and Wolfowitz came in a briefed them, and he just did not seem to Clancy as though he were "working for our side."

I'm not entirely sure what Clancy means by this. He is no liberal, though, so it is interesting that he says it.

Sistani's Fatwa on the New Government

Fatwa of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani on the New Government
trans. J. Cole

"In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

From the office of his excellency Grand Ayatollah Sistani, may God extend his shadow.

Peace be upon you, and the mercy and blessings of God.

Many of the believers have asked about his position toward the new Iraqi government, which was constituted yesterday through the efforts of Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the envoy of the secretary general of the United Nations:

---

In His Name, May He be exalted.

His excellency the Sayyid had previously and repeatedly affirmed the necessity for the Iraqi government to possess a sovereignty that derives from free and honest elections in which the children of the Iraqi people participate in a general way.

But, the option of holding [early] elections was rejected, for many well known reasons--procrastination and delay, opposition and intimidation. The time fled, and the appointed date of 30 June approached, on which it was supposed that Iraqis would regain sovereignty over their country.

Thus, the process has become one of appointment, in order to form a new government, without achieving the legitimacy of having been elected. Moreover, it does not represent all slices of Iraqi society and all political forces in an appropriate way.

Even so, if it is to be hoped that this government will establish its worthiness and probity and its unwavering determination to shoulder the immense burdens now facing it, it must:

1. Obtain a clear resolution from the United Nations Security Council on the return of complete sovereignty over their country to the Iraqis, unconstrained in any regard, whether political, economic, military, or security-related. Every effort must be made to efface all signs of occupation in every way.

2. Provision of security in every part of the country and putting an end to organized criminal activities, as well as all criminal actions.

3. Provision of public services to the citizens and reducing the effort necessary for them to pursue their everyday lives.

4. First-rate preparation for general elections, and keeping to the appointed date, which is at the beginning of the coming new year according to the Christian calendar, so that a national assembly can be formed that is not bound by any of the decisions issued in the shadow of the Occupation, including what they call the Law for the Administration of the Transitional State [i.e. the Interim Constitution].

The new government will never obtain popular acceptance save if it demonstrates through actual and practical steps that it is striving with earnestness and sincerity to fulfill the above mission. May God enable all to do as He wills and as pleases Him.

14 Rabi II, 1425
The Office of Sayyid Sistani"

There is now a printed text on the Web at Karbala News, which enabled me to make some final revisions at 2:43 pm EST.

Tenet Resigns

I have no inside sources on why George Tenet just resigned as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. But I can think of three reasons for which he ought to have resigned.

First, it was announced on Wednesday that President George W. Bush had retained counsel with regard to the Plame investigation. Last summer someone in the White House or close to it leaked to the press that Valerie Plame was a secret operative for the CIA, specializing in countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

This leak aimed at punishing her husband, former ambassador Joe Wilson, for having gone public about his mission to Niger in spring of 2002, in which he disproved the story that Iraq tried to buy yellowcake uranium from that country. Despite Wilson's report to the CIA, requested by VP Dick Cheney, and against Tenet's strong advice, Bush put the allegation into his 2003 State of the Union address.

Tenet should have resigned when Bush insisted on trumpeting an Iraqi nuclear weapons program at a time when Tenet was denying there was any such thing. (Tenet did think Iraq had chemical and biological programs, about which he was wrong). The nuclear claim helped convince the country to go to war. It was false. Tenet knew it was false. He told Bush that. Bush either knew it was false and said it anyway, or he disbelieved Tenet. Either thing should have produced Tenet's resignation.

That Bush retained counsel suggests that he intends to continue to cover for the slime who outed Plame, thereby endangering the lives of dozens of key contacts in the Third World who had been seen hanging out with her over the years when she had a cover as an energy consultant. Bush can produce the perpetrator if he wants, but has decided not to.

So Tenet should resign over that.

Then, someone leaked to Ahmad Chalabi sensitive details of the the cryptography operations of US intelligence against Iran. The leaker is probably a neocon with Defense Department links. Bush could also produce this person if he wanted to. He has not.

So Tenet should resign over Bush's shocking disregard for national security.

Note that Plame's portfolio was fighting the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Someone in Bush's circle set that effort back years by outing her. And note that having broken Iran's code, the US was in a better position to monitor any Iranian efforts to develop WMD. Now that capability has been lost.

With all this brouhaha about fighting weapons of mass destruction proliferation, the Bush administration has actually set back those efforts horribly, for the purposes of petty political gain. It took us to war in Iraq on a WMD pretext. But that turns out to have been a scam on someone's part, and we are much less safe now than before.

Shiites Disgruntled with Caretaker Government

James Drummond reports for the Financial Times that al-Da`wa and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) have expressed dissatisfaction at how the caretaker government was formed. These two major Shiite political groupings just got one post each. Ibrahim Jaafari of al-Da`wa is one of two vice presidents, and SCIRI's Adil Abdul Mahdi is Minister of Finance. An al-Da`wa spokesman had said on Tuesday that the government was formed "behind closed doors."

Still, Drummond says that Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani had been given a veto over candidates for prime minister, and had ok'd the list, which included Iyad Allawi (a secular ex-Baathist of Shiite background).

14 Dead in Iraq; More Fighting between Sadrists and US Troops;

Between a huge car bomb in Adhamiyah in Baghdad (which killed 4 and wounded many others) and new clashes with US troops, some 14 Iraqis died in violence on Wednesday. Guerillas also targetting a big US military arms depot in Kirkuk, setting off a huge set of explosions.

Az-Zaman: Fighting broke out again on Wednesday between the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr and US troops on a number of fronts in the Shiite south. There were clashes in Kufa when US armored vehicles entered the city from Najaf. The Mahdi Army militiamen opened fire on them. There did not appear to be any casualties in this battle.

There was also fighting in East Baghdad, as US armored vehicles rolled into that area. Two Mahdi Army militiamen were killed in these clashes. Shaikh Kadhim Jamal said, "Two of our militia fighters from the Mahdi Army were killed in the course of clashes in Sadr City . . . The reason for the clashes was that a number of US military vehicles entered the city, which was viewed as extremely offensive by the inhabitants . . . Mahdi Army elements attacked these forces that entered the city, and a clash occurred, involving an exchange of fire." He added, "There is no cease fire between us and the American forces . . . If these forces again entered the city, we would confront them and resist them.

Nagem Salem has an informed treatment of the relationship between Muqtada and Sistani. Likewise, Daniel Williams of the Washington Post has profiled Muqtada as a leader of the poor.

Chalabi Spy Case

James Risen and David Johnston have a story in the New York Times on Wednesday about the spying charges against Ahmad Chalabi. He is accused of passing to Iran the highly classified information that the US had broken Iranian codes. Although the Iranians use a number of cyptographic systems, and couldn't know which the US had penetrated, obviously they would be tempted to change them all in the light of this information.

Some observers have speculated that the entire Iraq war may have been an Iranian plot, with the Iranians using Chalabi to feed false information about Iraq's weapons programs to the US. They would then have used one enemy, the US, to get rid of another, Saddam, and would as a result have liberated the Iraqi Shiite community.

I want to intervene on this meme. It is impossible. Chalabi and the other Iraqi expatriates certainly gamed the Bush administration. But it is not credible to me that Iranian intelligence actively sought a US invasion of Iraq.

In 2002, the US occupied Afghanistan, to Iran's east. The hardliners in Iran did not like this development. They certainly would not have wanted US troops in Iraq to their West, as well. That they would manufacture fairy tales about Iraqi weapons to lure the US to Baghdad is inconceivable. And the hardliners are in charge of Iranian intelligence.

The hardline clerics objected strenuously in summer, 2002, when the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, then based in Tehran, openly admitted to having conducted negotiations with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's office about an alliance against Saddam. Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim received great heat for this alliance. Then when Abdul Majid Khoei went to Iran in winter, 2002-2003, he spoke to conservative clerics about the need to ally pragmatically with the US against Saddam, and it caused an uproar. His talk was at one point actually cut off by the tumult and he had to leave the hall.

That the Iranians reluctantly accepted that the US was determined to go to war against Iraq is obvious. But that they connived at it is ridiculous.

Indeed, the likelihood is that the Iranians were also victims of Chalabi's lie factory. The INC peddled the story to the US that Iraq had an active nuclear weapons program. It must have peddled the same story to the Iranians. In fact, what if the lies of Chalabi & Associates about the non-existent nuclear program so alarmed Iran that it redoubled its efforts to get a nuclear weapon, conducting an arms race against a phantom? If so, Chalabi and his group have single-handedly destabilized the entire Persian Gulf region. And for what? So that Ahmad could be president for life. And now that will not even happen.

Making Americans Safer

The frankly idiotic US battles fought near Shiite shrines in Najaf and Karbala have created a new, seething rage toward the US in many Shiite Muslim communities throughout the world. The riots in Karachi on Tuesday, protesting a bombing at a Shiite mosque in Pakistan's major port, involved setting fire to American fast food outlets. This sort of attack had previously been common among radical Sunnis, but it is ominous that now the Shiite mobs are asking for very extra crispy KFC. Now I find that in my old stomping grounds of Lucknow, India, where the Shiite community had been so kind to me in the early 1980s, Americans are now unwelcome. Why, if the Bush administration has any more successes in the War on Terror, I just don't know how we'll be able to survive them.

TUESDAY, JUNE 1, 2004
THE TIMES OF INDIA CITY SUPPLEMENTS: LUCKNOW TIMES


TIMES NEWS NETWORK[ WEDNESDAY, JUNE 02, 2004 02:16:26 AM


' "Americans should not venture anywhere near imambaras, mazaars or other places of religious importance. For if they do, the responsibility of their security would lie with the tourism department or themselves..." Shia cleric Maulana Kalbe Jawwad who issued this veiled threat before a 20,000 strong crowd in Lucknow says Americans or Britons are not welcome in holy Muslim shrines. "With anti-US sentiments running so high, anything can happen to the tourists. What if some individual decides to settle scores on his own? We can't do anything about that," Maulana Jawwad told Lucknow Times. "By closing our doors on US and UK nationals we are sending out a very strong message. We want these tourists to tell everybody back home that they were unwelcome in India because of their leaders who are killing innocent Muslims and and destroying our shrines," Jawwad reasons. "In fact, most of our imambaras are replicas of shrines in Iraq . How can the Americans bomb the original sites and visit their replicas! Where is the logic in that? The bottomline is that Americans should stay away from the imambaras and similar places, because we would be very uncomfortable with their presence," he adds. '

New Proposal for Mahdi Army in Najaf

A new proposal has emerged for dealing with the stand-off in Najaf, whereby the US troops will withdraw from the city to their bases and Mahdi Army fighters will be amnestied for 72 hours to allow them to leave Najaf. This plan is intended to salvage a cease-fire announced over the weekend, but which has fallen apart, with heavy fighting in Kufa between the Mahdi Army and US troops.

Al-Zurufi said, "The Mahdi Army must relinquish its positions. As for its members who do not live in the city (Najaf), they must depart it." (al-Hayat).

On Tuesday, according to az-Zaman, the US positioned several tanks near the grand mosque, in response to which the Mahdi Army launched heavy mortar rounds. Veteran US diplomat and Arabist Christopher Ross informed the Najaf governor, Adnan al-Zurufi, of the plan. There is also a provision for US purchase of the militiamen's arms. Although Al-Zurufi was told that Muqtada al-Sadr agreed to the new plan, it is not at all clear that it will have more success than previous such plans.

Meanwhile, one of the new vice-presidents of the caretaker government, Ibrahim Jaafari, admitted that the al-Da`wa Party, to which he belongs, has reservations about the Yawar/Allawi government. (-al-Hayat).

The new government was ushered in by further tragedy, when some 14 Iraqis were killed and over 50 wounded by a truck bomb at the HQ of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Baghdad.

Revised text of U.N. draft resolution on Iraq proposed by United States and Britain

(Via Associated Press):

"The United States and Britain circulated the following revised draft U.N. resolution on Iraq to Security Council members Monday:"

The Security Council,

Marking a new phase in Iraq's transition to a democratically elected government, and looking forward to the end of the occupation and the assumption of authority by a fully sovereign Interim Government of Iraq by 30 June 2004,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions on Iraq,

Reaffirming the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Iraq,

Reaffirming the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources,

Recognizing the importance of international support, particularly that of countries in the region, Iraq's neighbors, and regional organizations, for the people of Iraq in their efforts to achieve security and prosperity,

Welcoming the ongoing efforts of the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General to assist the people of Iraq in achieving the formation of a sovereign Interim Government of Iraq,

Taking note of the dissolution of the Governing Council of Iraq, and welcoming the progress made in implementing the arrangements for Iraq's political transition referred to in resolution 1511 (2003),

Stressing the need for all parties to respect and protect Iraq's archaeological, historical, cultural and religious heritage,

Affirming the importance of the rule of law, respect for human rights including the rights of women, fundamental freedoms, and democracy including free and fair elections,

Recalling the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on 15 August 2003, and affirming that the United Nations should play a leading role in assisting the Iraqi people in the formation of institutions for representative government,

Recognizing that international support for restoration of stability and security is essential to the well-being of the people of Iraq as well as to the ability of all concerned to carry out their work on behalf of the people of Iraq, and welcoming Member State contributions in this regard under resolution 1483 (2003) of 22 May 2003 and resolution 1511 (2003) of 16 October 2003,

Recalling the report provided to the Security Council on 16 Apri1 2004 under resolution 1511 (2003) on the efforts and progress made by the multinational force authorized under that resolution,

Recognizing the request of the incoming Interim Government of Iraq [as conveyed XX] to retain the presence of the multinational force,

Recognizing also the importance of the consent of the sovereign government of Iraq for the presence of the multinational force and of close coordination between the multinational force and that government,

Welcoming the willingness of the multinational force to continue efforts to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in support of the political transition, especially for upcoming elections, and to provide security for the UN presence in Iraq, as further described in the letter to the President of the Security Council on XX XX 2004,

Noting the commitment of all forces promoting the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq to act in accordance with international law and cooperate with relevant international organizations,

Affirming the importance of international assistance in reconstruction and development of the Iraqi economy,

Recognizing the benefits to Iraq of the immunities and privileges enjoyed by the Iraqi oil revenues and by the Development Fund for Iraq, and noting the importance of providing for continued disbursements of this fund by the Interim Government of Iraq and its successors upon dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority,

Determining that the situation in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Endorses the formation of a sovereign Interim Government of Iraq as outlined XXX, that will assume responsibility and authority by 30 June 2004 for governing Iraq until a Transitional Government of Iraq assumes office as envisaged in paragraph three below;

2. Welcomes that, also by that date, the occupation will end and the Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to exist;

3. Endorses the proposed timetable for Iraq's political transition to democratic government including:

(a) formation of a sovereign Interim Government of Iraq that will assume governing responsibility and authority by 30 June 2004;

(b) convening of a national conference; and

½c) holding of direct democratic elections by 31 December 2004 if possible, and in no case later than 31 January 2005, to a Transitional National Assembly which will, inter alia, have responsibility for forming a Transitional Government of Iraq and drafting a permanent constitution for Iraq leading to a constitutionally elected government;

4. Calls on all Iraqis to implement these arrangement peaceably and in full, and on all States and relevant organizations to support such implementation;

5. Decides that in implementing, as circumstances permit, its mandate to assist the Iraqi people, the Special Representative of the Secretary General and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), as requested by the Interim Government of Iraq and its successors, shall:

(a) play a leading role to:

(i) assist in the convening, no later than XX XX 2004, of a national conference to select a Consultative Council;

(ii) advise and support the Interim Government of Iraq and the Transitional National Assembly on the process for holding elections;

(iii) promote national dialogue and consensus-building on the drafting of a national constitution by the people of Iraq; and

(b) and also:

(i) advise the Interim Government of Iraq in the development of effective civil and social services;

(ii) contribute to the coordination and delivery of reconstruction, development, and humanitarian assistance;

(iii) promote the protection of human rights, national reconciliation, and judicial and legal reform in order to strengthen the role of law in Iraq; and

(iv) advise and assist the Interim Government of Iraq on initial planning for the eventual conduct of a comprehensive census;

6. Welcomes efforts by the incoming Interim Government of Iraq to develop Iraqi security forces, which will operate under the authority of the Interim Government of Iraq and its successors, and which will progressively play a greater role and ultimately assume responsibility for the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq;

7. Noting that the presence of the multinational force in Iraq is at the request of the incoming Interim Government of Iraq, reaffirms the authorization for the multinational force under unified command established under resolution 1511 (2003), having regard to the letter referred to in preambular paragraph XX above;

8. Decides that the multinational force shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq including by preventing and deterring terrorism, so that inter alia the United Nations can fulfill its role in assisting the Iraqi people as outlined in paragraph five above and the Iraqi people can implement freely and without intimidation the timetable and program for the political process and benefit from reconstruction and rehabilitation activities;

9. Welcomes that arrangements are being put in place to establish a partnership between the multinational force and the sovereign Interim Government of Iraq and to ensure coordination between the two;

10. Decides further that this mandate for the multinational force shall be reviewed at the request of the Transitional Government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of this resolution, and that this mandate shall expire upon the completion of the political process set out in paragraph three above and declares its readiness to terminate this mandate earlier if requested by the elected Transitional Government of Iraq;

11. Notes the creation of a distinct entity under unified command of the multinational force with a dedicated mission to provide security for the UN presence in Iraq, and requests Member States and relevant organizations to provide resources to support that entity;

12. Recognizes that the multinational force will also assist in building the capability of the Iraqi security forces and institutions, through a program of recruitment, training, equipping, mentoring and monitoring;

13. Requests Member States and international and regional security organizations to contribute assistance to the multinational force, including military forces, to help meet the needs of the Iraqi people for security and stability, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and to support the efforts of UNAMI;

14. Emphasizes the importance of effective Iraqi police, border enforcement, and Facilities Protection Service, under the control of the Interior Ministry of Iraq and, in the case of the Facilities Protection Service, other Iraqi ministries, for the maintenance of law, order, and security, including combating terrorism, and requests Member States and international organizations to assist the Interim Government of Iraq in building the capability of these Iraqi institutions;

15. Condemns all acts of terrorism in Iraq, reaffirms the obligation of Member States under resolutions 1373 (2001), 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), and 1526 (2004) and other relevant international obligations with respect, inter alia, to terrorist activities in Iraq or against its citizens, and specifically reiterates its call upon Member States to prevent the transit of terrorists to Iraq, arms for terrorists, and financing that would support terrorists, and reemphasizes the importance of strengthening the cooperation of the countries of the region, particularly neighbors or Iraq, in this regard;

16. Welcomes efforts by Member States to support the Interim Government of Iraq through the provision of technical and expert assistance;

17. Recognizes that the Interim Government of Iraq will assume Iraq's national responsibility for coordinating international assistance to Iraq;

18. Decides that the prohibitions related to the sale or supply to Iraq of arms and related materiel under previous resolutions shall not apply to arms or related materiel required by the multinational force or the sovereign government of Iraq to serve the purposes of this resolution, calls upon the multinational force and the sovereign government of Iraq each to ensure appropriate implementation procedures are in place, and stresses the importance for all States, particularly Iraq's neighbors, to strictly abide by them;

19. Reiterates its request that Member States, international financial institutions and other organizations strengthen their efforts to assist the people of Iraq in the reconstruction and development of the Iraqi economy, including by providing international experts and necessary resources through a coordinated program of donor assistance;

20. Notes that upon dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority the funds in the Development Fund for Iraq shall be disbursed at the direction of the Interim Government of Iraq and its successors, and decides that the Development Fund for Iraq shall be utilized in a transparent manner and through the Iraqi budget including to satisfy outstanding obligations against the Development Fund for Iraq, that the arrangements for the depositing of proceeds from export sales of petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas established in paragraph 20 of resolution 1483 (2003) shall continue to apply, that the International Advisory and Monitoring Board referred to in resolution 1483 (2003) shall continue its activities in monitoring the Development Fund for Iraq and shall include as an additional member of Iraq a duly qualified representative of the sovereign government of Iraq, that the provisions above shall be reviewed at the request of the Transitional Government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of this resolution, and that appropriate arrangements shall be made for the continuation of deposits of the proceeds referred to in paragraph 21 of resolution 1483 (2003);

21. Decides that, in connection with the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Interim Government of Iraq and its successors shall assume the rights, responsibilities and obligations relating to the Oil for Food Program that were transferred to the Authority pursuant to Resolution 1483 (2003), including all operational responsibility for the Program and any obligations undertaken by the Authority in connection with such responsibility, and responsibility for ensuring independently authenticated confirmation that goods have been delivered, and further decides that, following a 120 day transition period from the date of adoption of this resolution, the Interim Government of Iraq and its successors shall assume responsibility for certifying delivery of goods under contracts prioritized in accordance with that resolution, and that such certification shall be deemed to constitute the independent authentication required for the release of funds associated with such contracts;

22. Further decides that the provisions of paragraph 22 of resolution 1483 (2003) shall continue to apply, except that the privileges and immunities provided in that paragraph shall not apply with respect to any final judgment arising out of a contractual obligation entered into by Iraq after 30 June 2004;

23. Welcomes the commitments of creditors, including those of the Paris Club, to identify ways to reduce substantially Iraq's sovereign debt, calls on the Member States, as well as international and regional organizations, to support the Iraq reconstruction effort, urges the international financial institutions and bilateral donors to take the immediate steps necessary to provide their full range of loans and other financial assistance and arrangements to Iraq, recognizes that the Interim Government of Iraq will have the authority to conclude and implement such agreements and other arrangements as may be necessary in this regard, and requests creditors, institutions and donors to work as a priority on these matters with the Interim Government of Iraq and its successors;

24. Recalls the continuing obligations of Member States to freeze and transfer certain funds, assets and economic resources to the Development Fund for Iraq in accordance with paragraphs 19 and 23 of resolution 1483 (2003);

25, Calls upon all Member States to take appropriate steps within their respective legal systems to stay for a period of 12 months from 30 June 2004 all legal and other similar proceedings before their courts or other tribunals involving claims by or against the State of Iraq, its Government, or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including its State-owned enterprises or similar bodies;

26. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within three months from the date of this resolution on UNAMI operations in Iraq, and on a quarterly basis thereafter on the progress made toward national elections and fulfillment of all UNAMI's responsibilities;

27. Requests that the United States, on behalf of the multinational force, continue to report to the Security Council on the efforts and progress of this force as appropriate and not less than every six months;

28. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

More on Ghazi al-Yawar

From an informed Iraqi reader:

I thought I'd tell you a little bit about Ghazi Al-Yawer's background. He's a very good guy, and highly educated by Shammar standards. He is, however, only the nephew of the paramount shaykh (his uncle Muhsin) and not a big shaykh on his own. His uncle Muhsin spent the better part of thirty years in London, and never visited Iraq. He's married to the sister-in-law of Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia which is why the Shammar are so favored in Saudi Arabia, that, and of course, the historic ties of the Shammar of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Now Ghazi was nominated to the Governing Council by his other uncle, Humaidi, now deceased. This aroused strong enmity between himself and his cousins, Humaidi's sons. Humaidi was the acting shaykh and it was widely thought that, upon his death, one of his sons would take over his position. But they have been eclipsed by their cousin, Ghazi who was neither the son of the paramount nor acting shaykh. So now the Shammar are in limbo. In theory, Muhsin is still the paramount shaykh and did in fact visit Iraq after the US entry. But he is not very active. Meanwhile, the unknown Shammari, Ghazi, is set to become president of Iraq! No wonder Ghazi did not defer to Adnan al-Pachachi, as he reportedly deferred to the older Saleem who was later blown up. Even if Pachachi is his senior, we are talking about the Presidency of Iraq! This would put Ghazi, the Shammar and all educated, secular men on the map. What a great opportunity for this young man who never dreamed of being the paramount shaykh, let alone President of his country.

Washingtonpost.com: Iraq: New Government Takes Over

The Washington Post online kindly had me on for an online discussion of the developments in Iraq today.

For those who've asked for advance notice, I'll be on the Lehrer News Hour Tuesday evening.

New Iraqi Government Announced

How weak the Americans have become in Iraq became clear in Iraq on Tuesday when their choice for the ceremonial post of president of the transitional government had to withdraw in favor of Ghazi al-Yawar, the choice of the Interim Governing Council. Special UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi announced Pachachi as president with the blessing of lame duck American proconsul Paul Bremer. But almost immediately, Pachachi stepped down in favor of al-Yawar, feeling that he lacked the support on the IGC that would be necessary.

Al-Yawar was resisted by the Americans on a number of grounds. They were not sure of his commitment to the Interim Constitution hammered out by the IGC with Mr. Bremer in February. (I suspect he is viewed as insufficiently secular by the U.S. He lived in exile a long time in Saudi Arabia and is supported by the religious Shiite parties, which may suggest he favors shariah or Islamic personal status law--though he doesn't want religious law to be the only law of the state because of Iraq's pluralistic population). Al-Yawar also vocally criticized the American-crafted UN resolution now before the Security Council as being insufficiently clear about Iraqi sovereignty and control of military movements on Iraqi soil. Al-Yawar was critical of the US siege of Fallujah and served as a mediator in resolving that stand-off. He is therefore not a secular, pliant, pro-American sort of Iraqi president, and the CPA control freaks were wary of him.

I reported in November concerning the original Nov. 15 plan put forward by the Americans for elections based on the US-fostered provincial councils: ' Meanwhile, the leader of the Sunni [Shamar] tribe, Ghazi al-Yawir [Yawer] (a member of the Interim Governing Council), warned of large-scale protests at the secrecy surrounding the processes for electing the members of the new transitional council. He called for "A de facto end to the coccupation, not just in name alone." ' He is now in a prime position to press for such a de facto end to occupation, and that is presumably what the Americans fear.

The new government has two vice presidents. One is Ibrahim Jaafari, leader of the powerful Shiite al-Da`wa Party, the oldest and best organized party in Iraq now that the Baath is gone. Jaafari is now well placed to emerge as prime minister in the January elections. Lakhdar Brahimi had initially desired to avoid giving such posts to people like Jaafari, who will now try to use the advantages of incumbency to come to power. The other VP is the speaker of parliament of the Kurdish assembly, Rowsch Shaways, from the KDP of Massoud Barzani.

Ghazi al-Yawar on Iraqi Politics

Here are some documents on the new Iraqi president.

Some flavor of the new president can be gathered from this recent FNS interview.
----

Federal News Service

May 27, 2004 Thursday

LENGTH: 489 words

HEADLINE: INTERVIEW WITH GHAZI AL YAWAR, CURRENT PRESIDENT OF THE IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL, DISCUSSING THE EVENTS AT ANNAJAF AL ASHRAF (ABU DHABI TV, 10:00 (GMT+2) MAY 27, 2004)

BODY:


(Note: The following was translated from Arabic)

QUESTION: Would you be willing to intervene personally in trying to stop the fighting at Annajaf al Ashraf?

GHAZI AL YAWAR: I think that the issue of Annajaf al Ashraf is more difficult than that of al Faluja. Mr. Muqtada al Sadr has a large following. I am present on behalf of the Governing Council, and on my social standing to deal with this issue. But any work should be a part of group work for the sons of the region to pave the way for any involvement, and not a one person's involvement.

But it will honor me to undertake such an initiative in order to end the bloodshed of our dear families in this sacred city. Annajaf, al Faluja, Zakho, Basra, al Moussil, and Kirkuk are all like parts of a beautiful face. If one of these parts is disfigured, the entire face would be disfigured.

QUESTION: Once the authority is given to the new provisional government, who will be in charge of the new multinational forces in Iraq?

GHAZI AL YAWAR: I would assume that the leader of these forces, who will work with the Iraqis, would probably be American. Battalions of the Iraqi army will participate alongside this multinational force once the UN resolution is issued.

The important thing is not who will be in command of this force. The Iraqi armed forces will be under Iraqi command, but some battalions have to be under some foreign leadership irrelevant of who that leadership is.

QUESTION: Would you call for an Arab participation in these forces?

GHAZI AL YAWAR: We would welcome the Arab countries participation in these forces, as a part of the multinational forces in Iraq.

QUESTION: Do you have any idea as to the schedule or the time that these forces should stay in Iraq?

GHAZI AL YAWAR: There is no schedule, and we can't put a time limit because there are some bad elements who would wait for this date to come to restart their attacks. That's the reason why we did not have a time limit for the multinational forces.

But when the Iraqi leadership is ready to take the responsibility, we will not hesitate to thank our friend and request from them to leave Iraq. This, however, won't be any soon because its presence is a necessity.

QUESTION: There are some reports that after the transfer of power, the new American Embassy will relocate to the Republican Palace. Is this true?

GHAZI AL YAWAR: The Republican Palace, which was built in the 1950s is a symbol of sovereignty of Iraq, and many Iraqi leaderships used it. We will not accept the embassy relocating there and they have not asked.

QUESTION: Could you comment on President Bush's decision to raze the Abu Ghraib prison?

GHAZI AL YAWAR: President Bush was very clear in what he said. He asked if the Iraqis wanted it destroyed, and we, in the Governing Council said no. But the decision will be left for the new provisional government to make.

QUESTION: Thank you Mr. Ghazi Al Yawar, current President of the Governing Council.

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UPI, May 25, on al-Yawar's reaction to the UN resolution submitted by the US and the UK: "Rotating President Ghazi al-Yawer said Tuesday the draft disregarded Iraqi demands for granting the transitional government control over a national development fund and a multinational peacekeeping force that might be deployed under a United Nations' resolution."

---

April 10, on al-Jazeerah, via BBC world monitoring:

' SOURCE: Al-Jazeera TV, Doha, in Arabic 1306 gmt 10 Apr 04

BODY:
Text of live telephone Interview with Ghazi Ajil al-Yawir, member of the interim Iraqi Governing Council in charge of negotiations with the representatives of the Al-Fallujah residents, in Baghdad, by Al-Jazeera TV presenter Fayruz Zayyani in the Doha studio, broadcast by Qatari Al-Jazeera satellite TV on 10 April

Zayyani Are there any details about the negotiations which you held in Al-Fallujah?

Al-Yawir In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. The negotiating delegation is still in Al-Fallujah city. It has concluded a round of negotiations and it is holding now another round, but the most serious thing present there is the fact that the cease-fire has not been respected by both sides the US forces and the Al-Fallujah residents . The most serious issue is the intervention of the US Air Force and the F-16 jet fighters, which are raiding the city. We called the coalition parties and informed them about our condemnation and we expressed our surprise at these acts . We held them responsible for what they are doing and also for the safety of the delegation. We informed them that this situation would not allow calm negotiations to proceed.

Zayyani We heard that the Al-Fallujah residents were rejecting the arrival of any delegation that represented the Iraqi Governing Council IGC in the city. What changed these conditions and let you enter Al-Fallujah?

Al-Yawir This is not true. They did not reject us, but they blamed us for not making any moves towards them. We are moving as parties and in our capacity as having acquaintances and being well-known inside Al-Fallujah within tribal, religious and political circles. We are acceptable parties and we have with us the Muslim Ulema Council and many other benevolent parties. The situation is very serious and should come to an end peacefully.

Zayyani What about the humanitarian conditions in Al-Fallujah? You we were able to see the situation for yourself there. What is going on in the Al-Fallujah and what about your efforts there from the humanitarian viewpoint, in addition to the political efforts you are exerting now?

Al-Yawir The humanitarian situation is very bad and heartbreaking. We, with the benevolent forces, are doing a lot in collecting donations, but we hold the occupation forces, which are occupying Iraq - and according to the UN resolution - completely responsible for Iraq and responsible for allowing humanitarian and medical aid to enter into Al-Fallujah. These are Iraqi people and they the US forces are responsible, before international law, for their safety and for delivering the food stuff and aid to them.

Zayyani Ghazi Ajil al-Yawir, IGC member in charge of negotiations with the representatives of the Al-Fallujah residents, thank you.'

---

In February al-Yawar spoke out about the weakness of the Sunni Arabs on the Interim Governing Council to ash-Sharq al-Awsat (via BBC world monitoring):

'In their statements, Al-Yawar and Al-Chadirchi talked about the weakness of the Sunni voice in the political arena and in the Governing Council and the strength of the Shi'i and Kurdish voice.

Al-Yawar said that this went back to the period that accompanied the change of regime. During that period, he said, the Kurdish and Shi'i figures were closer to the coalition authority while the Sunnis were the weak link in this relationship. In several instances, he said, several Sunni figures were brought closer to the coalition authority following nominations or consultations with the other sides. He added that the interim Governing Council is not the only body that has political weight in the Iraqi arena. There are other Sunni religious and political parties and movements that should be relied upon and with whom alliances should be formed to strengthen the position of the Sunnis. We should blame ourselves for not coordinating our positions among ourselves both inside and outside the Governing Council, he said.

"Suspicions" about federation

Al-Yawar added, "The Iraqi Kurds have unified their voices and efforts and they are in agreement on their stands and demands. That is why we see them these days insisting on federal rule for their regions. This demand is something new and strange to Iraqi politics and to politics in the whole region. It is a vague demand that is subject to rumours and that entails doubts, suspicions and vagueness and that denotes a hard-line stand by the brother Kurds. They want to impose a federation on the Iraqi people despite the lack of census statistics and before any elections or general elections are held. They want to consecrate an ethnic federation whether the Iraqi people like it or not".

Al-Yawar said: "The Shi'is and Sunnis should work together to salvage what can be salvaged. They should not ignore the big issues, such as the issue of a federation. We have to sit with the brother Kurds and come to a frank understanding. This is a major problem; it is not an easy one. We have to understand what they really want and what they are planning for the future. Even Lakhdar Brahimi sensed this Iraqi problem and said that if the Iraqis did not wish to save their own country, no power on earth could help them. This is a fact." Al-Yawar added: "The Kurds are insisting on a federal rule while the brother Shi'is are insisting on elections although all the other forces insist that such elections are not feasible at present. The United Nations will adopt a similar stand; in other words, the current conditions are not suitable to hold such elections. What worries us most is the sectarian problem in Iraq. The issue of nationality between Arabs and Kurds is simple and can be surmounted. Sectarian sedition, however, is extremely dangerous, particularly since some neighbouring countries or some regional and international forces are encouraging such sedition".

"Misperception" of Sunni ties to former regime

Al-Yawar stated: "There is a misunderstanding that is lumping the Arab Sunnis in Iraq with Saddam Husayn. The misperception is that the Arab Sunnis were in the service of the former regime and that they enjoyed huge privileges under Saddam's rule. However, we all know that Saddam did not believe in any religion or sect. His injustices were inflicted on Sunnis, Shi'is, Kurds and all other national groups and sects. He did not differentiate between one Iraqi and another. Moreover, the Arab Sunnis of Iraq are the last people to think of sectarianism. All our ideas are purely Iraqi and nationalist ones. We can become a link between the Kurds and the Shi'is since we have nationalist links with both the Sunni and Shi'i Kurds. The Kurds are the most successful in coordinating their stands while the Shi'is understand one another the most. They hold periodic meetings called the "Al-Bayt Al-Shi'i" The Shi'i House whereas we have failed to hold such meetings due to personal or other reasons."

The member of the Governing Council added that it never crossed his mind that the configuration of the council would be formed on ethnic or sectarian bases and quotas. He said, "one week after the council was formed, I understood this was a process that the brothers had agreed upon in the London conference of the Iraqi opposition. I do not understand how a conference held in London two years ago could impose its will on 25 million Iraqis. I do not know how the quotas were determined. I believe that an accurate, scientific and neutral census under the supervision of the United Nations will reveal the real figures and ratios on condition that it is a fair census without armed militias." '

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January 22 in ash-Sharq al-Awsat via BBC world monitoring, on elections and Sistani:

' Ghazi Ujayl al-Yawir said Ayatollah Al-Sistani's view "is very important. He is the source of authority for a broad sector of the Iraqis. I am not saying Shi'is and Sunnis because we are all Muslims and the authority is the authority for Sunnis as it is for the Shi'is".

He added: "This religious leader is searching for the ideal solution for the issue of handing power over to the Iraqis. I do not believe there is any Iraqi who rejects holding free and honest elections. But how can these elections be free and honest when there are five armed militias affiliated to parties and political movements? Who will ensure the people's safety and how can the elections be held when there are the militias of the two Kurdish parties, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Al-Da'wah Party, National Congress and the Accord? How can the elections be free and honest when there are irregular armed forces? Security should be provided for the voter and we must ensure that no pressures are exerted on him. The presence of these militias sends a bad message to the Iraqi people confirming that the security situation in the country is out of control.. . "

Al-Yawir called for "amalgamating these militias in the Iraqi army and for their loyalty to be for Iraq and not a party, a political movement or a specific person" . . .

Al-Yawir went on to say . . . "Some want to stoke up the fire of sectarian sedition between the Shi'is and Sunnis. I say that there is not such a division in Iraq. We must say that the Iraqis are Arabs and Kurds and not Sunnis and Shi'is. It is odd that we do not hear anyone who says Iraq and demands Iraq's unification."

He concluded his statement by saying: "The important thing now is to restore Iraq's sovereignty and take over power from the occupiers. Any party delaying this causes us pain. The occupation is a wound to our dignity, at least morally. If we delay the hand-over of power, then everything will be delayed and this is not in the country's interest. The calls to rush the elections does not reflect the true image of what Iraqis want." '

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On December 10 al-Yawar gave an interview with a Kurdish newspaper, Hawlati, opposing decentralization and purely religious law (via BBC world monitoring):

' In an interview with Hawlati, the chief of Shammar tribe and member of the Iraqi Governing Council, Ghazi Ujayl al-Yawar, said he does not support the devolvement of governorates into a federal system because he fears that in place of one dictator we would get 25 in Iraq one for each of the 25 governorates. In the interview, he rejected religious governing system for Iraq. He said: "The Iraqi people are made up of a number of diverse national and religious groups. They should be taken into consideration. Our era is not the era of religious states." He expressed his support for federal status for Iraqi Kurdistan region . . .'

----------
Last December when a short-lived US plan was announced to retain several militias and meld them under Iyad Allawi into a new security force, al-Yawar went ballistic, according to Ed Wong of the NYT:

'The composition of the militia has raised concerns among some council members. Ghazi Yawar, a council member who does not represent any political parties, said forming a militia of soldiers from different parties could lead to violent factionalism. He added that the Governing Council was not consulted about this, and that only council members representing the five largest parties -- ones that would contribute soldiers -- took part in talks on the matter with General John Abizaid, the senior American military commander. "I am very outraged; this is stupid," Yawar said. "How many people are running Iraq? I'm very upset. This can lead to warlords and civil war. Should I form my own militia? I can have 20,000 people or more here. But that is not what I want to do." Yawar said the council members not involved in planning the creation of the militia had only learned about it on Saturday, after Talabani informed them of the proposal. His understanding of the militia differed somewhat from that of Mustafa's. Yawar said only five parties would contribute to the militia, with 160 to 200 people picked by each party.'

-----

On November 25, Joel Brinkley of the NYT reported Yawar's opposition to a plan to retain the IGC as a sort of senate even after a caretaker government was elected. One gets a sense that a lot of al-Yawar's complaints really had to do with Ahmad Chalabi and his clique.

' "This is from people who have a fear of losing a grip on things," said council member Ghazi Ajil al-Yawar, an important tribal sheik. "If we do this, we will be another Yasser Arafat," the Palestinian leader whose enemies accuse him of routinely reneging on agreements. Among the proponents of keeping the council intact in some manner are leaders of its most important factions, including the two major Kurdish parties, powerful Shiite clerics and prominent exile leaders including Ahmed Chalabi. '

Maneuvering over Transitional Government Continues

Al-Hayat reports that Paul Bremer has put enormous pressure on the Interim Governing Council not to vote on its candidate for president, which might have had the effect of ensconcing the candidate. It is thought that 22 of the 25 IGC members favor Ghazi al-Yawer, a civil engineer and prominent member of the powerful Sunni Shamar clan.

Al-Hayat says that Ghazi al-Yawer was the candidate of the Shiite establishment and the Kurdish parties, while UN special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi objected to him and preferred Adnan Pachachi as an independent candidate, or some other independent chosen by Brahimi himself.

Some sources said that UN special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi had boycotted Monday's meeting in protest at the way the Interim Governing Council had just announced on Friday that Iyad Allawi would be prime minister, thus usurping a prerogative that had been granted to the United Nations to choose the candidates. The agreement stipulates that the IGC is only one of three parties, and that it cannot act alone.

Kurdish IGC member Mahmud Uthman (Osman) on the other hand implied that Brahimi had become so weak that he was represented by Bremer at IGC meetings, suggesting that he is nothing more than an American puppet. (Since the IGC has been accused of the same thing, it must have been satsifying to Uthman to be able to make that charge).

An American source at the Coalition Provisional Authority leaked to Agence France Presse the statement that "It is just a complete fabrication that the competition for the post of president is confined to al-Yawer and Pachachi. We are seeking to ensure that the president and a third of the new ministers are political personalities not serving on the Interim Governing Council."

al-Hayat learned that the foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, will retain his post, as will Planning Minister Mahdi al-Hafidh, Culture Minister Mufid al-Jaza'iri, and the minister of science and technology (Rashad Omar ). The power post of Interior Minister, sort of like US Homeland Security Secretary combined with director of the FBI, will probably go to Fallah Hasan al-Naqib, the governor of Salahuddin (al-Hayat says Tikrit) and a close friend of Iyad Allawi. The ministry of finance may go to Adil Abdul Mahdi, a member of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. The Minister for Women's Affairs will probably be Nermin Mufti (a Kurdish name). (The only Nermin Mufti I could find on the internet seemed fairly angry about the US occupation and appears to have been deeply involved in Occupation Watch. But it may be a common name for all I know and not the same person.).

The four current candidates for president are Ra'd Mawlud Mukhlis, a surgeon and head of "The Bloc for the Sake of Iraq;" Muhsin al-Yawer, chieftain of the Shamar tribe and uncle of Ghazi al-Yawer; Ibrahim Faisal al-Ansari, former head of the joint chiefs of staff in the mid-1960s; and Shakir Mahmud Shakir, the former minister of defense in the mid-1960s.

Iyad Allawi as Prime Minister and Fallah al-Naqib as Interior Minister are obviously strong wins for the CIA and the State Department in Iraq, and further signs of the decline of Pentagon political power, which will be reduced to the uniformed military on June 30. Although the Allawis are also related to Pentagon-backed (and now disgraced) Ahmad Chalabi, they are his rivals and form a distinctive clique (Ali Allawi, currently defense minister, is some sort of cousin to Iyad; he is a nephew of Chalabi but disagreed with him on dissolving the army and punishing all Baathists). Note that Chalabi's close friends are being replaced. Thus, the old minister of finance was Kamel al-Gailani, a close Chalabi associate who supported unbridled robber baron capitalism. It is also significant that his successor is from the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a Shiite religious party with strong ties to Iran. Bloomberg has done a useful but completely uncritical profile of Iyad Allawi.

Colin Powell at State has gotten control of the $18 billion in reconstruction aid voted by Congress, very little of which the Pentagon managed to disburse. The CIA will reportedly put $3 billion into building up a new Iraqi secret police. Iyad Allawi, who is called "Iyad al-Baathi" on the streets in Iraq, has long had an interest in rebuilding the secret police which seems to me sinister. It is a little shocking that Brahimi should have been willing to be party to this appointment. But I suspect he believes that Allawi cannot be elected to anything important in January, since he has no grassroots support and is widely disliked for his 1970s Baath background before he broke with the party. He had organized ex-Baath officers in the 1990s, some of whom were even more recent converts from the Baath ideology.

Al-Naqib became governor of Salahuddin under suspicious circumstances, which I reported last February. I later learned from CPA sources that the previous governor, whom he replaced, had been accused of extensive corruption. I wrote of Naqib, "Al-Naqib's father had been a major general in the Iraqi army in the 1970s and then the Baath government's ambassador to Sweden at the end of the 1970s. He broke with the Saddam regime and became a political refugee in Syria. Al-Naqib himself has an engineering B.Sc. He is the 10th governor of Salahuddin in modern Iraq, and the article calls him the first to be elected. He is the first to hail from Samarra'."

Miller as Chalabi Stenographer

Franklin Foer's profile of Judith Miller of the NYT and the way in which her over-dependence on the Iraqi National Congress and Ahmad Chalabi besmirched her journalistic career asks an implicit question. It is, "How could she have avoided this disaster?"

I think the problem came about because she started doing a different type of reporting. There is a difference between getting a story about bureaucratic infighting in Washington and getting a story about Iraq's weapons programs. In the first sort of story, you can rely on principals to some extent, who are actually doing the fighting. You have to take into account that they are principals, of course, and seek some balance by talking to people on the other side. But the principals do have a fight going on, and are eager to put a good light on their role in it, to get out their side of the story. And if the story is their side of the story, then you've got it if you have the right people in the rollodex.

But Iraqi weapons programs or internal politics were a different type of story altogether. Miller had no access to the Iraqi principals. And the INC and the US Department of Defense were interested parties and outsiders, who were alleging things not in evidence. It wasn't like Washington infighting.

Miller's mistake could have been avoided by going outside the INC circle to other Iraqi experts. For instance, there were Iraqi nuclear scientists in the West unconnected to INC and Chalabi who were disgusted at the propaganda and said openly that the nuclear program was dismantled after the Gulf War. These were insiders of a sort. Miller did not seek them out or listen to them. Imad Khadduri [scroll down after clicking] was such a source, and I wrote about his account at length in February of 2003 before the war. (I.e. I was right and Miller was wrong).

Miller could also have asked around in the Iraq Middle East Studies establishment for academic views outside the beltway. Although some academics are themselves policy advocates, very large numbers are actually trying to see the world as it is, and often offer a good corrective to more self-interested accounts.

Foer does not make much of the fact that Miller co-authored her book about Saddam with Laurie Mylroie, a major purveyor of disinformation to the Washington power elite. Mylroie's assertions are so bizarre that they in my view raise the question of whether someone somewhere is actually paying her to say these weird things. That Miller has some kind of close association with her raises other questions. The book that Miller and Mylroie co-authored, by the way, at one point professes puzzlement as to why in the world Eisenhower grew angry and made Israel give back the Sinai after the 1956 war. Inability to understand that an American president would be unhappy about a secret neocolonial plot against Egypt sprung suddenly in late October just before an American election points to an ideological hard edge that may explain why Miller got so many things so wrong.

Kufa Fighting Flares; Bombs in Baghdad

Fighting flared again Sunday and Monday between Mahdi Army militiamen and US troops, who are apparently trying to reconquer the police stations in the city. Fierce fighting continued late Monday. 2 US troops and dozens of Mahdi Army fighters are dead. CNN reports that local US military commanders insist that Muqtada either disavow the Kufa fighters for breaking the ceasefire, or he will be held accountable for the attacks on US troops (no mention of gradual US military encroachment on key points in the city).

Taking the police stations as "anchors" of the Shiite urban communities was a widespread tactic of the Mahdi Army when the insurgency broke out in early April. One US counter-strategy, little reported on in a systematic way, has been gradually to take back these anchor points. The problem for the US is that the real power centers of the Mahdi Army are the slum tenements where the armed youth live and organize, and which are impenetrable to the US military (and they were relatively impenetrable to Saddam's secret police, too.)

The drum of violence beat on: a big bomb also went off near the Green Zone; two US troops were killed in separate incidents; British civilian contractors were ambushed Sunday; and a woman and her child were killed by a mortar round on Sunday in Mosul.

Bill Safire in his New York Times column today begins with a litany of unreported good news. One item is that attacks on US troops were half in May what they had been in April. This sort of statistic is profoundly dishonest. In April, the US launched assualts on both Fallujah and the Shiite south with specific goals in mind. In both cases, the US military failed for political reasons and had to back off. May saw instead negotiation and background military maneuver, including increased dependence on local proxy fighters. Of course the attacks on US troops were many fewer in May. But that datum is useless in a vacuum. April had seen the greatest violence since the end of the war in April of 2003. Safire's way of putting makes it seem as though there were a linear, secular improvement of the security situation. There is no such thing (see above), and it is a form of lying to imply that there is.

The Financial Times reported last week that Iraqi petroleum exports were down by 1 million barrels a day in May, much more than initially estimated. Bombings at a facility in the south and of the Kirkuk line in the north have been devastating. The bombings wiped out the entire OPEC increase in production quotas and are part of a new phenomenon in which insecurity is driving prices higher through speculation. (About $10 a barrel of the current $40 a barrel price is estimated to be owing to speculation). The Khobar terrorist incident in Saudi Arabia on Sunday will likewise probably drive prices higher.

Portrait of a Rebellion

In These Times has made my analysis of the Shiite rebellion of the past two months available online. It came out about a week ago and so before the recent "truce," but is still valuable for a narrative of the background.

In these Times
May 24, 2004
"Portrait of a Rebellion
Shiite insurgency in Iraq bedevils U.S."

By Juan Cole


The Great Uprising of early April 2004 boiled along into May, leaving Iraq in continued turmoil. The Bush administration unwisely provoked rebellions in both Fallujah and Najaf (and other southern Shiite towns) by deciding to put down small symbolic acts of defiance with massive force. In Fallujah, Geroge W. Bush ordered the American military to retreat from that Sunni Arab city and to rehabilitate the Baathist forces once associated with Saddam Hussein to help restore order. Yet in Najaf, Bush has been unyielding in his determination to arrest or kill the young radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and destroy his militia. That determination could tip the Shiite south into long-term instability.

Given the drumbeat of bombings and assassinations, most recently of Izzedine Salim, president of the interim government of Iraq, the country cannot take much more instability. The transfer of sovereignty scheduled for June 30 is not in doubt, since it simply requires some appointments and paperwork. But endowing the new government with any popular support and political reality will be difficult if the country is in flames. By mid-May, the Najaf home of the preeminent mainstream Shiite leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, was being sprayed by machine gun fire from unknown assailants. This raises the specter of his loss to assassination, as well, which could further radicalize the Shiites.

Al-Sadr, 30, inherited a large and active Shiite dissident movement from his father, who, under the nose of Saddam Hussein, had established it in the Shiite slums of the southern cities. The Baath Party found it difficult to penetrate and control the teeming ghetto of East Baghdad, allowing the Sadrist organization to flourish there. In 1999, Saddam had Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada’s father, killed along with Muqtada’s two older brothers. Muqtada Al-Sadr went underground and emerged over the next four years as a new, sectarian leader of Iraq’s dispossessed, guided by an ideology that differed little from that of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, his father’s teacher.

Read the rest here.

Wrangling over President delays Announcement

Rajiv Chandrasekaran of the WP summarizes the deadlock on the new prime minister among the Iraqi Governing Council, Paul Bremer, and special UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. The Council opposes the naming of Adnan Pachachi as transitional president, because he is perceived as too complaisant toward the US. It wants Shaikh Ghazi al-Yawer of the Sunni Shammar tribe. Al-Hayat said that Bremer had compromised by giving the Council a choice of 4 outsiders.

The US is clearly maneuvering here, to have the Iraqi government that it can deal with after the June 30 transition. Al-Yawer is known to be nationalistic, and was especially vocal about the siege of Fallujah.