Why would exercising influence in postwar Iraq be a strategic goal of such importance? It would be nice I suppose, but hardly worth spending tens of billions?

Yes, it is smart.

Influence in Iraq (ie oil contracts?) hardly important.

Success is Iraq is in their interest? Indeed, very much so, but more money from them would likely mean less money from the US rather than more money to Iraq.

Improving relations with US? Is indeed imperative, but this is not the way to do it. Rewarding the US for treating them like dirt will strengthen that tendency in US policy, which will long term cause further damage to relations.

#2 and #3 doesn’t apply to Afghanistan however. There Europe should step up to plate´, even though the US won’t.

And how influential is Tony “Poodle” Blair, these days ? More likely E.U. governments will continue to be uninfluential no matter how much they pledge to the U.S.

That said, if they’re after influence in postwar Iraq, they’re better off holding off on the big money until after the U.S. pulls out.

Are you sure, the numbers are correct? I’m wondering a bit, since I’ve read here that germany gives 193.000.000 Dollar (100 millions with the Eu help and 93 millions extra) and can’t give more, which I support. Germany spends lots of money in Afghanistan and as everyone knows, so great can’t the german economy be called, right now. I think this sum is all a responsible gouvernment can give without acting against the voters will.
So what is the point? If it comes to reaching the policemen and doing the paperwork (like teaching the police, building the administration and so on), Europeans will be - as usual - asked and active, or do you have any doubts about that?

It’s a bit of a puzzle, Doug, I agree.

But there’s a good chance it’s good old rational free riding. The following is an entry about the post war scenario I wrote pre-war, back in February. I assumed that the US would prefer to reduce its visibility after things would not work out the way they planned, which would increase Europe’s clout in the region which would have to be paid for then, of course. What I did not think of then was that it could go that bad in Iraq that Europe’s clout would grow even if the US pays for Iraq. Think of Tehran last week. Everybody is happy about the Mullahs slowing down their quest for the bomb for the moment. But they did this with Europe - not the US. My guess is that they will commit more money once the dust has settled and once there will be a clearer idea of what is going to happen in Iraq. As I said in my post about the French revolution: Explaining to the Bush admin in financial terms that going it alone does indeed mean going it alone is important for future transatlantic relations. That there are sufficient budgetary reasons to justify stingyness is even better. For the time being America pays while the Arab world increasingly looks to Europe to translate to American - it won’t last forever, but I think it is certainly rational to exploit such a windfall. In my judgement, the final deal will include a section on the Israeli-Palestinian problem. That, of course, would cause problems for Bush among the GOP’s hard core christian zionists which would not come handy given his battered state of affairs. Then again, the amount of money needed in Iraq isn’t exactly small either, so I think the White House’s electoral math & map for 2004 holds the key to increasing European contributions.

Anyway, this is what I wrote in February about a Europe free riding.

“Parallels.

Lately, I’ve been thinking about some historic parallels that could provide a usually forgotten perspective concerning the “transatlantic rift”. I’ve been thinking about a tale of exploitation from Eastern Europe. At least from the 1980s on, probably even before, Eastern European satellite states materially exploited the Soviet Union because they traded administratively overpriced low quality manufactured goods for world market priced raw materials. The Soviets probably knew what was going on, but thinking about Poland’s Solidarnosc experience they supposedly realised that there was a price to pay for continued hegemony in the 1980s.

I know I am restating the obvious but as the world does certainly not suffer from scarcity of misunderstanding these days - let me be clear about this: I am by no means implying that the US-European relationship is even slightly reminiscient of the Russian Cold War imperialism in Eastern Europe. I should also say that the argument below is based on the assumption that the Iraqi government will be changed forcefully at some point this year, which I am, personally, very sceptical about. My position is probably most accurately reflected by the French one. I’m against war. But if I can’t avoid it anymore, I would at least like to retain some influence over the process, please.

Well, one interpretation of the (generalised) European attitude towards American activities to improve the reliability of Middle Eastern natural energy resource supply as well as US attempts to reshape the political landscape of the region by redistributing the oil profits - ok, the last argument is clearly speculative, but popular large scale redistributions of formerly privatised oil-income would be the obvious starting point for me if I were to convince sceptic Arab polulations of my good intentions as a hegemonic power and the benefits of “democracy” - could be that Europe is taking advantage of American policies in a way reminding me of the former Eastern European trading patterns. It could be that Europe behaves as a rational free rider of American policy.

The world oil market is one big pool and everyone gets the same prices. Given such a pool, it is probably correct to assume that a straightforward American control of the oil-to-market interfaces in the Middle East will also benefit the European economy - in case oil prices as well as oil price volatility come down as a long term result of increased security in the region.

But should the overall impact of a hostile takeover be unfortunate (in all possible respects), Europe will still be able to say, ’look, Dubya, we told you so.’ Then, however, Europe might be forced out of its free rider position because its clout in the region will have grown substancially. Then it will be expected to act accordingly.

Either way, and moral troubles aside for the moment, things don’t look too bleak for Europe. If the US policy will be succesful in the short run

(definition: get rid of Saddamq quickly and without too many civilian and American victims, not too much bad press, no upward impact on the oil prices that would further shock a world economy already in doldrums, and most importantly, no large scale terrorist attacks in the US (and to a lesser extent, elsewhere in the West.))

as well as in the long run

(definition: bringing unused Iraqi oil reserves to market thereby reducing the salience of Saudi Arabia as swing producer (easy part), establishing a pro US government as well as a longer term presence in Iraq as a local home base for the “New Great Game” (less easy), redistributing Oil proceeds in a way beneficial to the long term goal of helping the “Islamic reformation”, that is, education, education, education (very difficult), shaking up the Arab peninsula in order to get rid of the weak autocratic regimes without creating too many Mohammed Attas)

it is clearly good for Europe. In this case, it’s also going to be a bit good cop, bad cop (or Venus and Mars…) - the US might want reduce her visibility as hegemonic power and European nations would step in to manage the nation-building process. European politicians mostly talk about this kind of burden-sharing engagement as “picking up the reconstruction bill”. But let’s face it - even if that were the case, if the overall outcome of the conflict is not too desastrous, it would probably be a good investment and enhance the European clout in the region. And given that nation-building (including the redistributive policies mentioned above) will in all likelihood be paid out of oil revenues (which the US will not be able to use to pay for the invasion itself) it looks like it’s predominantly the bad cop that will pay the bill this time.

Of course, the free rider argument does not explain the current situation in its entirety. But it does shed some light on the fact that European governments might have had to choose from a slightly different set of policy options if it weren’t for the determined American military presence. Do you really think that Europeans would be able to pose as noble minded people all the time if they had to the dirty work of ensuring energy supply themselves?

Hardly.”

Those who will really have influence in Iraq in the future are those blowing stuff to bits. The US influence is diminishing ans will eventually disappear. It’s a good practice not to invest much into a loosing side (=US).

Plus, of course, in the increasingly implausible event that the American intervention actually works out, does anyone really think Cheney et al. are going to consent to a division of the pie that favours anyone except themselves?

My personal theory, which is mine, is that Cheney et al. thought Iraq was going to be a pushover and deliberately made the least convincing case possible for intervention, precisely so as to take the lion’s share of the spoils. (I don’t see any reason to think that they bothered to brief poor, stupid Dubya - “Gee, Mr President it sure is too bad about the French, huh? I thought you were terrific!”)

On the other hand, I must say I’m fascinated that this blog has followed all its predecessors in its ecological niche in turning into a forum where Americans come to denounce Yoorpeans for not being them. But not, perhaps sadly, so fascinated that I can be arsed to read it anymore.

Influence in post-war Iraq is not dependent on the amount of aid offered. Influence in post-war Iraq is not even dependent on the closeness of diplomatic ties with Washington.

The first question is, what value direct influence in Iraq has to the EU per sé. There are two main economic concerns: oil-price stability, and income via CPA governmental contracts. With regards to oil prices, the EU’s and US’s interests dovetail, so it does not matter who is in charge as long as prices stay stable. With respect to the second, if reconstruction is to be financed in part by EU donations, it would merely be circuitous subsidy.

The argument can be made that supporting Iraq reconstruction would boost the EU’s ties with the US. This argument is somewhat dubious; after all in the US Democratic support for the war gained them precious little in return from the Bush Administration or the Republican Party. Quid pro quo works only if both sides are offering each other something, and I’ve yet to see what the US’s offer is.

Finally, the argument can be made that EU aid should be offered out of purely altruistic motives, for the sake of Iraqis themselves. This is the most compelling argument. However the EU-wide economic malaise, widespread antipathy towards the war, and the hostility of the Bush Administration towards the EU in the run-up towards the war (“Saddam-lovers”, “irrelevant”, “ingrates”, “Old Europe”) all contribute to donor fatigue. Combine this with the fact that the security situation in Iraq is highly unfavourable at present, and the fact that the Bush Administration has been less than transparent and honest with regards to the state of their operations in Iraq - a situation that would make even well-intentioned donors hestitate before pouring money into such a venture.

The wisest course for the EU would be to wait for order and stability in Iraq to be secured, and the order and transparency on the part of the CPA, if not the Iraqis, to improve, before funnelling massive amounts of financial aid to Iraq.

I’ll pick up a few cents that have scattered from the fistful of comments here.

I do find it genuinely odd that Germany and France took a pass. My questions outlined some reasons that I thought might explain the choice, and I’m glad to have evoked an interesting and generally enlightening response. In addition to the three possibilities I advanced (influential regardless, pique and democratic sensibilities), two more have been advanced: that contributing right now isn’t worth doing, or the weakness of European economies.

On the one hand, these factors do well for explaining France and Germany: the convergence of government & public opposition, the negative reaction from the US administration, economic weakness and belief in eventual influence all come together most forcefully in France in Germany. On the other hand, these are two of the three EU countries that profess to play important roles on the global stage.

Like it or not, Iraq is at present the top agenda on the global agenda. By taking a pass, France and Germany miss the opportunity to shape that agenda, they miss a chance to show what they can do, they miss the opening to build influence. And those are not the kinds of opportunities that influence-seeking states tend to let slip by.

I don’t buy the argument that these two European states will make major contributions later (either buying into success or rescuing from failure, depending on whose reasoning you subscribe to). The track record of these donor conferences - think Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan - shows that the headline figure from the first conference is the upper boundary of international assistance. In the years that follow, the struggle is to get the donors to live up to their commitments, as the problem slips from the daily news and new crises arise. I’m willing to stand corrected in the face of accurate figures, but recent examples don’t support the idea of major infusions of funds later in the game.

Lili, I may not have the full story on the pledges; but you could quadruple the reported EU contribution and still be just over 10 percent of the US contribution. This may lead to David’s first point - the price of significant influence would just be too high.

Elliott, I’d be interested in learning more about the sources of influence in postwar Iraq, and, perhaps, the Near East more broadly considered. Also, I’d add that the administration’s intemperate rhetoric was not addressed toward the entire EU, but more specifically at France, Germany and, conceivably, Belgium. Significant EU governments - UK, ES, IT - took a different view and were addressed differently. Equating the Elysee with the EU is an error that I hope only Chirac is prone to; certainly after next May this equation should be even less sustainable.

Finally, a more open-ended question. Several posters have said that the EU countries are free riding on security goods provided by thte US. What is the proper US response to such a strategy? Perhaps more pointedly, how much voice should free riders have in steering a system they are riding on? I’m genuinely interested in peoples’ thoughts on everything raised in this post.

Doug

Re: influence

Countries are generally influenced most by their geophysical neighbours, their trading partners, and their military alliances. Not by those who contributed the largest reconstruction sums.

Keeping the attention of Israeli and Egyptian leaders costs the US around six billion dollars annually; that’s a large amount of money for often miserly co-operation on the part of the recepients.
Who makes the greatest financial contributions to the Palestinian Authority? The EU. How much aid does Israel fork out annually to the PA? Zero. Who has the most influence in the Occupied Territories? Israel.

Therefore I predict that Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Jordan will have a greater impact on future Iraqi society than Japan, whatever the outcome of the current situation. I predict that statements by Iranian clerics will be listened to more attentively by the Iraqi public than statements by German prime ministers.

Doug

Re: free-riding

From a US foreign policy perspective for the last 50 years, European free-riding on US security goods is an enormous policy success, and absolutely not a problem. The US has been consistent in torpedoing every single independent European defence policy proposed since World War 2. Key word here is “independent”. The famous Bartholomew Telegram from 1991 in response to the WEU European Defence Initiative made the US’s standpoint abundantly clear:

“No European caucus inside NATO; no marginalisation of non-EC members of NATO; no alternative defence organisation for Europeans. “

This is at sharp odds with the image carefully fed to the US public, of course, about ungrateful Europeans unwilling to defend themselves.

I hope I don’t have to explain why the US has consistently pursued the strategy as outlined in the Bartholomew Telegram, a strategy which dates back to Eisenhower. It has been a positive-sum strategy, in general, for both sides. Which is why US politicial who use the “free-riding” meme as a convenient whipping-horse for electoral grandstanding had better be careful not to push it too far.

“in turning into a forum where Americans come to denounce Yoorpeans for not being them”

Can anybody translate this. I’m having difficulty, if it’s English then I obviously don’t understand the meaning of some widely used English words.

On the general topic. I am really confused, and worried. Looking at what happened yesterday I don’t know where things are leading. I don’t even see what could be a US exit strategy, or what would replace them. More than anything I’m not sure how easy it is to guarantee the future of an entity termed ’Iraq’. This is the point about Laurence of Arabia and the Balkans. You have three groups there who seem to be headed in different directions fast. Especially if Informed Comment is right and the bombing is coming from pan-Arab nationalists and not fundamentalists.

The best thing the EU can do? Reign-in Turkey by advancing the membership negotiations, in case things turn nasty in a disintegration scenario.

I’m not saying this will happen, I’m just saying it would be prudent from here on in to prepare for a variety of eventualities.

Yoorpeans :) - a reference to the inhabitants of that mythical and fabulous country Yerp, which as Kieran Healy eloquently pointed out:

”
Yerp

Matthew Yglesias is right to point out that the American media “when presenting “European” opinion, [has] a tendency to ignore the fact that there are a whole bunch of different countries in Europe.” This happens all the time. Conservatives love to bash Europe as decadent, weak and helpless without U.S. protection. Liberals sigh and pine for “socialized medicine” and other bits of the welfare state.

My favorite example of this comes from the blurb on the back of packets of Pepperidge Farm Milano Cookies, which begins “Imagine strolling down the cobbled streets to your favorite European bake shop…” Indeed. If only it continued “As you converse with the owner in fluent European…””

“By taking a pass, France and Germany miss the opportunity to shape that agenda, they miss a chance to show what they can do”

Sorry to come back so soon, but did you consider, they may not know what to do? I don’t know what can be done, and I don’t consider myself especially stupid. I think the US administration doesn’t look too confident that it has a strategy. Militarily they’re in a big bind. In some ways what we are looking at here is worse than Vietnam. At least in Vietnam you had the Brass Hats arguing for having their hands untied so they could go for the military solution. Here the element of surprise, of deciding what, where and when, all of this initiative is in the hands of the enemy. The military handbook doesn’t offer too many alternatives here. Precisely they can’t follow the French in Algiers or Sharon in Gaza. If they start that they’ve already lost.

So I think people are waiting. I can understand why. I don’t think it needs to be deliberate, I don’t think people are taking sadistic pleasure. Not every problem comes with one, ready-made, solution. Maybe a change at the top in the US? At this point in time who knows? And meantime down the hill we go.

Doug,
“I may not have the full story on the pledges; but you could quadruple the reported EU contribution and still be just over 10 percent of the US contribution.”

What an unusual role-reversal.
But please note that the aid the U.S. pledged is less than a quarter of the $87Billion Bush requested from Congress; the rest is for continuing military operations in Iraq. Think about the priorities being broadcast here ?

Also note that the pledge upper-bounds observation applies as much, if not more, to the Bush administration.

God, sometimes I think I must have a sixth sense. I just went over to informed comment and found this:

“In an interview with al-Zaman, Iran’s Supreme Jurisprudent, Ali Khamenei, said that he was extremely worried by the complex and confusing issue of Iraq, and that he prayed daily for the unity of the Iraqi people. He expressed concerns that there were forces that wanted to see Iraq split up, and said that Iraqis should fight them. He urged that they craft a constitution that expressed their national identity and ethnic plurality, but also addressed the issue of modernity.

It is not clear who he thinks wants Iraq to split up, but he probably has the US in mind. Some neoconservatives have long argued for breaking up the country, which would permanently weaken it. The break-up seems unlikely to happen, since none of the neighbors, including Turkey, would stand for it.”

No please note, I am not advocating break up, quite the contrary, but I am expressing the fear that the impact of the war may have unleashed forces which lead in this direction.

Edward, I do think that not knowing what to do is a big part of it - and with Schroeder coming back from EU summits early to shepherd reforms through parliament, there are clearly dozens of things he’d rather be doing than foreign policy, especially Iraq. I hadn’t thought about partition, either intentional or accidental, but it’s worth some brain time.

P(G), military operations will be more expensive than the civilian efforts. This is not a surprise.

Elliott, I’ll buy in on the influence factors, especially if you include occupying powers in the military part. Geographically shaped influence goes in both directions, of course, with events in Iraq having substantial effects on the neighbors you list.

European free-riding post-WWII has also been a whacking great success from the W. European point of view. Possibly the longest period of continual peace since Westphalia. In ECE, it was more of a mixed bag, but has definitely improved since 89 and is set to get even better from May 04.

Thus to insiders, the free-rider discussion has long been a bit of political kabuki: well-rehearsed rituals with a generally well-known conclusion, usually the European partners paying more than they wanted but less than the US would have liked (payment not always cash, sometimes political capital). It was also quite different from what various European publics were told by their governments.

What’s different now, is that there is no longer a limit to how bad relations can get between the two sides. Governments on either side of the Atlantic can drive the process, if they so desire, and I think Schroeder’s campaign in the summer of 2002 shows how such a desire could emerge and how it could escalate. It would be much harder to do from the American side, because the broad US public is benignly disinterested in Europe and the experts are very well informed. In contrast, America is much more present in, for example, Germany.

The fundamental US calculation is that the benefits of carrying the international system outweigh the irritations. Thus the bellyaching about burden-sharing and the European posturing that the system is a given and thus cost-free.

Could anything change this fundamental calculation? Has Sepember 11th changed it already? Could it change incrementally? Do European governments need to think about this possibility?
We’ve gone beyond the initial questions, but it’s getting interesting…

Doug
re: “The fundamental US calculation is that the benefits of carrying the international system outweigh the irritations. “

I don’t see in what way the realities underlying US policy of the past half century has changed. It is always much cheaper to have Europe as relatively fangless allies than as well-armed potential competitors and antagonists. September 11 has not altered this fact one whit; it has underscored in fact the US’s need to spend resources focussing on real adversaries rather than having to keep an eye on a Europe busy wandering off by itself.

The problem, I think, is that the current neo-conservative school in Washington has been drinking too much of its own Kool Aid, to use an American turn of phrase. That’s a real pity, foreign policy-wise, but reality has an unfortunate habit of intervening now and then.

I’m not sure the French and Germans would have any say in postwar Iraq even if they did contribute - there’s every reason to think Bush will continue his current “you’re either with us or against us” approach. Any contribution would be about building relations with the United States, not about gaining some say in Iraq.

Yes, that’s true, I didn’t think about it.

I must say I am puzzled by Doug’s puzzlement.

Doug,
military operations will be more expensive than the civilian efforts. This is not a surprise.

(a) It eventually came out that the $67B wasn’t actually needed just yet.
(b) the $20B is well below the estimate the U.N. made of what was needed. And no one realistically expected the rest of the world to be able to fully fund the difference.

To spell out what this implies about the priorities:
(a) The effort to crush the Iraqis will be fully funded, no questions asked because we Must Support Our Troops…
(b) The effort to rebuild Iraq is only for show. As political cover. (“it’s not our fault the reconstruction is underfunded, those greedy Europeans didn’t contribute enough”, even though Iraq is the U.S.’s responsibility, not Europe’s)

Tobias: while I concur with you in that Europe is a freeloading (free-riding) entity, the real question is: can a free-rider be a leader? I think not. Europe shows a remarkable lack of initiative, unless the US is also involved.

As to efforts to curb Iran, while I applaud European efforts on this, I think that European media has overplayed the significance of the agreement. The treaty is still remarkably loose, and fails to incorporate the cornerstone of successful US-USSR nuclear treaties: trust, but verify.

Until Iran grants complete, surprise-inspection access to its nuclear facilities, all of Europe’s efforts have been in vain.

Let us not forget that the overriding concern is not US action against Iran, but Israeli action: specifically, an Israeli air strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. In fact, the European diplomatic effort failed in this respect: instead of basking in the glare of European media, the Euro diplomats should have followed up with an overture to Israel - and convinced them that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are not a threat.

An opportunity was missed to bring Israel into the process, and to bring Europe and Israel closer together, thus increasing Europe’s influence in the Middle East. Yet, curiously - or not so curiously, if we take European anti-Semitism into account - no effort was made in this direction.

Thus, given the lack of effort Europe has shown for Israeli relations, the one entity that can bring their foreign policy initiative tumbling down… is still left with wide room for manoeuver.

“No European caucus inside NATO; no marginalisation of non-EC members of NATO; no alternative defence organisation for Europeans. “

This is at sharp odds with the image carefully fed to the US public, of course, about ungrateful Europeans unwilling to defend themselves.

The two have absolutely nothing to do with each other. Most Americans I know wish Europe was more of an equal partner. Europeans having larger militaries has nothing whatsoever to do with Europe creating its own faction in NATO. You could fund armies that contribute more to NATO, but you don’t. Your belief that having a better-funded military necessarily means factionalizing NATO is specious.

As for the deal with Iran, most Americans I know scoffed. There’s no enforcement mechanism. This will be about as succesful as the deal with Hiter was. The deal with North Korea was.

linden:

“Most Americans I know wish Europe was more of an equal partner.”

The US could start by placing its troops under European command every now and then, instead of insisting that C&C of all joint NATO operations be under its exclusive control. European nations ponying up more money and troops to be placed exclusively under US command is not progress towards an “equal partnership” in any sense of the word.

Elliott: The US has maintained that since they are still putting up the major share of the NATO budget, the commander should be American.

It’s sort of like the Franco-German axis insisting that, as France and Germany have the largest combined economies, their bankers should be head of the central bank, and their nations should receive majority representation in the European Union.

While it is true that now it is Trichet, a French, that heads the ECB, Duisenberg was from Netherland not Germany. And their power in the EU is lower than the one their populations give them.

DSW

Antoni: If you’ve noticed, Franco-Germans are trying to change all that. As a Spaniard (?) do you support the Franco-German initiative to give their countries more prerogatives through “fast-track” status?

The EU is a political entity, and since neither France nor Germany have so much power relative to the rest of the members, even if the get “their” way in some matters, they will have to gave in some others. The EU is not a “first past the pole” organisation, so being the bigger or even the two bigger members is not enough.

And yes, even as a Spaniard I reckon that the present situation is not the best, and that the changes that are maybe about to be may be in our benefit, and a lot, if not most Spaniards think in this way.

DSW

the present situation in the EU requires military powers who can make valid contributions in the ESDP and CFSP beside France and Deutschland.

Ruling out Britain and who als could contribute to safeguard the Frankish ambitions of independent Euro-forces: Turkey (once in the EU club)!

There was no immunity to cuckoo ideas on Earth.