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06.09.04
PANIC ON THE STREETS OF KURDISTAN:
The unanimity of the Security Council vote endorsing the Iraq transition plan is looking like a Pyrrhic victory. It's not just the lack of foreign troops--they probably were never on their way. It's that the Kurds are talking about the new resolution as a historic betrayal. The Kurds adamantly wanted the text to endorse the Transitional Administrative Law, the interim constitution written by the Governing Council (with more than a little assistance from the CPA) that preserves Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, including the right to reject federal law, preserve the pesh merga as a security force and, most controversially, permit the Kurdish provinces to veto the permanent constitution. Their leaders, Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani, warned President Bush how seriously they consider the inclusion of that provision in the resolution, sending him a strongly worded letter last week that included the ominous line, "Our fate is too closely linked to your fortunes in Iraq."
The resolution doesn't recognize the TAL. Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani wrote the Security Council a rejoinder--helpfully translated by Juan Cole--demanding that the TAL not appear in the text, and it complied. While he doesn't specify what exactly he finds objectionable about the TAL (that is, beyond the not-insignificant fact that it was written in secret by an unelected council appointed by the occupation authority), in the past he has emphasized that its Article 61 provides the Kurdish minority with an unreasonable amount of veto power over a permanent constitution and warned that it would lead to Iraq's "partition and division." As best as I can tell, Sistani hasn't raised objections to the provisions in the TAL preserving Kurdistan as a unified, autonomous political entity--indeed, at the behest of Shia Council members, any three provinces of Iraq can vote to create a similar enclave--nor has he complained about the quasi-nullification or militia guarantees the TAL gives the Kurds.
The Kurdish leadership is now threatening to pull out of the central government. As The New York Times puts it, "That would amount to something like secession, which Kurdish officials have been hinting at privately for months but now appear to be actively considering." Secession is the Kurdish nuclear option, and it's not to be taken lightly. Not only would the Turks feel enormous pressure to send its hated military into Iraqi Kurdistan, Kurdish secession could spark a real civil war inside Iraq. The Kurds are surely not going to leave without the multiethnic and oil-drenched city of Kirkuk, which the Kurds call their Jerusalem--or, as Talabani ally Barham Salih wrote last year in The Wall Street Journal, their Gorazde. And, if there was any doubt that Gorazde's fate might become Kirkuk's, recall that after pesh merga forces fought alongside U.S. Marines in Falluja, residents of the insurgent's hotbed declared that they would seek revenge against the Kurds.
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, a Kurd, tried to put his best face on the U.N. defeat, saying "the spirit of the Transitional Administrative Law" is in the resolution. Of course, a cursory review of recent Kurdish history--alliance followed by betrayal followed by slaughter followed by resistance followed by genocide followed by rebirth and followed by renewed alliance--makes it clear why the Kurds need more than just "the spirit" of protections against central power. I've argued against the expansive Kurdish proposals on vetoing the constitution, and I continue to think that an acceptable compromise could be a national vote requiring a two-thirds majority for ratification. I should, however, have been more mindful of the devastation that has been Kurdish history, and I also should have paid more attention to the fact that the Shia haven't exactly been proposing alternative mechanisms to safeguard Kurdish rights.
The Kurds have unveiled their nuclear option, but they haven't pressed the detonator yet, which means there's still time for compromise. A senior official cautioned the Times "against reading the letter as a firm threat to abandon the central government," but that runs the risk of denying that this is a full-blown crisis. If you need convincing, look at Ahmed Karadaghi's article today on KurdishMedia.com for a Kurdish perspective. Karadaghi places what has happened at the U.N. in the context of the Kurds' long history of betrayals by outside powers:
[T]he hopes of many Kurds all over the world were fading as they knew that slowly but surely the process of betraying the Kurds had started all over again.
A process they had hoped to avoid at least once from their so called allies. But alas the students of Kissinger and the neo-conservatives in Washington have decided to swing away from the Kurds and play politics in tune with Shiite Cleric Grand Ayatollah Sistani, somewhat similar to how they switched sides 1978 in Iran, turning their back on the Shah and we all know how that turned out for the United states and Western countries.
Karadaghi is addressing the question of what the Kurds should do now, and some of his answers are alarming:
The ball is rolling in our future scenario, the next part would be an exhibition of Kurdish strength and determination, we have seen how the Kurds have been able to assemble 1.6 million signatures for a call to a referendum on the Kurdish right to self-determination. What the world hasnt seen yet would be a display of the 60,000 strong, well trained and disciplined Peshmerga forces that Iyad Allawi the interim Iraqi prime minister so carelessly calls "Militias". Complete with a military parade down the main cities of Kurdistan with their leaders and thousands of Kurdish people cheering them on. This would be accompanied by all the heavy artillery and display of weapons the Kurds have been able to confiscate from the Iraqi army in the last 13 years. This would make headlines around the world even though the well engineered letter of Mr. Talabani and Mr. Barzani did not. But remember no more playing Mr. Nice Guy.
As a very wise observer pointed out to me as I inveighed against the Kurdish demands in the TAL and insisted on militia demobilization, from the Kurdish perspective, it's probably safe to assume you can't have both. The Kurds will either have legal protections or they will have military protections. (Already, you can kiss the recent "agreement" on militia demobilization goodbye.) With the future of Iraq at stake, Sistani and his allies are obliged to come up with some acceptable legal protections for the Kurds while compromise is still possible. Kurdish leaders have had praise for Sistani in the past, but they desperately need to see that they have a friend beyond the mountains.
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06.03.04
UMMM...:
From a just-released Pentagon transcript:
Q: [Inaudible]
RUMSFELD: I like that [Inaudible].
Q: Sir, [Inaudible]
RUMSFELD: You want me where?
Q: [Inaudible], sir.
RUMSFELD: Over there?
Q: [Inaudible] Thank you, sir.
Well, he is, as the transcript says, "en route to Singapore."
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GEE, MR. MUELLER, IT'D BE A SHAME IF SOMETHING WERE TO HAPPEN TO YOUR REPUTATION:
The intrepid Josh Marshall beats me to the punch on noting Ahmed Chalabi's bizarre statement wishing George Tenet good riddance. But that's neither the only recent shot from Chalabi's camp across the intelligence community's bow, nor the only erratic one. Yesterday, Chalabi's lawyers sent a letter to John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller (also noted by Josh) responding to the FBI's dual investigation of whether Chalabi in fact passed information about U.S. codebreaking efforts to the Iranians and who in the Bush administration told Chalabi about the cracked code. They demanded that the investigations into Chalabi desist, and, after noting the widespread reporting on his alleged intelligence-sharing, demanded a new investigation:
The disclosure of any investigation of Dr. Chalabi is a serious breach in itself of the laws of secrecy relating to grand jury investigations ... We therefore demand that they cease forthwith and that you order an investigation into the identity of the government sources who disclosed said information to the media, taking appropriate actions when your [sic] discover the identity of those involved.
Got that? Chalabi's people want an investigation into the leaking of an investigation about a leak!
But that's not all. These same lawyers also issue a veiled threat to FBI Director Mueller:
In closing, one of the undersigned, Mr. [John J. E.] Markham, would like to make a somewhat personal observation to Director Mueller. An investigation of this nature would undoubtedly be conducted under the jurisdiction of the F.B.I. Speaking as someone from your hometown where your reputation for probity is of the highest magnitude after your years of good service here, Director Mueller, it is well known that this is not the way you have ever conducted investigations in your long and honorable career in law enforcement. Nor can we imagine that you would allow the Bureau's name to be used for a personal attack on someone who was not under investigation. Either way, we ask that you take a personal hand in considering and acting on the requests herein made.
Please. Stop the investigation or we tarnish your good name back home? According to Newsweek, the FBI opened its investigation under precisely the proper circumstances. After discovering that listening into Iranian communications was a compromised operation, and the links of that compromise to Chalabi, the National Security Agency sent a criminal referral to the FBI. The FBI received a similar referral from the Defense Intelligence Agency, which until recently was the bagman for the Pentagon's $340,000-a-month payments to Chalabi for intelligence collection. That's how we got to where we are. Maybe Mueller should open an investigation into frivolous and puerile attacks.
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06.02.04
UPDATE:
The text of the revised U.S. draft resolution is available here. To revise my previous post somewhat, Article 14 specifies that the Facilities Protection Service will be under the Interior Ministry, along with the police and border patrol:
Emphasizes the importance of effective Iraqi police, border enforcement, and Facilities Protection Service, under the control of the Interior Ministry of Iraq and, in the case of the Facilities Protection Service, other Iraqi ministries, for the maintenance of law, order, and security, including combating terrorism, and requests Member States and international organizations to assist the Interim Government of Iraq in building the capability of these Iraqi institutions;
Nothing is specified, however, about the status of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps or the new Iraqi Army. The crucial Article 8 asserts that the "multinational force" (that is, the U.S. and its handful of coalition troops) shall retain "the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq." This can be interpreted to mean maintaining unified command over the ICDC and Army. No provision exists granting the Iraqi interim or transitional governments any authority over the U.S. for security operations; there is a vague reference in the preamble to the need for "close coordination" between the U.S. military command and the Iraqi government.
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UNRESOLVED, CONT'D:
New Prime Minister Iyad Allawi announced yesterday that the presence of coalition troops in Iraq is fine by him. "We will need the partnership with the multinational forces to defeat the enemies of Iraq who do not wish for us stability, prosperity, peace," he said. If I were Allawi, I'd say the same thing. For one thing, given his longtime connections to the CIA, this might well have been a precondition for U.S. support of his candidacy. For another, the U.S. just announced that the lion's share of its security mission in Iraq is going to be ensuring that the new Iraqi government doesn't get blown up. Were I an Iraqi political figure, I wouldn't turn down 138,000 bodyguards either.
Now that keeping U.S. forces in Iraq in the immediate term is no longer an issue, the U.S. pivoted at the United Nations to secure a legal basis for keeping them there ultimately--that is, the passage of a new Security Council resolution. (U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that they don't expect to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement, the typical mechanism for garrisoning troops on the soil of a sovereign government, with the interim Iraqi government, and will use the new resolution instead.) According to CNN, the U.S., which had hoped to secure passage of the resolution by June 6, is moving closer to French/German/Russian/Chinese negotiating positions. While the full text of the new draft isn't available yet, reportedly the U.S. is agreeing to leave Iraq entirely by 2006--the expected (good luck!) timetable for a permanent constitution and subsequent elections for a permanent government--although the draft just refers to the conclusion of the political process as the end date. That was something the Germans in particular wanted.
But on other issues, the U.S. seems to be passing off minor changes as sweeping moves toward consensus. In particular, a sticking point at Turtle Bay is whether the interim Iraqi government is in control of the new security forces, or if the Iraqi chain of command will remain under the ultimate control of U.S. generals. CNN reports, "Under the new draft, Iraqi security forces will be under the control of the interim government." But that's not what State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said at his briefing yesterday:
MR. BOUCHER: ... There's added language to highlight the interim government's authority over its security forces, that is, the interior ministry's control over police and it makes clear that the objective for Iraqis is to progressively play a greater security role and ultimately to assume responsibility for maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.
...
QUESTION: Richard, on the issue of the mandate, unless I misheard, you were saying that where security is concerned, if the Minister of Interior, the Iraqi Minister of Interior, would be responsible for the police. You didn't say anything about the armed forces or the American armed forces and so on. So is it in the new language explicit that it only talks about police; it doesn't say anything about the multinational force?
MR. BOUCHER: I'll wait in going into more detail language until we have it out on the street. We want to let other governments see it and discuss it with us in New York, first.
Which is to say that Boucher and the Bush administration want to see if the other Security Council members will settle on Iraq controlling its police forces but not having ultimate control over its other security forces, like the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps or the Facilities Protection Service. Similarly, Boucher punted on whether the interim government would possess the authority to review the practices of the International Advisory Monitoring Board, a Bremer-created entity designed to audit the government's disbursement of outside donor money. (As he explained, "The expectation is that [the interim government] will want it continued, and therefore the question would not arise during that interim period." Hope truly springs eternal.) Finally, according to CNN, the revised U.S. draft text offers the Security Council the ability to "terminate" the U.S. presence in Iraq before the late-2005 elections "if requested by the elected transitional government of Iraq." (Emphasis added.) That is, the transitional assembly scheduled for election in January 2005. Apparently, Allawi--the premier of the unelected, interim government--is giving the U.S. political cover to argue for a retained presence in the immediate term, but under the new U.S. draft text, he wouldn't have the ability to make the ultimate determination anyway.
Not surprisingly, the new U.S. positions aren't entirely satisfactory to the other Security Council members. In a radio interview, the top German foreign ministry official for U.S. relations, Karsten Voigt, praised the U.S. for "moving in the right direction," but pointedly added, "I can't predict whether this will be the final result." And that was just in reference to the Bush administration's agreement on setting an end date for its troop presence in Iraq--the item on which it moved the closest to the French/German/Russian/Chinese position. A French diplomat added, "We are not satisfied with the new version"; a member of the Chinese delegation said "full sovereignty has not been fully reflected" in the revised U.S. draft. We'll see where the discussions go next.
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