Taking the Bad With the Good
I'm still in a Belfast cyber cafe - listening to 'The Revolution Will Not be Televised' on the muzak track. I'll not tarry, popping up only to recommend Michael Fisher's assertion, contra Norm, that supporting a war neccesarily associating oneself with its forseeable consequences, and this includes brutality by occupiers. Read it here.

It was, of course, this real politik understanding that Michael Walzer critiqued in his book Just and Unjust Wars (1977), written in response to Vietnam. My copy is in Oxford now, but I might write something on his aguments when I get back.

More Wiles
Yesterday evening Professor Roy Foster summarised and anatomised what we know about the web of corruption and kick-backs that linked the crony capitalists and crony-politicians of the Celtic Tiger - notably one C. J. Haughey. So finely was it done that I think I kind of understood the complicated whole for at least twenty minutes before confusion re-descended. The greatest achievement of state capitalism is to make it all so complicated that we don't know we're being done until it's all over.

Wiles Lectures
I'm at Queen's University Belfast for the Wiles Lectures, a long running annual series (over fifty years now) dealing with themes of civilisation or some such. Herbert Butterfield gave the first Wiles, and luminaries since then include, to give just one eminent example, Eric Hobsbawm. His famous book on nationalism was based upon his Wiles talks.

This year's lecturer it is Roy Foster, Carroll Professor of Irish History at Oxford University. I find myself in Belfast, thus, as part of the Oxford baggage train. Surprisingly enough, Foster is the first Irish Historian to deliver lectures on the theme of Irish history for the Wiles. His subject is Ireland since 1972, a period he compares to the era of the Gaelic Revival (1890 - 1920) in its profundity and rapidity.

Over four nights there is a lecture, followed by drinks, then a slap-up meal and finally discussion all the more interesting for being pursued in a formal but tipsy atmosphere. We started last night and finish on Friday. It's shaping up to be an excellent series of lectures, and the subsequent debates have been animated and searching.

It's also nice to see various comrades, colleagues, mentors, idols and rivals in the field. I'm particularly awestruck in encountering K. Theodore Hoppen, whose work I have revered since being an undergraduate. I'll have to get him to sign me a napkin.

Hurried Thoughts on 'What is to be Done'
From the point of view of Leninist revolutionary defeatism - in which war is more or less welcomed as an opportunity to weaken the authority of reactionary regimes, particularly one's own - the Iraq War has gone rather well. Saddam has been ousted and a hundred flowers are blooming in Iraq, with allied weed killer being nasty but vastly less sweeping than that of the ancien regime. Meanwhile, the west's accumulation of moral capital, which allowed it to undertake all sorts of interventions, from soft to hard, has been much depleted.

Being no Leninist, I am less sanguine about the difficulties the occupation is facing. To be sure, support for the invasion did not rely upon a certainty that the best-case scenario would ensue, eg, cheering crowds, flowers strewn before tanks, democracy up and running within months, a new Iraqi beacon in the region etc. The (almost) worst case scenario was pretty robust too. Even if democracy was not stabilised, a despot would be overthrown. Other despots would be put on notice that lack of transparency on WMD can no longer be winked at in this age of hyper-terrorism. Even in the absence of a democratic Iraqi successor state, these are tangible benefits of the war.

The war can, however, become in retrospect evidently counter-productive. This would be so if the occupation was seen to be ousted with its tail between its legs by a radical islamicist insurgency.

The jury is still out on the outcome of the war, of course. Opinion polls suggesting Iraqi support for imminent coalition withdrawal are important, but not definitive. Any coherent movement for national self-determination insists upon a schedule for imperial withdrawal (Even the IRA, in its most militant phase, demanded British withdrawal 'within the life time of a single parliament'). Clearly precipitate withdrawal of coalition troops would not be a concession of Iraq self-determination. On the contrary, it would be an abdication at best, at worst a deliberate strategy of dividing one's opponents (encouraging a civil war) the better to dominate them from a distance.

The legitimate way forward is to nurture sufficient political space in Iraq to permit a coherent representative of putative Iraqi sovereignty to emerge. One cannot pre-define the complexion of any such representative. Nor can one rule as inadmissable forces participating in armed conflict against the occupation. When such a virtual state (or states – perhaps one Kurdish, one Shia and Sunni) coheres, the occupation must then negotiate with it as one sovereign power to another. This, of course, requires the coalition to a priori concede the ending of its leading role in state power, but otherwise it will be quite in order to apply normal inter-state pressures to ensure an outcome acceptable to coalition interests. If a noxious post-occupation regime in Iraq is likely to emerge, the coalition is not duty bound, for example, to extend a military umbrella or development funds. Sovereignty does not mean the pooling of international resources to permit any particular power to do whatever it wishes within the bounds of its own competence.

As it happens, this schedule for imperial withdrawal matches up pretty well with coalition plans for Iraq, and is the best though not certain hope for a democratically founded successor state. Coalition strategy, as stated, should be acceptable for the most dedicated anti-imperialist, given that a 'ditching strategy' is only ever undertaken in the narrow interests of the metropole. The coalition must be held to its promises. Tactics are a different matter. Most importantly, democratic elections must be held at the earliest opportunity and the risk taken that the results will reward extremist and secessionist parties. You may lead a horse to water but, you cannot make it drink. Delay is only likely to reinforce the impression of coalition defeat at the hands of Islamicism, a conclusion of incalculable consequences.

Iraq and Northern Ireland
I missed this when it came out, but History Today carried an interesting article in its February issue: Lessons From Northern Ireland. The author is Peter R. Neumann, author of Britain's Long War: British Strategy in the Northern Ireland Conflict, 1969-98(Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

Here are some extracts:

Lesson 1: Don't Fear Commitment

The failure to take the imperative of nation-building seriously was Wilson's principal mistake. In 1969, many members of the Cabinet conceptualised the conflict in historical terms, and both government and media seemed certain that ... the Irish would soon come to resent the 'occupation'. ...Hence, while the government pretended that it wanted to bring about a peaceful settlement, its ultimate priority was to get the troops out. ... In military terms, it was not considered necessary, therefore, to set up an intelligence-gathering operation, nor was it essential to confront the troublemakers, at least as long as they stayed within their own areas.

The consequences were disastrous. In accordance with its non-confrontational doctrine, the Army allowed the IRA to set up 'no go' areas in which the organisation recruited freely. By early 1971, when the conflict had escalated ... To penetrate the terrorist strongholds, the Army had to resort to large-scale cordon and search operations, which alienated the population but achieved little in terms of finding the real culprits. Ultimately, London's obsession with a 'swift exit' led to the introduction of internment without trial which ... shattered the image of the British government ...

In Iraq there are signs of 'occupation fatigue' already. ... the example of Northern Ireland shows that to deprive the coalition forces of necessary resources, or even to hope for a 'swift exit', will not pay off.

Lesson 2: Don't Ignore the Threat

Another, if related, problem is that of threat assessment. In Northern Ireland, the government's perception of reality was guided by wishful thinking, that is, the hope that the 'Irish nightmare' would soon be over. ...

In the hitherto peaceful Catholic areas of Derry and Belfast, riots became a feature of everyday life ... The British government ... preferred to interpret the outbreak of violence as a series of isolated incidents with few (if any) political implications ...

By mid-1970, the contradictory effects of London's misguided assessment became obvious. The Army continued to engage in peace-keeping, when really it should have started to fight a counter-insurgency campaign. ...

If the coalition in Iraq is to avoid the long war of attrition with which the British were faced in Northern Ireland, they have to stop talking about 'pockets of resistance'. Political leaders have to accept that there is stiff resistance to the occupation, and that a concerted campaign of counter-insurgency is necessary in order to re-establish law and order, even if this makes a swift end to the occupation impossible.

Lesson 3: Don't Forget about Politics

The third lesson from Northern Ireland is not to forget the primacy of politics. ... London allowed a power vacuum to emerge ... the most visible sign of London's intervention - the British Army - came to symbolise the continuation of Unionist rule.

... modern armed forces carry out political orders, and they are therefore bound to be identified with the political cause they serve. If the momentum for political reform slows down, the coalition armies will inevitably come to be seen as symbols of repression and occupation (if that is not already the case). Hence it is absolutely essential not to shy away from the task of creating a fair and equitable form of government in Iraq, however difficult that may seem.

This seems quite acute and not very heartening.

Who's Laughing Now?
These are unhappy days for bloggers, like myself, who supported the Iraq war. This is of little consequence in itself, of course, except that it has brought forth an unwelcome sourness and aggression in such stalwarts as Harry's Place. Socialism in an Age of Whingeing can't really get any more grumpy or bitter (the big question, for all sectologists adept at reading the rhetoric, is whether SIAW were cadres of the WRP, Sparticists or BICO is a previous life), so instead they seem to be sliding to apathetic demoralisation. "A plague on all their houses", they groan of the the government, media and “anti-war” clowns , "we’d rather be watching The Bill." Good news for all concerned, I think.

Anti-war bloggers are much more jaunty. Lenin's Tomb, in Desperately Seeking Similitude, briskly discusses the various possible parallels with Iraq before concluding that "the situation in Iraq is exactly like when, in the 15th Century, Swiss peasant pikemen kicked the everloving sh*t out of the Burgundian cavalries called to the aid of the Habsburgs." Why didn't it strike me before! Ken MacLeod, meanwhile, pokes gloriously unfair fun at pro-war leftwingers in his Vietnam War Hero Disappoints War Hawks.

Pro-war bloggers need to right the scales with their own light-hearted response to the sundry disappointments and occasional horrors of the world. But don't expect it off me. I am famed for my inability to tell jokes.

Advice For Students ...
From Jack Handey:

If you want to be the most popular person in your class, whenever the professor pauses in his lecture, just let out a big snort and say "How do you figger that!" real loud. Then lean back and sort of smirk.

Barbarism Again
Here.

"No Irish Need Apply"
An interesting article by Richard Jensen in the Journal of Social History, Vol. 36, 2002, entitled "No Irish Need Apply": A Myth of Victimization notes that:

The fact that Irish vividly "remember" NINA [No Irish Need Apply] signs is a curious historical puzzle. There are no contemporary or retrospective accounts of a specific sign at a specific location. No particular business enterprise is named as a culprit. No historian, archivist, or museum curator has ever located one; no photograph or drawing exists. No other ethnic group complained about being singled out by comparable signs. Only Irish Catholics have reported seeing the sign in America--no Protestant, no Jew, no non-Irish Catholic has reported seeing one.

He explains the 'urban myth' thus:

It was an enhancement of political solidarity against a hostile Other; and a way to insulate a preindustrial non-individualistic group-oriented work culture from the individualism rampant in American culture.

This same "preindustrial non-individualistic group-oriented work culture" accounts, says Jensen (echoing Kirby Miller), for catholic Irish underperformance in the nineteenth century. One may wonder about this. Donald Harman Akenson in his book Small Differences, demonstrates that in other destinations for Irish immigrants - Canada for example - Irish catholics did quite as well as Irish protestants, suggesting that their disadvantage in the US was indeed pervasive discrimination.

Whatever about this, I wonder if any readers out there remember, or better still have evidence for, 'No Irish Need Apply' signs?

Report From Bergen
My trip to Bergen in Norway was a fine experience. The sun shone - very brightly one day - ,the days were long, and the cheerfully coloured wooden faced houses, topped with large tile roofs often varnished and gleaming, clustered along tilted and winding slabed streets. The city accommodates itself amongst towering crags that rebuke the harsh vanity of man-made urbanity. Only at night was the impression less pleasing, for then the big houses crawling up the mountain side lorded over the city in a disturbing allegory of class. The citizenry, and this is how they seemed, looked at home and engaged. Bergen has a feel of great civic vibrancy and a quiet national pride that is very appealing.

I was there to examine, with Professor Paul Arthur of the University of Ulster, a doctoral thesis by Sissel Rosland on internment in Northern Ireland. Sissel submitted the rhetoric of the various Northern Ireland parties and interests to searching examination, uncovering as she did a liberal concept of state authority in unionist arguments and a republican concept (in the classical sense) in nationalist views. I'm glad to report that Sissel passed with flying colours.

In Britain and Ireland doctoral examinations have become rather low-key affairs. One discusses with a couple of examiners over an hour or two in an office. My own ended with me wandering out of the faculty to take a day-trip, with my girlfriend, to some port town I now forget.

In Norway they retain a much greater sense of formality. On the first day, the examiners and candidate process into a lecture room, where the candidate delivers a lecture on a topic associated with the thesis but of the examiners' choosing. Sissel spoke about the response of opinion in southern Ireland to internment.

The following day, there is a 'disputation'. First the candidate summarises her work. Then, for an hour and a half, the 'first opponent' discusses with the candidate. After lunch the 'second opponent' (me) continues. The whole comprises about three hours. The candidate stands behind one podium, the opponent behind another, and all this before an audience of interested colleagues, public and family.

In the evening, the successful candidate holds a party, with friends, family and colleagues. There is much delicious food (provided by friends) and numerous speeches. This latter sounds awful, but in Norway the art of rhetoric clearly thrives, and all the speeches were witty, engaging and brief. Sissel’s friends treated us to a rendition of 'Fields of Athenry' (beautifully harmonised) and a specially penned number in Sissel's honour. We concluded with cognac, coffee and further booze into the night.

It was, in all, a fine example of due ritual and formality combined with unembarrassed ease and conviviality.

Bergen I can highly recommend.