My brother bought a series of books that were translations of some of Churchill’s memories about the II WW, which I found entertainingly educatives, I would not put to much faith on the quality of the translation and edition, but there were some of the rationales of Churchill that I think are still of value. One was, translating back to English, “it is not that one General is better than another, it is that one General is better than two”, and failing that a good and fast way to coordinate the people that have to make the decision.

My take is that the EU should go for a parlamentary government, much like the one that the UK enjoys (or not, they may think it is bad) that gives, or takes away, its trust to a smallish commission that acts as the EU government. And that the actual member-states should transfer quite a few more functions, and the accompanying money, to this government. My rationale is in part that this is needed to reduce assymetrical shocks, a delicate question when sharing a currency. (While pro-Euro, I never thought that by itself it would solve all problems.)

DSW

Yeah, there’s something to this “Europe, stuck in the middle” argument, I agree. But then again, federalism wasn’t really an established model of governance when the US began the experiment and so Europe may just not be some kind of hybrid but one of a new kind, with specific ways and means to exercise, check, and balance power. The latter is more fluid than many believe, in my opinion. “Decisiveness” is a great tool in moviescripts and times of crisis - but in times of normal, incremental social evolution, it might not be that helpful. Arend Lijphart may not have hit a conceptual home run with his “Consensus Democracy”, but he certainly has a point in saying that it reduces institutional volatility. So I guess the answer to question if we (Europe) can afford this specific kind of political and institutional evolution depends on our personal time horizon.

As for the majority supported executive as opposed to the pseudo-presidential thingy now envisioned, I agree, it would have been better. But then again, this constitution isn’t there for eternity. In my opinion, it is only marginall less amendable as all other treaties have been so far.

And as far as fiscal federalism for assymmetrical (real) shocks are concerned, doesn’t Europe already have a stabilising system in place for those parts of the union with the least diverse economic structure (the agricultural South), I am of course talking about CAP as well as the structural funds?

I think it’s partly the structure (IGCs have always been unwieldy) and partly the Italian presidency. They are not getting the job done, and their PM isn’t helping. Berlusconi’s opening speech set the tone: antagonize your partners and waste energy on damage control. Spend the first six weeks of a six-month term on unnecessary distractions and you’ve used up 20 percent of your time in office. Worse, instead of laying the groundwork for a reputation of effectiveness, you’ve sent a signal that things may just get punted six months down the road.

The Irish government is quietly (or perhaps not so quietly, if I’ve heard about it) preparing to take up what’s left in the IGC after the Italian presidency. That means this thing will really go down to the wire before admission of the new members. The contrast between the Danish and Italian presidencies will be a great case study for scholars of government and politics.

Sometimes I think EU governance is a study in what precisely can be kicked six months down the road and what can’t. Only the things that cannot possibly be deferred get decided at the top level. Everything else gets taken up by the next presidency and the next.

The Savant’s view of the advantages of excluding future members is simply wrong. Excluding the new members would not have been tough-minded, it would have been muddle-headed. Keeping them out would have been a guarantee that the first five to ten years post-enlargement were spent with ten governments working tirelessly to change the structures to accommodate their needs.

There’s been plenty of ’take it or leave it’ in discussions over the acquis. Everyone has to take it. It’s very likely that new members will have implemented more of the acquis in national legislation than several current members, particularly France.

Preparation for EU membership has involved far more substantial changes in the laws and societies in Central Europe than probably any polity in Western Europe would be unwilling to undertake. Integration into the Union’s political processes has been gradual, and is now very thorough. Including the new members in the Convention and the IGC has been a matter of enlightened self-interest, and common sense.

By the by, if anyone missed the gradual regularization of candidate state involvement in EU processes this time around, it’s not too late to pay attention in the Balkans. Similar processes are happening, particularly with Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria, which are slated for membership in 2007.

It’s certainly true that both the Convention and the IGC have so far proceeded in the silence of something extremely boring. It’s also true that one of the key features of European integration is low-keyness; if we’d been more dramatic and tough on many occasions the whole thing would have fallen apart. After all, isn’t the point that through integration we can’t fall out too badly because we have to keep talking in order to manage the business of Europe?

I think I’ll comment on this at greater length (and higher quality) on my blog - http://yorkshire-ranter.blogspot.com