Lounsbury

Rather more important, in my opinion than the unfortunate deaths of the GE contractors, or the bombing of the oil terminal (Go long in oil?), but perhaps on the level of the assasination of shiite truck drivers are the following tidbits: (from The New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/15/international/middleeast/15CND-IRAQ.html
" Adding to the tensions, the American and Iraqi governments clashed over several contentious issues in what appeared to be the first major test of power for this country's new interim government.

Iyad Allawi, the prime minister, called for the Americans to hand over all detainees — including Saddam Hussein — to the Iraqis by June 30, when Iraq will gain limited sovereign powers. Mr. Allawi also said through a spokesman that foreign contractors should be subject to all Iraqi laws. The president, Ghazi Ajil al-Yawar, demanded that the Americans hand over Mr. Hussein's Republican Palace, a prominent symbol of power, to the Iraqi government after June 30.

American officials said they did not have to meet any of the demands and were in discussions with the Iraqi government over them. Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt said the resolution passed earlier this month by the United Nations Security Council granted the Americans final authority over detainees, while President Bush said he wanted to make sure there was "appropriate security" before handing over Mr. Hussein.

"We also do not have to hand him over until there's a cessation of active hostilities," said Dan Senor, a spokesman for the occupation. "Hostilities, unfortunately, continue."

On the issue of American contractors, Mr. Senor said such workers would answer to Iraqi laws if they committed criminal acts, but that an order signed by L. Paul Bremer III, the top American administrator here, gave contractors immunity from legal prosecution over any incident involving their work.

As for handing over the Republican Palace, he added, "we need substantial space, property, for the U.S. mission here." The palace is being used by the Coalitional Provisional Authority as a headquarters building and will likely become an annex for the American embassy due to open here after June 30, Mr. Senor said."

Emphasis added.

I suppose I should give up hope of the Americans in Baghdad ever adopting phrasing or public statements that will not unnecessarily rile up people and confirm their clumsy arrogance. Have to... Well "have to" in the legalist terms is probably not the most relevant issue. What is probably far more relevant is rescuing some tiny piece of your influence and some tiny bit of an ability to achieve something approaching your original goals. The public response could be far more... helpful in its phrasing.

Again, an elderly article, but one which I desire to point out:

washingtonpost.com
Iraqis Put Contempt For Troops On Display
By Edward Cody
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, June 12, 2004; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A35558-2004Jun11?language=printer

" Since U.S. forces drove to Baghdad and overthrew President Saddam Hussein in April 2003, the 138,000 American soldiers stationed here have lost their status as liberators in the eyes of most Iraqis. Polling by the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority has chronicled a steady souring of opinion, with the most recent surveys showing about 80 percent of Iraqis with an unfavorable opinion of U.S. troops."

Inevitable really. I recall military friends of mine early on in conflict complaining bitterly about the understaffing and undertraining for the military units in Iraq.

However, the happy talkers one out....

This is a rather aged article by Wolf, but I wanted to convey it and comment at the same time. As it is in archives, I will not bother with a link.

I mostly wished to convey it as I rather agree with the reasoning and heartily agree with the point of view.

Bush is not up to the job
The Financial Times
By Martin Wolf
Published: May 11 2004

First, Wolf opens:
I am a huge admirer of the US. Freedom and democracy survived the 20th century only because of American actions and values. Without the US, Hitler or Stalin would have emerged as undisputed winners of the second world war. Thereafter, the US turned defeated enemies into allies and undertook the long - and ultimately successful - task of containing and defeating the Soviet empire.

I am also neither hostile to Republican administrations nor opposed to the use of force. On the contrary, I was heartened by Ronald Reagan›s efforts to liberalise the US economy and oppose the Soviet Union. I preferred Richard Nixon to George McGovern, in 1972, and George H.W. Bush to Michael Dukakis, in 1988. I supported the first Gulf war, though I opposed the one in Vietnam.

For my part I was rather deeply ambivalent towards the First Gulf War, feeling it less-than-necessary although I now think it was largely a positive endeavor. And of course, I myself am "neither hostile to Republican administrations nor opposed to the use of force, although insofar as wars are expensive and often wasteful of resources, I rather prefer they be avoided if possible. If possible. And of course I have voted for a good many Republican administrations (although not the present one).

Wolf then adds:
"This personal history is of no intrinsic importance. But if I find the Bush administratio's foreign policy disturbing, so must the vast majority of humanity. If I feel Tony Blair has
allied the UK too closely, then sympathy for this alliance must be perilously low."

I concur. I very much concur. While no Government should be prisoner to foreign popularity, when one's account is so low with so many otherwise staunch friends, and one's not otherwise inclined to be harshly critical, one has to ask, is there not something wrong? Or another way, to use Machiavelli's observation that it is better to be feared than loved, but one should also not be hated.When one's natural allies fear and begin to loathe you, then one can guess that the remainder of the world may have well passed through fear into hatred, or be on that path.

Wolf then adds:
"So what is wrong with this administration? Put simply, it fails to understand the basis of US power, mis-specifies US objectives and is incompetent in executing its intentions. As a result, the position of the US - and so of the west - is worse, in significant respects, than it was the day after September 11 2001. Then, a huge proportion of humanity viewed the US as the victim of an outrage. Today, after the revelations of the treatment of prisoners in Iraq, it is seen as a perpetrator of them. Then it had the support of all its allies, now it can rely on the public›s sympathy in very few."
Emphasis added.

I rather agree and have argued this, I think, consistently. The revelations now that the current Bush Administration engaged in legalistic searches for justifying the use of torture, in clear contravention of the international accords the American government had long supported further these somewhat aged comments. As some who read my comments on the old "SDMB" message board know, I did not unalterably oppose... recourse to unpleasant methods in case of dire need. However, it has always been my view that this should be exceptional and something that remained shameful and indeed illegal. The current administration, as some commentators (I believe it The Washington Post editorial page) noted, has followed the logic and reasoning of rogue regimes where the rule of law does not obtain but rather the rule of the personal power of the ruler obtains. This is dangerous. Very dangerous, and very damaging to American standing. The revelations in this area have diminished American standing to (rightfully) comment on human rights abuses across the globe, and to further its own agenda for greater democratisation and greater respect for human rights - in short the very values said to be at the core of the country. Clumsy, naive cynicism for clumsily executed short term gain, and utterly unnecessary across a number of fields.

In short, gross incompetence.

Wolf adds then:
Let us start with the administration's faith in the application of US military power. This is a double error. The first lies in its exaggerated belief in force. The US was able to defeat the armies of Saddam Hussein, but a civilised occupying army cannot coerce the obedience of a population. The second error lies in its belief in the irrelevance of allies. A country containing 4 per cent of the world›s population cannot impose its will upon the world. It needs permanent allies, not reluctant stooges, willing acceptance of its leadership, not sullen acquiescence. The contempt shown by leading members of the administration for those who disagree with it is now matched by the hostility of those whipped by their scorn.
Emphasis added:

I have long called this the Napoleonic error. Shining belief in one's own rightness is rarely all that convincing to others, above all foreigners whose values are not in entire congruence with one's own.

Clumsy incompetence.

Wolf amplifies this:
Without military power, victory would not have been achieved in the second world war. Nor would the Soviet tanks have been kept at bay for more than 40 years. But the cold war was won not because the US had a bigger army than the Soviet Union, but because it offered a more attractive model. The more the US plays the unilateral bully, the more its attraction fades.

Precisely, the pole of attraction is a powerful tool.

Turn then to definition of US objectives. Terrorism is a technique of the powerless adapted to the age of mass communications. A war against terrorism is as empty a slogan as one against crime, drugs or disease. But proclaiming a war against terrorism justifies the indefinite suspension of the rule of law, allows every thug on the planet to ally his repressive policies to those of the US, spawns new enemies and foments a war psychosis in the US itself.

I believe this passage rather takes on a great deal of weight in the context of the revelations regarding the legal memoranda on torture, on the strange lawlessness (rather unnecessary as well as self-damaging) in regards to detainees. I note the strange collapsing of the Padilla case, the incident of the arrest of the Oregon lawyer, etc. I would note that this article in The New York Times Commander Swift Objects is instructive and interesting.

"As David Scheffer pointed out in the Financial Times last Thursday, the behaviour of the guards at Abu Ghraib is the natural, almost the inevitable, consequence of the position in which the administration has - in its pursuit of its war on terrorism - put detainees.These are neither prisoners of war nor criminal suspects. Instead, they are in a legal limbo for as long as the US decides that this so-called "war" continues. Interrogators have absolute power and, as Lord Acton pointed out, absolute power corrupts absolutely. Nobody, not excluding Americans, is immune to the temptations such power creates."

There is little to add to Wolf's observation than to draw the line to the legal memoranda regarding torture.

Wolf notes re competence:
Now let us turn to the question of competence. In the short history of the war on terrorism, only one institution has shown its effectiveness - the US armed forces in "shock and awe" mode. Almost everything else has been a humiliating shambles. Afghanistan is, once again, in the arms of the war lords whose behaviour led to the Taliban invasion. The outcome in Iraq now looks far worse than that. "

Indeed, and a month has not changed that, other than my feeling that the new Iraqi of the moment probably represents a sureptious slide to re-Baathification, which is to say, not long before one sees a new Iraqi dictatorship, but one dressed up a little better to meet simple minded tastes for the appearance of democracy - Potemkin or Egyptian democracy.

"The decision to wage a war of choice, not of necessity, was a great risk. It could be justified only by discovering the weaponry Mr Hussein was alleged to hold or by leaving the country, if not a Jeffersonian democracy, at least in a reasonably stable condition. Having been so resoundingly wrong on the first point, the US must now succeed on the second. Always difficult, the chances of such an outcome now seem vanishingly small. What will Iraq be a few years from now - a military dictatorship, a theocracy, a divided country, an anarchy, or a permanent US occupation? Any of these, except the last, seems more plausible than stable democracy."

I would lay my bets on a military dictatorship rather like Egypt. A ticking bomb.

"It is impossible to exaggerate the dangers attendant upon a US failure in Iraq: jihadis would conclude that they had now defeated a second superpower; friendly regimes would be shaken; and US prestige would be destroyed. Iraq is not another Vietnam. It is far more dangerous than that. While this venture was never going to be as militarily perilous as that war, this time dominoes could well fall. An incontinent US withdrawal could be a deciding moment in the relationship between the US and the Arab, if not the entire Muslim, world."

I would add that in fact American standing has already been badly, badly damaged by the clear, indeed gross incompetence shown in Iraq to date. No one, not even a cynic such as myself, expected things to go this badly, so quickly. I recall stating on the SDMB that I expected car bombs by Spring. I did not even think by the past Fall that such utter incompetence would have generated what it did.

Wolf adds
"The US has, rightly or wrongly, staked its prestige not just on getting rid of Saddam Hussein, but on leaving behind a thriving country. If, instead, it leaves behind despotism or chaos, it will be a grievous defeat, with huge long-run consequences. Responsibility for such a failure must rest with the White House. It cannot be blamed on any subordinate department, not even the defence department. This is the president's policy and responsibility. The buck stops there."

Precisely, and precisly why this current president must go. Incompetence of this magnitude can not be tolerated.

Crafting a foreign policy for a new era is hard. The last time this had to be done was in the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry Truman more than half a century ago. The
institutions they established and the values they upheld were the foundation of the successful US foreign policy of the postwar era. Now, a task even more complex has fallen on this
president. He is not up to the job. This is not a moral judgment, but a practical one. The world is too complex and dangerous for the pious simplicities and arrogant unilateralism
of George W. Bush.

Emphasis added. My feelings exactly.

Unfortunately a rebound in the nastiness from the Chicken Biryani has me down again - I am beginning to suspect the old iron stomach is getting delicate in its old age (well not old age yet, but my woman tells me I have a grey hair, first one, so there.).

Nevertheless, a brief comment on this, which I will quote in full as there is no online archive. Emphasis added at the key points, in my opinion of course, with [Key Point Markers] in brackets for ease of reference.

Jordanian Perspective
Reform — need and conviction
Musa Keilani
I have just returned from Qatar, where the Gulf Studies Centre held a conference on Democracy and Reform in the Middle East. The former prime minister of Sudan, Sadeq Al Mahdi, Prof. Sadd Eddin Ibrahim, who was recently released from a Cairo jail for his human rights activism, Dr Hasan Mohammed Al Ansari from Qatar University and nearly 80 Arab intellectuals discussed the chronic question of democracy and reform in their respective countries and wondered why decision makers abide by Washington's recipe for economic reform, through the International Monetary Fund, but refrain from applying a parallel political recipe for reform, and consider it a violation of their territorial imperative and sovereignty.

[Point A]We know that it is not exactly the great desire to see democracy prevail in the Arab world that is behind America's Greater Middle East Initiative. The US wants the Arab governments to eliminate local groups opposed to the American policy in the Middle East and Washington's approach to the Muslim world in general. The only way the US could think of achieving its objective is to insist on “democracy” and “reform” in the Middle East as a pressure point and leverage against the governments.

The equation is quite simple: [Point B]the world knows that if there were to be Western-style elections in the Arab world today, the winners would be those who are described by Washington as anti-US hardliners and extremists — Islamists, the very party that the US is targeting for crackdown. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the American explanation that the root of all troubles in the Middle East is lack of democracy and that is why the US is pushing for it.

The Arab countries expressed their rejection of the American drive to impose reforms on the Arab world. No externally imposed reform is going to work in the Arab world; it would only result in chaos and confusion and that is something we, Arabs, could ill afford. Reforms in the Arab world have to take into consideration many factors, including history, culture, traditions, politics, tribalism and indeed the ground realities.

Several Arab countries, including Jordan, accepted the American invitation to the Group of Eight summit in Georgia, but their attendance does not signal an endorsement of the US plan. [Point C]If anything, they took advantage of the marked absence of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to emphasise the Arab rejection of the US proposals and managed to dilute it. Instead of the Greater Middle East Initiative, it became “Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa”. It is obvious that the changes did take into consideration the Arab reservations over the first draft prepared by Washington, although the amendments did not go far enough.

[Point D]The prevailing feeling in the Arab world over whatever the US does in the region is scepticism. Rightly so, because Washington has done little to convince the Arabs that it is interested in a fair, just and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary, the American track record has nothing but open bias in favour of Israel.

Therefore, the feeling is that Washington is again trying to hoodwink the Arabs into believing that it has a genuine intention to find a just, fair and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, not to mention the original American draft of the reform initiative, which reeked of a grand design to reshape the Arab region to suit American and Israeli interests.

The endorsement of the “amended” US plan by the G-8 has given it an international look. Why should other members of the group worry about the impact of the US plan on the Arab world, anyway? They signed on the dotted line and lined up behind the US in this context, while refusing to let the US have the full Iraqi pie. [Point E] Again, we Arabs find ourselves and our future being judged by others. No one is disputing that the Arabs need reform; that the Palestinian problem remains unresolved and the Arabs were unable to respond effectively to the Iraqi crisis are the best indicator of the dire need for reforms in the Arab world. However, the American way is not the answer, since its objective is not reform, but serving American interests.

The need of the day is for the Arabs to look inwards and find out for themselves where they have been going wrong and what should be done to correct things. It needs a sea change in mindset. The Arabs have to be convinced of legitimacy regarding the areas where they need reform and they need to come up with realistic and feasible ideas to usher in the changes. It has to be done gradually and in phases. Those who do not want to share power should be persuaded to understand and accept that changes are inevitable, and it is much better if they come from within rather than being imposed from the outside.

Sunday, June 13, 2004

Coming Soon, my reflections on the above.
[EDITED ADDED ANALYSIS]

A bit late, but here it is:
Comments

Well, an interesting article. It reflects fairly common thinking, some of it dead on in my opinion, some of it rather whinging on.

Now as to my "Point A", as I identified it, it strikes me that the author is correct in writing "The US wants the Arab governments to eliminate local groups opposed to the American policy in the Middle East and Washington's approach to the Muslim world in general." There is no doubt about that, although how one defines "opposed to" (tightly, widely) changes the meaning of this in some respects. The author, I know, means this very broadly. I doubt that is entirely fair (although it is not so off the mark in some respects. Certainly there is a dangerous and clumsy tendancy in certain quarters to identify any opposition to the United States with terrorism - e.g. the accusations of al-Jazeerah spreading jihadi agitprop when al-Jazeerah is really just more or less plain vanilla pandering to inchoate Arab nationalist sentiment. I would grant then the author has a real point here, despite the implicit exageration.

He adds, on this same line, "The only way the US could think of achieving its objective is to insist on “democracy” and “reform” in the Middle East as a pressure point and leverage against the governments." Hard to say how I would characterize this analysis. Certainly on its face (leaving aside the "only" which is mere hyperbole) it is hard to say this is an incorrect analysis. Certainly the insistance on democracy and reform is indeed intended to pressure Arab governments along some path the United States believes best, although I would qualify this by saying it is not at all clear that the current American Administration has anything approaching a clear, analytical view of what that path is, what it should and can entail and what trade offs between near term and long term goals need to be made given limited resources.

Certainly, while the author implies here and later on rather more clearly that the focus on democracy and the like is utterly cynical, I would argue that from what I have seen, I would be happier if it were, for sadly it appears naively sincere. That is to say, the present Bush Administration seems all-too driven in its Middle Eastern policy (as probably other policies, but I don't care very much about anything but my turf), by airy, pie-in-the-sky thinking and cotton candy analysis of what "democracy" can achieve - one can understand this as the sort of childish, amateur bar=room analysis of "democracy good, autocracy bad" and the equally childish and simplistic analysis that if one simply brings "democracy" to a country, why all will just turn fine and dandy.

Which is to say, that frighteningly this current Bush Administration is not cynical enough in the right ways, and deeply off-track in its approach to practical matters - as we have seen in my ... bloody hell over a year of commentary on the CPA-Iraq. The senior officials no doubt really mean it when they say, in their blithe and childish ignorance of the real world over here, that they consider the "European" position that one cannot just drop in democracy into the region (mis-stated in their hazy cotton candy thinking to be that democracy is impossible - full stop - in the Middle East) to be "incredibly condescending" etc. Of course they are blissfully unaware that their naive and childish assumption that the rest of the world thinks, acts, reacts exactly as they do, and I mean that very precisely not merely in a general sense, is itself the actually condescending view. I note again that few of us specialists - I say few as I imagine there are always exceptions - believe democratic, free market states are impossible in the Arab world, rather I would say that "we" (I and people like me) understand there is a hard row to hoe in terms of near term material and cultural conditions before you can create healthy democratic polities in most of the Arab states. The socio-economic stresses are just too high.

Now as to "Point B," the author is largely right in stating: " the world knows that if there were to be Western-style elections in the Arab world today, the winners would be those who are described by Washington as anti-US hardliners and extremists — Islamists, the very party that the US is targeting for crackdown. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the American explanation that the root of all troubles in the Middle East is lack of democracy and that is why the US is pushing for it."

Indeed, he is perfectly correct in pointing out the fundamental contradictions in the new US policy, and the reason why it is viewed so. I think the implication, however, that the new push for reform and democracy is utterly cynical is off-base. Rather, it is not cynical enough, in my opinion, and as I states supra, in my opinion more informed by cotton-candy, wishful thinking than clear-headed analysis. Regardless, in my opinion, the first portion of the statement is perfectly correct. Now, the second half, with the implication that lack of democracy is not at the root of issues, is a bit more problemetic. I certainly would agree that there are issues more important than democratisation in the immediate future, such as economic reform and opening up opportunities for the huge demographic bulge coming up in the Arab region.

I note that "Point C" actually surprised me, but his statement that attending Arab countries "took advantage of the marked absence of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to emphasise the Arab rejection of the US proposals and managed to dilute it" rather clearly reflects hostility towards the Saudi and Egyptian regimes. I am not sure where to place that. Probably both as ineffectual toadies of the Americans, or perhaps panderers. Hard to place, but an interesting comment.

Now, as to "Point D" where the author writes that scepticism towards the US rules, well that is quite clear. His explanation, in terms of local perceptions or rather regional perceptions is spot on: "Rightly so, because Washington has done little to convince the Arabs that it is interested in a fair, just and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary, the American track record has nothing but open bias in favour of Israel." The loss of the pretence, the plausible deniabilty - rather typical of the artless foreign policy of the present Administration - was incredibly damaging. The transparent adoption and discarding of policies for near term domestic political gain, or rather childishly cynical adoption for achieving "next week goals" at the expense of longer (and I speak only of months or years) term goals seems all too typical, and rather indicative of the tedious idiocy of this present American Administration in its clumsy lurching about.

This comment, regarding Israeli designs in particular should not be too quickly dismissed: Therefore, the feeling is that Washington is again trying to hoodwink the Arabs into believing that it has a genuine intention to find a just, fair and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, not to mention the original American draft of the reform initiative, which reeked of a grand design to reshape the Arab region to suit American and Israeli interests.

There is much to Iraq planning that suggests to me that certain personnages in the present Administration confused American and Israeli strategic interests in regards to Iraq.

Finally, regarding "Point E" it rather appears to me correct on one level, that the Arabs need to move and generate their own reforms - certainly with outside help as appropriate, but only as far as they wish to go. Islamophobes such as the 'blogger' Tacitus and others with a desire to see the entire world turned into a little America (or a big one as the case may be) are simply going to be disappointed and frustrated with their messianic transformational dreams. Transformation does not happen without massive bloodshed and war, something that I doubt is worth the cost on either side, and frankly trying to 'transform' other cultures was already done - colonialism was its name, and it worked rather poorly as the incetive incompatibilities are too great. This is not to emptily moralize against "change" in the region or maunder on about imperialist imposition, blah blah blah. Rather it is simply to accept the reality of what is actually achievable, and what the reality of social reaction is to outside penetration, above all by people like this Tacitus who are so clueless as to write about the false consciousness of the Xian elite in this region, because their views on Israel match those of their fellow Arabs and not his. That is to say, all this "tranforming" the Muslim/Arab worlds talk is largely driven by deep-seated ignorance and misconceptions regarding what the cotton candy thinking dreamers "understand" of the region. Incremental change on the margins, in key areas, above all economic are the points which are most likely to help, and indeed are least controversial and most likely to succeed. Not a matter of idealizing the culture, but mere practicality, economics is easier.

However, even here there is controversy and the work is hard. An example to ponder: recent conversation with an Ass't GM of a bank here, the AGM opined that there was "too much" competition and that it would be better to restrict the number of authorized companies so as to provide more stability.

This the AGM of a bank, and someone otherwise well versed in economics of some kind.

A great deal to do, effecting my transfer soon, although I am about 5 centimeters away from resigning actually as these clowns I signed on with seem to have no clue as to how to do business in this region. I was hired for my regional expertise, but am seriously feeling it's goddamned window dressing. Managing Director asks my opinions, then ignores them, then seems puzzled and irritated when, as I predicted, his approach blows things up.

This ain't fucking New York where you can waltz into town, order up a conference call and get the "decision makers" on the horn like that. It's not a productive way to break into the market. I warned him time and time again. So, what does he do? He designs his "kickoff" exactely as if he was in New York. And sure enough, it flops. Flops like a fucking pan pizza. Never mind the consultants he has trailing along with him analyzing things seem to be able to draw conclusions out of their asses (speak with five guys who speak good English and they're suddenly telling me about the fucking market...). Fucking American rubes.

Well, the person coming into to manage this area is going to have her hands full as Fat Man has gone and insulted a bunch of people, managed to leave everyone with the impression he's a big spending, easy money American dolt and a gullible twit to boot. I am also pissed that he managed to personally insult a number of the contacts of mine (friends and the like) at senior levels who I took the trouble to introduce him to. Never mind his using me as a scapegoat with the consultants for his own lack of preparation for meetings and the like (the previously mentioned due diligence binders). Snake. Total snake. And extraordinar maladroitness.

It's actually the later that bothers me more.

Well, I need to sit down again and get the Zombie going. Me and the Man really need to kickstart that motherfucker. Indeed, with the fucking CPA going away there may, just may, be an opportunity (although it's not "really" going away, the facade of decision making may be just enough to get information flowing).

In the meantime, gotta go do some weekend meetings. At least Fat Boy is on a fucking plane back home.

Why order such a thing, at a Five Star. You know the chef has probably made it twice, lord knows how much turnover there is, ... etc.

So, the benefits? None, really, except being laid out all Friday (non-working day you know out here), and having the opportunity during my in and out of consciousness moments, to watch the (in)famous al-Hurra, the US Propaganda Channel in Arabic.

First time I subjected myself to it.

Likely the last.

Let me say, lame does not quite capture the effort.

Primo, the format was "chatty" American style joke-around TV anchors. Completely alien format to the region, and my read of my friends reactions (some amigos dropped in to make sure I was not dead) tells me it went over like a lead balloon. Not to say people like the local State TV "Living Dead News Caster" format, but the more formal European style of news reporting (e.g. BBC) is clearly rather more appreciated. One amigo sarcastically remarked "all they're doing is translating American TV."

Secondo, choice of topics. Again, it was... well as if I was watching American TV translated into Arabic. I mean, carrying Reagan's funeral live with color commentary? How the fuck is that speaking to Arab audiences? Cover the damn thing, yes, but carry it live? The rest of the newscasting was similarly bizarrely parochial (i.e. American focused). They could have at least tried copying BBC Arabic, which is highly appreciated and manages to promote a certain British POV without being staggeringly parochial.

I was left with the sensation that maybe, just maybe this might appeal to Arab Americans, but for Arabic speakers in the region (never mind the agitprop aspect) it simply will be passed over in total bemusement. What a stupid idea and waste of money. Bloody navel gazing idiots in the States who know nothing of the ground here.

Reminds me, last week having dinner with some American VC guy from Arizona, who starts loudly talking about the Jihadi propaganda on al-Jazeerah (misprounounced of course).... where do people like this get this crap? Jihadi propaganda indeed. Corrected that.

Today I paid my landlord.

3 months late.

I had the rent of course, that was not the issue. Rather, I was punishing him for not doing something on time and costing me money.

Now, it could have been an actionable issue, but for a few thousand dollars, one has to be stupid to try the courts. Waste of time and money.

Far better, I know he needs me rent to finish off the renovations he has planned, in order to get this building full of various embassy staff (I live in embassy ghetto). Very profitable, sucker renters.

Now, a few thousand ain't nothing, but it's a constraint for him. I know that directly and indirectly. So I don't pay. He knows I have the money, I knw that he knows. And he also knows I am pissed off about the subject matter.

Of course all this passed politely. "Mounaouer al-Beled", lighting up the city I am.

Funny fucking game, because he knows I have his cash. I even told him at one point, directly, to bother him some more. He also should understand why I was fucking with him. But threaten me?

Uhuh. Nope, I'm better than fucking sliced bread. All about connections here, he knows what they are, so he acts subservient. Acts, maybe he is. I don't know. I hope that he hates me, but I cost him serious dough, but that was well deserrved.

So, when I pay today - and I confess I was a real asshole about it, running into him and saying I had money for him and why had he not come by? - he bows and scrapes and tells me I am more important than money, I light up the country, blah blah.

Felt rather dirty actually, but that's how it works.

The sad part, as a property owner, he had little to no recourse. He knows I have connections, he knows that he is a felah (his fucking around isn't sadly bec. of bad intentions, but simple ignorance and incompetence), and he plays the game.

That is not good. The role I played (abstracting away from the issue he cost me money) was a real negative and asshole one. Writ large, it says the up and coming property owner (take property to mean any given asset) is at the mercy (in the extreme sense) of the established, the connected.

Well, the fucker got his dough, Months late, but I took pit on him. His real fear was that I would fuck off without paying at all. However, I felt bad enough on this basis, given I know he's just an idjit and not a truly evil fuck.

How to say this?

My fucking managing director used me as a scapegoat this evening with some consultants and I am pretty fucking pissed off. This ain't a trvial issue, and he called into question my competence - although (and I note one should always take self reps with a grain of salt) it's pretty clear his avoidance of taking decisions was the underlying cause. All about having financial data on some banks available. Of course the due diligence binders did not contain the required infos, but I hadn't fucking seen them since they were FedExed from New York late. His shop, not my fucking shop.

This asshole is going to pay. I may have to take some time for payback, but there is no way I am going to stand for me being fucked with like this. Motherfucker. Fat lazy fucking ex-Treasury motherfucker is going to pay.

Still going to take fancy footwork, I am the new boy in the org (not for long, motherfuckers are going to push me to fuck off if I see anymore of this cheap ass bullshit).

I am not sure if I impressed or not, but I thought I would share my continued bemusement (arising from a recent conversation) at this. Nothing new here, no news, but I was bemused to hear, after a meeting wrapped up, one of the financial consultants praising the "entreprenurial energy" that he sees in Jordan, after holding some meetings with some SMEs that are anything but SMEs, and hearing a bunch of nice English packaged up to dupe him.

I would rather think that sitting in a conference room, one might think, "Perhaps I should validate the glurge I am hearing?"

More on this later, re specific financial matters and the stunningly stupid comments.

I know this will be yet another item to make me unpopular in many quarters, but the following is an excellent development.

U.S. Gulf War POWs Denied Settlement
By Hope Yen
Associated Press
Saturday, June 5, 2004; Page A15

"An appeals court panel threw out a $959 million judgment yesterday for U.S. prisoners of war who say they were tortured by the Iraqi military during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, ruling that Congress never authorized such lawsuits against foreign governments.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit overturned a lower court's ruling that said 17 former POWs and 37 family members were entitled to the damages under a federal statute allowing suits involving countries that financed or aided terrorists.

The three-judge panel said the statute allows lawsuits for pain and suffering only if they are filed against agents and officers of those foreign states responsible for the torture who are not acting on behalf of their government. So, even though the lawsuit also names Saddam Hussein, he is immune because the POWs sued him for his alleged activities as Iraq's president.

"We are mindful of the gravity of the allegations in this case. That appellees endured this suffering while acting in service to their country is all the more sobering," Judge Harry Edwards said. "Nevertheless, we cannot ignore . . . its impact on the United States' conduct of foreign policy where the law is indisputably clear that appellees were not legally entitled.""

I note the underlying judgement was a default judgement.

Rather simply, while suing another government for abuses etc. sounds all nice and touchy feely, it is, like the Belgian courts, something that opens a pandora's box of problems... an inappropriate mechanism. Of course, one can only imagine how a similar Iraqi lawsuit might go in re Abu Ghrieb.

EDIT Added:
Further to this point, I note the following comment from here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/05/international/worldspecial/05court.html

"David Eberly, an Air Force colonel, now retired, whose F-15 fighter was shot down over northwest Iraq and who says interrogators repeatedly pointed a gun at his head and pulled the trigger on an empty chamber, described himself as confused by the administration's priorities. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has expressed support for compensating Iraqi detainees who suffered abuse by American soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison, Colonel Eberly noted, even as the government fought the former prisoners' suit.

"I can't believe," Colonel Eberly said, "that the government is willing to spend U.S. tax dollars to compensate Iraqis when they are not willing to allow us to pursue this judgment against Iraqi dollars. And they have fought it with U.S. dollars."

Reasons of state, simple fellow, reasons of state. The compensation for the Iraqi detainees is not justice, it is bribery, it is face saving. And of coruse trivial in comparision with the ridiculously large judgement won against the Iraqi state. I note further that use of private lawsuits in matters of foreign policy is recipe for chaos and self-defeating disasterous posturing. The spectacle of (relatively) wealthy Americans winning nearly a billion dollars from an impoverished country for abuses/torture, while US soldiers commit the same is bad politics and harms US interests. As soldiers, their personal interests fell behind interests of state.

At present I do not have a view on this, but let me share some phone calls I got from "friends" here:

"Hey, you're director resigned" [I.e. my personal director, not ambig. in Arabic)

"Your boss resigned."

Etc.

I note that the convos suggested more people than I thought really do think I am not what I am. Fucking irritating.

The following, besides being senselss, is just silly. They're doing PR for "nameless" officials "on the record." Fucking waste of human flesh, these fucking useless ass idjits.

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BACKGROUND BRIEFING



SUBJECT: NEW IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT



ATTRIBUTION TO A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL



LOCATION: BAGHDAD, IRAQ



DATE: TUESDAY, JUNE 1, 2004





(Note: Because the briefer and questioners were off mike, this transcript contains numerous inaudible portions.)



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: (In progress) -- against the armed opponents of democracy in Iraq.



So this new cabinet which has been announced today along with the presidency is, we think, deeply committed to democracy. And their willingness to take these responsibilities in such difficult and dangerous times is inspiring, I think, to all of us who love freedom.



So with those comments, I'm happy to take your questions. If you could identify yourselves, I'd be grateful. (Off mike.) Okay, so I'll just -- I'll spread them around as best I can.



Yes.



Q (Off mike.)



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think you'll have to use the mike. Begin again.



Q As far as the interim --



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Can I have somebody -- (inaudible.)



Q There had been an agreement with the Governing Council and with the women -- (inaudible) -- for a quarter of the new government to be women, and this looks like you have six of 33. That's less than a quarter. Could you talk about that?



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, this was -- the outcome was the result of enormously intense and complex discussions. As you know, the political geometry in Iraq is complicated, so there are many, many factors that were balanced one against the other. I think as you get a chance to see the biographies of these women, you'll be impressed.



Why don't we go to somebody on the side of the room. Okay. (Off mike.)



Q (Off mike) -- with the Washington Post. The U.N. released a statement earlier today saying that Dr. Pachachi was offered the position of president, but declined for personal reasons. And then Dr. Pachachi at a press conference just a little while ago said that the reason he had declined it was because there were people inside the Governing Council who didn't want him to be the president. Can you talk to us a little bit about the process of the selection of the president and how we, you know, got from Pachachi to Ghazi Yawar?



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I don't want to intrude on Ambassador Brahimi's purview. He'll, I think, explain the latest events in that respect -- (off mike) -- in the statement that you mentioned.



I will say several things. We had, as we went through this process in this (four-cornered ?) way, many, many suggestions of who ought to be the president of Iraq. About -- now about a week ago, the list was narrowed and -- (off mike) -- the cabinet -- (off mike). And -- but the -- (off mike) -- just explain the process, but it was narrowed; however, really up until yesterday, other names started appearing. So someone would say, "Well, that's good, but have you thought of so-and-so?" So this was evolving really right on up through yesterday -- (off mike) -- including the presidency where there were some other names that came up late in the process.



But I think it was clear that Sheik Ghazi and Ambassador -- Minister Pachachi had the most significant support, so the preoccupation was centered on them, both of whom I think are exemplary.



One thing I did want to say in that regard is, I noticed -- you all are in that -- (off mike) -- but I noticed that several days ago, somebody wrote that Pachachi was the American choice; some of you wrote it, maybe even somebody in this room. And then every other story said this. I think this is -- (off mike). It's not true. In the middle of last week, when it looked as if these two were the strongest contenders -- (off mike) -- were those two gentlemen, Ambassador Bremer and I went back to Washington for guidance. We asked our -- the top of the administration -- these are the two; please express whatever preferences you might have. And fairly rapidly, within, indeed, I think, several hours, the answer came back, either of them would make an excellent president of Iraq, and we don't have a favorite.



And therefore, as these discussions went on, we lobbied for either one. You won't find any of these people that we talked to who will tell you -- truthfully, anyway -- that we went to them and said you should choose A or B.



By the way, there were some other stories, although they're fewer in number, that had exactly the opposite argument. We didn't lobby -- (off mike.) We said that we thought either one of them would make a fine president of Iraq. So I've corrected that, for what it's worth.



Yes?



Q (Name off mike) -- from -- (off mike) -- newspaper. Yesterday we heard about the -- (off mike) -- with Sheik Ghazi and Mr. Pachachi. Can you describe to us -- (off mike) -- nominate and how has he been chosen -- how the Governing Council or the -- (inaudible) -- Sheik Ghazi -- (off mike)?



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not, of course, going to name who else's name came up, not least because they didn't get the job. (Chuckles.) I don't think that would be (smart ?).



But I think I've just said all I need to say about the process that produced these decisions. And essentially, it was Ambassador Brahimi put out the statement, and you would want to talk to him, and you ought to ask him about it.



Sir? (Off mike.)



Q (Name off mike) -- from National Public Radio. Thank you. Do you expect the Governing Council to dissolve? There's been some discussion --



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: My best understanding is it did.



Q (Off mike.)



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think it dissolved this morning.



STAFF (?): Yes, they dissolved this morning. (Off mike.)



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Okay. It dissolved this morning. It dissolved itself, I believe, if I'm not mistaken. It dissolved itself.



Q Did they make a statement or anything?



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I'm --



STAFF (?): (Off mike) -- we can set up --



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Okay. I know I -- (off mike) -- you'll have to -- (off mike).



Yes, sir?



Q (Off mike.) So who is running things on the Iraqi side -- (off mike).



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: The prime minister and cabinet.



Q They've actually taken (things over ?)



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, there's a ceremony today, as you know, which we all, if we can, will go see, at -- this afternoon at 4:00. And then, they're the interim government of Iraq until the election.



Hi.



Q (Off mike) -- today, and what's the difference between today --



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, from now until June 30, the sovereign authority in Iraq, on behalf of the Iraqi people, is the CPA. And between now and June 30, you have an interim Iraqi government, which will prepare to acquire that full sovereignty on the 30th of June. And that -- that's -- under international law, until June 30th, the CPA is the sovereign authority in Iraq. And then, on the afternoon of June 30th, this interim government, led by the prime minister and the cabinet that you've seen, will take control of sovereignty and begin to exercise it.



Sir?



Q (Off mike.)



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: But I said that Ambassador Bremer and myself went to Washington and said these are the two final candidates, (most liked ?); do you have a preference? Because we get to have our opinion, too.



Q Did you go to Washington?



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Oh, no, no, no, I didn't go -- (inaudible) -- not that. I meant --



Q You talked to -- (off mike).



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yeah. (Inaudible.) That would have been dramatic, into the night, fly off -- you didn't even miss me -- (inaudible). As I say, I don't know where that story started. (Inaudible.)



I better go over here. Yes, sir? But I'll be back.



Q Eddie Sanders from the LA Times. In the cabinet, do you know what the ethnic breakdown is? And were you looking to hit any specific targets in terms of --



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: You should -- I'm not going to comment on that. There are many complexities -- geographic, ethnic, religious. So you just have a look and see what you think.



Q Can you talk about whether or not that was one of the factors in your determinations?



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, balance of various kinds. Where are they from? Are they from -- (inaudible) -- all of us to have all of the various dimensions of Iraq that we could reflected in a cabinet, and I think you can see. So it's got --



Q And I would ask one tag-on to that. Were you specifically looking for people that were not part of the GC now in trying to round out that cabinet?



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, we were looking -- yes, the answer is we were looking for new faces, and we were looking for people, individuals who had indigenous roots and support. We were looking for excellence. And of course, some number of members of the Governing Council qualify on all those accounts. Some of them -- I'm not going to announce which ones -- some of them took themselves out of the interim government, didn't wish to participate in it, and so forth. So, but yeah, we were looking for essentially a new team. And as you look at the names, you'll see it's a new team.



I'll go back over here. Sir?



Q (Off mike.)



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yes, sir.



Q How do you see that -- (off mike).



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Of course, that's the most fundamental question that's been asked so far. We think it's an extremely strong, talented group. And of course they have, as we've seen today, even around where we are, what a daunting, difficult task they have. But we think that they are up to it, and we think that they will perform well. We think that they have the qualities, the talent, the strength, bravery, now and historically -- (off mike) -- I suppose, bravery. They know that the new security situation -- (off mike). So we think this is really quite an extraordinary group of people that Brahimi's come up with, and think that they're up to the task. And we'll do our best to support them.



Sir.



Q Larry Kaplow with Cox Newspapers. At the beginning of the process, I think Ambassador Brahimi said he felt that there would be a conflict of interest for people in this interim government to put themselves up for election to the transitional government. So have any of these people pledged not to run for election? And what kind of oversight or restriction would there be on them not to abuse their powers given them, absent of any Congress, absent of any kind of -- (off mike) -- holding the purse strings to make sure that they don't use -- (off mike)?



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I think those are two different questions. I'll try to take them seriatim. The first one is no, there's no prohibition on running for office. And I think, if I may ask -- (inaudible) -- to ask questions about what Mr. Brahimi thinks, (you can direct it to him ?).



Q Well -- (off mike).



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yeah. (Off mike.) But anyway, the answer is no. I think there are other countries where serving members of the government can run for reelection. (Off mike) -- think of one.



Q (Inaudible) -- congresses and --



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: That was what I was going to say next, which is the issue of checks and balances. If you look at the TAL, you will see that the creation of the presidency -- (off mike). And if you'll also look at the TAL annex, (which we don't have to look at ?), there will be a supreme court. And then of course there will be this council, this interim council that will be stood up probably in early -- about mid-July by the time we do it. So I think there will be oversight of -- (off mike).



Let me try and pick someone I haven't -- (inaudible.)



Q Yes, Mark Jolley (sp) from Reuters. There's a widespread perception in the street of Iraq that all of these politicians you've talked to or appointed since day one, the whole process has been signed and sealed by the Americans. How much time did you actually go out and spend with people in the street asking them who they want versus these various organizations you talked with and women's groups?



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, this is, of course, always a problem when one -- I'm a social scientist, so I actually know something about databases. This is a problem in democracies, if you -- the talent to try to understand what votes who aren't organized think. And we did give our best at doing that.



But as always in these exercises, we mostly speak with representatives. So you try to find women's groups and you talk with women about how they see Iraq and so forth. So you mostly -- (inaudible) -- I don't know exactly practically how (you go to ?) any other. And by the way, if I may be tedious -- the tedious professor here, in social science terms, anything you discover in such anecdotal encounters -- (inaudible) -- it really depends on who you (drop ?) into. So can't meet with 10 people.



So we did what people do. We (engulfed ?) as broad a -- as a matter of fact, all together thousands and thousands of people, maybe even some of them were ordinary Iraqis. I know who you think the street is, but thousands of people, thousands of people. And that process -- which as I say, took the last month -- won't satisfy everybody. I suppose in democracies, you can't.



But what happened as the process went on is some names begin to be mentioned more and more and more. And so we -- and I'm not saying -- the U.N. was extremely entrepreneurial in itself going out. They didn't just sit and wait, "Well, who wants to come and see?" They were out soliciting -- "Who should we talk to? Who should we talk to" -- all the time, and we were as well.



I guess over here, sir.



Q Dexter Filkins with The New York Times. What promises did you receive from the members of this government on -- that they wouldn't amend the interim constitution and they would not -- (inaudible) -- political freedom -- (inaudible) --



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No.



Q And if you didn't, then why didn't you?



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, I don't exactly know how we would require them to -- (inaudible) -- promises. On the first point, of course, there's the TAL, and if you read the TAL, that answers your question.



On the second -- well, maybe --



Q I mean, so many groups have said that they -- (inaudible) --



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I know, but the problem is that it wouldn't be legal if they did, so I don't think that's going to happen. (Inaudible) -- they run into the law of the land here someplace.



On the second point, we didn't ask for any such, "Raise your right hand, do you solemnly swear," because we didn't have a government. And one of things we'll want to do in June, now that -- starting from, I guess, 6:00 tonight, we'll have an Iraqi prime minister, an Iraqi defense minister, interior minister. At some point -- I don't know when, but not too far -- we'll start having discussions with them about the security arrangements -- (off mike). So, we couldn't do it beforehand because we didn't have an entity with which to do it. But that will be fairly soon, I think. They'll have to settle in to some degree, of course, because there are so many new people that (define their ?) ministries, and so forth. But once they get their feet on the ground, we'll start having that discussion.



Sir?



Q (Name off mike) -- with the AP. Ambassador Brahimi -- (off mike) -- to us. What are the differences between this government today and the government you gave Iraq after the invasion? What's the main --



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I think that that invites you to make invidious comparisons between -- directed at a group of people, some of whom lost their lives by carrying out their responsibilities as members of the Governing Council. I think that's your (applicable ?) job; you do it, you look at it and make your judgments. But I'm not going to say anything critical of these people in the Governing Council. They did the best they could under extraordinarily difficult circumstances, and some of them died. And all of them were under threat all the time; there were close calls, and so forth. So I take my hat off to them. There's nobody -- nobody forced them to do this; they kept at it, and I take my hat off to them. I think it was an extremely difficult situation that they faced.



Yes?



Q (Name and affiliation off mike.) I'm just still a little bit unclear about how the president was chosen. I know you said that you -- (inaudible) -- Washington; they said either one would be fine. But what happened from there? How did -- (off mike)?



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, there were -- these were discussions -- again, this is something that you should ask Ambassador Brahimi about. He released a statement today. So have a word with him about the naming -- (off mike).



Yes?



Q (Name off mike) -- from Knight Ridder. Besides Adnan Pachachi, were there others who were offered positions who declined? And if so, what were the reasons?



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I don't -- I think there were a couple, and I think they were basically personal -- (off mike).



Q Security?



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No, no, no. Personal. That I have a sick somebody or other that I -- (off mike).



STAFF: We have time for one more.



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Most said yes, most of them. There were a couple.



(Off mike) -- I think two more, two more.



Q (Off mike) --



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: I'm sorry can you -- (off mike)?



Q (Off mike) -- spoken for the past few weeks and said -- (inaudible) -- this process, not just, you know, the presidency, but all along, and how -- (off mike). Can you comment on that? I know you say -- (off mike) -- but how much -- (off mike.)



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: We have -- (off mike). We were one of these four -- (off mike) -- and we were expressing views and we were coming up with names. But it was collaborative. I can't speak to whether we conducted ourselves -- (inaudible) -- manner. There are people, if I might say, and it's completely natural and fine, who are disappointed their particular favorite didn't make it across the finish line, or their -- by the way, the one thing I would just point out to you all if I might, maybe this will show up as a -- (inaudible). What's been happening here, including in addition to the presidency, is a process that's called whoa, politics.



What is politics? People going out and saying -- (inaudible) -- I have to have seven ministries or I shall not this and this, or I -- and this is what happens with -- (inaudible) -- politics. It's exciting. It's never happened here before, by the way, in how many millennia? Ever. Okay? I know that may be too long a time span for your readers. (Laughter.) I'd like to start my lead with Mesopotamia -- (off mike). But it's true. I mean, I know maybe it's hard -- it's certainly hard for me -- (off mike) -- step back and say, this is actually sort of out of control. And so -- (inaudible). Oh, he's getting so -- (off mike). But I could just (feel it ?) that through -- (off mike).



Oh, it's not as good as elections, and you will find that people on the street in January get to make the definitive. It's not as good as elections. We could have had elections earlier, but we're -- (off mike) -- not to -- (off mike). But given what happened, I -- (off mike) -- see these people emerge from this process.



Okay, last question.



Q (Off mike) -- the president and the prime minister --



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: This sounds like a hypothetical -- (inaudible) -- (briefer's name) didn't give -- (off mike).



Q (Off mike.)



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: No hypotheticals. No -- (off mike). If I were (wonderful ?), I'd answer that question.



Q Okay. (Off mike.)



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: (Off mike.)



Q Do the president and the prime minister have the right to say whether --



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Well, this is -- what I'm trying to say is they have full sovereignty. They're just -- they're a country. They have full sovereignty. And we have had -- I'll just say this: We've had more than 50 years of successful security arrangements with nations and governments that face similar threats. And how do we do that? You get that by talking to them and then reaching arrangements. And that's what I think will happen. We haven't been able to do that before because we didn't have the entity. We now have a prime minister, Defense minister, just like that. And so we'll be talking to them soon about this. And let me say -- let me give you a prediction: It'll work out fine. And the reason it'll work out fine is that the threat to those characteristics that I began with about what do people want, they want security, personal, all relatives; they want kids to be able to go, leave the house and home; they want economic development, prosperity. They want what Homo sapiens want. And on the security side, they can't do it themselves now. But they'll be working hard with us to create the capabilities where they can do it all themselves. And when that moment arrives, the coalition leaves. They can't -- I don't know of any Iraqis who is arguing that they can do it themselves. So that will occur, this discussion, in the next month or so, and I think it will work out between ourselves and this interim government which will take full sovereignty on June 30th.



(Inaudible cross talk.)



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: (Off mike) -- that was one of the last acts -- (off mike) -- CPA.



Q They did that today?



SR. ADMIN. OFFICIAL: Yeah, sworn in.



(Inaudible cross talk.)



END

The Zombie has shuffled to life, but the Zombie has decided to have fuck all to do with the fucking CPA.

As those who have been reading for a while know, I like to start every month with a note asking who's out there.

Meanwhile, I am running ragged at present, not much time...

[EDITED Added following]

And of course feel free to ask for topics, ask questions, etc. whcih somehow you may inexplicably feel I have something vaguely interesting to say about. I will, of course, as is my habit, feel free to respond as pleases, or ignore, or just be plain abusive. Although actually I haven't been that abusive to any commentators so far.

However, shortly to share some clueless comments by some American financial consultants out here.

I had a chat with one of the officials behind this. Regarding the language. Senior guy, told me that US Treasury, who are the real movers, had written even MORE aggressive language, the text quoted was "toned down.,"

So, State did look at this, and that arrogant idiocy was the best they could do.

In the mailbox:

"Okay, okay, okay, so I’m asleep at the wheel today…..thank you to the 150 people who sent me emails gently reminding me that today is in fact, Monday, May 31st, not June 1st. Nonetheless, there is a Kimmitt/Senor briefing today (May 31st) @ 6:00pm"

Well, lord knows I would not want to miss my daily dose of clumsy dezinformatsia. Pity I had meetings.

As someone noted, canaries in mines:

" It is too early to determine whether Western companies will begin pulling employees out, though some American companies are already reducing their presence in the country. Citigroup, for example, ended nearly a half century of activities in Saudi Arabia last week when it said it would sell its remaining stake in the Samba Financial Group."
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/31/international/middleeast/31OIL.html?hp=&pagewanted;=all&position;=

However, I note that Citi had plans to oper on its own in KSA, as licensing for fully owned foreign banks should be available soon.

They may, however, be rethinking that. Still, it is a large and lucrative market, with the High Net Worth princes and all.

My goddamned pressing ... dry cleaners, whatever, did not deliver my goddamned dry cleaning, once again, as promised. Now last time, it was just as I was leaving for 2 weeks on the road. That was fucking brilliant. My favorite suits, in the fucking cleaners. Me, in another country. Then, they fucking call me to ask where I am. As I had bloody well told them, in another fucking country, stupid gits.

Pity they happen to be more competent than most cleaners (and non-smoking, I have had dry cleaning delivered that smelled like cigarrettes, rather defeating the fucking point of it all).

Now, big meeting tomorrow, series of the goddamned things, and again, no proper suits. Well, that's not quite true, but close enough.

Assholes.

Ah, well, a fine evening doing expense reports. I hate fucking expense reports. I suppose they're necessary (well, they are clearly) but bloody hell, I gots them in multiple currencies and the evil bitch of a controller wants a daily accounting on FX fluctuations, blah blah blah. Fucking Goldie trained bitch. Two hours and I only got two out of four done.

Well, on Chalabi:
This fine article from the Kevin Drum site I think, or something like that:
http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/040607fa_fact1

Of which I focus on the following:
"After attending boarding school in England, Chalabi went to America to study math. Upon finishing his Ph.D., which was in the rarefied branch of geometry known as knot theory, Chalabi moved to Lebanon, to teach math at the American University in Beirut. In 1977, however, Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan invited him to found a new bank in the country, whose financial sector was largely dominated by Palestinians. With the help of royal patronage and of innovations previously unavailable in Jordan, such as consumer credit cards, computerized banking, and A.T.M.s, the company created by Chalabi, Petra Bank, grew impressively. [Interj: mild exageration there] Within a decade, it had become the second-largest bank in Jordan, and Chalabi became a rich and well-connected man in Amman. Like his father and grandfather, he extended easy credit to important benefactors. He boasted to an American friend that he had personally made Prince Hassan, the King’s brother, “a wealthy man.” (Prince Hassan, who continues to regard Chalabi as a friend, declined to be interviewed.) Chalabi lived with his family in the suburban hills outside Amman, in a house of his own design, surrounded by a collection of modern art. His children rode horses with the royal family. .... [omitted]

In 1989, however, Chalabi’s comfortable life collapsed amid allegations of criminality. Jordan’s Central Bank, facing a liquidity crisis, demanded that the country’s banks place thirty per cent of their foreign currency in its accounts. Petra balked, prompting an emergency audit. Chalabi betrayed little outward concern about this sudden turn. Patrick Theros, a former Ambassador to Qatar, who was then stationed in Jordan, had dinner at Chalabi’s home during this period. “He was completely charming, particularly to the ladies—he could talk about any subject,” Theros recalled. Two days later, Chalabi, who had apparently been tipped off about his impending arrest, fled. He forfeited many of his family’s assets, and resettled with his wife, Leila, and their four children in London.

On April 9, 1992, a military tribunal in Jordan delivered a two-hundred-and-twenty-three-page verdict, which concluded that Chalabi was guilty of thirty-one charges, including embezzlement, theft, forgery, currency speculation, making false statements, and making bad loans to himself, to his friends, and to his family’s other financial enterprises, in Lebanon and Switzerland. The Jordanian docket shows that Chalabi was sentenced to serve twenty-two years of hard labor, and to pay back two hundred and thirty million dollars in embezzled funds. An Arthur Andersen audit commissioned by Jordanian authorities found that the bank had overstated its assets by more than three hundred million dollars. In addition, a hundred and fifty-eight million dollars had disappeared from its accounts, apparently as a result of transactions involving people linked to the former management. (Swiss documents obtained by the Newsweek correspondent Mark Hosenball show that Socofi, an investment firm in Switzerland run by the Chalabi family, also collapsed under suspicious circumstances, leading to pleas of no contest by two of Chalabi’s brothers, Jawad and Hazam, in 2000.)

After Chalabi arrived in England, he claimed that the Petra affair had been a political frameup. He said that he was targeted because he had been an outspoken critic of Saddam (an assertion that is not unlike his recent defense in Baghdad), and claimed that he was indicted because the Jordanians were beholden to Saddam for oil and other economic aid. Chalabi, like many Iraqi exiles living in Jordan, had indeed opposed Saddam openly. However, a well-informed American friend of Chalabi’s could not recall other instances of Saddam forcing Jordan to clamp down on his critics there.

John Markham, a lawyer representing Chalabi, recently forwarded to me a previously undisclosed letter, which Chalabi claims is “the smoking gun” that proves his accusers are lying. During the trial proceedings, the Jordanian military prosecutor wrote to the country’s authorities that “the method of dealing with the Petra Bank and its liquidation was the result of personal hatred and envy.” The prosecutor blamed Said Nabulsi, the head of Jordan’s Central Bank. According to Markham, Nabulsi was complicit with Saddam.

In Jordan, banking officials scoff at Chalabi’s claims of innocence. Petra had opened a subsidiary in Washington, D.C., in 1983, and after the bank’s collapse, according to a top Jordanian finance official, investigators combed America for forty-five days, trying to locate the bank’s hidden assets. Almost all the assets listed on the books, the official said, were worthless, except for an auxiliary office that was listed as a repository for valuable bank records. The investigators soon discovered that the “office” was a country estate with a swimming pool, in Middleburg, Virginia. It belonged to the Chalabi family, which was charging the bank a monthly rent. “There was not one business record in the whole place,” the official said. “This man is a vicious liar. There is no end to it. It’s like you find someone killing with a gun in his hand, and he says he’s innocent. He just wears you down.” The official declined to be named, because he feared Chalabi’s influence. “He has more powerful friends in Washington than you or me,” he said, adding, “Really, some of your people are such suckers.”"

Emphasis added. On the very last line, oh yes, oh yes indeed. Just be polished, speak English well and you can so easily charm the fuckers who get all starrey eyed about Arab reform and blah blah.

I note that I know Nabulsi, personally although not well. He is presently in the private sector as the chief executive of a major financial institution here. I have never heard of him being connected with the Sadaam regime and per representations from people I know close to the key principals on this, while there was a personal angle in Nabulsi absolutely loathing Chalabi, it had nothing at all to do with politics or Sadaam, everything to do with personalities.

What I rather found interesting about the article was the items re Chalabi's motivations - i.e. the obession (cited in the article) with recovering the ancient feudal properties. One rather finds this rather more believable than the "democratization" pap that the gullible idiots among the Neo-Cons and their conservative fellow-travellers have lapped up with such enthusiasm.

I am glad that the CPA and its Iraqi lackeys are concentrating on important things, like the following:

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR SUMAIDA’IE ANNOUNCES REVISIONS TO IRAQ’S TRAFFIC CODE

Baghdad, Iraq…May 30, 2004 – Iraq’s Minister of Interior, Samir Shakir Mahmood Sumaida’ie has announced recently-completed revisions to Iraq’s National Traffic Code.

The revised Code includes provisions requiring operator licenses as well as vehicle registration, licensing and safety inspections.

The Code stipulates that fines for violations of the Code be paid directly to an accounts officer at the police sector headquarters.

“Citizens often complain to me about the traffic conditions in Iraq – especially in Baghdad,” said Minister Sumaida’ie. “This revised Code will go a long way toward improving traffic and, more importantly, the safety of Iraqi drivers and pedestrians.”

Vehicle licensing and inspection stations will be established at various traffic police offices throughout Iraq. The Ministry of Interior will notify Iraqi vehicle owners of the time and place of their vehicle inspection and registration.

The provisions of the Code will be enforced by Iraq’s traffic police officers. Those vehicle owners and/or drivers who fail to comply with the Code are subject to punishment in Iraqi courts.

The revisions, implemented by CPA Order Number 86, were requested by Baghdad’s Director General for Traffic. The revisions are the first since 1972.

The revised Iraq National Traffic Code is available in Arabic and English at www.iraqcoalition.org.

Emphasis (underline) added.

Of course this is just the kind of asinine posturing that fools the Americans but does nothing to change the situaiton on the ground. When is it going to sink through their fucking thick heads that it's not the laws that are the main fucking binding fucking constraints around here, it's the motherfucking practices on the ground! The issue is not an out of date traffic code - who the fuck pays attention to the fucking laws in this goddamned region anyway you silly ignorant idealistic twits! - the issue is (i) lack of enforcement of what exists, (ii) lack of an idea on the rule of the legal text over the negotiated practice with the police man (the institutionalized (x) dinar 'fee'), (iii) the lack of respect for the system generally! Bloody hell, will these rubes, these wide-eyed do-gooding rubes never learn?

Bloody idiots. Bloody goddamned idiots getting taken to town like fucking innocent virgins right out of bloody damned school.

New goddamned traffic code indeed. Spanking new traffic code, to be ignored just like the old decrepit ones.

Fuck, it isn't fucking Kansas Dorothy.

Edited to Add:

And you wonder why I am supporting the Cuban economy. It's because of arrogantly naive crap like this. Drives me bloody batty.