Still more stereotype-busting

Giff Johnson profiles Palauan vice president Sandra Sumang Pierentozzi, who may become the Pacific's first female head of state if she defeats the incumbent president this November.

Measuring bias

I've been having an interesting exchange here (check here if the page cuts off at the bottom of the sidebar) about a recent study by two Glasgow University professors purporting to show that BBC news coverage is systemically biased in favor of Israel. Suffice it to say that I'm skeptical, as is Norman Geras, who points out that the researchers may have brought their own biases to the table.

Geras' point may in fact be the telling one. Since the beginning of the second intifada, the news coverage of the Middle East has spawned a subgenre of "coverage of the coverage," much of which accuses news media organizations of bias toward one side or another. Measuring bias, however, is difficult if not impossible where there is nothing resembling a consensus on neutral interpretation of the facts. To those who "know" that Israelis are the villains, any coverage that humanizes Israel or suggests that some of its policies might have legitimate motivations must suffer from a pro-Israel bias. To those who maintain that the Palestinians are the villains and the Israelis the victims, precisely the opposite is the case. Nearly every mainstream Western news agency, from the most pro-Israeli to the most pro-Palestinian, receives complaints of bias from both sides that often say more about the complainers than the media.

Matters are complicated still more by the fact that some news coverage is biased. Some reporters covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, like those who cover any other beat, believe that promoting the cause of one of the parties is part of their mission. Coverage may also be informed by unconscious bias in which editorial choices as to who to interview or which facts to emphasize are influenced by reporters' sympathies. Separating out the biased coverage, however, can be difficult where the people who measure bias have their own agendas.

Breaking the deadlock

New Caledonia finally has a government after two weeks of deadlock. The 11-member government resembles the one that was installed two weeks ago but collapsed within hours due to objections from the outgoing ruling party, with Future Together leader Marie-Noelle Themereau as president and pro-independence novelist Déwé Gorodé as vice-president. The difference is that the RPCR, which ruled New Caledonia for more than two decades until the general election in May, will have four cabinet seats rather than three. In practical terms, however, the RPCR has been marginalized and the government will be led by a coalition of the Future Together (Avenir ensemble) and the moderate pro-independence parties.

Doing it right

The Israeli government is planning further adjustments to the route of the wall in the wake of a Supreme Court decision upholding the right to build it but ordering changes to "30 kilometers of the route so as to minimize hardship to Palestinians." The section that will be changed is northwest of Jerusalem, in one of the most densely populated areas through which the fence will pass:

The landmark ruling by Chief Justice Aharon Barak and justices Eliahu Mazza and Mishael Cheshin comes in response to a petition filed in the High Court of Justice by the village council of Beit Surik, north of Mevasseret Zion. In their ruling, the justices disallowed 30 kilometers of the 40-kilometer stretch of fence mentioned in the petition.

"The route disrupts the delicate balance between the obligation of the military commander to preserve security and his obligation to provide for the needs of the local inhabitants," the ruling said. "The route that the military commander established for the security fence... harms the local inhabitants in a severe and acute way while violating their rights under humanitarian and international law... This route has created such hardship for the local population that the state must find an alternative that may give less security but would harm the local population less. These alternative routes do exist."

With this ruling, the Supreme Court has shown that it intends to provide effective judicial supervision of the fence-construction process in light of actual conditions, and to balance security imperatives against the hardships to the people living along the fence route. Although this ruling affects only 40 kilometers of the 600-kilometer route, the mere fact that the court is willing to exercise jurisdiction has had much greater impact. The government has previously made changes to other parts of the route in order to make this stand up in court, and this ruling will probably lead to reconsideration of other planned construction.

The interplay between the courts, the security forces and the legislature will slow the completion of the fence somewhat, but this is both a necessary part of constitutional decision-making and one that will ensure that the wall achieves its security objectives with minimum humanitarian damage. This is a practical as well as a moral consideration; the fewer people suffer hardship because of the wall, the more likely it is to be an effective conflict management tool and enable a safe Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. It is important - indeed critical - that the fence be built, but it should be done in such a way as to keep suffering to a minimum, and the supervision of the courts will help to achieve this.

Confrontation

The Fiji courts were the scene of high drama as former Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry, who was ousted in the May 2000 coup, confronted Vice President Jope Seniloli, who is on trial for his part in the coup plot. Despite charged with treason, Seniloli has rejected the chairman of the Great Council of Chiefs' call for him to resign, and continues to have the backing of the Conservative Alliance-Matanitu Vanua, a party which supports indigenous supremacy and is part of the governing coalition. The fact that Seniloli is on trial shows how far Fiji has come since the coup, but his continuing support on the right highlights the tensions that remain in Fijian society.

What was that about a natural governing party?

Final results in the Canadian general election: Liberals 135, Conservatives 99, Bloc 55, NDP 19 and independents 1. That's about as hung as a parliament can get, with the Liberals and NDP one vote short of a majority and no other obvious alliances in sight. My guess: a minority government depending on ad hoc coalitions to pass each bill, and another general election well short of the end of the term.

A single war

The conflicts in western and southern Sudan are becoming intertwined with the SPLA's announcement that it will "refuse to join a coalition government that 'crushes' Darfur." This announcement could move the conflict one of two ways. It might influence the Sudanese government, which badly wants to conclude the peace process in the south, to moderate its Darfur policy. On the other hand, it might also lead Khartoum to abandon or delay the implementation of the peace accord in the south until it settles affairs in Darfur to its liking. The coming weeks will tell whether the SPLA's principled stand helps bring an end to the wars in Sudan or whether it only inflames them.

Constitutional ruling

Another African nation may be headed for a rule of law crisis with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni's rejection of a Constitutional Court ruling nullifying a 2000 referendum on the country's political system. In the referendum, a plurality of voters supported Museveni's non-party "Movement system,", but the court has now overturned those results as procedurally flawed.

Although Museveni deserves credit for returning much of Uganda to normalcy, his governing style has become increasingly autocratic in recent years, and his response to the court ruling is a case in point. He greeted the decision by declaring that he "will not allow any authority including the courts to usurp people’s power in any way" - a statement that ignores the fact that rule of law is an essential component of democracy. Museveni's advocacy of "people power" as against the constitution of Uganda is an appeal to demagoguery, not democratic rule. Fortunately, cooler heads may prevail with the government's announcement that it will appeal to the Supreme Court, which it may do under Article 132(3) of the constitution. Museveni played a large part in creating Uganda's constitution, and he should not complain when the courts enforce it.

Decolonization on Easter Island

The latest Pacific territory to jump on the independence bandwagon is Easter Island, now an integral part of Chile after a particularly painful colonial history. Last week, members of the Rapa Nui independence movement held what they called an "encouraging meeting" with the United Nations concerning their application to be placed on the UN decolonization list as a non-self-governing territory.

About half the population of Easter Island consists of indigenous Rapa Nui with Chilean settlers making up the other half, and leaders of the independence movement are concerned about continuing immigration from the mainland. They also object to the fact that 82 percent of the island has been designated as a national park, leaving 18 percent to be occupied by the residents.

According to spokesperson Erity Teave, the independence movement's short-term goal is an autonomous government, which would legislate for the island "until the decolonisation and international recognition takes place." Given that Easter Island's population is only 4000 people, though, autonomy rather than independence may also be the most viable long-term goal. The presence of the moai guarantees a tourist trade, but Easter Island is one of the most remote places in the world, and both tourist access and importation of necessary supplies will be difficult if it becomes an independent nation. An arrangement that gives Easter Island self-government in association with Chile, similar to those currently in place in the islands associated with France, New Zealand and the United States, may ultimately be best for all concerned.

Back from the brink?

The presidents of Rwanda and the DRC have agreed on steps to calm tensions along the border and reduce the possibility of a war:

After three hours of talks mediated by President Olusegun Obasanjo in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, both countries resolved to set up “a joint verification mechanism” to investigate activities on their frontiers and adhere to the terms of the 2002 peace agreement signed in Pretoria, South Africa.

“We agreed to take measures to carry out verification to prove or disprove whatever may have been alleged," Kagame told journalists, referring to recent outbreaks of fighting in eastern DRC allegedly involving Rwandan militias.

Hopefully, these measures will end the escalation that has occurred along the border during recent weeks, including the deployment of 10,000 DRC troops to the region and the mobilization of the Rwandan army. It's far too early to break out the champagne, though; no details were provided about the "joint verification mechanism," and it is questionable whether the DRC government has control over the eastern provinces to implement the proposal. This is one situation where a little international aid could potentially go a long way.

(With thanks to Helena, who posted the same news yesterday in French)

More stereotype-busting

Karim el-Gawhary talks to some professional Saudi women.

Intensifying crackdown

The Zimbabwe government is moving beyond its closures of opposition papers to attack Zimbabwean journalists who work as stringers for the foreign media. Proposed new regulations call for a penalty of up to two years' imprisonment for practicing journalism without a license, and

The planned revision of the Act comes in the wake of the forced closure of three newspapers, the Daily News, the Daily News On Sunday and the Tribune. Analysts point out that the changes are meant to stop journalists from these newspapers from working for foreign publications.

At the same time, the government has begun a name and shame campaign against foreign papers who use unaccredited Zimbabwean stringers, which many see as a prelude to banning those papers from circulating in Zimbabwe. Another front has also been opened with the tabling of a law to crack down on political activity by NGOs and churches. It appears that the government wants to eliminate as much independent political activity as possible before next year's general election in order to ensure a compliant parliament for Mugabe's successor.

Damascus spring, part 2

Dina Dakhlallah discusses the progress of proposals for constitutional reform in Syria. The review process has accelerated in the past few months in preparation for a party congress later this year, and the items on the agenda include removal of the constitutional provision prohibiting peace with Israel. This will be a cosmetic change absent a dramatic breakthrough in peace negotiations, which seems unlikely given current Syrian attitudes. At the same time, the reform process could also end up having real impact on Syrian domestic politics - or, more accurately, allowing some form of open domestic politics to exist in Syria.

The Syrian political system can best be compared to the sham popular front governments that ruled most of Communist-era Eastern Europe. The Bulgarian Fatherland Front, the National Front governments of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the Democratic Bloc of Poland and the Communist-led ruling bloc in Hungary were all technically multi-party coalitions. They would typically include minor social democratic and agricultural parties - usually survivals from the interwar period - and occasionally entities such as women's organizations, trade unions and recognized church groups. East Germany, which was most assiduous at maintaining the coalition facade, often allocated less than a third of the seats in the national parliament to the Communist Party. In practical terms, of course, none of this mattered; the Communists' coalition partners had no real political influence and were little more than channels for patronage.

Syria uses a slightly modified form of the eastern European system. Of the 250 seats in the Syrian parliament, 83 are allocated to independents - some of whom are more independent than others - and 167 to the National Progressive Front. The Ba'ath party holds 135 of the NPF's seats, with its coalition partners - including, somewhat ironically, the Syrian Communist Party - making up the other 32. There is a limited amount of electoral competition, and the Ba'ath has at times fallen short of a majority, but that has historically mattered about as much as the East German Communist Party's lack of a majority in the Volkskammer. Dakhlallah describes the NPF euphemistically as a "coalition of nine opposition parties that works in partnership with the Ba'ath Party," but they aren't opposition parties except in the most technical sense. Indeed, they hardly even qualify as parties; current laws don't allow them to print newspapers or engage in more than token political activism.

The proposals that will go before the NPF committee later this year, however, will loosen the restrictions on political activity and allow party newspapers. In the short term, this isn't likely to change much, but as the example of Poland shows, the long-term ramifications might be profound. In Communist-era Poland, five satellite parties - the United Peasant Party, the Democratic Party and three Catholic associations - were represented in the Sejm but were de facto adjuncts of the Communist Party. In 1983, three years after the Solidarity strike, the government granted somewhat more autonomy to the minor parties. For the most part, they continued to march in lockstep with the Communists throughout the 1980s, but they began to develop independent power bases and ideologies. This set the stage for the dramatic events that followed the election of 1989, when the Democratic and Peasant Parties switched sides to join with Solidarity and end four decades of Communist rule.

I can't quite see the minor Syrian parties pulling that off anytime soon - they're too weak, none of them have the natural constituencies that the Polish satellite parties had, and the Ba'ath doesn't appear ready to give up its grip on political life. It's more likely that any opening that results from Syrian constitutional reform will resemble Malaysia or Egypt - in other words, it will transform Syria from a totalitarian state to a garden-variety authoritarian one and leave limited space for public debate. But even that could make a real difference. The Egyptian opposition parties, for instance, don't amount to much in parliament, but their newspapers and elected officials are capable of asking embarrassing questions, mobilizing public opinion against the government and occasionally forcing it to back down. If that is combined with the slow growth of an independent judiciary, then the opaque Syrian political process might become considerably less so.

UPDATE: Daniel Geffen responds.

More constitutional theater

The never-ending process of approving the Swazi draft constitution had its latest twist today with a lawsuit against the Constitutional Draft Commission by several trade unions, church groups and opposition parties. The plaintiffs are challenging the procedure by which the commission is conducting the public hearings ordered last November by King Mswati III, claiming that it is anti-democratic to bar written submissions by public interest groups.

That, of course, is exactly the point. The draft constitution is designed to cement royal power rather than to democratize Swaziland, and the review process reflects the same goal. The format of the public hearings, in which submissions are taken orally in the presence of local chiefs, is designed to manufacture consent, and written submissions from the opposition might make things somewhat awkward.

And even if the commission loses in the courts, the ruling probably won't do much good for the plaintiffs. The opposition might be able to embarrass the king with its critiques of the draft charter, but the process will end the same way - with the constitution obtaining royal consent. The most the unions and churches will be able to do is show exactly how naked the emperor is becoming.

Painful concessions

Imshin points to a new protest song by Yaakov Rotblit, the author of the Sheer Shalom - but this time, he's protesting against the evacuation of the settlements. As Imshin says, it's a hard song to read. If it were an intellectual defense of the settlements, I would dismiss it as disingenuous because it ignores or glosses over many facts unfavorable to the settlement movement. It isn't meant as an intellectual defense, though; it's a cri de coeur, and like anything from the heart, it inspires compassion:

For thirty years a man builds, got a wife, children, grandkids, that's the gig
They grew under the trees he planted, now their own children are getting big
And he puts down a garden and backyard, a small business, building additions
Until some politico in a jacket and a manicure tells him it's the end of the mission.

He's right about one thing. Many of the settlers did get taken for a ride by the governments that gave them financial incentives to move to the West Bank and Gaza during the 1970s and 1980s, and by the governments that winked an eye at settlement expansion during the Oslo period (although Rotblit glosses over the degree to which the settlers ran the state rather than the other way around). Many of them were misguided idealists rather than Arab-hating lunatics. Many of them - most of them - aren't particularly ideological, and some of the second and third-generation settlers aren't ideological at all. And yes, they're being betrayed by the movement that created them, and yes, it's hypocritical for "poets from Sheich-Munes-turned-Ramat-Aviv [to] write the Times on poetic justice."

But none of that changes my mind. None of that changes the fact that the settlements outside Israel's internationally recognized border should never have been built, and none of that changes the fact that their continued existence is a military, economic, political and moral liability to Israel. And even if the settlers' moral rights will be damaged if they are evacuated from the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestinians' moral rights - which don't seem to figure into Rotblit's calculus at all - will suffer far greater damage if they aren't. The continued existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state requires that some of the Land of Israel be given up, and if the settlers love the state, they will accept the loss of the land.

And then there's this:

There's a sea of dangerous madmen out there, I know, I'm not naive
I suspect God Himself don't really know what the heck those folks believe
And loose cannons and hilltop boys and girls chasing their own tracks
And a zillion different rabbis and healers and messianic quacks.

When Rotblit wrote this verse, he wasn't talking about Palestinians. Diana Moon has seen some of these 'dangerous madmen' up close and personal, and the story isn't a pretty one. That's the sort of thing Rotblit's narrator minimizes as "spots" on his "blue and white shawl," and even if most of the settlers don't approve of the "madmen" among them, they will exist as long as the settlements and their underlying ideology do.

It's also an interesting coincidence that Imshin's post comes soon after the Yesha Council of Rabbis urged soldiers to violate orders and hinted at violent resistance to any attempt at evacuation. This call has been condemned by Likud MK Yuval Steinitz and even by Effi Eitam, but it shows the lengths to which some of the "rabbis... and messianic quacks" are willing to undermine the state to keep the land. I'm no fan of the refuseniks on the left, but the refuseniks on the right are a genuine threat to the Israeli state. Like the Algerian colons, their time has come and, if they are true Israeli patriots, they will make the necessary sacrifice.

Imshin says the song makes her "hang [her] head in shame." I suppose I'm also a bit ashamed of the way I've stereotyped the settlers as if they were all Levingers. Those who cooperate with the evacuation should not be vilified, and should be respected for their patriotic decision however misguided the ideals they served in the past - the "ideological compensation" recommended by the Israel Democracy Institute.

But I'm not ashamed, and never will be, of supporting the withdrawal, opposing the settlement movement or demanding an end to the occupation. The settlers are not the only ones with moral rights, and both the future of Israel and the dignity and freedom of the Palestinians are in the balance. Neither of these can, or should, be cast aside for the settlers' sake. The settlements must go regardless of the pain, because far more pain will result if they don't.

Empty victory

The latest big international law news, at least if the papers are to be believed, is the United States' decision to withdraw a draft resolution extending its troops' immunity from prosecution in the International Criminal Court. In June 2002, the United States secured a controversial resolution granting a two-year exemption for American troops serving in United Nations peacekeeping missions, but the post-Abu Ghraib shift in the political climate made a renewal unlikely. Yesterday, in order to "avoid a prolonged and divisive debate" - or perhaps to avoid the embarrassment of losing - the United States decided to let the immunity resolution expire.

I'm going to take a somewhat contrarian view and say that this isn't big news at all. The United States' decision has a certain symbolic significance, especially since it was taken by an administration known for its hostility to international courts, but it won't mean much in practical terms. ICC prosecution isn't a realistic threat for American troops, given that Article 17 of the Rome Statute requires the court to defer to national investigations and decisions not to prosecute unless "the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute." The regulations surrounding Article 17 make clear that ICC prosecution is a last resort, a point which is emphasized by the other procedural safeguards provided by the Rome Statute at the pre-prosecution stage. In the two years since the Rome Statute entered into force, the ICC has yet to take a case, and its examinations are focused largely on failed states such as the DRC rather than countries with functioning criminal justice systems.

Even more importantly, the lack of blanket immunity for American troops doesn't preclude the United States from obtaining immunity on a case-by-case basis, as it has already done in bilateral treaties with 89 countries. Indeed, no sooner had the United States withdrawn its Security Council motion than the CPA administrator in Iraq extended an immunity order shielding American troops in Iraq from prosecution at least until the installation of an elected government early next year. It is likely that any future American participation in international missions will be preceded by negotiations with the host state for judicial immunity (or, for missions that are more in the nature of invasions, followed by an after- the-fact grant of immunity from whatever compliant government is put in place).

The same pattern has been followed by other regional powers providing military aid; Australia also insisted on immunity for its troops before agreeing to take part in the Solomon Islands peacekeeping mission, and has recently negotiated similar terms for advisors stationed in Papua New Guinea. Since nations providing such assistance generally have more bargaining power than those receiving it, deals granting some level of immunity will continue to be made in the majority of cases. The expiration of the United States' blanket immunity will no doubt be seen as a victory for the forces of international law, but it will mean little on the ground.

Back to BIOT

The tangled saga of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) has taken yet another turn, and not for the better. BIOT, it will be remembered, lies in the Chagos Archipelago, a chain of islands that has been leased by the United States Navy since the early 1970s. Prior to that, the territory was home to a permanent population of 1500 to 2000, mostly descended from imported plantation laborers, but they were all removed through a combination of trickery and force in order to make room for the Americans. Ever since then, members of this community, which now numbers 4500, have been trying to get home.

In 2000, it looked like they were on the verge of doing just that after a British Divisional Court in Ex parte Bancoult declared that they had the right to reinhabit the unused portions of the archipelago. This would have given them the right to return to all islands other than Diego Garcia, which was the site of the American naval base. Although the Foreign and Commonwealth Office agreed to abide by the ruling, it satisfied nobody - the Chagosian ilois wanted to return to Diego Garcia as well, and the United States opposed any return to the islands. Both the ilois and the American government kept up the pressure, the former by continuing their lawsuit and the latter by applying subtle persuasion to the FCO.

The ilois' pressure was much less successful than the United States'. In October 2003, the ilois lost their bid for a full right of return when another British court ruled that they had no right to reinhabit Diego Garcia. In the meantime, the FCO dragged its feet in complying with the 2000 order, and two weeks ago, it gave up the pretense entirely. By means of an order in council, the British government has overruled the 2000 decision and reasserted control over immigration to BIOT. Specifically, the new order "replaces the existing constitution of the territory and 'makes clear, as a principle of the constitution, that no person has the right of abode in the territory or has unrestricted access to any part of it.'" And at the same time, the FCO released a "feasibility study" declaring that climate change made resettlement impossible:

[Foreign minister] Rammell called [the ilois' attorney] to the Foreign Office on Tuesday morning to brief him. In a written parliamentary statement, Mr Rammell said that a feasibility study suggested the islands were vulnerable to natural events that were "likely to make life difficult for a resettled population" and, in the longer term, to global warming.

"Thus resettlement is likely to become less feasible over time," he said, adding that life on the islands would be highly precarious and would need heavy underwriting by the British government.

As Eamonn Molloy wryly put it a letter to the Guardian, this excuse "smacks of double standards in light of the refusal of the UK and US to regard climate change as a serious policy issue." It is more likely that the other consideration cited in the FCO's feasibility study - the United States' continued defensive needs after September 11 - was the real deciding factor.

The ilois are, quite naturally, up in arms. Their attorney Richard Gifford greeted the order in council by arguing that "[n]ot since the days of King John has anyone tried to expel British citizens from the realm by executive order." His argument omits the expulsion of Jews under Edward I but is no doubt more accurate about the islanders' emotions than about history.

The islanders' next step is probably an appeal to Strasbourg, which could place the European Court of Human Rights at the center of a controversy affecting not only British but American interests. In addition, Mauritius is now actively reasserting its claim to the islands. The Chagos archipelago was administered as part of Mauritius before being split off to form BIOT in 1965, and successive Mauritian governments have claimed that the creation of BIOT violated the principle of uti possidetis or sanctity of colonial borders. The General Assembly - although, for obvious reasons, not the Security Council - has backed Mauritius' anti-BIOTic position, but nobody including Mauritius has really taken it seriously for decades. In the wake of the order in council, however, Mauritian prime minister Paul Berenger has promised to take up the issue before the Commonwealth, which could put Britain in a very awkward position with respect to its position on human rights violations in Zimbabwe and other Commonwealth states.

The most tragicomic aspect of the latest Chagos fiasco, however, is how unnecessary it all is. There is no rational reason for the United States or Britain to oppose the ilois resettling in the islands other than Diego Garcia, most of which are hundreds of miles from the USN base. The ilois have never resorted to terrorism or other forms of violence and have no known contacts with terrorist groups - and even if they were otherwise inclined, the idea of infiltrating Diego Garcia from Peros Banhos or the Salomon islands is ridiculous. Indeed, even a return to Diego Garcia itself should not be out of the question. The USN base occupies only a small part of the island, and much of the maintenance work is already done by imported Mauritian workers, some of whom may be of ilois descent. If the ilois were allowed to reinhabit the rest of Diego Garcia, the base would be relatively easy to protect and would gain the advantage of a local labor pool.

Nor is the climate-change excuse particularly persuasive. The Chagos islands are in no more danger than other low-lying Indian Ocean islands, and their long-term habitability (not to mention their suitability for long-term naval occupation) has never previously been called into question. The cost to the British government of resettling the ilois would be no more than it currently spends on the Falklands - and possibly much less, if the archipelago develops a tourist trade or if the USN base provides employment. The case of Chagos is not one in which return would pose any real danger either to the occupying powers or to the ilois themselves, and might even be advantageous to all parties. A negotiated solution seems possible, but nobody appears to be interested in pursuing one.

From the lords to the commons

One contentious issue shaping up in the Vanuatu general election campaign is the decision by several members of the Port Vila Council of Chiefs to compete for parliamentary seats. With the exception of officers of local and national councils of chiefs, traditional leaders are not legally barred from running for elected office, but critics argue that their candidacy violates the political neutrality they have maintained since independence. The chiefs, on the other hand, argue that they are taking a more active political role because the government treats their own councils as window dressing:

One point that was expressed... as to why council members were going to stand in these next elections was because the government has indicated that it will consult with the Council of Chiefs but never has. So they were feeling that if they were actually members of parliament they'd have to be consulted.

The chiefs have a point, but there are also good reasons for traditional leaders to stay out of electoral politics. In societies where chiefs are respected, as they are in most Pacific islands, they have an enormous political advantage if they decide to run for office. The potential consequences of this advantage can be seen in Fiji, where, with the exception of a brief interregnum during 1999-2000, electoral politics has been dominated by an entrenched group of chiefs from the eastern islands. Vanuatu has had more than its share of political crises and problems both before and after independence, but a small group of chiefs running the country for their benefit hasn't been one of them.

Maybe the best solution is the British one. As long as a Vanuatu chief wants to remain a chief, he can take part in traditional councils and exercise the moral authority of his position. If he wants a more direct role in government, he can run for elected office - but he should have to resign his chieftaincy first.

Democracy in action

Now that the Harare mayor and most of the opposition members of the city council have been suspended by the ministry of local government, the remainder of the council is getting down to what really matters - a $600,000 project to widen the access roads to Mugabe's palace.

Overactive spam filter

If any of you were barred from commenting today because of "questionable content," you have my apologies. Someone evidently inserted the term "http" into the MT-Blacklist spam-filter that is shared by all Blogmosis blogs, so every comment with a URL was being bounced. The filter has now been fixed, so feel free to resubmit any bounced comments or to include URLs in future threads. If you experience any further commenting problems, please let me know.

Building bridges

Israel is beginning to reap the diplomatic fruits of the disengagement proposal with the planned opening of a liaison office in Abu Dhabi similar to what it now has in Qatar.

Down and out in Beirut

Maya Abou Nasr describes the plight of Lebanon's other long-term refugees - the 2400 displaced persons from Somalia, Sudan, Iraq and other war-torn regions. Unlike the Palestinians, most of them live in poor Beirut neighborhoods rather than refugee camps, but they receive little if any financial support and face many of the same restrictions:

Holding his UN certificate aloft, a document that is supposed to ease a refugee's stay until a permanent solution is found, Omar said he is still riddled by a constant fear of being arrested.

"The Lebanese authorities are not on the refugees' side. They do not recognize refugees' right to legal citizenship. But still, Sudan's living conditions are far worse," said Omar, at the inauguration of the refugees' Social Care Center in Ain al-Rummaneh on Friday.

Since Lebanon has not signed the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, a UN certificate does not confer the same rights that it would in signatory countries, including education, public assistance, freedom of residence and the right to work upon three years' residence. In some cases, the UN is trying to arrange voluntary repatriation or resettlement in a third country, but the limited resources of both Lebanon and the UN make this unlikely for many.