Boston, in brief

The city of Boston has changed since I visited in the summer. While visiting in the summer, the usual skepticism about the performance of the Red Sox prevailed. Fans, and non-fans (the ordinary folk), did not believe the Red Sox would be the wild card team heading to the ALCS or World Series. If asked whether the Red Sox had a chance to be in the ALCS or the World Series, I am sure a person would respond, "I dunno."

Now, Boston is Red Sox crazy. Everywhere I turn there are Red Sox jerseys, bumper sticker, t-shirts, or hats. Everyone wants the Red Sox to repeat as World Series champions. Instead of a nation of sketpics, Red Sox fans, and non-fans, believe the Red Sox have a chance to win in 2005.

I cannot help to ask: Is this belief a disguised wish?

The Principles of Justice Among Free and Democratic Peoples

Rawls asserts that there are 8 principles of justice among free and democratic peoples. Two principles seem contradictory (see Law of Peoples, p. 37).

5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for
reasons other than self-defense.

8. Peoples have a duty to assist other people living under unfavorable
conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social
regime.

For #5 and #8, Rawls has left unsettled why peoples should defend other people living under unfavorable conditions if peoples only have a right to wage war in cases of self-defense. If a commonwealth defends people living under unfavorable conditions, then they have violated principle #5.

I assume Rawls will clarify the issue later, but I am wondering whether principle #8 should be tweaked in such a way to say that peoples have a duty to defend others only in cases where their freedom is threatened. For example, if some group invaded Canada, the United States has a duty to defend Canadiens against the aggressors because the aggressors threaten the safety and well-being of every American. The proximity, both geographically speaking and socio-politically speaking, of Canadiens gives us a reason to defend ourselves against the invaders. In this case, we may assume that the aggressors invaded a country with similar values. So, if they have attacked a country with similar values, then the invaders have no reason not to attack us. Going to war against the Canadien invaders would be an act of self-defense. Therefore, according to principle #5, Americans have a right to wage war since it is an act of self-defense.

The worry is how far we can extend an argument of self-defense to cover not only proximity issues but also more general topics, e.g., natural resource governance.

Peoples vs. States

Rawls distinguishes between peoples and states. He asserts that states have "the powers of sovereignty" (Law of Peoples, p. 25ff). With sovereignty, there are two powers that states hold: (1) the right to go to war in pursuit of state policies and (2) a certain autonomy in dealing with the state's own people. He thinks that states should not have these powers.

Granted, states should not have the right to persecute its citizens unjustly. If, however, the person has committed a crime against other citizens, then the state does have a right to sanction the offender. The extent of the state's power over its people seems debatable, but it must have the right to sanction offenders - any offender. If this is what we mean by a state's autonomy - which seems to be a narrower definition than Rawls assumes but it is still a definition - then the state has a certain autonomy in dealing with its citizens.

Also, if one of the state's policies is to defend any (or all) of its citizens, then the state has not only a right to go to war in pursuit of the state's policy but it might be seen to have an obligation to do so. Is the obligation what Rawls wants to avoid?

Eastbound and the Pipeline

The semester has ended, and I am leaving Salt Lake City for the Hub of the Universe, i.e., Boston. Blogging might be sporadic since I don't know what sort of connection I will have while I am in Boston - though I do plan on checking whether a local cafe has free wi-fi internet access.

I have some posts in the pipeline that I have not posted yet. There will be several back-dated posts on my reading of Rawls's Law of Peoples over the course of the next few days. So, if a post looks like it has something to do with Rawls's work, check it out. It is probably new.

Realistic Utopia, a fantasy?

Some may object to Rawls's idea of a reasonably just constitutional democratic society by insisting that this type of society is purely fantasy. Dreadfully evil events, like the Holocaust and the Inquisition for instance, prove that the hopes expressed by Rawls's realistic utopia are fantastic.

Rawls presents an awkward argument to defend himself against this objection. He wants to show that the past and present evils fail to undermine hope for the future of a society as belonging to a Society of liberal and decent Peoples (Law of Peoples, p. 22f).

Ultimately, his argument rests on the idea of the "reasonableness" of the Law of Peoples. There are two ways we could interpret "reasonableness." The first way is that any reasonable person would agree that x is reasonable. There is something fundamentally true or fundamentally valuable about x that makes it reasonable. The second way is that given a, b, c, etc., x is reasonable. In this case, reasonable means that if certain conditions are met, then we consider x the most plausible or most reasonable.

If Rawls uses the first sense of reasonable, then his view has not addressed the fantasy charge. If Rawls uses the second sense of reasonable, then his view fails to have any force. Rawls's idea of "reasonableness" is not clear.

Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Part 1

I'm beginning John Rawls's The Law of Peoples this weekend, and I'll probably blog on it over the course of the next few weeks (I'll probably blog about Hobbes's Leviathan and Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust War too).

In the Introduction, Rawls mentions that as a consequence of focusing on the idea of a realistic utopia - something I don't understand yet but hope to in the next few days - he will leave aside discussion of issues in foreign policy, particularly "unjust war, immigration, and weapons of mass destruction." But he does give a low key argument toward the end of the introduction (p. 9) about keeping outlaw states in check by the threat of possible nuclear attack.

Here's the passage: "so long as there are outlaw states - as we suppose - some nuclear weapons need to be retained to keep those states at bay and to make sure they do not obtain and use those weapons against liberal or decent peoples."

Events, since Rawls published this book, have proved him incorrect. Retaining nuclear weapons against rogue states do not act as a deterrent. Outlaw states use alternative tactics against superpowers, e.g., guerrilla warfare, ambush, sniper. They use these sorts of tactics because they know that they cannot compete with the more technologically advanced weaponry of the liberal or decent peoples. So, even if liberal or decent peoples retain a large cache of nuclear weapons, it does not keep rogue states (or terrorists) at bay. The outlaws find new and interesting ways of fighting the super power. They use tactics the super power is not equipped to handle very well.

I think the argument could be made that if liberal or decent peoples have a large cache of nuclear weapons, then outlaw states will have more reason to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Large caches of nuclear weapons are a threat to states that do not have them. So, they have reason to seek nuclear weapons for their protection.

Let me assure the reader that the last argument does not imply I will argue that liberal or decent peoples surrender all of their nuclear weapons to the United Nations, or some other unaligned political entity. What I think follows is that there needs to be more than nuclear deterrence in play when it comes to keeping outlaw states at bay.

Do "old" feelings go away?

Suppose that Margie attends a convention where she sees an old friend, Cleavis, she was greatly drawn to, but never dated, in graduate school. Cleavis was drawn to Margie in graduate school too, but thought she was "out of his league." After some friendly conversation, Cleavis walks Margie back to her room. They embrace, begin kissing, and make love. The next day, Margie and Cleavis have no desire to repeat the amorous interlude.

The problem is that both Margie and Cleavis were "drawn to" one another in graduate school. Neither Margie nor Cleavis acted on their impulse until the convention several years after graduate school. If they both act on their "old" feelings, then they must still feel attracted to one another. If they feel attracted to one another, then their feelings might be more intense than just a friendly bond. They may be in love with one another. Therefore, both parties might be acting out of some feelings of love they share for one another.

Is it possible that the "old" feelings Margie and Cleavis had in graduate school went away and reappeared only during the time of the convention? Did Margie and Cleavis commit adultery?

If neither Margie nor Cleavis want to have intercourse again, then there is no feeling of love between them. Since a component of adultery might include falling out of love with one's spouse and falling in love with the extramarital partner, neither have committed adultery. They have had a sexual romp, but nothing further than that.