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July 22, 2004

Special War Briefing: Points of Interest

by Dan Darling at July 22, 2004 01:20 AM

Hey all, I've been away more than I probably should have been, but that's life in The Great Conspiracy. Still, I couldn't help but notice a number of memes that have been floating around recently concerning terrorist threats related to the election, Spain, Iran and whatnot. Presenting 5 mini-briefings, therefore, covering:

The Spanish Elections: Lessons (Not) Learned

Both sides of the debate are missing the point on this one. Spain was not targeted prior to the elections because it had a center-right government, and al-Qaeda believed that center-left governments are easier to defeat. That isn't it.

If one takes a look at Iraq al-Jihad, the al-Qaeda strategy document that came to light in the wake of the Madrid bombings, one can very clearly see that the merits or lack thereof regarding the Popular Party versus the Socialist Party were not much considered by the orchestrators of the attack. Certainly al-Qaeda cares little over the various domestic issues that appear to be near and dear to President Zapatero's heart at this particular junction. Rather, the Spanish elections were targeted because the Socialist Party had, on its party platform, a pledge to pull Spanish troops out of Iraq barring a UN mandate. If a Democratic candidate adopted this position (and to the best of my knowledge John Kerry has not), the Republican Party would accuse him of wanting to cut and run - and rightly so, in my view.

Understand, every Spanish soldier that wasn't in Iraq was one less member of the coalition that Abu Musab Zarqawi and his followers would have to kill in order to achieve their objectives. Moreover, by influencing a Western election al-Qaeda achieved something that has long been the dream of Arab nationalists across the Middle East since the days of Nasser: influence over a major Western power.

Just on account of the perception existing that al-Qaeda was able to influence a Western nation's election, the organization's stock rose sharply among like-minded Islamists.

One other thing I want to make very clear, incidentally, is that Iraq al-Jihad is not about al-Qaeda's plot to topple center-right parties and replace them with their center-left counterparts as a prelude to their conquest of the West. Indeed, a fair portion of the document is spent examining British politics and plotting a fate similar to that suffered by President Aznar for Tony Blair, whom I trust still has reliable center-left domestic credentials if my Tory friends are any guide.

In short, the lesson that needs to be learned from examining what happened in Spain is that when al-Qaeda seeks to influence elections, it does so strictly in its own interests rather than in those of either the incumbent or the challenging party. If Aznar had been running against a right-wing isolationist in the mold of Pat Buchanan who had also vowed the withdrawl of Spanish troops, Jamal Zougam still would have led the cell that planted those bombs in Madrid and when Zougam entered the courtroom after spending several days in isolation, his first question still would have been, "So who won the elections?"

Who, indeed.

Same Old Same Old: Al-Harbi, Al-Hawali and Our "Friends" The Saudis

Now then, a lot of people are starting to ask questions about Khalid al-Harbi, a member of bin Laden's entourage who can be seen on the videotape in which he's gloating over the 9/11 attacks.

Al-Harbi, Iranian assurances to the contrary, was not picked up on the Iranian-Afghan border. He was among those senior al-Qaeda leaders who sought shelter with the IRGC and VEVAK following the events of Operation Enduring Freedom, and until recently was staying at one of the IRGC villas just outside of Chalus. He was recently moved first to an IRGC safe house near Qom and then eventually to the Saudi embassy in Tehran, where he returned home to be greeted by a sizeable crowd of admirers.

To understand the more complex rationale as to why al-Harbi was sent home, please stay with me on this one.

Saudi statements to the contrary, al-Qaeda has dealt a number of extremely serious blows to the Kingdom in recent months, even to the point of attacking the oil trade. This has caused all manner of concern among both the pragmatists and the hardliners among the princes, leading to the current amnesty offer at the behest of Safar al-Hawali, bin Laden's spiritual advisor and an unindicted co-conspirator in the 1993 WTC bombing.

Al-Hawali has promised the princes that he can work out a deal with al-Qaeda to return to the pre-May 2003 relationship of mutual tolerance, but al-Qaeda has scorned Crown Prince Abdullah's amnesty offer. Still, neither former prison sergeant Saleh Mohammed Awadallah al-Alawi al-Oufi (their supposed replacement for Abdul Aziz al-Muqrin) or Louis Attiyat Allah (the true al-Qaeda leader in Saudi Arabia) have carried out any additional attacks.

Al-Harbi was returned to Iran at Saudi request to ensure that, should al-Hawali's bid to resume the status quo ante fail, the princes still have an ace-in-the-hole to use to rein in al-Qaeda: an associate of bin Laden's with genuine jihadi credentials who has Seen The Light™ and is no longer calling for the overthrow of the royal family.

One final point to be made about al-Harbi is that although he was a CIA contact in Afghanistan during the 1980s and in Bosnia during the early 1990s, that had nothing to do with why the Iranians or al-Qaeda handed him over to the Kingdom. Nobody really cares about that stuff, especially when there's a much bigger game afoot.

Iran & al-Qaeda: The Ties That Bomb

I've written about what is in my mind the self-apparent fact that the majority of al-Qaeda's surviving leadership has relocated to Iran. However, it's always nice to have your views reaffirmed in writing, so I was pleasantly surprised the other day when al-Sharq al-Awsat via AFP stated quite up-front that there are over 384 al-Qaeda members, including 18 senior leaders, who are currently living at facilities under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

The al-Sharq piece doesn't say who these people are, but previous press reports have identified Saif al-Adel, Saad bin Laden, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, Abu Mohammed al-Masri, Abu Khayr, Abu Musab Zarqawi, Amer Azizi, Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, Mahfouz Ould Walid, and Abu Khalid as being among the 18 senior leaders mentioned. There are also a number of credible (in my view and those of people I trust) press reports which have claimed that bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have taken up residence Iran as well, leaving behind body doubles in northern Pakistan.

I do know that at least one al-Zawahiri double, an Uzbek by the name of Thuraya (not to be confused with the satellite phone type of the same name) was killed by Pakistani forces during the spring 2004 offensive in South Waziristan. Whether or not bin Laden is in Iran, however, his military chief al-Adel is there - and he is going to be the ultimate architect of any future mass casualty attack on the United States.

Now, the AFP story is important because it identifies the specific locations where these 300+ folks (and I've heard the number cited as high as 500) are based at. Before, the most specific as we ever got before was a piece in Okaz via Rantburg, identifying the Iranian al-Qaeda haven as being located somewhere in the Namak region. AFP got even more specific by naming the two specific locations as being Chalus (Chalous) and Lavizan.

Chalus is a resort town along the Caspian Sea and the lavish villas being referenced here are all owned by members of Qods Force, the elite of the IRGC, which are answerable only to Ayatollah Khamenei. It is perhaps worth noting that Chalus is also quite close to an underground nuclear weapons development facility that has at various times been staffed by Russian, Chinese, and North Korean experts. In case anyone is curious, it is currently being staffed by scientists from North Korea, which is a fairly clear indication in my view that the individuals at the facility are in all likelihood up to no good.

Lavizan is even more interesting - it's one of the biggest and most heavily-defended IRGC bases in all of Iran. It received a fair amount of press not too long ago when its occupants decided to engage in some creative revisions at the Shiyan Technical Research Center prior to an inspection visit by members of the IAEA. Lavizan, I should also mention, is unfortunately nestled right in the middle of the 8,500,000 or so people who make up the inhabitants of the greater metropolitan area of Tehran. This is where Saif al-Adel in particular is reputed to be based, and Iranian assurances of him being "in custody" to the contrary, I am of the opinion that it's probably not a good idea to have one of the most dangerous terrorists on the planet apparently at the same location as the Iranian nuclear program.

Call me paranoid, but there's just something about this that rubs me the wrong way.

If the US suffers a mass casualty terrorist attack in the immediate future, Iran will be the immediate target of reprisal. Period. The decision by the Iranian government, whether it's as a matter of official state policy or simply the private whims of the hardliners, is currently being shoved under the rug by the majority of US policy-makers. We are quite free to leave well enough alone in this regard, just as we did in the late 1990s with Afghanistan harboring the Taliban. However, leaving Iran to its own devices indefinitely is simply untenable, if for no other reason then that we're going to be pretty much guaranteed the same results - this time from what is very likely to be a nuclear power.

Anybody want to take any chances on that one? Anyone? Bueller? Anyone?

Please understand, I do not favor a US invasion of Iran at this point, if for no other reason than it is logistically unfeasible at this point in time. However, if there is another mass casualty attack on the United States, I don't think that any US president is going to have the option of that kind of restraint.

UPDATE: More thoughts in "Special Analysis: Iran & 9/11"

Muqtada al-Sadr, Iraqi Shi'ite Disturber

I've been getting a fair amount of e-mail concerning the current state of Muqtada al-Sadr, a good portion of it from well-meaning abeit in my view mistaken readers of Professor Juan Cole.

Readers hsould be aware that Prof. Cole has tried to tie Israel to the violence in Fallujah and the Abu Gharib prison scandal. He more or less believes that the majority of US claims concerning the presence of foreign fighters inside Iraq are nothing more than an elaborate facade as part of the sinister neocon plot to eventually invade and conquer Syria and Iran.

These differences of opinion between myself and Professor Cole aside, the Christian Science Monitor has a pretty good piece up on how Sadr is attempting to recoup his losses in the aftermath of his failed "popular uprising" back in April. According to the CSM account, the Mahdi Army is down to roughly 500 fighters - as compared to the 10,000 that it boasted at its height. Sadr's Iranian-based mentor Ayatollah al-Haeri (who is the real guy to keep your eyes set on in all of this) has already washed his hands clean of his protege's debacle, abeit after Sadr's followers started fleeing or dying in droves at the hands of American and Iraqi forces.

Now, Professor Cole is quite right to point out that there a number of minor theological differences between Sadr and the official religious orthodoxy of Iran as expounded upon by Ayatollah Khamenei and his predecessor. However, just to make a comparison that should hopefully make sense to most of my readers, these differences are fairly minute, especially when compared with that manifested by say, Grand Ayatollah Sistani.

Certainly there are greater theological differences between Khamenei and Yemeni Zaidi Shi'ite cleric Hussein Badr Eddin al-Huthi, who also receives a fair amount of Iranian funding and weaponry these days. However, the IRGC and VEVAK are quite capable of backing any number of factions who ideologically or even theologically opposed to the official orthodoxy of the Islamic Republic, just as any number of Western or communist intelligence agencies have during various periods in history.

Ayatollah al-Haeri, Sadr's mentor, is part of the ruling class of Shi'ite clerics inside Iran and as open-source reporting alone will tell you, Sadr and the Mahdi Army have received a great deal of money, training, weaponry (abeit the crappy variety, the 57-mm anti-aircraft guns mentioned in the CSM account are ZSU 57-2s ...), and logistical assistance from Iran.

But what about the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), one might ask? Aren't their Badr Brigades militia also funded and trained by the IRGC?

Yes, however, SCIRI, which has been used by the Islamic Republic for the last two decades as the opposite number to the Iraqi-backed Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK) is loyal to the civilian government of President Mohammed Khatami, not to the IRGC or VEVAK. Khatami, who is often mischaracterized as a "moderate" by the Western and in particular the European press, does share the hardliners' goal of Shi'ite hegemony in Iraq, but he prefers a "one man, one vote, one time" means of accomplishing this versus a direct confrontation with the Americans.

Amir Taheri explained a great deal of this prior to the war in one of his columns and extrapolating from that I don't think that it's all that unlikely to say that Iranian domestic politics have spilled over into Iraq in a very bloody fashion. The Badr Brigades joined the Ansar al-Sistani (an ad-hoc militia made up of moderate followers of Ayatollah Sistani) and the Polish-Bulgarian contingent in fighting off the Mahdi Army in Karbala, whom SCIRI's handlers likely view quite rationally as the natural outgrowth of their own domestic political opponents.

In short, the question of whether or not Sadr should be classified as an Iranian pawn is a complicated one, but I'd say that at the very least he can be seen as a tool being used by the Iranian hardliners to advance their own political agenda with respect to Iraq and the rest of the Middle East. The reports of Hezbollah (including its operations chief Imad Mugniyeh), Iranian agents, baseeji, and IRGC irregulars disguised as pilgrims fighting alongside the Mahdi Army during their uprising are too credible to ignore and when you combine that with the $80,000,000 or so that Iran paid to bankroll his insurgency, I think that his theological views aside it becomes quite clear whose behest he was working for.

The Size and Composition of the Iraqi Insurgency

There have been a number of recent AP and even one al-Jazeera story on the fact that the figure of 5,000 or so insurgents frequently cited by US officials is probably inaccurate. This is true, but it needs to be understood that the number of insurgents fighting inside Iraq at any given time isn't fixed and varies depending on any number of factors.

Back in April, when we had both Sadr and Fallujah erupting simultaneously, there could easily have been anywhere between 10-25,000 insurgents fighting the coalition. The Mahdi Army at its height fielded roughly 10,000 fighters, for example, and the fact that most reliable reporting has put them at between 500-800 should serve as an illustration of just how badly the coalition tore apart Sadr. The reason for the rapid attrition of Sadr's forces doesn't mean that we slaughtered them all to a man (though a good chunk of them did end up dead) so much as it is that many of the Mahdi Army fighters were little more than slum kids who were easily enticed to join Sadr's forces through the offer of easy cash. Easy come, easy go.

Moreover, there appears to be a great deal of confusion about the composition of foreign fighters active inside Iraq. This issue is actually a lot more complex than it is normally explained, due to the proclivities of al-Qaeda operatives for having any number of forged documents on their personage at any given time.

In the case of the several hundred European Islamists who have been recruited by Zarqawi to fight in Iraq for example, many of them were routed to Syria by Abderrazak al-Mahdjoub (the former head of al-Qaeda's European recruiting network who is now in German custody) where they met an individual who went by the kuniyat or assumed name of Mullah Fuad and received either legitimate or fake Syrian or Iraqi documentation. At least several British and Italian al-Qaeda members are known to have taken part in suicide bombings inside Iraq and at least one Italian al-Qaeda recruit is believed to have helped to mastermind the assassination attempt on Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz in October 2003.

In many cases, the only means of identifying dead insurgents is by any documents they were carrying upon them. Given their habit of carrying fake documentation, it becomes quite difficult to determine the exact point of origin for many of these folks.

More to the point, the Iraqi al-Qaeda contingent is, in reflection of the variance reflected within the network, a coalition of several different groups, including a number of reasonably indigeneous Islamist organizations: Ansar al-Islam, Salafist Jihad, and Jaish Mohammed.

  1. Ansar al-Islam is an Iraqi Kurdish group that I'm sure everyone here remembers from before the war and is now regrouping with help from Iran.
  2. Salafist Jihad consists of Iraqi Sunnis who were recruited to join al-Qaeda after the fall of the Baathist regime.
  3. Jaish Mohammed is an alliance between foreign al-Qaeda fighters and members of the Iraqi Mukhabarat and Special Security Organization, led by a Saudi national who uses the kuniyat of Abu Abdullah.

All of these groups have definite ties and allegiance to the global terror network headed up by Osama bin Laden, yet the majority of their members are native Iraqis. So are these native Iraqi groups or are they homegrown? Here again, that depends on who you ask.

One thing needs to be understand, however: the surviving Baathists have moved beyond fighting for a restoration of the Revolution™.

Former Vice Revolutionary Command Council Chairman Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri and at least 2 of his sons have renounced both the tenets of Sufism and the Baathist ideals of infidel socialism, pledged bayat to Zarqawi, and folded whatever remains of the former Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard troops into his organization.

The sheer number of suicide bombings, gruesome beheadings of hostages intended to mimic the brutal hadd punishments of apostates in Saudi Arabia, and willingness to work across political or even sectarian lines in the interest of fighting both the coalition and the new Iraqi government should be seen as nothing less than an implementation of the strategy articulated in both Iraq al-Jihad, as well as in the final work of the late Yousef al-Ayyeri. Both of these doctrinal sources agree: the formation of a stable democracy inside Iraq must be defeated at any and all cost.

Unless, of course, the attempt costs them everything.


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#24894 Posted by Gary Farber on July 22, 2004 01:23 AM

"...though neither their punitive replacement for Abdul Aziz al-Muqrin...."

Was this supposed, possibly, to be "putative replacement," or are you saying relations are that bad?


#24898 Posted by Joe Katzman on July 22, 2004 01:30 AM

It was. I've stepped in to do the editing thing per my understanding with Dan, and that (plus a couple more things) are all fixed now.


#24901 Posted by Dan Darling on July 22, 2004 01:41 AM

Yep, thanks Joe!


#24903 Posted by praktike on July 22, 2004 02:04 AM

more editing to be done: do a control-F on "abeit"

In any case, a good report, as usual.

I'm in the middle of Bodansky's A Secret History of the Iraq War (my intial summary here) and, I have to say, it squares with this post. But some of Bodansky's claims are quite outrageous, and some of them have already been discredited. On the whole though, I think he does a good job in explaining the stategies of the players involved, and he's no flack for the Bush administration. I am concerned about the quality of a lot of his sources -- no doubt MENL, DEBKAfile, and regional newspapers contain a fair bit of disinformation. And it seems, from his notes in the back, that Chalabi is his major inside source.

What do you think?


#24910 Posted by Vesicle Trafficker on July 22, 2004 02:56 AM

"In short, the lesson that needs to be learned from examining what happened in Spain is that when al-Qaeda seeks to influence elections, it does so strictly in its own interests rather than in those of either the incumbent or the challenging party."

This is fairly self-evident, Dan, but nonetheless worth repeating.

I'm curious, however, what you think would happen if and when the interests of Al Qaeda and the interests of one party become aligned?


#24924 Posted by Dan Darling on July 22, 2004 04:14 AM

VT:

Caricatures aside, unless one party wants to create a worldwide Islamic theocracy ruled by bin Laden, I would say that it would be virtually impossible for al-Qaeda to be aligned with a Western political party. You want a party that's in their pocket, the closest Western equivalent that comes to mind is something along the lines of the Arab European League, the Algerian FIS, Yemen's al-Islah, or the Malaysian PAS.

And of course the MMA up in Pakistan.


#24931 Posted by Vesicle Trafficker on July 22, 2004 05:27 AM

Dan;

You're presuming only alignment of the broadest goals, not the shorter-term ones that they likely think will bring them there.

Reduce their objectives to small, immediately achievable steps, and re-consider my question.


#24935 Posted by Dan Darling on July 22, 2004 06:00 AM

VT:

Here again, I don't see that happening no matter who wins in November. Neither Bush or Kerry are going to abandon the war on terrorism or screw it up beyond the point of no return, though I think that there's a legitimate debate that can be held over who would do a better job of managing it.

This is my own view, incidentally, and there are others who can construct plausible scenarios one way or another. In my view, this is a subject upon which I think one can hold to a variety of different but otherwise legitimate positions on.

Or to put it another way, when Bush 41 lost the election, Saddam Hussein figured that he had triumphed over his enemy. If one takes a dispassionate view of how Clinton handled Iraq, I don't think that you can argue that he did that badly a job within the political framework of the 1990s.

In short, bad guys make big plans, but they also make mistakes as well.


#24965 Posted by jinnderella on July 22, 2004 03:59 PM

Hi Dan: missed you :-)
"Moreover, by influencing a Western election al-Qaeda achieved something that has long been the dream of Arab nationalists across the Middle East since the days of Nasser: influence over a major Western power."
Based on this analysis, coupled with your assessment of current Iranian nuclear capabilities, can you make a Kepler-Trigo threat assessment(or some other metric of your choice) of the liklihood of a radiological weapon being used to influence the US elections?

"I don't think that you can argue that he did that badly a job"
Can and will. The single action of implementing Toricelli tanked our HUMINT in the ME, and guaranteed we'd be deaf and blind there for years. Cm'on you know what the commission talked about in closed door! We didn't just stop hiring-- we FIRED operatives. And they immediately outed anyone they could finger to their new masters. Clinton was a disaster.


#24968 Posted by Dan Darling on July 22, 2004 04:27 PM

Praktike:

Ah, good old Yousef Bodansky ...

According to what I know or can reasonably deduce, there was a great deal of outsourcing that has gone on throughout the Middle East with respect to any number of countries in the region. The Saudis bankrolled a solid chunk of the Pakistani nuclear program and if people like Prince Sultan had their way they would almost certainly have de jure as well as de facto control of it. Allegations about Iraq having outsourced WMD R&D to Syria, Sudan, and Libya have been floating around since at least 1998 under the Clinton administration with respect to things like the al-Shifa plant, which is was extremely conveniently all blacked out in the Senate Select Intelligence Committee report on Iraq. Without getting into specifics, I can certainly see how people reached these conclusions, but the evidence is far from clear on this stuff.

Limited Iraqi support to Ansar al-Islam did occur in terms of weaponry and explosives (plus the personage of Abu Wael), but they also received weaponry from Iran, which was instrumental in setting up the proto-Ansar group Jund al-Islam. Zarqawi arrived in Baghdad because he was an Iraqi intelligence asset from the 1980s (for more on this, see an upcoming article in the Weekly Standard), though there were hundreds of al-Qaeda fighters in addition to other jihadis that showed up to comprise Saddam Hussein's foreign legion prior to the war in Iraq that Hussein hoped would deter the US from attacking, when in fact it ironically bolstered the administration's case for war.

Iraqi Shi'ites provided a great deal of assistance to the US during the war and prior to his murder al-Khoei had organized a Shi'ite revolt in Basra. Ayatollah Sistani likewise issued a fatwa in support of the US efforts to overthrow the Baathists. The Iranian infiltration did occur, but it wasn't centrally coordinated until after the fall of Saddam Hussein because of the internal politicking between SCIRI, Dawaa, Hezbollah, VEVAK, and the IRGC. They also sent a number of assassination squads into Iraq in order to annihilate any remnants of the MEK that survived the US bombing campaign.

The Russians did push for a coup on several occasions inside Iraq prior to war, but all of these efforts were thwarted by the Mukhabarat and the would-be plotters detained or executed.

jinnderella:

Aww, thanks ;)

If radiological weapons are everything that al-Qaeda has to throw at us, I'll be a very happy man. They successfully constructed several out in Herat during the late 1990s, but the problem is that dirty bombs are woefully ineffective terror weapons if you're looking to perpetrate a mass casualty attack like the kind that bin Laden's acolytes tend to favor.

Toricelli should be eviscerated and rightly so for what he did to our intelligence capabilities entirely apart from his apparent personal corruption. My point, however, was that Clinton was hardly a dove on the issue of Iraq, as I think even his detractors (and I count myself among them) will admit.


#24978 Posted by Vesicle Trafficker on July 22, 2004 05:14 PM

Jinnderella;

Bad Clinton! Good Republicans! They would never compromise American Intelligence (HUMINT, I guess?) for idealogical or other purposes, would they?

(Via corrente.)


#24979 Posted by jinnderella on July 22, 2004 05:18 PM

Dan: Ah, but what sort of kill factor would be neccessary to cause chaos with the US elections? IMHO, just the use of any sort of nuclear material would work.
And I definitly believe Kerry would be their candidate of choice, based on the restoration of the UN to power in the democratic platform, and the extremely nasty things the Kerrians say about GWB. Y'know, the enemy of my enemy is my ally?


#24980 Posted by Vesicle Trafficker on July 22, 2004 05:21 PM

OK, Dan, now focus your attention on the time leading up to the election, and come again. Remember, I asked about a potential confluence of short term goals.

Why don't you start by taking a step into the great forest of the Caliph that you have been focusing on for so long, and examine the trees a little more closely.


#24982 Posted by Joe Katzman on July 22, 2004 05:53 PM

VT, I think that's exactly what Dan was arguing re: the Spanish elections. There was a confluence of short term goals around Iraq between al-Qaeda and Spain's socialists, and the bombing showed that AQ's calculations re: the effects of a major terror attack there were correct. The Phillipines has probably just strengthened AQ's belief in the utility of this approach.

There's also a cynical POV that says if AQ can spin any attackas as proof of their effectiveness and viability, it almost doesn't matter if the political result is objectively favourable - that's more of a bonus to them.


#24983 Posted by Vesicle Trafficker on July 22, 2004 05:53 PM

Jinderella;

"Y'know, the enemy of my enemy is my ally?"

Always nice to know you'd happily veer off into civil war or anarchy rather than trying to come together with your fellow American to solve some of the big problems of our times.


#24985 Posted by praktike on July 22, 2004 05:59 PM

VT, what point are you trying to make with this whole thing?


#24986 Posted by jinnderella on July 22, 2004 05:59 PM

V.T.: Dooooooon't even get me started on impeached president Clinton-- I worked for the dude, and IMHO he should be drawn and quartered for treason over NK.
Reguarding your link-- wasn't "don't ask, don't tell" a Clinton policy? And your value scales are way off. People got killed over Toricelli. A lot of people.
Not to say it wasn't horribly wrong to fire those guys. I also abhor the treatment Alan Turing, one of my personal gods, received at the hands of the military.


#24987 Posted by jinnderella on July 22, 2004 06:12 PM

Joe: Excellent point. The value-added for AQ is often prestige enhancement, and recruitment.


#24988 Posted by Vesicle Trafficker on July 22, 2004 06:13 PM

Joe;

I tend to agree more with the "cynical" view, which I think is based on a perhaps more realistic interpretation of Al Qaeda's immediate motivations as wanting to sow fear and chaos, primarily, and having some political goals perhaps as an adjunct.

But while the success of the second is unpredictable, I think it is easy to see from recent history that they can be certain to achieve the first of these goals.

And that is where we are not confronting them strongly enough. By amplifying the effects of their actions through the media, color-coded threat-levels, and bogus news conferences announcing "intentions" to strike, the Bush administration and the complicit media are helping to ensure that their goal of creating fear and chaos are succeeding.

And to extend this point, I have some serious concerns that the Bush administration also thinks that a high terrorist fear level amongst Americans benefits their political goals.

This is what I am trying to get at when I talk about a confluence of goals. I'm not accusing the admin. of sharing their long term goals, but I wonder whether it hasn't already occurred to them that there is some short-term benefit to also keeping Americans in a constant state of fear (or War), thereby synchronizing their goals with Al Qaeda's for the moment. This is a dangerous road to travel, to be sure, but I am also worried that the Bush Admin. may just be arrogant enough to believe that they can control the situation so that it doesn't get too out of hand.

Do you or Dan believe it benefits or hurts the Bush administration to make sure we are constantly reminded of the terrorist threat and hold the fear of this in the forefront of our minds until November?


#24990 Posted by Lurker on July 22, 2004 06:23 PM

VT,
Would it be better for the administration to keep knowledge of a perhaps imminent attack secret? What would the conspiracy theories be then? Something like: "Bush buries terror threat for election advantage"?

I'm not sure that the color alert system is best, but publicizing risk levels, or not, can be spun any which way.


#24996 Posted by Vesicle Trafficker on July 22, 2004 07:15 PM

Lurker;

Perhaps a simpler way to look at it is that those who control the information have the real power, but to gain from this just enough information must be made public to remind everyone of this.

Your question does not reflect the current state of affairs. It should really be "would it be better for the administration to keep suspicions of a "perhaps" attack secret", to which the answer is almost certainly "yes, of course".

Because those are the kind of warnings that this adminstration has been issuing.

Yes, it can be spun any old way, but don't dismiss the subject because of this. In this climate, every damn think is grist for the mill, that doesn't mean it shouldn't be considered.

The real question is not what you or I think of these warnings, but the general CNN/ABC/NBC/CBS-watching public thinks, and moreover whether the Bush adminstration thinks that fear of terrorism benefits them politically or not.

I am quite sure they do not dismiss a potential strategy because it can be "spun" any way.


#24998 Posted by Sebastian Holsclaw on July 22, 2004 07:23 PM

I didn't realize that people thought Al-Qaeda supported 'left' governments. I think you are correct that they don't care about the traditional left-right ideas, they will support whichever party has their preferred foreign policy. That said, most of those choices in Europe at this point in time are leftish governments. In any case it is worth repeating the idea that Al-Qaeda doesn't mind attacking anyone (on what we see as the normal political spectrum) who does not agree with their foreign policy goals.


#25001 Posted by Dan Darling on July 22, 2004 07:43 PM

jinnderella:

We don't know enough about any potential plots right now to know what kind of plan they might have in the works - my biggest fear is a mass casualty chemical attack. Also, I would note that if al-Qaeda does follow through on the (apparent, and I will be quite honest and say that their leadership will say any nasty things they have to about anyone they want to in order to attract recruits) hatred that its leadership appeals to feel concerning Bush in some kind of assassination attempt, the most likely result would be to ensure a Republican victory come November given how assassinated presidents are generally granted martyr status in American culture.

The main problem with trying to decipher al-Qaeda's motives with respect to an election attack is that we don't have much to go on (at least to my knowledge) beyond Iraq al-Jihad. We can look at Europe and see which party's they might well want to triumph or at the very least which coalitions they would like to collapse there. Those dynamics don't exist on this side of the pond, however, because they don't want to simply remove us from the playing field as we're their main adversary as well as their bogeyman. In the absence of any definitive information, it is quite easy to see how people can draw conclusions one way or another regarding how they would seek to influence the election.

VT:

Al-Qaeda does not simply exist to create chaos and fear. Those are the tools that it uses to achieve a very specific set of religio-political goals that they believe will eventually culminate in the formation of a worldwide caliphate ruled by bin Laden. While there is a definite nihilistic trend to the movement, it is balanced by a great deal of pragmatism, as can be seen in the Madrid bombings.

As far as the color-coded alerts are concerned, all criticism aside, let me just present two key points: those alerts have averted or delayed terrorist attacks. The September 2002 alert forced the delay of the Bali bombings for another month while the December 2003 alert forced an abortion or at least a delay of another attack on the scale of 9/11.

Just so you know.

As far as what administration officials believe, I can only tell you what I know from talking to people in government and most of the folks that I speak with are about as removed as one can be from the internal politicking of the Beltway, but they have all struck me as people who are sincerely trying to do their best to protect America. This also includes many of their opponents in government, who have legitimate issues of contention as to whether or not Iraq was involved with al-Qaeda (or whether Libya was involved with Lockerbie, for that matter) but are still doing everything they can to protect America to the best of their abilities. But then again, I'm a neocon, so what do I know?

As to your question, let me rephrase it a different way: Does it benefit or hurt al-Qaeda to have the American people thinking about who will do a better job of managing the war on terrorism when they go into the ballot box on election day?

Lurker:

At the beginning, the administration did try to keep things under wraps. Then we got that famous FBI memo that was leaked to press describing the warning that got lost in the bureaucracy at FBI HQ and everyone started demanding to know what the administration did before 9/11. This, of course, led to every odd word that Abu Zubaydah happened to mumble being leaked to the press, in most cases without context.

Sebastian Holsclaw:

There a number of exceptions to that argument, notably in Poland, where the ruling coalition is the Democratic Left Alliance. There, it would benefit al-Qaeda to knock the Polish coalition out of power and engineer a right-wing victory.


#25009 Posted by Vesicle Trafficker on July 22, 2004 08:28 PM

Dan;

I am not accusing the Bush administration or the rest of our governent of allowing an attack (through either will or neglect) for political benefit. I am addressing the issue of the promulgation of fear of attacks.

Although you cryptically cite 2 examples of how the "public alert" system has helped thwart acts (I'm not going to ask you to provide any further evidence either, BTW, since at best it is likely to be impossible to substantiate) I am more curious about many others where perhaps such a link is not well founded, as well as the almost constant references to terror, Al Qaeda, 9/11, etc. etc., in every stump speech and political statement by Bush/Cheney 2004. These are not terror alert warnings and I doubt any acts have been thwarted as a result. (Yes Kerry mentions it often also, but I doubt not nearly as much as Bush, and I don't like hearing it from him either if it sounds like an effort to scare people.)

I think we should be able to live our lives without constant fear, like in Isreal, where the threat is much more palpable and real. I think it is the job of the President to ensure this.

And I did not say Al Qaede exists simply to sow fear and chaos, only that is likely to be, IMO, their proximate goal.


#25010 Posted by praktike on July 22, 2004 08:32 PM

You know, it's very interesting to read Hizb-ut-Tahrir's political analysis. Now, I'm not familiar with whether HT is an active collaborator with AQ or its variants, but I think it does show that Islamists do pay close attention to Western politics.


#25011 Posted by Holger Uhl on July 22, 2004 08:38 PM

The Spanish Elections: Lessons (Not) Learned
your comments have reminded me again that the right/left distinction makes less and less sense. In particular when it comes to fighting islamist terrorism. I recently read a book by two German authors entitled Enzeitpropheten oder die Offensive der Anti-Westler"(Doomsday Prophets-or the anti-western offensive) in which they argue the distinction should be between western and anti-western not right wing left wing. If one thinks in terms of right-left, a working relationship between Sadaam and Osama makes no sense, but it does if you look at it from the western - anti-western perspective. Al Queda does not care about positions on medicare or gay-marriage, it does not even care if you are muslim or not.


#25012 Posted by Dan Darling on July 22, 2004 08:41 PM

Praktike:

Hizb-ut-Tahrir, or at least the global core of it, is an al-Qaeda front according to the Milan wiretaps. So while you aren't very likely to get anything equivalent to the old Party Line that Pravda used to publish, reading its stuff should give you a pretty good idea of what members or supporters of the organization are thinking.


#25015 Posted by Owen on July 22, 2004 08:55 PM

Judging from this Washington Times story today, it seems the administration knows a lot that it isn't letting on, and could certainly be doing more to scare the public.

VT,

I believe that the closer to the forefront of our minds the possibility of an attack is, the more vigilant and observant the public will be. This is much different than simple fear. The positive benefit to fearing terrorist attacks is a heightened sense of awareness that can help prevent those attacks.

I live in a very urban area. The crime rate is relatively high here, and I fear being a victim. However, that fear results in several positive modifications to my behavior to reduce my chances of becoming a victim. If I wasn't afraid, I'd be more likely to put myself into a situation that would result in my victimization.

Our best - only - defense on 9/11 was private citizens taking matters into their own hands after acting on new information. We need more information, not less. I agree that color-coded systems and grand pronouncements from Sec. Ridge and AG Ashcraft are an imperfect way to disseminate that information, and result in a lot of fear. But I think that many citizens put that fear to good use.

I also agree with Dan and others that the recent examples of Spain and the Phillippines are not particularly applicable to the US election. From AQ's POV, the benefit to striking before the election is probably prestige, which leads to new recruits, funds, and influence. Governments wavering in their support for the GWOT might interpret it as a serious disincentive to continue. A successful attack now could very well hand the election to Kerry, but I see no reason to believe that it's Kerry they want as president. Rather, bringing down an American president or either party is an end in itself.


#25016 Posted by Oscar on July 22, 2004 08:55 PM

VT: I see your point about public alert levels etc. However, I would argue that a rather regular churning of the juices on this point can lead to a heightened level of awareness of what is going on around us. The trouble is in calibrating this, as the recent discussions of NW 327 amply demonstrate.

My personal belief is that Kerry would be a more dangerous President for AQ (and for the US as well, truth be told). If something bad got pulled off in this country under his watch, he might have to overreact in self-defense. Who would be more likely to nuke Teheran in retaliation for an attack on this country? I am not sure. It reminds me of Malcolm X's justification for telling his supporters to vote for Goldwater, because at least you knew where you stood with him.


#25023 Posted by praktike on July 22, 2004 09:22 PM

I need to read up on those wiretaps, this being the second or third time something has come up related to them that I hadn't been aware of.

But wiretap or no, I'd already been predisposed to believe it, after reading Inside Al Qaeda (the other one).

I wonder if it's fair to consider groups like HT and Tabligh as "gateways." That is, they're a recruiting pool and source of people who can "advance jihad" in non-violent ways, such as the dessemination of propaganda. They're the upstairs crowd at the European mosque, while the boys downstairs are running logistics for terrorist attacks.

I think this a tough problem for law enforcement types. How do they know when the line has been crossed?


#25025 Posted by praktike on July 22, 2004 09:25 PM

More on TAbligh here


#25040 Posted by Dan Darling on July 22, 2004 11:38 PM

Praktike:

The Milan wiretaps are pretty much the Rosetta Stone for how al-Qaeda operates in Europe and should hopefully contain more than enough for you to imagine how they operate over here.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Tabligh are more or less "funnel organizations," from what I'm given to understand. The people at the top of both of them know damned well what's going on as far as recruiting is concerned but the folks at the local level may well not be party to that information in order to keep both as legitimate fronts. You hit the nail right on the head as far as how they fit into the infrastructure aspects of the terror network.


#25050 Posted by praktike on July 23, 2004 01:03 AM

But I don't think HT and Tabligh were originally set up as gateways; rather, they seemed to have evolved in that direction or been used as such. And from what Sifaui describes in his book, local imams may be aware of what is going on but also afraid and somewhat sympathetic to the overall program.


#25051 Posted by Dan Darling on July 23, 2004 01:21 AM

Well, Hizb-ut-Tahrir was set up in the 1950s and I think that Tabligh existed within a similar timeframe. My guess is that they've more or less evolved in the same direction, however.


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