Below is my response to Dan Koffler's argument on same-sex marriage. Readers can read his previous critique of my argument here. If anybody is interested in the core of the same-sex marriage debate, they can skip to point 3.
Point one: Finnegan says that he does not understand this statement of mine:
"You are misguided on the polygamy vs. gay marriage point. It is a bit like saying 'it is okay to fall in love with many different people, but not more than one at a time."'Well, I do not see the problem with the state condoning polygamy when it does condone people cheating on each other. That is, if I go cheat on my girlfriend, what is the state going to do about that? Nothing. Thus, the discrimination against polygamous people is arbitrarily enforced -- not merely against homosexuals."
Firstly, I am merely attacking Dan's argument against the state intruding on privacy, which it does in the case of "polyamory." If the key legal reason why homosexual sex, and thus gay marriage, is legal (see Lawrence v. Texas) has to do with non-state intrusion (a bona fide right to privacy), then why must the state pick and choose which sexual relationships to make legal or illegal. That is merely my point here. The fact that the state is in the marriage business altogether is 'arbitrary' in the sense that it arose out of the Christian canon law.
Of course, this raises a different interesting question: why is the state in the business of marriage altogether anymore? Is it legitimacy of monogamous couples? Tradition? Family? Perhaps that the continuation of the human races largely depends on monogamous heterosexual relationships? Even a proponent of same-sex marriage cannot deny this. If every relationship in the world were of the same-sex, how would humanity live on (minus scientific advancements that could fertilize)?
Point 2: Dan dazzles as our resident philogist. Polyamory should be used, not polygamy - since polygamy is ambiguous, he says. Well, I prefer polygyny (but not many people know what that is), so I use polygamy. For argument's sake I think Webster's will vindicate my position that polygamy can refer to a man or woman with multiple wives of the opposite sex: "The having of a plurality of wives or husbands at the same time; usually, the marriage of a man to more than one woman, or the practice of having several wives, at the same time." I do not think it matters whether one has many wives or one has many husbands. Polygamy suffices as a concrete enough term.
Point 2.5: This point is so 'rife' with hyperbole that it ought to be left for readers to decide its veracity:
Personally, I don't have a huge problem with allowing groups of people to marry each other. The problem is that every historical instantiation of polyamory involving multiple marriage is rife with physical and sexual abuse.
Every instance? Don't set the bar too low for me. But sarcasm aside, even if this is mostly true this does not mean the state should legislate based on what may happen. The possibility for a loving and abuse-free relationship depends largely upon the people involved. Every relationship is a fresh start; each one has the potential to be abusive. Banning a relationship merely because it is likely to be abusive seems a lot like the state banning second marriages to people in which their first marriage was dissolved due to abuse.
Point 3: I think that using this line of argumentation just helps my case:
What Jonathan is not legally able to do is marry one woman, and then marry another. I'll defend to the death his right to cheat on his girlfriend and take on as many sexual partners, men and women, as he desires...A polyamorous heterosexual person is free to marry any person with whom he falls in love. What he lacks is the freedom to marry multiple people simultaneously.
This helps my case because your restriction of polygamists' liberty depends on current laws, without acknowledging that polygamists want to do is change the positive laws which restrict marriage -- which is the same as same-sex marriage proponents. Homosexuals currently lack the freedom to marry in most states; just as polygamists do. Both want to modify the definition of marriage so as to gain liberty. Thus, the similarity between the cause of polygamists and homosexuals. For a deeper explanation of why this is so, I move on to my next point.
Point 4: Now my last point that polygamist rights are similar to homosexual rights is anchored in this point: that the traditional definition of marriage ought to be changed. Here is Dan's position:
Were homosexual marriage to be legalized, homosexuals would have no more freedom to enter into group marriages than anybody else. Nothing about the fundamental structure of marriage as a union between two individuals will have changed. It remains to be shown why homosexuals should be barred from joining such a union.
Now this point appears to be the pivot of his argument. Allow me to outline it as I see it.
The traditional definition of marriage is a contract that requires the consent of the parties involved which requires
a) Two individuals
b) One man and one woman
This definition has been the core civil, common and canon law traditions up until the 21st century. Dan proposes that marriage is discriminatory since two people who love each other are "barred from joining such a union."
Dan's argument attempts to modify b) to read "two people." The problem with this is that is messes with Custom. The result of distorting, as opposed to incremental changes to custom and subjecting it to rational review, is that it will eventually disintegrate the whole custom altogether. What Dan proposes is no different, and here is why.
I can see no reason why if one changes b) they are restricted from changing a). They are both coequal characteristics which are integral in the traditional definition of marriage. You can argue sociologically all you want on why two people are better than three. But legally speaking, if homosexuals argue based on love and discrimination, I see no reason to deny polygamists' claims on the same ground.
As a Canadian court in Layland vs. Toronto put it:
"The law does not prohibit marriage by homosexuals provided it takes place between persons of the opposite sex. Some homosexuals do marry. The fact that many homosexuals do not choose to marry, because they do not want unions with persons of the opposite sex, is the result of their own preferences, not a requirement of the law."
Thus, the law is not required to cater to all sexual preferences. By the nature of their respective relationships, homosexual and heterosexual relationships are different. With respect to many laws, the law does discriminate between relationships. It discriminates based on personal and business relationships (with respect to things taxable or not); and between father and son (with respect with authority and obedience).
Point 5: Dan says:
In the United States in 2004, any two heterosexuals of sufficient age and not blood-related within prohibited degrees have the right to marry one another. They need not want to have children, need not have the ability to have children, and need not love or even like each other. Heterosexuals are free to marry for financial reasons, in order to facilitate an immigration, because they're in love, or for any other reason that they could come up with. The only restriction is that no one can be forced to marry. These are criteria that any two homosexuals can easily meet, and to deny them the right to marry is arbitrary discrimination.
Well you are right and wrong. Marriage laws do not distinguish between heterosexuals and homosexuals. Thus, it is wrong to say that homosexuals are denied to marry. You are right in saying that homosexuals easily meet the criteria for marriage based on the above restrictions. A male homosexual may marry a female homosexual: thus homosexuals can marry each other. Homosexuals are not denied the right to marry. They can marry anyone they want, provided it be a member of the opposite sex. Thus, there is no arbitrary discrimination there. Homosexuals and heterosexuals can marry. If there is arbitrary discrimination, it is in the definition of marriage, which was discussed in the point above.
Point 6: Regarding incest. Here is your main argument against incest: that incest is associated with a) rape and abuse b) it results in birth defects.
Well a) is not always the case in these relationships. It is not a necessary condition that all of these relationships are abusive. But assuming that b) is a valid argument, I submit that all couples of the same-sex be sterilized before getting married. That way, no birth defects. But even this I see as going too far -- heterosexual couples who know that their baby will have birth defects are not required to have an abortion. Even if their previous children have had birth defects, suggesting a defective gene, they are not prohibited from procreation.
Although I think those 2 reasons are really quite weak at their base, I am willing to give you the benefit of the doubt and assume for the moment that you are correct. Assuming that these are the only reasons why incest is banned by the state, I suggest that there is still good reason for the state to bless relationships with marriage between close family members.
Assuming that two people in the same family (or first cousins) love each other, I see no reason for the state to deny two members of the same-sex to marry. Brother-brother. Sister-sister. Mom-daughter. Legally speaking, why deny them?
Point 7: Dan says:
I want to be as objective as possible, but it's difficult when confronting so many horrific misinterpretations of American Constitutional law. In the Brown decision of 1954, the US Supreme Court ruled 9-0 that arbitrary forms of discrimination violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.
The issue in
Brown was simply unjust and arbitrary. What is forgotten is that racial segregation is not rooted in the common law. That is, segragation is not explicitly protected, whereas marriage is.
In response to Dan's comparison from Brown to same sex marriage, I point out that Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that the Fourteenth Amendment
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923) -- (Look up the case here for more supportive legal cases for the reasoning behind this statement). Since it is safe to say that the marriage is a privilege "long recognized at common law" I do not see that same-sex proponents have anything to gain under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Last point: Dan:
What unique principle that has not already been removed from civil marriage law can a heterosexual couple achieve that a homosexual couple cannot? Fertility, as I've already discussed at more than sufficient length, is not a legal criterion for the issuance of a valid marriage license.
I say that marriage is based on a biological reality based on the concept of consummation. For any marriage to be valid, it must be consummated. This "coming together" is abiological. What differs this coming together from any homosexual relationship is that there is no biological united involved in their type of sexual relations. In heterosexual relations, real unity is achieved by the sperm and egg uniting to create a unique biological principle. With regards to the question of fertility, Finnis has this response, which I think is apt:
"In this reductivist, word-legislating mood, one might declare that sperm and egg unite only physically and only their prouclei are biologically united. But it would be more realistic to acknowledge that the whole process of copulation, involving as it does the brains of the man and woman, their nerves, blood, viginal, and other secretions, and coordinated activity is biological through and through. The organic... unity of the persons is the intentional, consensual act of seminal emission/reception in the woman's reproductive tract."
Further, as Robert George points out,
"the plain fact is that the genitals of men and women are reproductive organs all of the time -- even during periods of sterility. And acts that fulfill the behavioral conditions of reproduction are acts of the reproductive type even where the nonbehavioural conditions of the reproduction do not happen to obtain" (conception).
Matrimonial law has traditionally understood marriage as consummated only by reproductive acts of spouses. And finally, the sterility of spouses has never been an impediment to consummation.