Saturday, July 03, 2004
According to this report, the 3 soldiers who forced Zaydun and his cousin Marwan into the Tigris at Sammara resulting in the drowning of Zaydun are now facing charges of manslaughter, assault, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy. A fourth soldier was charged with assault and making false official statements. A court hearing has been scheduled next Thursday, and further charges may be waiting the soldiers. Here is Reuter's story, and I have been told that the story was mentioned today on several news channels, nothing in the Arab channels yet.
This following an Army CID investigation which took about 6 months. Zaydun and Marwan returning from a business trip at Baghdad were arrested just outside Sammara minutes before the night curfew last January, they were released at the Tharthar dam gates on the Tigris and were forced into the river by the soldiers even though Zaydun pleaded with them that he couldn't swim. Zaydun drowned and Marwan who was picked up by the Sammara ICDC force survived to tell the story. Zaydun's corpse was recovered from the river days later, his family was denied an investigation so his mother wrote a letter to president Bush which was published on this blog. Days later a full investigation commenced, press reporters and journalists picked up the story.
For the full story go here (scroll up for later entries and make sure to check the comments section), for the divided reaction of the blogosphere which ranged from flat denial, incredulity, doubt, strong personal attacks to support, understanding, and promises to help go here.
Zaydun's family made it clear from the beginning that they only seeked full justice, and they repeatedly refused any kind of financial reparation. They gave up ages ago but I hope this will satisfy them.
Thanks to everyone who sent letters to their officials and congressmen, thanks to the people and soldiers who wrote to me and to Zaydun's family expressing their support and encouragement, and thanks to the wonderful bloggers whose persistence and support made this possible.
Update: Yes, it's all because of those damn anti-malarial drugs. The mystery is solved. I also think that Iraqi insurgents are killing people because the heat has gone to their heads.
This following an Army CID investigation which took about 6 months. Zaydun and Marwan returning from a business trip at Baghdad were arrested just outside Sammara minutes before the night curfew last January, they were released at the Tharthar dam gates on the Tigris and were forced into the river by the soldiers even though Zaydun pleaded with them that he couldn't swim. Zaydun drowned and Marwan who was picked up by the Sammara ICDC force survived to tell the story. Zaydun's corpse was recovered from the river days later, his family was denied an investigation so his mother wrote a letter to president Bush which was published on this blog. Days later a full investigation commenced, press reporters and journalists picked up the story.
For the full story go here (scroll up for later entries and make sure to check the comments section), for the divided reaction of the blogosphere which ranged from flat denial, incredulity, doubt, strong personal attacks to support, understanding, and promises to help go here.
Zaydun's family made it clear from the beginning that they only seeked full justice, and they repeatedly refused any kind of financial reparation. They gave up ages ago but I hope this will satisfy them.
Thanks to everyone who sent letters to their officials and congressmen, thanks to the people and soldiers who wrote to me and to Zaydun's family expressing their support and encouragement, and thanks to the wonderful bloggers whose persistence and support made this possible.
Update: Yes, it's all because of those damn anti-malarial drugs. The mystery is solved. I also think that Iraqi insurgents are killing people because the heat has gone to their heads.
Blind justice
Watching the dreaded face of Saddam Hussein on tv was a climactic experience. For the first time in Iraqi (and Arab) history a ruler is brought to court to face charges. I admit it feels strange and the mixed feelings are impossible to describe.
The majority of Iraqis have expressed their desire to see him hanged publicly as soon as possible to mark an end to his era and to move on. A few said they didn't care anymore and that they were more interested in their future, and an even smaller group (from the Sunni areas) said they were against the trial. The Arab media (Al-Jazeera to be exact) focused on the last group. They already had a reporter at Al-Oja, Saddam's home village near Tikrit, interviewing members of Saddam's tribe to 'prove' that Iraqis were against trying their 'leader'. Today, they reported a small rally of about 50 kids in Sammara carrying posters of Saddam demonstrating against the trial of the 'honourable hero'. Al-Jazeera described them as 'crowds of demonstrators' even though the opposite was very obvious.
However, many Iraqis were disappointed in the secrecy surrounding the whole procedures. Only 3 minutes of the half hour session were displayed with audio, the room was apparently not designed to be a courtroom, and something was definitely not 'right' about the whole thing. The judge looked young and a bit nervous, the back of his head was glistening with sweat, and he stopped just short from addressing Saddam by Sayyidi (as he was always addressed before). I admire his bravery though. Saddam also shouldn't have been allowed the opportunity to give a sensational speech. I believe he made a fatal mistake by defending his invasion of Kuwait and calling Kuwaitis 'dogs'. The list of charges also raise some questions. There are no
penalties for crimes against humanity in Iraqi criminal law as far as I know, so there is some confusion here.
Maybe the new government is gauging the reaction of the Iraqi street, but a live public and transparent trial was promised, though I doubt anything is going to convince the enemies of the new Iraq who are now clinging to human rights excuses. They say the court is illegitimate. Where they legitimate under Saddam? If yes, then Saddam is going to be judged by his own Revolutionary Command Council amended laws, according to which he should face the death penalty for desertion and abandoning the battlefield when he was General Commander of Armed Forces last April.
Let's see how this unfolds.
The majority of Iraqis have expressed their desire to see him hanged publicly as soon as possible to mark an end to his era and to move on. A few said they didn't care anymore and that they were more interested in their future, and an even smaller group (from the Sunni areas) said they were against the trial. The Arab media (Al-Jazeera to be exact) focused on the last group. They already had a reporter at Al-Oja, Saddam's home village near Tikrit, interviewing members of Saddam's tribe to 'prove' that Iraqis were against trying their 'leader'. Today, they reported a small rally of about 50 kids in Sammara carrying posters of Saddam demonstrating against the trial of the 'honourable hero'. Al-Jazeera described them as 'crowds of demonstrators' even though the opposite was very obvious.
However, many Iraqis were disappointed in the secrecy surrounding the whole procedures. Only 3 minutes of the half hour session were displayed with audio, the room was apparently not designed to be a courtroom, and something was definitely not 'right' about the whole thing. The judge looked young and a bit nervous, the back of his head was glistening with sweat, and he stopped just short from addressing Saddam by Sayyidi (as he was always addressed before). I admire his bravery though. Saddam also shouldn't have been allowed the opportunity to give a sensational speech. I believe he made a fatal mistake by defending his invasion of Kuwait and calling Kuwaitis 'dogs'. The list of charges also raise some questions. There are no
penalties for crimes against humanity in Iraqi criminal law as far as I know, so there is some confusion here.
Maybe the new government is gauging the reaction of the Iraqi street, but a live public and transparent trial was promised, though I doubt anything is going to convince the enemies of the new Iraq who are now clinging to human rights excuses. They say the court is illegitimate. Where they legitimate under Saddam? If yes, then Saddam is going to be judged by his own Revolutionary Command Council amended laws, according to which he should face the death penalty for desertion and abandoning the battlefield when he was General Commander of Armed Forces last April.
Let's see how this unfolds.
Thursday, July 01, 2004
Sovereignty
I was on the road back to Baghdad on the 28th when the transfer of authority to the Iraqi interim government was announced. Since I was exhausted and starving from the long road, I was therefore more interested in gobbling up my lunch of tishreeb and rice than the ceremonies on tv at the bustling restaurant near Kut. I thought it was a wise decision to announce the event two days before it was planned so I wasn't much surprised, though some people argue that it spoiled the whole thing. Actually, it took the unguarded Arab media by complete surprise, and I swear I could notice their confusion since it was very obvious that they hadn't yet prepared anything to downplay the significance of the event.
We were stopped several times on the road at IP and National Guard checkpoints, and our luggage meticulously searched much to the impatience of our grumbling driver. The last time I was on this road our taxi was tailed by armed Mi'dan bandits in a shiny Nissan pickup truck. Taxi drivers have nicknamed the truck 'aljamra alkhabitha' (the malignant carbuncle or Anthrax) because it can catch up with any vehicle. We were close to Qal'at Salih south of Ammara and the speed gauge of our 92 Caprice read 200 km/h, yet the pickup persistently followed us for a few minutes until we noticed an ICDC patrol. The bandits slowed down gradually while we drived along with the ICDC patrol, they eventually turned around probably to search for an easier target.
In Basrah, people were much more welcoming and optimistic regarding the sovereignty handover. In Baghdad, however, people seem dubious especially since American patrols continue to roam the streets. Yesterday morning there were clashes in Adhamiyah between Americans and insurgents, though some say it was an armed gang. In another incident later on the same day, some people armed with RPG's and AK-47's (apparently looters) surrounded the Adhamiya bank which was guarded by an IP and FPS force. The looters shouted to the police that they were here to attack the Americans so it was better for them to leave the area because they did not intend to harm them, nice trick. The IP responded by shooting at the looters, killing two of them and arresting six others. The disturbing bit was that the police dragged the dead looters and violently beat the others.
Other than this incident I haven't heard of any other attempts to loot government property. In fact the performance of the IP until now is encouraging, a number of gangs were surrounded and arrested at Al-Battawiyeen by an Iraqi SWAT force, and people claim that the police used satellite images to locate the gangs, such rumours do have a benefit though. Another widespread and preposterous rumour is that Ayad Allawi has been showing up at IP stations and executing criminals himself, and I have heard this one from a very large number of people.
Baghdad looked 'normal' today even though the 30th was announced a holiday. Traffic was the same as everyday and no curfew took place contrary to what many predicted, except in Najaf where a truck full of explosives was intercepted by IP and three purported Qaeda members were arrested, one of them a Libyan who had just entered Iraq from Syria and the other two were Iraqis. Overall, I can say that Baghdadis are cautiously optimistic about the new developments, they have postponed their judgement on the government until they sense some real changes on the ground. Security remains the primary concern, and if the present measures continue I can say that it would improve drastically. I really hope we would see less and less American troops on the streets in the next few days.
Longlive Iraq
We were stopped several times on the road at IP and National Guard checkpoints, and our luggage meticulously searched much to the impatience of our grumbling driver. The last time I was on this road our taxi was tailed by armed Mi'dan bandits in a shiny Nissan pickup truck. Taxi drivers have nicknamed the truck 'aljamra alkhabitha' (the malignant carbuncle or Anthrax) because it can catch up with any vehicle. We were close to Qal'at Salih south of Ammara and the speed gauge of our 92 Caprice read 200 km/h, yet the pickup persistently followed us for a few minutes until we noticed an ICDC patrol. The bandits slowed down gradually while we drived along with the ICDC patrol, they eventually turned around probably to search for an easier target.
In Basrah, people were much more welcoming and optimistic regarding the sovereignty handover. In Baghdad, however, people seem dubious especially since American patrols continue to roam the streets. Yesterday morning there were clashes in Adhamiyah between Americans and insurgents, though some say it was an armed gang. In another incident later on the same day, some people armed with RPG's and AK-47's (apparently looters) surrounded the Adhamiya bank which was guarded by an IP and FPS force. The looters shouted to the police that they were here to attack the Americans so it was better for them to leave the area because they did not intend to harm them, nice trick. The IP responded by shooting at the looters, killing two of them and arresting six others. The disturbing bit was that the police dragged the dead looters and violently beat the others.
Other than this incident I haven't heard of any other attempts to loot government property. In fact the performance of the IP until now is encouraging, a number of gangs were surrounded and arrested at Al-Battawiyeen by an Iraqi SWAT force, and people claim that the police used satellite images to locate the gangs, such rumours do have a benefit though. Another widespread and preposterous rumour is that Ayad Allawi has been showing up at IP stations and executing criminals himself, and I have heard this one from a very large number of people.
Baghdad looked 'normal' today even though the 30th was announced a holiday. Traffic was the same as everyday and no curfew took place contrary to what many predicted, except in Najaf where a truck full of explosives was intercepted by IP and three purported Qaeda members were arrested, one of them a Libyan who had just entered Iraq from Syria and the other two were Iraqis. Overall, I can say that Baghdadis are cautiously optimistic about the new developments, they have postponed their judgement on the government until they sense some real changes on the ground. Security remains the primary concern, and if the present measures continue I can say that it would improve drastically. I really hope we would see less and less American troops on the streets in the next few days.
Longlive Iraq
Saturday, June 26, 2004
I just heard that Sistani's spokesman announced that one of the four most senior clerics of the Najaf Hawza has been assassinated. He also launched a strong verbal attack against Al-Qaeda. Since it is obvious that it wasn't Sistani, then we have one of the other three, Sayyid Bashir Al-Najafi, Sayyid Mohammed Ishaq Al-Fayyadh, or Sayyid Mohammed Sa'id Al-Hakim. This isn't good at all.
Mass murder
I was deeply horrified when I arrived at the residence yesterday and witnessed the gruesome images of the mass murder that was carried out in several Iraqi cities on Al-Jazeera. I was in downtown Basrah earlier and I noticed a heavy presence of IP and ICDC patrols plus several streets leading to the General Police Directorate, the Basrah Governorate, and the Traffic Police Directorate at Al-Asharr were blocked. People were talking about two explosive rigged cars that were intercepted and dismantled by the police, one close to the governor's residence at Mannawi and the other at a nearby police station. I had not realised how carefully planned this whole operation was. Ayad Allawi insists that the attacks were not coordinated while it is very clear that they were, moreover they appear to have been carried out by different groups working together. Groups of Arab fighters and Iraqi insurgents at Ramadi, Fallujah, and Ba'quba, a number of suicide bombers at Mosul (5 or more), and a single pedestrian suicide bomber at Dora in Baghdad. There was another smaller bombing at Hilla which didn't make the news, a bomb was dismantled at Nasiriyah, and the two rigged cars I mentioned before at Basrah. Now all this can hardly be coincidential, and Zarqawi can't be the only person behind this.
100 dead and over 300 badly injured. The scenes of bloody bodies of Iraqi policemen are painful and heartrending, and there is absolutely NO justification for this. I swear if someone says there is I would be glad to strangle him with my own hands and drink from his blood. I cannot express the rage I am feeling now in words. I did not blog about it yesterday because I would have said some very nasty things, and I am still struggling to restrain myself now from doing so. What kills me is that not one of the assailants were killed or captured in the attacks, I just can't possibly understand how a group of armed men can enter and hold several police stations, kill everyone inside and leave without a scratch. How are they supposed to secure the country in a few days from now if they can't even protect their own police stations?
These attacks are all the more reason for handing over the security to Iraqis. I doubt that Iraqi security forces would be able to deal with some places like Fallujah though. Some families have left Fallujah for good and the stories they have to tell are depressing. They say the IP and the Fallujah brigade are helpless and just for show and that in fact several groups now control the city with clerics (some of whom have accummulated extreme wealth from the donations and aid from other areas two months ago) trying to impose Sharia on Fallujah residents, foreign fighter keep a low profile but they are there. Armed clashes between the different groups is common, thy only forget their disputes when they feel the Americans are about to enter town, 'The enemy of my enemy is my friend' and 'Me and my brother against my cousin, me and my cousin...' all over again. They say some tribal Sheikhs attempted to challenge the insurgents sometimes with success. One case when the insurgents threatened a translator from the Jumaila tribe working with the Americans, his Sheikh told them that if they carried out their threat they will have the whole tribe to deal with, the translator's life was spared.
Some hooded men appeared on Al-Jazeera today claiming that there were no foreign fighters in Fallujah only the 'heroes of the Iraqi resistance'. What are they trying to resist now when an Iraqi government is going to control the government in less than a week from now? Okay, let's assume, for argument's sake, that they are incompetent, 'traitors', 'collaborators', or 'puppets' as some people like to say. Elections are going to be held in less than 6 months after all and they can be deposed of if the Iraqis don't want them. What? No elections or constitutions under occupation would be accepted? Okay then, does the 'resistance' have a political plan (other than mass murder that is) or any realisation on how the country should be managed when the occupation is over? Of course they don't have one. Anarchy and total destruction of the Iraqi state (or what is left of it) with the strongest man taking over is what they are asking for.
The Sunni Majlis Al-Shurra li Ahl Al-Sunna strongly condemned the attacks describing them as 'cowardly' and 'murderous', but nothing yet from the Haiy'at Ulemma Al-Muslimeen (the front for kidnappers and former regime appointed clerics headed by Harith Al-Dhari). Clerics in Mosul also spoke out against the attacks in Friday's prayers.
100 dead and over 300 badly injured. The scenes of bloody bodies of Iraqi policemen are painful and heartrending, and there is absolutely NO justification for this. I swear if someone says there is I would be glad to strangle him with my own hands and drink from his blood. I cannot express the rage I am feeling now in words. I did not blog about it yesterday because I would have said some very nasty things, and I am still struggling to restrain myself now from doing so. What kills me is that not one of the assailants were killed or captured in the attacks, I just can't possibly understand how a group of armed men can enter and hold several police stations, kill everyone inside and leave without a scratch. How are they supposed to secure the country in a few days from now if they can't even protect their own police stations?
These attacks are all the more reason for handing over the security to Iraqis. I doubt that Iraqi security forces would be able to deal with some places like Fallujah though. Some families have left Fallujah for good and the stories they have to tell are depressing. They say the IP and the Fallujah brigade are helpless and just for show and that in fact several groups now control the city with clerics (some of whom have accummulated extreme wealth from the donations and aid from other areas two months ago) trying to impose Sharia on Fallujah residents, foreign fighter keep a low profile but they are there. Armed clashes between the different groups is common, thy only forget their disputes when they feel the Americans are about to enter town, 'The enemy of my enemy is my friend' and 'Me and my brother against my cousin, me and my cousin...' all over again. They say some tribal Sheikhs attempted to challenge the insurgents sometimes with success. One case when the insurgents threatened a translator from the Jumaila tribe working with the Americans, his Sheikh told them that if they carried out their threat they will have the whole tribe to deal with, the translator's life was spared.
Some hooded men appeared on Al-Jazeera today claiming that there were no foreign fighters in Fallujah only the 'heroes of the Iraqi resistance'. What are they trying to resist now when an Iraqi government is going to control the government in less than a week from now? Okay, let's assume, for argument's sake, that they are incompetent, 'traitors', 'collaborators', or 'puppets' as some people like to say. Elections are going to be held in less than 6 months after all and they can be deposed of if the Iraqis don't want them. What? No elections or constitutions under occupation would be accepted? Okay then, does the 'resistance' have a political plan (other than mass murder that is) or any realisation on how the country should be managed when the occupation is over? Of course they don't have one. Anarchy and total destruction of the Iraqi state (or what is left of it) with the strongest man taking over is what they are asking for.
The Sunni Majlis Al-Shurra li Ahl Al-Sunna strongly condemned the attacks describing them as 'cowardly' and 'murderous', but nothing yet from the Haiy'at Ulemma Al-Muslimeen (the front for kidnappers and former regime appointed clerics headed by Harith Al-Dhari). Clerics in Mosul also spoke out against the attacks in Friday's prayers.
Ba'athist blog
I recently stumbled across this very unusual blog (in Arabic) apparently run by an Iraqi called Fadhil. He regularly posts periodic official statements by the 'Political Media and Publishing Office of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party' on current events. The latest statement was on the 18th of June and it harshly criticised Russian president Putin, describing him as a 'traitor' for his surprising statements on the Russian Intelligence information regarding planned Iraqi attacks against the US. The statement ends like this:
He also hails the daily explosions and bombings in Baghdad and throws the title of 'traitor' or 'agent' at every official currently employed in government positions including fomer Ba'athists, he praises the 'resistance' for assassinating them and he laments failed assassination attempts. Also, I was surprised to know that he is not so pleased with the performance of the Arab media (especially Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabia) since he mentions that they 'serve the American agenda' and are 'compelled to display all the rubbish and speeches of the murderer and killer Bush, something which American channels are ashamed to do'. He confidently proclaims that the CIA pays these channels in return for doing so. Below is his most recent post (translated):
His blog seems to have been around since last October, I have never head of it before though. Fadhil also links to a petition to free Dr. Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash and the rest of the former regime figures imprisoned by the Americans, he also links to another blog called Great Iraq (in English) which is very unreadable but appears to offer translations for the official statements issued by the Ba'ath.
Glory and immortality to the martyrs of Iraq and Palestine,
Long live the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party,
Long live a free and independent Iraq to defeat the occupation and extinguish the traitors and agents,
Long live a free Arab Palestine,
Long live the defiant general secretary comrade Saddam Hussein in his prisoner camp.
He also hails the daily explosions and bombings in Baghdad and throws the title of 'traitor' or 'agent' at every official currently employed in government positions including fomer Ba'athists, he praises the 'resistance' for assassinating them and he laments failed assassination attempts. Also, I was surprised to know that he is not so pleased with the performance of the Arab media (especially Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabia) since he mentions that they 'serve the American agenda' and are 'compelled to display all the rubbish and speeches of the murderer and killer Bush, something which American channels are ashamed to do'. He confidently proclaims that the CIA pays these channels in return for doing so. Below is his most recent post (translated):
In the name of Allah, most compassionate, most merciful.
The Iraqi resistance has offered the proof for its Islamic national character, meaning it is faithful, honest, truthful, and pure. It has proven its credibility by targeting the enemies of Allah and humanity, in the folowing priorities:
1-American and British ulooj.
2-Foreign Intelligence agencies, under whatever identity they may assume (experts, contractors, merchants, etc.)
3-The ulloj that ally themselves with them from other nationalities.
4-Mercenaries employed by the ulooj from different nationalities including Arab and Islamic ones.
5-Agents of the occupation employed by the American adminstration in government positions (ministers, deputy ministers, advisors, etc.)
6-People working with ulooj as translators and guides.
7-People used by the ulooj against Iraqis as the agent militias of Tarzani's group [Barazani and Talibani], the Hakim of the ulooj [Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim of SCIRI], and the Da'wa.
His blog seems to have been around since last October, I have never head of it before though. Fadhil also links to a petition to free Dr. Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash and the rest of the former regime figures imprisoned by the Americans, he also links to another blog called Great Iraq (in English) which is very unreadable but appears to offer translations for the official statements issued by the Ba'ath.
Thursday, June 24, 2004
Beheadings
I look forward to see what the conspiracy theorists who were convinced that the Nicholas Berg video was staged are going to say about this one. Just a week after the beheading in Saudi Arabia by Al-Qaeda, Jama'at Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad which is believed to be the group led by Zarqawi beheaded a South Korean national who was kidnapped in Fallujah. They say his body was found near Baghdad which painfully shows the ease and confidence in which this group operates and moves around from place to place.
These are the same people that continue to pour in from the borders of our 'friendly neighbours' to wage their 7th century Jihad on Iraqi soil, they are the same people that pack vehicles with tons of explosives to relieve thousands of Iraqis of their existence, they are -I believe- the same people who continue to assassinate hundreds of Iraqi professionals and 'collaborators', they are the same people that run the Taliban-style Emirate of Fallujah, they are the same people who the Arab media insists are heroic 'resistance fighters'. Yet all we hear after such grisly scenes is... (croak).. (croak).. a maddening silence, and then a few obligatory half-hearted 'This is not the real Islam, you know', 'Noooo, it's really a religion of peace, you don't understand'. However, I don't think people are buying these lines any more.
What the media fails to realise, is that the logic of these groups can actually be turned against them. They claim they are here to drive the foreigners who have been killing Iraqis out of Iraq. Ironically, those Mujahideen are also foreigners who have been slaughtering thousands of Iraqis over the last year. I'm not sure we are going to see any of them beheaded on tv though.
Another barbaric incident yesterday which hasn't been given the media attention it deserves was the slaughter of Layla Abdullah, dean of Law College at Mosul University. She was found slaughtered and shot in the head together with her husband at her residence in Mosul. She has been getting death threats for a while according to her relatives.
I believe we are going to see more beheadings, the Mujahideen seem to appreciate the publicity and attention they receive with each new execution. Don't count on any public demonstrations of Muslim outrage though, there won't be any.
These are the same people that continue to pour in from the borders of our 'friendly neighbours' to wage their 7th century Jihad on Iraqi soil, they are the same people that pack vehicles with tons of explosives to relieve thousands of Iraqis of their existence, they are -I believe- the same people who continue to assassinate hundreds of Iraqi professionals and 'collaborators', they are the same people that run the Taliban-style Emirate of Fallujah, they are the same people who the Arab media insists are heroic 'resistance fighters'. Yet all we hear after such grisly scenes is... (croak).. (croak).. a maddening silence, and then a few obligatory half-hearted 'This is not the real Islam, you know', 'Noooo, it's really a religion of peace, you don't understand'. However, I don't think people are buying these lines any more.
What the media fails to realise, is that the logic of these groups can actually be turned against them. They claim they are here to drive the foreigners who have been killing Iraqis out of Iraq. Ironically, those Mujahideen are also foreigners who have been slaughtering thousands of Iraqis over the last year. I'm not sure we are going to see any of them beheaded on tv though.
Another barbaric incident yesterday which hasn't been given the media attention it deserves was the slaughter of Layla Abdullah, dean of Law College at Mosul University. She was found slaughtered and shot in the head together with her husband at her residence in Mosul. She has been getting death threats for a while according to her relatives.
I believe we are going to see more beheadings, the Mujahideen seem to appreciate the publicity and attention they receive with each new execution. Don't count on any public demonstrations of Muslim outrage though, there won't be any.
Friday, June 18, 2004
Iraq's tribal society: A state within a state (part four)
The Ottoman empire entered the war on the side of Germany in 1914 and as soon as the drums of war started beating in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities thousands of young men started leaving their daily jobs to hide away in the country and take refuge among Iraqi tribes. Iraqis had experienced the brunt of Ottoman wars in the past, most notably in the 1877 Caucasus military campaigns against the Russians when ten thousand Iraqi conscripts died frozen and starved, and again in 1904 against Ibn Saud when thousands died lost in the desert. There was no reason to believe this war was any different. Iraqi tribes sheltered thousands of refugees while attempting to mislead the government as much as they could. People who would assist the government in locating the deserters were regarded as 'spies' and 'government agents', and were scorned and often targeted. Protection of refugees (dakhala) is a sacred tradition for the tribal Sheikh, no matter what the position of the refugee (dakheel) he should be protected or disgrace would fall on the Sheikh. For example, a tribesman once took refuge at the Sheikh of another tribe, he recognised the Sheikh as the father of his son's murderer so he decided to leave. When the Sheikh heard about this he rushed and killed his own son in order to avenge and satisfy his refugee so he would stay under his protection. The Sheikh lost a son but he preserved his 'honour'. On many occasions, outlaws and individuals wanted by the government would take refuge at tribal Sheikhs and they would be safe. Since then, dakhilak (I'm your refugee) became a common expression used by Iraqis, when you plead a person for something you say dakhilak. In 1915, the government started executing deserters publicly, and it arrested family members of others who were still in hiding until they turned themselves in. However, since corruption was widespread in Ottoman government offices, many escaped conscription by bribery, this habit would continue in the following decades especially during the 90's.
When Basrah was about to fall in the hands of the advancing British army, the government declared holy war on the infidels in a clever move to get the Shi'ite marji'iya recruit Iraqi tribes to defend the country. Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Kadhum Al-Yazdi, Najaf's most senior cleric at the time, issued fatwas calling Iraqis for Jihad. The Jihad movement was popular for a while and tens of thousands of tribesmen marched with clerics from all over the country to Basrah, even Kurdish tribes and some from neighbouring Iran joined the movement. The Turkish troops and the tribes scored limited victories at first, which appealed to the tribes and more undecided tribesmen joined the movement. Some British sources revealed that Indian Muslims who made the bulk of the British army refused to fight against the Arab tribes apparently affected by the Jihad movement. The Sheikh of Bani Lam handed out rewards in gold to tribesmen in return for every head of a British or Indian soldier which led the tribesmen to behead even the wounded soldiers for the gold. The tribes remained dedicated to the Jihad cause until their defeat in the Shu'aiba battle outside of Basrah in which they sustained a heavy loss, they turned immediately against the Turks and started looting their camps and weapons, they went beyond that and robbed their own clerics to the astonishment of the British who could not understand this contradicting behaviour of Iraqi tribes.
The British advanced swiftly to Kut through Ammara and Nassiriya, villages and tribes on the way raised white flags and banners. The tribes had abandoned the Jihad movement much to the dismay of the marji'iya in Najaf, while people spread ludicrous rumours about the incredible technology of the British and their advanced sciences and weaponry. There was an insurrection against the Ottomans which was started by deserters in Najaf and Karbala and by the year 1916 the whole area of the mid-Euphrates was independent from the Turks. Government offices and army depots were ransacked, telegraph lines were sabotaged, revenge killings against Turkish officers skyrocketed, and tribal battles became part of everyday life. Inside the cities clerics and neighbourhood leaders kept a relative degree of order but disputes over government property and clashes were still common and nobody dared leave their houses after dark. This anarchy which lasted well over 2 years resulted in tribalism strongly resurfacing again throughout the country, especially in the south.
The Turkish army retreated from Baghdad at night in March 10, 1917. Prisoners broke out from their jails and were the first to loot the markets, Baghdadis joined them and plundered government offices. The looting continued well through the night until 9 in the morning. Never had Baghdad witnessed such a night probably since the plague in the early 19th century. Nothing was spared, even bricks, windows, and wooden parts were taken out. Government buildings were all set to fire and documents were completely destroyed. It only ceased the next morning when the British marched into town and started shooting at the mob. Order only ensued after the British started hanging criminals and troublemakers in public squares.
The 1920 rebellion against the British started with two related events. The borders between Iraq and Syria were not yet defined and the British had originally promised the Hashemite Sharif Hussein Bin Ali a united Arab state which included the whole Fertile Crescent and the Arabian peninsula in return for his support during WWI. Iraqi officers in the Turkish army joined the Sharif's movement and they were in Syria in 1920. When an Arab state was formed in Syria headed by Prince Faisal (son of Sharif Hussein), one of the officers of the Arab army, Ramadan Shlash moved to Dayr Al-Zur and Al-Bu Kamal with the help of the Dulaym tribes and kicked out the small British force. Faisal was irritated by Ramadan's behaviour and replaced him with Mawlud Mukhlis (a Tikriti officer). Mukhlis started spreading Arab nationalist independence ideas among the tribes and shortly later he was following the steps of his predecessor. The Dulaym tribes began raiding British convoys on the Baghdad-Mosul road encouraging other tribes to join the movement. Jamil Al-Madfa'i (another Iraqi officer) took over Tala'far in the north with the help of Ajil Al-Yawar (Supreme Sheikh of Shammar and grandfather of Ghazi Al-Yawar) and the Juboor tribes, after that he started planning to retake Mosul from the British. The rebels were defeated outside of Mosul and the British chased them to the Turkish borders. These limited victories had a significant effect on other tribes in the south and they realised that the British were not as omnipotent as they had believed.
The British arrested and exiled Sayyid Mohammed Ridha Al-Shirazi (son of the most senior Shi'ite cleric Grand Aytaollah Muhammed Taqi Al-Shirazi). Tensions were high and tribal Sheikhs were complaining from the strict rules enforced by the British, rising political parties in Baghdad introduced new terms unfamiliar to Iraqis such as 'independence, 'unity', 'Arabism', anti-colonialist propaganda poured into Iraq from Syria, Turkey, and Iran. All the above led to the suitable conditions for the 1920 rebellion which lasted 4 months and united all Iraqis for the first time in history against the British. But that subject will be discussed in a further post of its own since it has so many parallels with the current situation.
The British modified their policy toward the Iraqi tribes after the rebellion, before that they had assigned duties to several unpopular Sheikhs with no consideration to the traditional tribal leadership hierarchy, they also made it possible for small peasants to file complaints against their landlords most of whom were influential Sheikhs thus antagonising them. At this point there was no true land ownership, the stronger Sheikhs controlled the best land and the tribesmen lived and worked on them, ownership was communal and the land a tribe controlled today may be controlled by another the next day. The new Iraqi government under King Faisal recognised the power of Iraqi tribes and came to realise that it could not function properly without co-opting them. "Regrettably, I can say there is no Iraqi people yet, but only deluded human groups void of any national idea," King Faisal wrote in a secret memo, Iraqis are not only disunited but evil-motivated, anarchy prone and always ready to prey on their government... The tribes have more power than the government, they own more than 100,000 rifles, while we own only 15,000..". The 1924 Tribal Criminal Disputes Regulation granted Sheikhs increased authorites and it permitted independent tribal courts in rural parts of the country. Another law in 1933 granted tribal Sheikhs huge estates and it legally bound the tribesmen to the land, this was the start of feudalism in Iraq. A new generation of wealthy and greedy Sheikhs replaced the old generous warriors, and many Sheikhs dropped their ancient traditions and began moving into cities.
The last major tribal rebellion against the government was in 1935-36 in the mid-Euphrates region south of Najaf. General Bakr Sidqi crushed the rebellion mercilessly and the tribes began to realise that the new Iraqi government was not the same as the Ottomans. Inter-tribal clashes continued though, Ali Al-Wardi cites several of these during the last century; in 1937 between the Izayrij and the Bazzun in Ammara over a land dispute, hundreds were killed on both sides and the government had to settle the dispute by a tribal court, they clashed again in 1946. In 1941 between the Al-Bu Mohammed and the Al-Bu Ali over a few stolen buffalos and a dog that was killed by the other side, a hundred tribesmen were killed and 250 houses were looted and burnt. In 1945 between Bani Assad and Al-Hassan in the marshes over a land dispute. In 1946 fierce fighting broke out between the Shammar and the Jihaish around Mosul. In 1952 between Al-Azza and the Ubayd and hostilities between the two tribes continue to this day. In 1954 the Mayyah attacked and looted the town of Al-Hayy south of Kut because the town was expanding on the expense of the surrounding land which was owned by the tribe. Hostilities between the Mi'dan Garamsha and Shaghamba tribes continue to this day and I recently witnessed one of their battles in Basrah a while ago.
Tribalism declined however during the monarchy (1921-1958), and with the exception of tribes in the southern and western deserts, most tribes were now well 'ruralised'. Sheikhs no longer held much power over their tribesmen because of feudalism and instead tribesmen started turning towards clerics. 'cultural ambivalence' now prevailed among tribesmen, they were still proud of their old tribal traditions and attempted to act by them as much as possible, however the rule of law and the changing circumstances made it difficult. The Bedouin tribesman scorns peasantry and instead lives on grazing and ghazu, this was no longer possible for the rural tribesman and his customs had to change as well. The Bedouin tribesman regards the government as his enemy and attempts to harm it whenever he can, the rural tribesman acted the same at first but then under the pressure of government taxation and military conscription he had to act friendly and submissive to it, a Bedouin might prefer death than submit to the government, however whenever the rural tribesman perceives weakness in the government he is the first to attack it thus acting by his inherited traditions, when faced with a strict government he starts to complain and whine showing a different aspect of his personality.
The 1958 republican regime delivered several blows to tribal Sheikhs starting with the abolishment of the aforementioned regulations and introducing land reforms, this resulted in an exodus of impoverished peasants from the country to the cities. Tribes weakened and the cities became a melting pot for people from different tribal backgrounds, large slums were created on the outskirts of Baghdad and several other cities (Al-Thawra or Sadr city is one example in Baghdad, and Hayyania in Basrah), the immigrants brought their tribal customs with them. Political demonstrations were popular during the 50's and on many occasions these would serve as a pretext for anarchy and looting. Political parties acted as tribes and would often engage in revenge killings in the name of 'defending the nation' or 'fighting colonialist spies and enemies of the revolution'. The Ba'ath party came to power in 1968 and it regarded tribalism as a major obstacle to reforms and modernisation. Radical agrarian reforms were introduced to the country, estates owned by tribal Sheikhs were confiscated and limited, and peasant associations were formed to reduce the influence of tribal Sheikhs and to undermine their historical position as intermediaries between the government and their tribesmen. It was under Saddam Hussein however that tribalism resurfaced again starting from the mid-80's. That will be the subject of the next and final installment.
About 120 distinct tribes exist in Iraq today, and a total of about 2000 clans. The smallest tribal unit is the bayt (house or family), several houses make up a fukhth (clan), and a number of clans make the 'asheera (tribe). A tribal confederation or the qabeela consists of a number of tribes sharing a common ancestor. Most tribes in Iraq are related to each other, and several fukhths have grown into seperate tribes with their own leaderships. A number of tribes have both Sunni and Shi'ite branches and extend over different parts of the country. Over 80% of Iraqis can trace back their tribal origins although many of them may not be properly associated with their tribes, for example my family has lived in Baghdad for over 200 years with no contact whatsoever with our tribe, but during the 90's when tribal affiliation became important again due to the resurgence of tribalism we reestablished contact with our supreme Sheikh and pledged allegiance to him in return for his protection and my uncle was assigned as head of our clan. The largest tribal confederations in Iraq are: Shammar, Al-Dulaym, Al-Muntafiq, Anniza, Al-Azza, Al-Juboor, Al-Ubayd, Al-Zubayd, Al-Bu Lam, Al-Bu Mohammed, Rubai'a, Ka'ab, and Al-Khaza'il. Some tribal groups associate themselves with the area they live in such as: Al-Tikarta, Al-Duriyeen, Al-Suwamra, Al-Fallujiyeen, and the tribes that live in Rawa, Aana, Al-Qaim, and Haditha. Bedouin tribes that continue to live in the desert are: Anniza, Al-Dhufair, Shammar, Al-Hassan, Al-Ghalal, and Al-Umtayr.
I searched for an accurate map of Iraqi tribes on the web but I couldn't find any good ones, so I compiled a basic colour-coded map with a legend which should give a general idea on the locations of these tribes.
When Basrah was about to fall in the hands of the advancing British army, the government declared holy war on the infidels in a clever move to get the Shi'ite marji'iya recruit Iraqi tribes to defend the country. Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Kadhum Al-Yazdi, Najaf's most senior cleric at the time, issued fatwas calling Iraqis for Jihad. The Jihad movement was popular for a while and tens of thousands of tribesmen marched with clerics from all over the country to Basrah, even Kurdish tribes and some from neighbouring Iran joined the movement. The Turkish troops and the tribes scored limited victories at first, which appealed to the tribes and more undecided tribesmen joined the movement. Some British sources revealed that Indian Muslims who made the bulk of the British army refused to fight against the Arab tribes apparently affected by the Jihad movement. The Sheikh of Bani Lam handed out rewards in gold to tribesmen in return for every head of a British or Indian soldier which led the tribesmen to behead even the wounded soldiers for the gold. The tribes remained dedicated to the Jihad cause until their defeat in the Shu'aiba battle outside of Basrah in which they sustained a heavy loss, they turned immediately against the Turks and started looting their camps and weapons, they went beyond that and robbed their own clerics to the astonishment of the British who could not understand this contradicting behaviour of Iraqi tribes.
The British advanced swiftly to Kut through Ammara and Nassiriya, villages and tribes on the way raised white flags and banners. The tribes had abandoned the Jihad movement much to the dismay of the marji'iya in Najaf, while people spread ludicrous rumours about the incredible technology of the British and their advanced sciences and weaponry. There was an insurrection against the Ottomans which was started by deserters in Najaf and Karbala and by the year 1916 the whole area of the mid-Euphrates was independent from the Turks. Government offices and army depots were ransacked, telegraph lines were sabotaged, revenge killings against Turkish officers skyrocketed, and tribal battles became part of everyday life. Inside the cities clerics and neighbourhood leaders kept a relative degree of order but disputes over government property and clashes were still common and nobody dared leave their houses after dark. This anarchy which lasted well over 2 years resulted in tribalism strongly resurfacing again throughout the country, especially in the south.
The Turkish army retreated from Baghdad at night in March 10, 1917. Prisoners broke out from their jails and were the first to loot the markets, Baghdadis joined them and plundered government offices. The looting continued well through the night until 9 in the morning. Never had Baghdad witnessed such a night probably since the plague in the early 19th century. Nothing was spared, even bricks, windows, and wooden parts were taken out. Government buildings were all set to fire and documents were completely destroyed. It only ceased the next morning when the British marched into town and started shooting at the mob. Order only ensued after the British started hanging criminals and troublemakers in public squares.
The 1920 rebellion against the British started with two related events. The borders between Iraq and Syria were not yet defined and the British had originally promised the Hashemite Sharif Hussein Bin Ali a united Arab state which included the whole Fertile Crescent and the Arabian peninsula in return for his support during WWI. Iraqi officers in the Turkish army joined the Sharif's movement and they were in Syria in 1920. When an Arab state was formed in Syria headed by Prince Faisal (son of Sharif Hussein), one of the officers of the Arab army, Ramadan Shlash moved to Dayr Al-Zur and Al-Bu Kamal with the help of the Dulaym tribes and kicked out the small British force. Faisal was irritated by Ramadan's behaviour and replaced him with Mawlud Mukhlis (a Tikriti officer). Mukhlis started spreading Arab nationalist independence ideas among the tribes and shortly later he was following the steps of his predecessor. The Dulaym tribes began raiding British convoys on the Baghdad-Mosul road encouraging other tribes to join the movement. Jamil Al-Madfa'i (another Iraqi officer) took over Tala'far in the north with the help of Ajil Al-Yawar (Supreme Sheikh of Shammar and grandfather of Ghazi Al-Yawar) and the Juboor tribes, after that he started planning to retake Mosul from the British. The rebels were defeated outside of Mosul and the British chased them to the Turkish borders. These limited victories had a significant effect on other tribes in the south and they realised that the British were not as omnipotent as they had believed.
The British arrested and exiled Sayyid Mohammed Ridha Al-Shirazi (son of the most senior Shi'ite cleric Grand Aytaollah Muhammed Taqi Al-Shirazi). Tensions were high and tribal Sheikhs were complaining from the strict rules enforced by the British, rising political parties in Baghdad introduced new terms unfamiliar to Iraqis such as 'independence, 'unity', 'Arabism', anti-colonialist propaganda poured into Iraq from Syria, Turkey, and Iran. All the above led to the suitable conditions for the 1920 rebellion which lasted 4 months and united all Iraqis for the first time in history against the British. But that subject will be discussed in a further post of its own since it has so many parallels with the current situation.
The British modified their policy toward the Iraqi tribes after the rebellion, before that they had assigned duties to several unpopular Sheikhs with no consideration to the traditional tribal leadership hierarchy, they also made it possible for small peasants to file complaints against their landlords most of whom were influential Sheikhs thus antagonising them. At this point there was no true land ownership, the stronger Sheikhs controlled the best land and the tribesmen lived and worked on them, ownership was communal and the land a tribe controlled today may be controlled by another the next day. The new Iraqi government under King Faisal recognised the power of Iraqi tribes and came to realise that it could not function properly without co-opting them. "Regrettably, I can say there is no Iraqi people yet, but only deluded human groups void of any national idea," King Faisal wrote in a secret memo, Iraqis are not only disunited but evil-motivated, anarchy prone and always ready to prey on their government... The tribes have more power than the government, they own more than 100,000 rifles, while we own only 15,000..". The 1924 Tribal Criminal Disputes Regulation granted Sheikhs increased authorites and it permitted independent tribal courts in rural parts of the country. Another law in 1933 granted tribal Sheikhs huge estates and it legally bound the tribesmen to the land, this was the start of feudalism in Iraq. A new generation of wealthy and greedy Sheikhs replaced the old generous warriors, and many Sheikhs dropped their ancient traditions and began moving into cities.
The last major tribal rebellion against the government was in 1935-36 in the mid-Euphrates region south of Najaf. General Bakr Sidqi crushed the rebellion mercilessly and the tribes began to realise that the new Iraqi government was not the same as the Ottomans. Inter-tribal clashes continued though, Ali Al-Wardi cites several of these during the last century; in 1937 between the Izayrij and the Bazzun in Ammara over a land dispute, hundreds were killed on both sides and the government had to settle the dispute by a tribal court, they clashed again in 1946. In 1941 between the Al-Bu Mohammed and the Al-Bu Ali over a few stolen buffalos and a dog that was killed by the other side, a hundred tribesmen were killed and 250 houses were looted and burnt. In 1945 between Bani Assad and Al-Hassan in the marshes over a land dispute. In 1946 fierce fighting broke out between the Shammar and the Jihaish around Mosul. In 1952 between Al-Azza and the Ubayd and hostilities between the two tribes continue to this day. In 1954 the Mayyah attacked and looted the town of Al-Hayy south of Kut because the town was expanding on the expense of the surrounding land which was owned by the tribe. Hostilities between the Mi'dan Garamsha and Shaghamba tribes continue to this day and I recently witnessed one of their battles in Basrah a while ago.
Tribalism declined however during the monarchy (1921-1958), and with the exception of tribes in the southern and western deserts, most tribes were now well 'ruralised'. Sheikhs no longer held much power over their tribesmen because of feudalism and instead tribesmen started turning towards clerics. 'cultural ambivalence' now prevailed among tribesmen, they were still proud of their old tribal traditions and attempted to act by them as much as possible, however the rule of law and the changing circumstances made it difficult. The Bedouin tribesman scorns peasantry and instead lives on grazing and ghazu, this was no longer possible for the rural tribesman and his customs had to change as well. The Bedouin tribesman regards the government as his enemy and attempts to harm it whenever he can, the rural tribesman acted the same at first but then under the pressure of government taxation and military conscription he had to act friendly and submissive to it, a Bedouin might prefer death than submit to the government, however whenever the rural tribesman perceives weakness in the government he is the first to attack it thus acting by his inherited traditions, when faced with a strict government he starts to complain and whine showing a different aspect of his personality.
The 1958 republican regime delivered several blows to tribal Sheikhs starting with the abolishment of the aforementioned regulations and introducing land reforms, this resulted in an exodus of impoverished peasants from the country to the cities. Tribes weakened and the cities became a melting pot for people from different tribal backgrounds, large slums were created on the outskirts of Baghdad and several other cities (Al-Thawra or Sadr city is one example in Baghdad, and Hayyania in Basrah), the immigrants brought their tribal customs with them. Political demonstrations were popular during the 50's and on many occasions these would serve as a pretext for anarchy and looting. Political parties acted as tribes and would often engage in revenge killings in the name of 'defending the nation' or 'fighting colonialist spies and enemies of the revolution'. The Ba'ath party came to power in 1968 and it regarded tribalism as a major obstacle to reforms and modernisation. Radical agrarian reforms were introduced to the country, estates owned by tribal Sheikhs were confiscated and limited, and peasant associations were formed to reduce the influence of tribal Sheikhs and to undermine their historical position as intermediaries between the government and their tribesmen. It was under Saddam Hussein however that tribalism resurfaced again starting from the mid-80's. That will be the subject of the next and final installment.
About 120 distinct tribes exist in Iraq today, and a total of about 2000 clans. The smallest tribal unit is the bayt (house or family), several houses make up a fukhth (clan), and a number of clans make the 'asheera (tribe). A tribal confederation or the qabeela consists of a number of tribes sharing a common ancestor. Most tribes in Iraq are related to each other, and several fukhths have grown into seperate tribes with their own leaderships. A number of tribes have both Sunni and Shi'ite branches and extend over different parts of the country. Over 80% of Iraqis can trace back their tribal origins although many of them may not be properly associated with their tribes, for example my family has lived in Baghdad for over 200 years with no contact whatsoever with our tribe, but during the 90's when tribal affiliation became important again due to the resurgence of tribalism we reestablished contact with our supreme Sheikh and pledged allegiance to him in return for his protection and my uncle was assigned as head of our clan. The largest tribal confederations in Iraq are: Shammar, Al-Dulaym, Al-Muntafiq, Anniza, Al-Azza, Al-Juboor, Al-Ubayd, Al-Zubayd, Al-Bu Lam, Al-Bu Mohammed, Rubai'a, Ka'ab, and Al-Khaza'il. Some tribal groups associate themselves with the area they live in such as: Al-Tikarta, Al-Duriyeen, Al-Suwamra, Al-Fallujiyeen, and the tribes that live in Rawa, Aana, Al-Qaim, and Haditha. Bedouin tribes that continue to live in the desert are: Anniza, Al-Dhufair, Shammar, Al-Hassan, Al-Ghalal, and Al-Umtayr.
I searched for an accurate map of Iraqi tribes on the web but I couldn't find any good ones, so I compiled a basic colour-coded map with a legend which should give a general idea on the locations of these tribes.
Tuesday, June 15, 2004
Iraq's tribal society: A state within a state (part three)
The earliest Bedouin tribal confederation to appear in southern Iraq in the 15th century was that of Qash'am (the tribe exists today as Jash'am). The Mamluks in Egypt and Greater Syria were concerned about the alarming growth of the Al Fadhl 'Emarat Al-Arab' tribal emirate on their eastern borders, which prompted the Mamluk Sultan in Cairo Al-Dhahir Barquq to write to Thamir the Sheikh of Qash'am instigating him to take over the emirate from the Al Fadhl clan. Thamir raided and plundered Basrah and started to collect taxes from the weaker tribes, all the new migrating tribes from the desert had to ally with Qash'am until the confederation controlled most of the southern Iraqi desert west of the Euphrates from Basrah to Fallujah. By the 17th century the confederation was undermined by attacks from new migrating tribes such as the Shammar and Anniza from the south, and pressure from older tribal groups such as the growing Al-Muntafiq tribal confederation from the east and the Al-Khaza'il from the north. Allied tribes left the confederation to join other rising ones, and in the end the Qash'am tribe itself was forced to join the Al-Muntafiq.
Meanwhile, north and east of Iraq, two young states were being formed, both of which had a significant role in shaping Iraqi society, the Ottoman and the Safawid empires. In 1501 Shah Ishmael had succeeded in uniting Iran for the first time since the Muslim invasion. Shah Ishmael embraced Shia Islam and established it as the state religion although the Safawids were originally Sufi in their beliefs, he then commenced to forcefully convert the largely Sunni population of Iran into Shi'ism. Ishmael Shah captured Baghdad in 1508 and destroyed the Abu Hanifa shrine in Adhamiya to the horror of the Sunni Ottoman Turks who were then busy with their Jihad wars in the Balkans. Sultan Selim declared a holy war on the Shi'ite Safawids with the help of fatwas from muslim clerics. His successor Suleiman was able to capture Baghdad in 1534 and it was under Sultan Suleiman that the Islamic world had reached its zenith, if it were not for the rival Safawids in his back he might have been able to conquer most of Europe. For the next 150 years war continued between the two empires with Iraq as the main war field. Iraqis themselves were divided between the two, Sunnis supported the Ottoman empire while Shia were with the Safawids, never minding that both were actually foreign occupying powers. Iraqi tribes were not much big on religious matters so they supported whoever was stronger at the time and raided and looted the armies of the weaker empire.
In about the mid 17th century the large Bedouin Shammar tribe started migrating from its traditional territory north of the Arab peninsula to the large desert area between Iraq and Syria, it soon clashed with the Al-Mawali tribe which had settled earlier in the region and succeeded in driving it west to Syria. Another Bedouin wave brought the large Anniza tribe to the area shortly afterwards, it had to fight for territories with the Shammar and the Shammar were pushed north across the Euphrates where they finally settled also in the process driving older tribes such as Al-Jubur and Al-Ubayd eastward across the Tigris. This movement led many scholars to believe that the tribes that inhabit southern Iraq east of the Tigris are the oldest settled tribes in Iraq, and there is much evidence to prove this since Bedouin traditions are the weakest among these tribes.
It was not uncommon for the Ottoman governor (or wali as he was called) of Baghdad to clash with insurgent tribes. Usually, the Baghdad wali would grant leaders of large tribal confederations such as the Muntafiq or the Khaza'il some degree of autonomy in return for an annual payment of taxes and royalties to his treasury, by the same token the Ottoman Sultan at Istanbul did not have much central control over Iraq due to communication difficulties at the time and as long as he also regularly received his annual share of taxes he left the governor to his own devices. Needless to say this policy over four centuries contributed to much of the chaos and spread of tribal values in Iraq. Travellers and pilgrims had to pay royalties to each tribe when passing through their territory, merchants had to seek protection from local tribes to avoid being raided. Every now and then tribes would refuse to pay the governor and he would have to move armies to control them. One governor, Hassan Pasha, was in constant war with tribes, once he subjugated a tribe, another would immediately rebel against him. After he brutally repressed the Shammar and Bani Lam tribes in 1708, an alliance of several powerful Iraqi tribes including Shammar, Zubayd, Al-Khaza'il, and Al-Mayyah rebelled against him under the leadership of the Al-Muntafiq tribal confederation. A fierce battle was fought near Basrah in which cannons were used against the tribesmen killing thousands.
The Qajar dynasty took over Iran following a brief rule of Afghans who had overthrown the Safawid family. Nadir Shah shortly invaded Iraq in 1733 and besieged Baghdad plunging the country into even more chaos. Many tribes assisted Nadir in his campaign against the Ottomans especially the Shammar and at the same time ravaged most of the country, and after Nadir's army was defeated the new Ottoman governor Ahmed Pasha started another huge campaign to punish the defected tribes. He fought the Shammar, Zubayd, Bani Lam, and Qash'am, however when he was transferred by the Sultan to another province the mentioned tribes returned to their old ways. And in 1738 there was another rebellion in the south by Sa'dun, the Sheikh of Al-Muntafiq which lasted four years. During the following decades there were several revolts by Iraqi tribes such as the Ubayd, Al-Khaza'il, and Al-Muntafiq, one which even succeeded in attaing brief independence from the Ottomans. The Ottoman governors had realised by now that military campaigns alone were not successful in oppressing the tribes, therefore they resorted to the old 'divide and conquer' methods. They started appointing rival Sheikhs from other clans to the tribal confederations, starting with the Al-Khaza'il and Al-Muntafiq. They also employed a 'stick and carrot' policy when dealing with tribal leaders, obedient Sheikhs would have a handsome share of taxes and land privileges over neighbouring tribes in return for maintaing order in their territories, insurgent Sheikhs on the other hand would have to pay huge fines and in addition their land would be confiscated and handed to rival tribes. At this point many of these tribes settled down, slowly started dropping their old Bedouin traditions and became 'ruralised'. The governors also introduced military conscription especially after the Ottomans had ended the domination of Jannissaries over the army, this was primarily to face the increasing threat of Wahhabi raids in southern Iraq.
In 1797 an army of Iraqi tribes armed with cannons and firearms led by Sheikh Thuwayni of Al-Muntafiq moved south against the Wahhabis after news of the fall of the Ahsa region in the hands of Abdul Aziz Bin Mohammed Bin Saud. Sheikh Thuwayni was assassinated by a slave who sympathised with the Wahhabis, he stabbed him in the chest with a dagger while shouting 'Allahu Akbar!'. As soon as the news spread among the Iraqi tribes they fled in panic and the Wahhabis looted the army. Another larger campaign followed the next year which was also met with failure, and the Baghdad governor was forced to sign a truce with Ibn Saud. The truce didn't last long, a caravan of Wahhabis was passing by Najaf and they witnessed a Sheikh from Al-Khaza'il kissing the gates of the shrine of Imam Ali, this enraged the fundamental Wahhabis so they attacked and killed the Sheikh. After that Wahhabis continued to raid southern Iraqi villages slaughtering their inhabitants including the women and children. During the Ghadeer day festivities in 1802 they attacked Karbala and plundered the shrines of Imam Hussein and Abbas, killing 5 thousand Iraqis. Four years later they tried to attack Najaf but it was defended by the tribes. Wahhabi raids against the Iraqi south continued to be a problem for over a century until after the British occupation, when British aircraft started bombing the raiding tribes.
One interesting observation when studying the history of Iraqi tribes is that with the exception of a few tribes in the Ahsa region, almost all of the migrating Bedouin tribes to Iraq are Sunni. In the north all remain to be Sunni but when we start to move south to older tribes we notice mixed Sunni-Shia tribes such as the Janabiyeen, Tamim, Jubur, Azza, Ubayd, and Zubayd, further south into the mid-Euphrates area around Najaf and Diwaniyah and we find the tribes exclusively Shia, as we move a bit eastward to the Iranian border we find the tribes almost fanatical in their Shi'ism, a little more south to Basrah and we find some pockets of Sunni tribes until we reach close to the Kuwaiti borders where we find all are Sunni again. A 19th century Iraqi Sunni cleric describes the widespread conversion of Iraqi tribes to Shi'ism and gives specific dates for the conversion of each. According to him the Al-Khaza'il converted in the early 18th century, followed by Rubai'a, Zubayd, Tamim, and then the others. He attributes this to the 'propaganda of the insinuating satanic clerics' and 'the ignorance of Arab tribes in religious matters'. However, this also meant that Shia clerics and Sayyids throughout the rural south would also have power and influence over the tribes together with the traditional tribal Sheikhs. We would witness later how the Shia clerics would implement this influence in the early 20th century against the British and the Iraqi monarchy.
Under the rule of powerful Ottoman governors such as Dawud Pasha and Midhat Pasha during the 19th century much of the power of Iraqi tribes had diminished due to the successful tribal policy of the governors, more and more tribes settled down and turned to agriculture instead of grazing, some tribal Sheikhs were educated in Istanbul and granted honorary titles such as Farhan Pasha, supreme Sheikh of Shammar, and Mansur Pasha Sheikh of Al-Muntafiq. Midhat Pasha introduced some reforms to the country and started some limited community services, most of the southern Iraqi cities were built in the second half of the 19th century such as Kut, Nasiriya, Ammara, Aziziya, and Nu'maniya. The historical antagonism between state and tribes did not disappear though, tribes still regarded the state with suspicion, for them the state was always a symbol of taxation, imprisonment, and conscription. Civil law was absent in the country except inside provincial centers such as Baghdad, Mosul, and Basrah, the rest of Iraq was ruled by tribal law or to be exact 'law of the jungle'. Iraqis scorned people who turned to the government to guarantee their rights. An old Iraqi proverb says 'take your rights by the sword, only the weak need witnesses'. The story was that two people had a dispute over a piece of land, one of them brought his tribesmen and took over it, this led the other to ask witnesses to testify against the aggressor who mentioned the above proverb. Iraqis therefore, regardless of their background, had to resort to tribal values in order to survive the chaotic situation. Towns were regarded as tribes, therefore when someone from Najaf killed a tribesman, the tribe would avenge the murdered by murdering another Najafi. Different neighbourhoods in the same town would treat each other as tribes, and the same when dealing with other towns. This introduced several layers of allegiance among Iraqis; allegiance to one's tribe or clan, to one's sect or religion, to one's neighbourhood, and to one's town, 'me and my brother against my cousin...' defines it all. The same is true today among a large section of Iraqis, a unified sense of Iraqi nationality only emerged after WWI, but it has not succeeded in completely uniting the population, and remnants of the old allegiances still control the divided Iraqis.
Another important observation is that the population of Iraq at the start of the 20th century was less than 1.5 million. Only 25% of those were urban dwellers, the remaining 75% was composed of Bedouin and rural tribes (today, the urban population is about 60% of the 25 million Iraqis but with a large portion of it retaining its tribal identity), plus the cities were constantly plagued with epidemics, famine, and floods which had two main consequences; tribes moving into the cities to replace the perished population, and the spread of tribal values among the survivors due to raids from the opportunistic neighbouring tribes. Several neighbourhoods today in Baghdad are named after tribes such as Al-Fadhl, Al-Mahdiya, Al-Shiyukh, Al-Ji'aiffer, Hay Al-Tikarta, Hay Al-Sawamra, Al-Duriyeen, and Al-Bu Shujaa'. The same applies to most Iraqi cities.
The tribes continued to wreak havoc throughout the country, banditry and crime were considered to be very normal at that time, outlaws were in fact respected and admired by most Iraqis, some even used it to achieve higher social status, for example it was not uncommon for outlaws to turn themselves in to the Ottoman gendarma since 'prison is for men' as the Iraqi proverb goes. In a last attempt to cure this persistent disease, the Ottomans sent Nadhum Pasha in 1909 to govern all three provinces of Iraq (Mosul, Baghdad, and Basrah) granting him unprecedented authorities and funds to control the deteriorating security situation. He started by ordering prominent clerics from both the Sunni and Shia sects to issue fatwas against ghazu (raiding) and inter-tribal violence stating that it was against Islam, he distributed strong military garrisons throughout the country, and he also invited tribal leaders from all over Iraq to a large military parade outside of Baghdad which seemed to have the desired effect on the Sheikhs. For a couple of years there was stability in the country, Baghdadi families could now go out for walks at night, something which was regarded as foolish before. The mere mention of Nadhum's name was enough to instill fear in the heart of the most courageous of men. When he was replaced with Jamal Pasha in 1911 however, the tribes returned to their fighting again.
to be continued...
Meanwhile, north and east of Iraq, two young states were being formed, both of which had a significant role in shaping Iraqi society, the Ottoman and the Safawid empires. In 1501 Shah Ishmael had succeeded in uniting Iran for the first time since the Muslim invasion. Shah Ishmael embraced Shia Islam and established it as the state religion although the Safawids were originally Sufi in their beliefs, he then commenced to forcefully convert the largely Sunni population of Iran into Shi'ism. Ishmael Shah captured Baghdad in 1508 and destroyed the Abu Hanifa shrine in Adhamiya to the horror of the Sunni Ottoman Turks who were then busy with their Jihad wars in the Balkans. Sultan Selim declared a holy war on the Shi'ite Safawids with the help of fatwas from muslim clerics. His successor Suleiman was able to capture Baghdad in 1534 and it was under Sultan Suleiman that the Islamic world had reached its zenith, if it were not for the rival Safawids in his back he might have been able to conquer most of Europe. For the next 150 years war continued between the two empires with Iraq as the main war field. Iraqis themselves were divided between the two, Sunnis supported the Ottoman empire while Shia were with the Safawids, never minding that both were actually foreign occupying powers. Iraqi tribes were not much big on religious matters so they supported whoever was stronger at the time and raided and looted the armies of the weaker empire.
In about the mid 17th century the large Bedouin Shammar tribe started migrating from its traditional territory north of the Arab peninsula to the large desert area between Iraq and Syria, it soon clashed with the Al-Mawali tribe which had settled earlier in the region and succeeded in driving it west to Syria. Another Bedouin wave brought the large Anniza tribe to the area shortly afterwards, it had to fight for territories with the Shammar and the Shammar were pushed north across the Euphrates where they finally settled also in the process driving older tribes such as Al-Jubur and Al-Ubayd eastward across the Tigris. This movement led many scholars to believe that the tribes that inhabit southern Iraq east of the Tigris are the oldest settled tribes in Iraq, and there is much evidence to prove this since Bedouin traditions are the weakest among these tribes.
It was not uncommon for the Ottoman governor (or wali as he was called) of Baghdad to clash with insurgent tribes. Usually, the Baghdad wali would grant leaders of large tribal confederations such as the Muntafiq or the Khaza'il some degree of autonomy in return for an annual payment of taxes and royalties to his treasury, by the same token the Ottoman Sultan at Istanbul did not have much central control over Iraq due to communication difficulties at the time and as long as he also regularly received his annual share of taxes he left the governor to his own devices. Needless to say this policy over four centuries contributed to much of the chaos and spread of tribal values in Iraq. Travellers and pilgrims had to pay royalties to each tribe when passing through their territory, merchants had to seek protection from local tribes to avoid being raided. Every now and then tribes would refuse to pay the governor and he would have to move armies to control them. One governor, Hassan Pasha, was in constant war with tribes, once he subjugated a tribe, another would immediately rebel against him. After he brutally repressed the Shammar and Bani Lam tribes in 1708, an alliance of several powerful Iraqi tribes including Shammar, Zubayd, Al-Khaza'il, and Al-Mayyah rebelled against him under the leadership of the Al-Muntafiq tribal confederation. A fierce battle was fought near Basrah in which cannons were used against the tribesmen killing thousands.
The Qajar dynasty took over Iran following a brief rule of Afghans who had overthrown the Safawid family. Nadir Shah shortly invaded Iraq in 1733 and besieged Baghdad plunging the country into even more chaos. Many tribes assisted Nadir in his campaign against the Ottomans especially the Shammar and at the same time ravaged most of the country, and after Nadir's army was defeated the new Ottoman governor Ahmed Pasha started another huge campaign to punish the defected tribes. He fought the Shammar, Zubayd, Bani Lam, and Qash'am, however when he was transferred by the Sultan to another province the mentioned tribes returned to their old ways. And in 1738 there was another rebellion in the south by Sa'dun, the Sheikh of Al-Muntafiq which lasted four years. During the following decades there were several revolts by Iraqi tribes such as the Ubayd, Al-Khaza'il, and Al-Muntafiq, one which even succeeded in attaing brief independence from the Ottomans. The Ottoman governors had realised by now that military campaigns alone were not successful in oppressing the tribes, therefore they resorted to the old 'divide and conquer' methods. They started appointing rival Sheikhs from other clans to the tribal confederations, starting with the Al-Khaza'il and Al-Muntafiq. They also employed a 'stick and carrot' policy when dealing with tribal leaders, obedient Sheikhs would have a handsome share of taxes and land privileges over neighbouring tribes in return for maintaing order in their territories, insurgent Sheikhs on the other hand would have to pay huge fines and in addition their land would be confiscated and handed to rival tribes. At this point many of these tribes settled down, slowly started dropping their old Bedouin traditions and became 'ruralised'. The governors also introduced military conscription especially after the Ottomans had ended the domination of Jannissaries over the army, this was primarily to face the increasing threat of Wahhabi raids in southern Iraq.
In 1797 an army of Iraqi tribes armed with cannons and firearms led by Sheikh Thuwayni of Al-Muntafiq moved south against the Wahhabis after news of the fall of the Ahsa region in the hands of Abdul Aziz Bin Mohammed Bin Saud. Sheikh Thuwayni was assassinated by a slave who sympathised with the Wahhabis, he stabbed him in the chest with a dagger while shouting 'Allahu Akbar!'. As soon as the news spread among the Iraqi tribes they fled in panic and the Wahhabis looted the army. Another larger campaign followed the next year which was also met with failure, and the Baghdad governor was forced to sign a truce with Ibn Saud. The truce didn't last long, a caravan of Wahhabis was passing by Najaf and they witnessed a Sheikh from Al-Khaza'il kissing the gates of the shrine of Imam Ali, this enraged the fundamental Wahhabis so they attacked and killed the Sheikh. After that Wahhabis continued to raid southern Iraqi villages slaughtering their inhabitants including the women and children. During the Ghadeer day festivities in 1802 they attacked Karbala and plundered the shrines of Imam Hussein and Abbas, killing 5 thousand Iraqis. Four years later they tried to attack Najaf but it was defended by the tribes. Wahhabi raids against the Iraqi south continued to be a problem for over a century until after the British occupation, when British aircraft started bombing the raiding tribes.
One interesting observation when studying the history of Iraqi tribes is that with the exception of a few tribes in the Ahsa region, almost all of the migrating Bedouin tribes to Iraq are Sunni. In the north all remain to be Sunni but when we start to move south to older tribes we notice mixed Sunni-Shia tribes such as the Janabiyeen, Tamim, Jubur, Azza, Ubayd, and Zubayd, further south into the mid-Euphrates area around Najaf and Diwaniyah and we find the tribes exclusively Shia, as we move a bit eastward to the Iranian border we find the tribes almost fanatical in their Shi'ism, a little more south to Basrah and we find some pockets of Sunni tribes until we reach close to the Kuwaiti borders where we find all are Sunni again. A 19th century Iraqi Sunni cleric describes the widespread conversion of Iraqi tribes to Shi'ism and gives specific dates for the conversion of each. According to him the Al-Khaza'il converted in the early 18th century, followed by Rubai'a, Zubayd, Tamim, and then the others. He attributes this to the 'propaganda of the insinuating satanic clerics' and 'the ignorance of Arab tribes in religious matters'. However, this also meant that Shia clerics and Sayyids throughout the rural south would also have power and influence over the tribes together with the traditional tribal Sheikhs. We would witness later how the Shia clerics would implement this influence in the early 20th century against the British and the Iraqi monarchy.
Under the rule of powerful Ottoman governors such as Dawud Pasha and Midhat Pasha during the 19th century much of the power of Iraqi tribes had diminished due to the successful tribal policy of the governors, more and more tribes settled down and turned to agriculture instead of grazing, some tribal Sheikhs were educated in Istanbul and granted honorary titles such as Farhan Pasha, supreme Sheikh of Shammar, and Mansur Pasha Sheikh of Al-Muntafiq. Midhat Pasha introduced some reforms to the country and started some limited community services, most of the southern Iraqi cities were built in the second half of the 19th century such as Kut, Nasiriya, Ammara, Aziziya, and Nu'maniya. The historical antagonism between state and tribes did not disappear though, tribes still regarded the state with suspicion, for them the state was always a symbol of taxation, imprisonment, and conscription. Civil law was absent in the country except inside provincial centers such as Baghdad, Mosul, and Basrah, the rest of Iraq was ruled by tribal law or to be exact 'law of the jungle'. Iraqis scorned people who turned to the government to guarantee their rights. An old Iraqi proverb says 'take your rights by the sword, only the weak need witnesses'. The story was that two people had a dispute over a piece of land, one of them brought his tribesmen and took over it, this led the other to ask witnesses to testify against the aggressor who mentioned the above proverb. Iraqis therefore, regardless of their background, had to resort to tribal values in order to survive the chaotic situation. Towns were regarded as tribes, therefore when someone from Najaf killed a tribesman, the tribe would avenge the murdered by murdering another Najafi. Different neighbourhoods in the same town would treat each other as tribes, and the same when dealing with other towns. This introduced several layers of allegiance among Iraqis; allegiance to one's tribe or clan, to one's sect or religion, to one's neighbourhood, and to one's town, 'me and my brother against my cousin...' defines it all. The same is true today among a large section of Iraqis, a unified sense of Iraqi nationality only emerged after WWI, but it has not succeeded in completely uniting the population, and remnants of the old allegiances still control the divided Iraqis.
Another important observation is that the population of Iraq at the start of the 20th century was less than 1.5 million. Only 25% of those were urban dwellers, the remaining 75% was composed of Bedouin and rural tribes (today, the urban population is about 60% of the 25 million Iraqis but with a large portion of it retaining its tribal identity), plus the cities were constantly plagued with epidemics, famine, and floods which had two main consequences; tribes moving into the cities to replace the perished population, and the spread of tribal values among the survivors due to raids from the opportunistic neighbouring tribes. Several neighbourhoods today in Baghdad are named after tribes such as Al-Fadhl, Al-Mahdiya, Al-Shiyukh, Al-Ji'aiffer, Hay Al-Tikarta, Hay Al-Sawamra, Al-Duriyeen, and Al-Bu Shujaa'. The same applies to most Iraqi cities.
The tribes continued to wreak havoc throughout the country, banditry and crime were considered to be very normal at that time, outlaws were in fact respected and admired by most Iraqis, some even used it to achieve higher social status, for example it was not uncommon for outlaws to turn themselves in to the Ottoman gendarma since 'prison is for men' as the Iraqi proverb goes. In a last attempt to cure this persistent disease, the Ottomans sent Nadhum Pasha in 1909 to govern all three provinces of Iraq (Mosul, Baghdad, and Basrah) granting him unprecedented authorities and funds to control the deteriorating security situation. He started by ordering prominent clerics from both the Sunni and Shia sects to issue fatwas against ghazu (raiding) and inter-tribal violence stating that it was against Islam, he distributed strong military garrisons throughout the country, and he also invited tribal leaders from all over Iraq to a large military parade outside of Baghdad which seemed to have the desired effect on the Sheikhs. For a couple of years there was stability in the country, Baghdadi families could now go out for walks at night, something which was regarded as foolish before. The mere mention of Nadhum's name was enough to instill fear in the heart of the most courageous of men. When he was replaced with Jamal Pasha in 1911 however, the tribes returned to their fighting again.
to be continued...
Saturday, June 12, 2004
Iraq's tribal society: A state within a state (part two)
Bedouin tribes started pouring into the Fertile Crescent during the 7th century searching for new opportunities while the invading tribes moved forward to conquer further land west in north Africa, and east into Khorassan. During the rule of the first 3 Caliphs there were no proper regular armies, the invaders consisted of tribal warriors organised according to their respective clans, they even had their own seperate flags and banners, and would often turn against each other over land and booty disputes. Later on under the rule of the aristocratic Ummayids (Ummawiyeen), the army was regulated and selected from loyal tribesmen inhabiting the greater Syria region which was the stronghold of Ummayids. The early Caliphs at Medina realised that the perfect way to distract the tribes from revolting against the Caliphate was by continous invasion of new land. The tribal warriors and their leaders were granted carte blanche over the new occupied territories by the Caliph, they would divide the land among themselves and treat the natives as they saw fit.
Ibn Khaldoun describes the behaviour of the Bedouin when they first occupied Iraq. First they systematically pillaged the country, they thought camphor was salt and used it in their cooking, they took out the bricks from buildings and used them to put their large cooking pots on, wooden rods were used to erect their tents with. Shortly later they started building their own cities on the edge of the desert, Kufa and Basrah were the main two cities and many tribal Sheikhs settled in these. Each clan had its own neighbourhood and leader, and the blocks were designed so that tribesmen can still graze their flocks in the nearby desert. The natives, most of whom were Persians, Arameans, Jews, and older settled Arabs welcomed the Bedouin 'liberation', they had after all suffered from the oppressive Byzantine and Sassanid empires for decades, their Muslim occupiers promised religious tolerance but they had to pay taxes jizya in return for protection. Most of the natives chose to convert and they continued to tend their land on behalf of their new Arab landlords. The natives were called Mawali (allies) because they had to ally with tribes, generations later the Mawali became an undistinguished part of the tribes and were 'Arabised', they were also nicknamed hummr (reds) for their fair skins, or ulooj (non-Arabs).
Under Othman, the third Caliph who belonged to the aristocratic Ummayid branch of Mohammed's tribe Quraysh, the conquests ceased briefly. Othman attempted to properly adminstrate the new Islamic empire, and he assigned powerful family members from his clan to the provinces. The Ummayids (who were Muhammed's arch-enemies before they converted) siezed this opportunity and started consolidating their power throughout the Islamic empire getting even wealthier in the process. This did not appeal to other clans and tribes since the new adminstrators started pressurising them and exercising strict rule and scrutiny. Tribal leaders felt that their authority was waning especially since they were unfamiliar with governmental control back in Arabia. Some dissident tribesmen besieged Medina and assassinated Othman, after which they elected Ali Bin Abi Talib (Muhammed's cousin and son-in-law) as Caliph. Mu'awiya, the governor of Syria and a cousin of Othman, held Ali full responsibility for Othman's murder and he refused to recognise Ali's caliphate unless Ali turned in the murderers to him (Mu'awiya was head of the Ummayid family and Othman's next of kin and according to tribal customs had to avenge his murder). Ali of course declined causing other senior companions of Muhammed to turn against him as well and challenge his caliphate (most of those desired the caliphate for themselves). This marked the first Muslim civil war 37 years after Islam, also the start of the deep schism which divided Muslims into Sunnis and Shia.
Ali had to move to Iraq and wage controversial wars against several adversaries and in the end against Mu'awiya for a couple of years which turned into a stalemate. His followers, who came to be known later as Shia, also turned against him eventually because they were sick of wars. Ali was widely criticised by Muslim elders and tribal leaders for fighting other Muslims and dividing them. A mixed group of tribes who called themselves Khawarij (Kharijites) deserted Ali and plotted to assassinate him, together with Mu'awiya and his top army commander. They succeeded only in murdering Ali at Kufa. The Kharijites can be technically regarded as the first true Islamic fundamentalists. They scorned this earthly conflict over the caliphate, and called for Muslims to revert to the original Islam, 'there is no rule but that of Allah', they regarded any Muslim who didn't agree with their interpretation of Islam as Kafir and therefore should be killed. History books provide many examples of their atrocities carried out in the name of Islam.
Mu'awiya having deposed of Ali announced himself as Caliph and moved the capital of Islam to Damascus where he was surrounded by loyal tribes, he resumed the conquests of North Africa to expand his empire, introduced civil laws and government control, bought off most tribal leaders by bribery and intimidation, and started preparing his son Yazid as his successor thus restoring the traditional Bedouin blood ties and ending the brief democratic era that Arab Muslims enjoyed for about 40 years, all in all he was the first official Arab dictator. The Ummayid Caliphs had to subjugate several revolts most of which started in Iraq and the Arabian peninsula which was losing its importance as the birthplace of Islam. Yazid sent an army to Medina which ruthlessly slaughtered hundreds, and the next year he sent another army to fight Hussein bin Ali at Karbala(who also like his father was lured to Iraq only to be abandoned by the Arab Shia tribes). Abdul Malik bin Marwan had to lay siege to Mecca and bomb it with stonethrowers when Abdullah bin Al-Zubair (one of the last surviving companions of Muhammed) rebelled with the backing of several Bedouin tribes, he also sent his strongman Hajjaj Bin Yusuf to control the disorder among Iraqi tribes. Hajjaj massacred thousands of people and forced military conscription. Iraqis to this day tell tales of his violent rule, and Saddam Hussein was always compared to Hajjaj in his ruthlessness. Hajjaj called Iraqis ahl alshiqaq wal nifaq or 'the people of disunity and hypocricy', one famous story was that during a curfew on Kufa, his guards brought him an old Bedouin who had entered the town unaware of the curfew, he implored Hajjaj that he did not know about the curfew and that he just came here from the desert, 'I know you are innocent' Hajjaj replied, 'But killing you is for the best interests of the umma, hang him on the city walls guards!'. A later Ummayid Caliph, Walid Bin Yazid had to send an army to Khorassan to fight Zaid Bin Ali Bin Al-Hussein (another of Ali's rebelling descendants). All this internal turmoil and the weakening grip of the less experienced Ummayid Caliphs on the expanding empire (which now extended from the borders of China to southern France) led to their fall one century after they assumed power.
The Abbassids (descendants of Al-Abbas, an uncle of Muhammed) came to rule the Islamic empire after a short rebellion against the Ummayids which started from Persia. The Persians constituted the bulk of their army and its military leaders. No more would Arab tribes have the upper hand in the Islamic empire. The Abbassid caliphate also marked the golden age of Islamic culture and sciences, Baghdad was built and the ME became the center of civilisation back then together with Constantinople. Tribalism now only existed where it belonged, in the desert. Three centuries later however, the Abbassid empire started weakening under the threat of different tribes this time, Buwayhid Persians and later Seljuk and Mamluk Turks. The Berbers in North Africa seperated from the Abbassid empire, and the Fatimids (descendants of Ali and the ancestors of Ismaelis or Shi'ite Seveners) in Egypt appointed their own caliphs. Crusaders invaded greater Syria and the Abbassid caliphate after recieving several blows was now restricted to a small area around Baghdad, with tribal emirates controlling the rest of the country and Arabia. Although all Muslims recognised the Abbassid caliph as a spiritual figure, he no longer held any political control over anything. Caliphs were even put under house arrest and were sometimes replaced by whoever controlled Iraq. Tribalism returned with a vengeance since the state was extremely weak, and later when the Mongols under Hulagu finally ended the Abbassid dynasty and plundered Baghdad in 1258.
During the following century Baghdad was controlled by Mongol Sultans from the Jala'iri and Ilkhan tribes, while the rest of the country was practically run by Arab tribes which revolted against the Mongol adminstrators when they attempted to impose taxes on the tribes. One of the most powerful Arab tribes in southern Iraq was Tai' (which exists to this day around Mosul), their leaders from the Al Fadhl clan established a tribal emirate called 'Emarat Al-Arab' which extended south as far as Bahrain, they also collected taxes from other tribes and often raided Mongolian trade caravans. The Mongols also employed systematic looting in order to compensate for the stagnation of their economy. In 1401, Baghdad was plundered again this time by Tamerlane driving the country into further chaos. During the fifteenth century, Mosul and Baghdad were ruled by two rival Turkomen tribes (Qara Quweynlu and Alaq Quweynlu), and southern Iraq was divided between four or five main tribal confederations, the Al Fadhl and Rubai'a clans from the Tai' tribes, Bani Assad, Jash'am, Al-Muntafiq, and Bani Lam. These were the earliest Bedouin tribes that had settled in Iraq during the late Abbassid caliphate through a second wave of Bedouin migration, all still exist today and are considered as the oldest known Iraqi tribes.
to be continued...
Ibn Khaldoun describes the behaviour of the Bedouin when they first occupied Iraq. First they systematically pillaged the country, they thought camphor was salt and used it in their cooking, they took out the bricks from buildings and used them to put their large cooking pots on, wooden rods were used to erect their tents with. Shortly later they started building their own cities on the edge of the desert, Kufa and Basrah were the main two cities and many tribal Sheikhs settled in these. Each clan had its own neighbourhood and leader, and the blocks were designed so that tribesmen can still graze their flocks in the nearby desert. The natives, most of whom were Persians, Arameans, Jews, and older settled Arabs welcomed the Bedouin 'liberation', they had after all suffered from the oppressive Byzantine and Sassanid empires for decades, their Muslim occupiers promised religious tolerance but they had to pay taxes jizya in return for protection. Most of the natives chose to convert and they continued to tend their land on behalf of their new Arab landlords. The natives were called Mawali (allies) because they had to ally with tribes, generations later the Mawali became an undistinguished part of the tribes and were 'Arabised', they were also nicknamed hummr (reds) for their fair skins, or ulooj (non-Arabs).
Under Othman, the third Caliph who belonged to the aristocratic Ummayid branch of Mohammed's tribe Quraysh, the conquests ceased briefly. Othman attempted to properly adminstrate the new Islamic empire, and he assigned powerful family members from his clan to the provinces. The Ummayids (who were Muhammed's arch-enemies before they converted) siezed this opportunity and started consolidating their power throughout the Islamic empire getting even wealthier in the process. This did not appeal to other clans and tribes since the new adminstrators started pressurising them and exercising strict rule and scrutiny. Tribal leaders felt that their authority was waning especially since they were unfamiliar with governmental control back in Arabia. Some dissident tribesmen besieged Medina and assassinated Othman, after which they elected Ali Bin Abi Talib (Muhammed's cousin and son-in-law) as Caliph. Mu'awiya, the governor of Syria and a cousin of Othman, held Ali full responsibility for Othman's murder and he refused to recognise Ali's caliphate unless Ali turned in the murderers to him (Mu'awiya was head of the Ummayid family and Othman's next of kin and according to tribal customs had to avenge his murder). Ali of course declined causing other senior companions of Muhammed to turn against him as well and challenge his caliphate (most of those desired the caliphate for themselves). This marked the first Muslim civil war 37 years after Islam, also the start of the deep schism which divided Muslims into Sunnis and Shia.
Ali had to move to Iraq and wage controversial wars against several adversaries and in the end against Mu'awiya for a couple of years which turned into a stalemate. His followers, who came to be known later as Shia, also turned against him eventually because they were sick of wars. Ali was widely criticised by Muslim elders and tribal leaders for fighting other Muslims and dividing them. A mixed group of tribes who called themselves Khawarij (Kharijites) deserted Ali and plotted to assassinate him, together with Mu'awiya and his top army commander. They succeeded only in murdering Ali at Kufa. The Kharijites can be technically regarded as the first true Islamic fundamentalists. They scorned this earthly conflict over the caliphate, and called for Muslims to revert to the original Islam, 'there is no rule but that of Allah', they regarded any Muslim who didn't agree with their interpretation of Islam as Kafir and therefore should be killed. History books provide many examples of their atrocities carried out in the name of Islam.
Mu'awiya having deposed of Ali announced himself as Caliph and moved the capital of Islam to Damascus where he was surrounded by loyal tribes, he resumed the conquests of North Africa to expand his empire, introduced civil laws and government control, bought off most tribal leaders by bribery and intimidation, and started preparing his son Yazid as his successor thus restoring the traditional Bedouin blood ties and ending the brief democratic era that Arab Muslims enjoyed for about 40 years, all in all he was the first official Arab dictator. The Ummayid Caliphs had to subjugate several revolts most of which started in Iraq and the Arabian peninsula which was losing its importance as the birthplace of Islam. Yazid sent an army to Medina which ruthlessly slaughtered hundreds, and the next year he sent another army to fight Hussein bin Ali at Karbala(who also like his father was lured to Iraq only to be abandoned by the Arab Shia tribes). Abdul Malik bin Marwan had to lay siege to Mecca and bomb it with stonethrowers when Abdullah bin Al-Zubair (one of the last surviving companions of Muhammed) rebelled with the backing of several Bedouin tribes, he also sent his strongman Hajjaj Bin Yusuf to control the disorder among Iraqi tribes. Hajjaj massacred thousands of people and forced military conscription. Iraqis to this day tell tales of his violent rule, and Saddam Hussein was always compared to Hajjaj in his ruthlessness. Hajjaj called Iraqis ahl alshiqaq wal nifaq or 'the people of disunity and hypocricy', one famous story was that during a curfew on Kufa, his guards brought him an old Bedouin who had entered the town unaware of the curfew, he implored Hajjaj that he did not know about the curfew and that he just came here from the desert, 'I know you are innocent' Hajjaj replied, 'But killing you is for the best interests of the umma, hang him on the city walls guards!'. A later Ummayid Caliph, Walid Bin Yazid had to send an army to Khorassan to fight Zaid Bin Ali Bin Al-Hussein (another of Ali's rebelling descendants). All this internal turmoil and the weakening grip of the less experienced Ummayid Caliphs on the expanding empire (which now extended from the borders of China to southern France) led to their fall one century after they assumed power.
The Abbassids (descendants of Al-Abbas, an uncle of Muhammed) came to rule the Islamic empire after a short rebellion against the Ummayids which started from Persia. The Persians constituted the bulk of their army and its military leaders. No more would Arab tribes have the upper hand in the Islamic empire. The Abbassid caliphate also marked the golden age of Islamic culture and sciences, Baghdad was built and the ME became the center of civilisation back then together with Constantinople. Tribalism now only existed where it belonged, in the desert. Three centuries later however, the Abbassid empire started weakening under the threat of different tribes this time, Buwayhid Persians and later Seljuk and Mamluk Turks. The Berbers in North Africa seperated from the Abbassid empire, and the Fatimids (descendants of Ali and the ancestors of Ismaelis or Shi'ite Seveners) in Egypt appointed their own caliphs. Crusaders invaded greater Syria and the Abbassid caliphate after recieving several blows was now restricted to a small area around Baghdad, with tribal emirates controlling the rest of the country and Arabia. Although all Muslims recognised the Abbassid caliph as a spiritual figure, he no longer held any political control over anything. Caliphs were even put under house arrest and were sometimes replaced by whoever controlled Iraq. Tribalism returned with a vengeance since the state was extremely weak, and later when the Mongols under Hulagu finally ended the Abbassid dynasty and plundered Baghdad in 1258.
During the following century Baghdad was controlled by Mongol Sultans from the Jala'iri and Ilkhan tribes, while the rest of the country was practically run by Arab tribes which revolted against the Mongol adminstrators when they attempted to impose taxes on the tribes. One of the most powerful Arab tribes in southern Iraq was Tai' (which exists to this day around Mosul), their leaders from the Al Fadhl clan established a tribal emirate called 'Emarat Al-Arab' which extended south as far as Bahrain, they also collected taxes from other tribes and often raided Mongolian trade caravans. The Mongols also employed systematic looting in order to compensate for the stagnation of their economy. In 1401, Baghdad was plundered again this time by Tamerlane driving the country into further chaos. During the fifteenth century, Mosul and Baghdad were ruled by two rival Turkomen tribes (Qara Quweynlu and Alaq Quweynlu), and southern Iraq was divided between four or five main tribal confederations, the Al Fadhl and Rubai'a clans from the Tai' tribes, Bani Assad, Jash'am, Al-Muntafiq, and Bani Lam. These were the earliest Bedouin tribes that had settled in Iraq during the late Abbassid caliphate through a second wave of Bedouin migration, all still exist today and are considered as the oldest known Iraqi tribes.
to be continued...
Thursday, June 10, 2004
Iraq's tribal society: A state within a state (part one)
Understanding the tribal aspect of Iraqi society is essential for any outsider seriously interested in Iraqi and ME affairs. Not much attention has been devoted to this subject in the Western media, and all the related articles published on the web are shallow and do not reflect the true picture nor the importance of the historical role of tribalism in Iraqi (and Arab in general) society.
First you have to take in consideration the unique geographic location of Iraq, in that it is surrounded and enclosed by mountains in the north and east, while from the west and south it lies on the northern edge of the largest source of Bedouinism, the Arabian Desert. The land that is today called Iraq has been exposed for millenia to waves of
Bedouin migration from the south for purposes of either military conquest (such as the Arab Muslim invasion during the 7th century), searching for water and pasturage to graze their flocks, raiding and looting (such as the Wahhabi raids on Shi'ite holy cities during the 18th century), or settlement. Iraq was also known to be the cradle of
civilisation, and the spread of tribal social values brought by the successive Bedouin waves contributed much to the decline and destruction of this civilisation at different times in history. Whenever the tribal influence diminishes over a few centuries and
civilisation slowly flourishes again, a new wave of fresh desert tribes moves to the area and disrupts the process all over again.
Iraqis therefore have been conditioned (for centuries) by this ongoing 'clash of cultures' to follow two different (and often antithetical) sets of social values; urban values derived from their own ways of life and history as the cradle of civilisation, and tribal values imposed upon them by the Bedouin influence. Urban Iraqis cannot remain totally unaffected by the spread of tribal values and eventually they have to pick up from them in order to defend themselves and adapt to their new environment, the newly settled tribes on the other hand cannot indefinately retain their Bedouin culture which was only suitable for desert life and have to reshape it in order to coexist with the
original inhabitants. This has resulted in a form of duality or 'cultural ambivalence' in the Iraqi personality which is easily recognised by Westerners and they may therefore incorrectly describe Iraqis as being 'two-faced', when in fact Iraqis are unaware of their inconsistent behaviour and have had no choice in it. This duality is also evident on different scales in other Arab countries such as Syria, Palestine, Libya, Algeria, and to a lesser extent in Egypt.
Tribalism originated in the Arabian peninsula in order for the inhabitants to survive the harsh desert nature. No individual can survive on his own in the desert, this realisation led to the formation of primitive forms of clan society. A group of nomad families sharing a common ancestry is more likely to deal with the challenges of the
desert. All for one and one for all. Blood kinship is important in clan societies, it is the bond that unites all clan individuals and which also defines the relationships with other clans. A tribe is composed of several clans also sharing the same lineage, tribal groups or confederations are also made of several different tribes which trace back their origins to one forefather. Arab tribes before the advent of Islam fell into two larger groups, Adnaniya or northern Arabs who trace back their ancestry to Ishmael son of Abraham, and Qahtaniya or southern Arabs inhabiting Yemen, and to this day Arab tribes follow this classification although they have later intermingled with different cultures and ethnic groups throughout the Arab world.
Clan members had two main methods of survival, grazing their herds and raiding of neighbouring (usually weaker) clans. Later they served other functions such as the protection of trade caravans passing from Yemen to Iraq and Syria at the behest of the Roman Byzantine and Persian Sassanid empires. During dry seasons they would roam the desert in search for grazing areas (often clashing with competitive clans in the
process) or migrate further to the fertile north. Land ownership was nonexistant in the Arabian desert, instead there was collective control over the oases, pastures, and wells, and mostly the stronger clans controlled the best territories. Clan societies were lead by Sheikhs, the term Sheikh in Arabic means a 'male elder' and is not
neccessarily restricted to tribal leaders. The Sheikh, usually elected by the clansmen, acts as judge to the clan or family, decides on matters of war and peace, assigns duties to clansmen, and mediates during disputes between the clan and other clans. Each smaller family and clan has its own leader or Sheikh, and consequently each tribe and tribal confederation has its own Sheikh. Some of these leaders of large tribal groups were regarded as kings before Islam and even fought wars against the surrounding empires. Within each tribe there is a Council of Sheikhs of different clans who would assist and advise the leader and at certain occasions replace him with another Sheikh when he fails
his duties, is unworthy of leadership, or when his actions threaten the welfare of the tribe. So tribal Sheikhs were not exactly tyrants, and were easily replaceable by force of sword if neccessary.
The supreme Sheikhdom of each tribe is traditionally confined to one family, usually the elder male descendants of the distant forefather, and with time as families grew into clans and clans grew into seperate tribes with their own independent leaderships, a sense of superiority among the different tribes was established. Certain Sheikhs were
superior to other Sheikhs (either because of their heritage or personal glories), certain clans superior to other clans, and certain tribes and tribal groups superior to others, this eventually led the Arabs to believe that they were superior to all other people living in the region. The Bedouin still to this day look down at any other people
even urban Arabs considering them 'impure'. This also explains the absolute obsession of Arabs with genealogy, individuals or clans in the desert who were unaware of their lineage were outcasts, they would have to ally with another known tribe and later on would be 'adopted' by the tribe and assume its lineage. Almost every Sheikh today can proudly show you his family tree which would include thousands of names and would go up and up to Adam sometimes. My own family tree goes back to Qahtan, the forefather of southern Yemeni Arabs who is supposed to have lived around 2000 B.C.
This preoccupation with lineage and blood ties was also a source of hostility between different tribes as the famous saying put it 'Me and my brother against my cousin, and me and my cousin against the stranger'. Therefore it is not uncommon for clans of the same tribe to be at war with each other, and then suddenly unite against an outside
aggression or a common enemy, after which they would be back to fight each other. One would be shocked when taking a look at tribal wars throughout history for their absurd reasons. For example the famous Bessus war before Islam which lasted forty years was because a leader of one tribe killed a camel belonging to another tribe when he
noticed it was grazing with his flock, the Dahis wa alghabraa war was over cheating during a horse race. And the tribal tensions between Adnaniya and Qahtaniya continued for centuries in all Arab countries, up to the 18th century.
Tribal values can be summed up in three groups or complexes: loyalty (to one's tribe), militancy, and honour. Firstly, the tribe expects absolute loyalty from its individuals in return for its protection, no matter whether the tribe is right or wrong, tribesmen should rush to its support. Just as each tribesman expects the whole tribe to protect
him and guarantee his rights at time of need, the tribe also expects unequivocal support from each tribesman. It's a symbiotic relation. This complex also includes values such as Sheikhdom, tribal superiority, blood feuds, etc. Secondly, the individual tribesman in order to achieve a higher status and personal glory among his peers is expected to demonstrate great courage and valiance in battles, should be a gallant chivalrous warrior, and the larger the booty he gains from battle the greater he is respected within the tribe. Tribal society despises the cowardly and weak, they also despise craftsmen because they don't live by the sword. Last we have the honour complex which
includes generosity, hospitality, self-esteem, honesty, integrity, safeguarding of women, protection of the weak and the refugee, etc. Some of these values may seem contradictory to outsiders at first glance, for example a Sheikh may wholeheartedly offer a whole lamb to a guest for dinner, but at the same time he may argue ridiculously with a grocer over a few Dinars. To understand that you should know that it is not the money that the Sheikh is upset about, he argues because he feels he is being cheated and that is humiliating to him, he wants to be the cheater not the cheated, if the grocer later asks the Sheikh for an incredible sum of money the Sheikh would without any hesitation give it to him out of generosity because it would bring pride and a sense of
dominance to him. You can also attribute that to the sense of superiority, the Sheikh wants to be dominant, he enjoys being asked for anything, yet he hates with all his heart to ask anyone for anything even for directions, as that would be a sign of weakness. That also explains the tendency of most Arabs to bargain over almost everything.
***
Although there is mention of Bedouin raids in ancient Assyrian and Persian tablets in which the Bedouin were described as Areebi, the most significant historical Bedouin conquest of Iraq was that of early Islam during the 7th century. Muhammed had succeeded in uniting the Bedouin tribes of Arabia, ridding them of their pagan ways, and
utilising their traditions of raiding and looting into political conquest. Following the death of Muhammed there was no real design on invading the stronger Byzantine and Sassanid empires up north, it was rather spontaneous. During the reign of Abu Bakr, the first Caliph after Muhammed, most of the Bedouin tribes reverted to their old ways of intertribal warfare, and Abu Bakr had to wage war against them in order to return them to the flock. This was known as the redda wars (wars of apostasy), after shortly succeeding in subduing the insurgency the reconverted tribes started raiding southern Iraqi cities which were under the control of the Sassanids. Many of these incursions
brought great material gains for the tribal warriors, and since these cities were inhabited by older tribes (such as the Manadhira) which had settled earlier in Iraq, the warriors were met with little resistance, which encouraged them to raid and conquer more land up north along the Euphrates until they had beseiged Damascus. During the reign of Omar, the second Caliph, the Arab tribes had already beaten the two major empires in the region and occupied Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Persia. This Jihad was less motivated by religious fervour than by ancient Bedouin traditions of raiding and warfare. Westerners often assume that Islamic conversion was forced by the sword, however the invading Arab tribes didn't care less if the conquered populations converted or not, they were just doing what they were good at.
to be continued...
First you have to take in consideration the unique geographic location of Iraq, in that it is surrounded and enclosed by mountains in the north and east, while from the west and south it lies on the northern edge of the largest source of Bedouinism, the Arabian Desert. The land that is today called Iraq has been exposed for millenia to waves of
Bedouin migration from the south for purposes of either military conquest (such as the Arab Muslim invasion during the 7th century), searching for water and pasturage to graze their flocks, raiding and looting (such as the Wahhabi raids on Shi'ite holy cities during the 18th century), or settlement. Iraq was also known to be the cradle of
civilisation, and the spread of tribal social values brought by the successive Bedouin waves contributed much to the decline and destruction of this civilisation at different times in history. Whenever the tribal influence diminishes over a few centuries and
civilisation slowly flourishes again, a new wave of fresh desert tribes moves to the area and disrupts the process all over again.
Iraqis therefore have been conditioned (for centuries) by this ongoing 'clash of cultures' to follow two different (and often antithetical) sets of social values; urban values derived from their own ways of life and history as the cradle of civilisation, and tribal values imposed upon them by the Bedouin influence. Urban Iraqis cannot remain totally unaffected by the spread of tribal values and eventually they have to pick up from them in order to defend themselves and adapt to their new environment, the newly settled tribes on the other hand cannot indefinately retain their Bedouin culture which was only suitable for desert life and have to reshape it in order to coexist with the
original inhabitants. This has resulted in a form of duality or 'cultural ambivalence' in the Iraqi personality which is easily recognised by Westerners and they may therefore incorrectly describe Iraqis as being 'two-faced', when in fact Iraqis are unaware of their inconsistent behaviour and have had no choice in it. This duality is also evident on different scales in other Arab countries such as Syria, Palestine, Libya, Algeria, and to a lesser extent in Egypt.
Tribalism originated in the Arabian peninsula in order for the inhabitants to survive the harsh desert nature. No individual can survive on his own in the desert, this realisation led to the formation of primitive forms of clan society. A group of nomad families sharing a common ancestry is more likely to deal with the challenges of the
desert. All for one and one for all. Blood kinship is important in clan societies, it is the bond that unites all clan individuals and which also defines the relationships with other clans. A tribe is composed of several clans also sharing the same lineage, tribal groups or confederations are also made of several different tribes which trace back their origins to one forefather. Arab tribes before the advent of Islam fell into two larger groups, Adnaniya or northern Arabs who trace back their ancestry to Ishmael son of Abraham, and Qahtaniya or southern Arabs inhabiting Yemen, and to this day Arab tribes follow this classification although they have later intermingled with different cultures and ethnic groups throughout the Arab world.
Clan members had two main methods of survival, grazing their herds and raiding of neighbouring (usually weaker) clans. Later they served other functions such as the protection of trade caravans passing from Yemen to Iraq and Syria at the behest of the Roman Byzantine and Persian Sassanid empires. During dry seasons they would roam the desert in search for grazing areas (often clashing with competitive clans in the
process) or migrate further to the fertile north. Land ownership was nonexistant in the Arabian desert, instead there was collective control over the oases, pastures, and wells, and mostly the stronger clans controlled the best territories. Clan societies were lead by Sheikhs, the term Sheikh in Arabic means a 'male elder' and is not
neccessarily restricted to tribal leaders. The Sheikh, usually elected by the clansmen, acts as judge to the clan or family, decides on matters of war and peace, assigns duties to clansmen, and mediates during disputes between the clan and other clans. Each smaller family and clan has its own leader or Sheikh, and consequently each tribe and tribal confederation has its own Sheikh. Some of these leaders of large tribal groups were regarded as kings before Islam and even fought wars against the surrounding empires. Within each tribe there is a Council of Sheikhs of different clans who would assist and advise the leader and at certain occasions replace him with another Sheikh when he fails
his duties, is unworthy of leadership, or when his actions threaten the welfare of the tribe. So tribal Sheikhs were not exactly tyrants, and were easily replaceable by force of sword if neccessary.
The supreme Sheikhdom of each tribe is traditionally confined to one family, usually the elder male descendants of the distant forefather, and with time as families grew into clans and clans grew into seperate tribes with their own independent leaderships, a sense of superiority among the different tribes was established. Certain Sheikhs were
superior to other Sheikhs (either because of their heritage or personal glories), certain clans superior to other clans, and certain tribes and tribal groups superior to others, this eventually led the Arabs to believe that they were superior to all other people living in the region. The Bedouin still to this day look down at any other people
even urban Arabs considering them 'impure'. This also explains the absolute obsession of Arabs with genealogy, individuals or clans in the desert who were unaware of their lineage were outcasts, they would have to ally with another known tribe and later on would be 'adopted' by the tribe and assume its lineage. Almost every Sheikh today can proudly show you his family tree which would include thousands of names and would go up and up to Adam sometimes. My own family tree goes back to Qahtan, the forefather of southern Yemeni Arabs who is supposed to have lived around 2000 B.C.
This preoccupation with lineage and blood ties was also a source of hostility between different tribes as the famous saying put it 'Me and my brother against my cousin, and me and my cousin against the stranger'. Therefore it is not uncommon for clans of the same tribe to be at war with each other, and then suddenly unite against an outside
aggression or a common enemy, after which they would be back to fight each other. One would be shocked when taking a look at tribal wars throughout history for their absurd reasons. For example the famous Bessus war before Islam which lasted forty years was because a leader of one tribe killed a camel belonging to another tribe when he
noticed it was grazing with his flock, the Dahis wa alghabraa war was over cheating during a horse race. And the tribal tensions between Adnaniya and Qahtaniya continued for centuries in all Arab countries, up to the 18th century.
Tribal values can be summed up in three groups or complexes: loyalty (to one's tribe), militancy, and honour. Firstly, the tribe expects absolute loyalty from its individuals in return for its protection, no matter whether the tribe is right or wrong, tribesmen should rush to its support. Just as each tribesman expects the whole tribe to protect
him and guarantee his rights at time of need, the tribe also expects unequivocal support from each tribesman. It's a symbiotic relation. This complex also includes values such as Sheikhdom, tribal superiority, blood feuds, etc. Secondly, the individual tribesman in order to achieve a higher status and personal glory among his peers is expected to demonstrate great courage and valiance in battles, should be a gallant chivalrous warrior, and the larger the booty he gains from battle the greater he is respected within the tribe. Tribal society despises the cowardly and weak, they also despise craftsmen because they don't live by the sword. Last we have the honour complex which
includes generosity, hospitality, self-esteem, honesty, integrity, safeguarding of women, protection of the weak and the refugee, etc. Some of these values may seem contradictory to outsiders at first glance, for example a Sheikh may wholeheartedly offer a whole lamb to a guest for dinner, but at the same time he may argue ridiculously with a grocer over a few Dinars. To understand that you should know that it is not the money that the Sheikh is upset about, he argues because he feels he is being cheated and that is humiliating to him, he wants to be the cheater not the cheated, if the grocer later asks the Sheikh for an incredible sum of money the Sheikh would without any hesitation give it to him out of generosity because it would bring pride and a sense of
dominance to him. You can also attribute that to the sense of superiority, the Sheikh wants to be dominant, he enjoys being asked for anything, yet he hates with all his heart to ask anyone for anything even for directions, as that would be a sign of weakness. That also explains the tendency of most Arabs to bargain over almost everything.
***
Although there is mention of Bedouin raids in ancient Assyrian and Persian tablets in which the Bedouin were described as Areebi, the most significant historical Bedouin conquest of Iraq was that of early Islam during the 7th century. Muhammed had succeeded in uniting the Bedouin tribes of Arabia, ridding them of their pagan ways, and
utilising their traditions of raiding and looting into political conquest. Following the death of Muhammed there was no real design on invading the stronger Byzantine and Sassanid empires up north, it was rather spontaneous. During the reign of Abu Bakr, the first Caliph after Muhammed, most of the Bedouin tribes reverted to their old ways of intertribal warfare, and Abu Bakr had to wage war against them in order to return them to the flock. This was known as the redda wars (wars of apostasy), after shortly succeeding in subduing the insurgency the reconverted tribes started raiding southern Iraqi cities which were under the control of the Sassanids. Many of these incursions
brought great material gains for the tribal warriors, and since these cities were inhabited by older tribes (such as the Manadhira) which had settled earlier in Iraq, the warriors were met with little resistance, which encouraged them to raid and conquer more land up north along the Euphrates until they had beseiged Damascus. During the reign of Omar, the second Caliph, the Arab tribes had already beaten the two major empires in the region and occupied Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Persia. This Jihad was less motivated by religious fervour than by ancient Bedouin traditions of raiding and warfare. Westerners often assume that Islamic conversion was forced by the sword, however the invading Arab tribes didn't care less if the conquered populations converted or not, they were just doing what they were good at.
to be continued...
Thursday, June 03, 2004
Ghazi Al-Yawar
Sheikh Ghazi Ajeel Al-Yawar was announced yesterday as the first Iraqi President in post Saddam Iraq. I have to say that I have mixed feelings about Yawar. I found it a bit troubling that the head of the state is a tribal figure. Tribalism has been without doubt the most significant problem in Iraq (and the ME) for centuries, one that has been plaguing our urban societies and infecting them with a multitude of social diseases that have proven almost impossible to cure, problems that on the surface may seem to be dissipating from time to time, but which also have a high rate of recurrence . I might be judging the man harshly, since this may not neccessarily apply to him personally, and I'm not denying his expertise and western education, however he will always be regarded as a symbol of our largely tribal society (maybe they were just being realistic?). Shortly after he was announced president, I noticed a few sheikhs following him around wearing the traditional Iraqi tribal dress, which is not a good sign at all.
On the other hand, I perceive that the majority of Iraqis have accepted him as president, even welcomed the decision, of course there will always be naysayers but for the first time in months I feel there is almost a consensus among Iraqis of all backgrounds. Also Yawar is known to have good relations with Kurds, is trusted by the Shia, is respected by other Arab nations, has a clean record, and belongs to a powerful wealthy well-known Iraqi family that leads the Shimmar tribal confederation, one of the largest tribes in Iraq, with both Sunni and Shi'ite clans, and spanning several neighbouring countries (such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey). That may be a unifying factor and one that Iraqis need badly at this moment of their history. After all the presidency is almost a symbolic title.
The cabinet is impressive. We now have 5 female ministers, which is an unprecedented step in the region. Just as Iraq was the first Arab country to have a female minister in 1958, it is now also the first Arab country to grant a larger role for women in the government. I expect a much larger percentage of women in the future National Assembly or parliament. The majority of ministers are independent politically, they are mostly technocrats, and come from all Iraqi social, ethnic, religious, and sectarian backgrounds. Many old players are absent such as Chalabi's INC. Also another interesting observation is that four of the ministers are also tribal figures.
So, perhaps I'm a bit optimistic today? Maybe. But Iraqis need to be optimistic at such a critical moment. There is no use in shrugging your shoulders and saying "I don't care.." anymore. You will be left behind along with the dark forces that insist on killing more Iraqis and disrupting the new changes. I'm confident that the Arab world is now watching Iraq with eyes wide open (or wide shut). Some Iraqis are saying the new government will be just a copy of the GC. It depends. Another problem is that I can already feel that the majority of Iraqis are expecting miracles from this new and young government. Unrealistic expectations tend to create endless problems and frustrations. Just like when the GC was formed, or when the Americans first entered Baghdad and people expected that their decades long problems would be fixed in a week.
***
I returned to the residence from work yesterday and headed, as usual, to the kitchen uncovering the various pots and pans before lunch. One of the doctors hollered to me from the living room where they were all fixated on the tv. "Ghazi Ajeel is the new president" one of them announced. "Whyyyyy?" I almost wailed. "Pachachi apologised, said the other GC members didn't want him to be president" the fundie doctor said. Actually I think Pachachi made a small gamble. I believe he is working for the 2005 elections. "So who's the vice president?" I asked them. "Ibrahim Al-Ja'ffari, and 'roast'.. ". "What 'roast'?" I asked puzzled. "Oh 'roast', you know like 'roast meat'". "I don't care if he is 'roast' or 'steak', but who is he?". "He's a Kurd, from the Kurdish Democrat Party". It turned out later that his name was Rosh Shawis.
I'll be heading back to Baghdad in a few hours.
On the other hand, I perceive that the majority of Iraqis have accepted him as president, even welcomed the decision, of course there will always be naysayers but for the first time in months I feel there is almost a consensus among Iraqis of all backgrounds. Also Yawar is known to have good relations with Kurds, is trusted by the Shia, is respected by other Arab nations, has a clean record, and belongs to a powerful wealthy well-known Iraqi family that leads the Shimmar tribal confederation, one of the largest tribes in Iraq, with both Sunni and Shi'ite clans, and spanning several neighbouring countries (such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey). That may be a unifying factor and one that Iraqis need badly at this moment of their history. After all the presidency is almost a symbolic title.
The cabinet is impressive. We now have 5 female ministers, which is an unprecedented step in the region. Just as Iraq was the first Arab country to have a female minister in 1958, it is now also the first Arab country to grant a larger role for women in the government. I expect a much larger percentage of women in the future National Assembly or parliament. The majority of ministers are independent politically, they are mostly technocrats, and come from all Iraqi social, ethnic, religious, and sectarian backgrounds. Many old players are absent such as Chalabi's INC. Also another interesting observation is that four of the ministers are also tribal figures.
So, perhaps I'm a bit optimistic today? Maybe. But Iraqis need to be optimistic at such a critical moment. There is no use in shrugging your shoulders and saying "I don't care.." anymore. You will be left behind along with the dark forces that insist on killing more Iraqis and disrupting the new changes. I'm confident that the Arab world is now watching Iraq with eyes wide open (or wide shut). Some Iraqis are saying the new government will be just a copy of the GC. It depends. Another problem is that I can already feel that the majority of Iraqis are expecting miracles from this new and young government. Unrealistic expectations tend to create endless problems and frustrations. Just like when the GC was formed, or when the Americans first entered Baghdad and people expected that their decades long problems would be fixed in a week.
***
I returned to the residence from work yesterday and headed, as usual, to the kitchen uncovering the various pots and pans before lunch. One of the doctors hollered to me from the living room where they were all fixated on the tv. "Ghazi Ajeel is the new president" one of them announced. "Whyyyyy?" I almost wailed. "Pachachi apologised, said the other GC members didn't want him to be president" the fundie doctor said. Actually I think Pachachi made a small gamble. I believe he is working for the 2005 elections. "So who's the vice president?" I asked them. "Ibrahim Al-Ja'ffari, and 'roast'.. ". "What 'roast'?" I asked puzzled. "Oh 'roast', you know like 'roast meat'". "I don't care if he is 'roast' or 'steak', but who is he?". "He's a Kurd, from the Kurdish Democrat Party". It turned out later that his name was Rosh Shawis.
I'll be heading back to Baghdad in a few hours.
Tuesday, June 01, 2004
LA Times article on kidnappings of Iraqi doctors
Kidnappings Bleed Iraq of Doctors
As many as 100 have been abducted in two months. A
number have fled, leaving desperate patients and a
strained healthcare system.
By Edmund Sanders
Times Staff Writer
May 31, 2004
BAGHDAD ? Five months pregnant, Khalida Hussein lies
dying in a Baghdad hospital, a malignant brain tumor
sapping her ability to walk, eat and speak.
There's perhaps one doctor in Iraq talented enough to
save her life: a neurosurgeon ranked among the best in
the Middle East.
But Dr. Abid Hadi Khalily is holed up in his home,
recovering from a traumatic kidnapping in April.
Colleagues say he's too depressed and frightened to
return to work and is preparing to leave the country.
For two months, someone has been kidnapping the best
doctors in Iraq. Health officials and doctors estimate
that as many as 100 surgeons, specialists and general
physicians have been abducted from their homes and
clinics since the beginning of April. Some were beaten
and tortured. Most were released after the payment of
between $20,000 and $200,000 in ransom.
Already plagued by outdated equipment and drug
shortages, Iraq's fragile healthcare system is buckling
under this new security threat. Some doctors who have
not been kidnapped have fled Iraq ? just as the nation
most needs their help.
"We are losing the brain power of our most brilliant
doctors," said Dr. Sami Salman, internist and medical
director at the Special Care hospital at Baghdad's
Medical City healthcare complex. "You can't just
replace these people overnight."
Ransom, it seems, is not the only motivation for the
crimes. In many cases, abductors have ordered the
physicians to leave Iraq, sometimes setting a deadline.
Iraqi officials fear that the abductions and threats
are an organized attempt to cripple the country's
healthcare network, likening the tactics to terrorist
attacks on the country's oil pipelines or electricity
plants.
"These are not purely thieves," said Dr. Amir Kuzaii,
deputy health minister. "These people have different
aims. They are professionals. They want to paralyze the
basic functions of the country."
Interior Minister Samir Shakir Mahmoud Sumaidy has
promised to set up a task force to investigate the
crimes.
"There is a political component to this," he said.
But such efforts will do little to help the desperate
patients in Khalily's waiting room. Each day they come
and sit, hoping to be treated by the renowned
neurosurgeon in case he returns to work.
One patient, a father of 11, suffers from abnormal
secretion of growth hormones, which doctors say is
causing his brain cells to overproduce. His hands and
nose are enlarged, and he suffers from severe
headaches. His operation was canceled after the
doctor's kidnapping, and he doesn't trust anyone else
to do it.
"Whoever did this kidnapping hurt me more than they did
the doctor," said Malallah Azeez, 47, a retired
military officer.
The husband and brother of Khalida Hussein wait for
news of whether another doctor will be willing or able
to operate on her brain tumor. Doctors told them
Khalily was uniquely qualified for the complicated
case.
"They tell me they will do their best," said her
husband, Hartim Makhlif.
The couple lost their first son to leukemia at age 5
last year.
"Now they say I may lose both my wife and my [unborn]
son ? again," he said.
The list of kidnapping victims and those who have fled
the country is a who's who of Iraq's medical
establishment. A pioneer in renal transplants. Saddam
Hussein's former plastic surgeon. And Khalily, who was
voted Best Arabic Doctor in 1998 by the Pan Arab
Medical Union.
The top cataract surgeon at a leading eye hospital in
Baghdad, Dr. Jawad Shakarchi, moved to London after
being abducted from his garage in April.
"He was a genius," said a hospital manager, Amira
Salman. "Now his students are doing his job."
Many of the doctors also taught at Baghdad University's
College of Medicine. Officials there said a quarter of
the school's surgeons have gone or have requested
temporary leaves next year.
"A lot of doctors are planning to quit for a year, and
we don't have enough teachers for the clinical
studies," said Dr. Hassan Rubaye, deputy dean of the
medical school.
Some schools are having to limit enrollment for
advanced studies until they can be sure there will be
enough doctors to teach.
Dr. Gayath Tawfiq, an orbital surgeon, was on his way
home from work this month when two other vehicles
suddenly blocked the road. His driver fled, and a gang
of men with machine guns grabbed Tawfiq and his
22-year-old son.
"They hit us with their guns," Tawfiq said, parting his
hair and pulling up a pant leg to reveal bruises that
remained two weeks later. His abductors lifted his
blindfold just long enough, Tawfiq said, for him to see
his son with a rope around his neck. "They told me they
would hang him if I didn't pay," he said.
After the kidnappers received $70,000, they ordered him
to leave the country forever. One of them ? whom Tawfiq
was never able to see ? exchanged wristwatches with
Tawfiq and threatened to go to his office if he didn't
leave, pretending to be a patient. "You'll recognize me
by the watch," he told the doctor.
But Tawfiq has not left. "I can't leave now," he said
with a shrug. "They took all my money."
As soon as he is able, however, he is planning to move.
By the time kidnappers arrived at Dr. Mothafer
Kurkuchi's clinic, the orthopedic surgeon ? who said he
knows dozens of doctors who have been abducted ? was
practically expecting them.
"You are welcome to come with us, doctor," one of the
kidnappers said sarcastically. They drove him around
for eight hours, he recalled, including two hours in
the trunk of the car. He lied and told the men he had
no other family, he said, and negotiated the ransom as
low as possible. "I know how to deal with Iraqis," he
said.
Afterward, he said he did not bother to report the
crime. "What can the police do?" he asked. "Some of
them are probably in on it."
The Iraqi Central Criminal Court is investigating three
cases of doctor kidnapping, including one allegedly
involving employees of the Iraqi National Congress, the
political party founded by controversial Governing
Council member Ahmad Chalabi that was once funded by
the Pentagon. A recent raid of Chalabi's home in
Baghdad was partly based upon a doctor's claims that
INC employees had apprehended him.
Kurkuchi isn't optimistic that police will be able to
halt the kidnappings. But unlike many of his
colleagues, he will not budge.
"This is my country and I'm not leaving," he said. "A
few of us are holding the fort. But when we go, what
will happen? There is no one."
Copyright 2004 Los Angeles Times
Sunday, May 30, 2004
Mi'dan and democracy
Nothing much has been going on in Basrah, except of course steam
emanating from the ground (I swear) and humidity that is bringing every unfortunate asthmatic in the province to our hospital. There is a shortage of nebulizers though, and physicians have to decide which patients are in most need for them, this of course tends to make other patients a bit aggressive. I was skulking around the emergency hall last night and I saw an angry patient who was just leaving, red in the face, shaking his fist in fury, shouting that he would return and shoot every last @#%$ doctor in the hospital. The FPS guards laughed the whole thing off while puffing at their cigarettes. I suppose it would help if I tried to convince him (if he returns) that I'm actually a mere dentist, and that I'm only unfortunate enough to live here?
This is not to give the impression that everything is dandy at the primary health care clinic where I work. We've been having a shortage of antibiotic pills for almost a week now. Well not quite a shortage, you see my boss has decided to use the weekly medications ration only in the afternoon shifts. It works this way, at Iraqi primary health care clinics there is a system called ta'meen sihi (Health Insurance) which is carried out during the afternoon shifts, according to this system doctors get a fixed share from each treatment ticket, and the more patients they get in the afternoon, the more money goes down in their pockets. And since prescriptions in the morning shift bring them nothing (they're free), they have made a habit of referring
patients to the afternoon shift. Everyone is happy, except of course me since I only work morning shifts and have to do my best to convince patients to purchase their medication from outside pharmacies which are much more expensive and a burden to most villagers. A couple of days ago, when it started to get a bit embarrassing I considered reporting my boss' actions to the Basrah Health Directorate since she has been acting rather nasty with me lately, but Jabbar the old medical aide advised me not to, since corruption goes as high up in the hierarchy to the Health Director himself, and my boss would be told about it and
thus creating endless trouble for me. Sometimes I feel that these
leftovers from the former system will never disappear even though
everyone gets fair salaries now.
Banditry has somewhat ceased over the last few days. A top member of SCIRI (Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq) was carjacked close to Al-Dayr north of Basrah, and he was reported to be injured by the bandits. A force from Faylaq Badr (Badr Corps, SCIRI's armed wing) entered the town hours later and forcefully deported all the Mi'dan residents. It's a bit ironic that SCIRI which has a history of fighting the former regime's forces from the marsh areas to defend the Mi'dan tribes from forced deportation are now doing the same thing. Shortly afterwards, Badr members started patrolling the main road between Basrah and Amarrah with the help of IP in the area and with the British turning a blind eye to it all (since they couldn't deal with the bandits themselves). There were a couple of incidents in which Badr used mortars last Thursday to force the Mi'dan to leave a few villages near Qurna and Al-I'zair. No one is complaining as long as it keeps the road safe. All attempts to convince the Mi'dan to resettle in their original villages in the marsh areas have failed, I guess they found that banditry and carjacking is a much more profitable
business. A Kurdish smuggler at one of the villages was arrested. His job was to smuggle stolen vehicles to the Kurdish region where new Kurdish registration plates would be issued for them and later sold. This was quite common, in fact most of the former government's looted vehicles ended up one way or another in the Kurdish region.
Also another incident involving Mi'dan. Someone was attacked and carjacked at Tannumah, across the river from Basrah city. He was a Hasawi. Hasawiyah are a wealthy and influential Shia sect (not a tribe) in the Basrah governorate. Their origins are from the Ahsaa region in northeastern Saudi Arabia. They are a bit different from other Iraqi Shia being somewhat closer to the Sunni sect. Their leader in Basrah, Sayyid Ahmed Al-Musawi heard about the incident and ordered a group of armed Hasawiyah to attack the Mi'dan Garamsha and Shaghamba tribes. When they crossed the bridge over Shatt Al-Arab, British troops forced them to turn around but they took a side road through Tannumah and found that the Mi'dan had fled from the villages leaving their women and children. Some clerics tried to mediate and the Hasawiyah left them a warning that next time they would return and burn the villages on their inhabitants.
***
We had an interesting meeting at the clinic a few days ago. The
director asked all employees to her room where we were politely asked to be seated by two people who mentioned that they were from the governorate office, but I suspect they work for the CPA. A middle-aged woman in Hijab and a tall skinny fellow wearing thick glasses. They were supposed to gather information and our opinions on several issues regarding the future Iraqi government, they were touring hospitals, schools, and clinics to meet with people. I don't know why but the situation felt rather awkward and funny, apparently I wasn't the only one because I noticed that everyone else was smiling. They asked us a few questions about democracy, federalism, the form of the government, etc. I also felt that the two people who were lecturing us were in bad
need themselves for someone to lecture and explain a couple of things to them. Toward the end of the meeting, the woman in Hijab progressed more and more into fiery talk until it was all reduced to recycled common rhetoric, that was when I started yawning occasionally glancing at my watch. As soon as I heard her mention "Sayyid Sistani (Allah preserve him)", I began to think that discussion was futile. It was nice however to watch the other employees talk, the discussion went something like this:
"How do you see the future of Iraq?" the woman asked us.
"There's no use in anything" our biologist whined morbidly, "Iraqis don't deserve a democracy. We need a firm ruler to prevent chaos, anything else is useless".
"Yes, a firm and just leader" the registrar added, "We don't want any new mass graves".
"So you are already quite hopeless?" the woman asked them.
My boss was having a hard time trying to conceal her giggles. I was grinning from ear to ear as well.
"Excuse me, but I think what Iraq needs at the moment is martial laws" ,this was one of my colleagues. "Every nation implements martial laws at such times, it might sound violent at first, but there have to be some firm steps taken to put an end to the lawlessness and anarchy".
"But don't you think some innocents would also be caught up in it?" the man in glasses asked her.
"Not quite.. " a medical aide chimed in. "When you catch someone guilty like a looter or a bandit I say HANG HIM on the spot!". The evident glee in which he pronounced the words 'hang him' made me a bit uneasy.
"So what do you think about federalism?"
"No federalism", "No no", "Of course not" seemed to echo from all around the room.
"Do you understand what federalism is?" the fellow in glasses asked them, "Do you think it's a ploy to divide Iraq?" he offered (it looked like that was what he thought).
"Yes yes", the others replied in unison.
This was where I had to enter the discussion. "Do you actually believe the Kurds are going to agree to anything less than federalism?", everyone remained silent. "I mean they have been virtually independent for 13 years. Why would they give that up?". Some of them nodded in agreement.
"Yes, but Dr., they just want to seperate from Iraq" the medical aide said.
"They didn't say so, even though they have that right. The Kurdish leaders have stated on many occasions that they aren't interested in seperation, they just don't want to be second class citizens". This seemed to have convinced them and they let it go at that.
"So what do you think about the Transitional Adminstrative Law? Is it appropriate for the new Iraq? Has anyone read it?".
No one had read it of course. I gave them a brief explanation about the rights and freedoms granted by the document, they seemed impressed but they objected to the article stating that two thirds of the population of any three governorates could annul the permanent constitution. Some heated discussion followed and we agreed in the end that the law was temporary and could be modified by a future sovereign government and that overall it was a very progressive constitution, while keeping in
mind that constitutions are merely ink on paper and that Iraq had some good constitutions in the past, but that proper enforcement of the constitution was the most important issue.
emanating from the ground (I swear) and humidity that is bringing every unfortunate asthmatic in the province to our hospital. There is a shortage of nebulizers though, and physicians have to decide which patients are in most need for them, this of course tends to make other patients a bit aggressive. I was skulking around the emergency hall last night and I saw an angry patient who was just leaving, red in the face, shaking his fist in fury, shouting that he would return and shoot every last @#%$ doctor in the hospital. The FPS guards laughed the whole thing off while puffing at their cigarettes. I suppose it would help if I tried to convince him (if he returns) that I'm actually a mere dentist, and that I'm only unfortunate enough to live here?
This is not to give the impression that everything is dandy at the primary health care clinic where I work. We've been having a shortage of antibiotic pills for almost a week now. Well not quite a shortage, you see my boss has decided to use the weekly medications ration only in the afternoon shifts. It works this way, at Iraqi primary health care clinics there is a system called ta'meen sihi (Health Insurance) which is carried out during the afternoon shifts, according to this system doctors get a fixed share from each treatment ticket, and the more patients they get in the afternoon, the more money goes down in their pockets. And since prescriptions in the morning shift bring them nothing (they're free), they have made a habit of referring
patients to the afternoon shift. Everyone is happy, except of course me since I only work morning shifts and have to do my best to convince patients to purchase their medication from outside pharmacies which are much more expensive and a burden to most villagers. A couple of days ago, when it started to get a bit embarrassing I considered reporting my boss' actions to the Basrah Health Directorate since she has been acting rather nasty with me lately, but Jabbar the old medical aide advised me not to, since corruption goes as high up in the hierarchy to the Health Director himself, and my boss would be told about it and
thus creating endless trouble for me. Sometimes I feel that these
leftovers from the former system will never disappear even though
everyone gets fair salaries now.
Banditry has somewhat ceased over the last few days. A top member of SCIRI (Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq) was carjacked close to Al-Dayr north of Basrah, and he was reported to be injured by the bandits. A force from Faylaq Badr (Badr Corps, SCIRI's armed wing) entered the town hours later and forcefully deported all the Mi'dan residents. It's a bit ironic that SCIRI which has a history of fighting the former regime's forces from the marsh areas to defend the Mi'dan tribes from forced deportation are now doing the same thing. Shortly afterwards, Badr members started patrolling the main road between Basrah and Amarrah with the help of IP in the area and with the British turning a blind eye to it all (since they couldn't deal with the bandits themselves). There were a couple of incidents in which Badr used mortars last Thursday to force the Mi'dan to leave a few villages near Qurna and Al-I'zair. No one is complaining as long as it keeps the road safe. All attempts to convince the Mi'dan to resettle in their original villages in the marsh areas have failed, I guess they found that banditry and carjacking is a much more profitable
business. A Kurdish smuggler at one of the villages was arrested. His job was to smuggle stolen vehicles to the Kurdish region where new Kurdish registration plates would be issued for them and later sold. This was quite common, in fact most of the former government's looted vehicles ended up one way or another in the Kurdish region.
Also another incident involving Mi'dan. Someone was attacked and carjacked at Tannumah, across the river from Basrah city. He was a Hasawi. Hasawiyah are a wealthy and influential Shia sect (not a tribe) in the Basrah governorate. Their origins are from the Ahsaa region in northeastern Saudi Arabia. They are a bit different from other Iraqi Shia being somewhat closer to the Sunni sect. Their leader in Basrah, Sayyid Ahmed Al-Musawi heard about the incident and ordered a group of armed Hasawiyah to attack the Mi'dan Garamsha and Shaghamba tribes. When they crossed the bridge over Shatt Al-Arab, British troops forced them to turn around but they took a side road through Tannumah and found that the Mi'dan had fled from the villages leaving their women and children. Some clerics tried to mediate and the Hasawiyah left them a warning that next time they would return and burn the villages on their inhabitants.
***
We had an interesting meeting at the clinic a few days ago. The
director asked all employees to her room where we were politely asked to be seated by two people who mentioned that they were from the governorate office, but I suspect they work for the CPA. A middle-aged woman in Hijab and a tall skinny fellow wearing thick glasses. They were supposed to gather information and our opinions on several issues regarding the future Iraqi government, they were touring hospitals, schools, and clinics to meet with people. I don't know why but the situation felt rather awkward and funny, apparently I wasn't the only one because I noticed that everyone else was smiling. They asked us a few questions about democracy, federalism, the form of the government, etc. I also felt that the two people who were lecturing us were in bad
need themselves for someone to lecture and explain a couple of things to them. Toward the end of the meeting, the woman in Hijab progressed more and more into fiery talk until it was all reduced to recycled common rhetoric, that was when I started yawning occasionally glancing at my watch. As soon as I heard her mention "Sayyid Sistani (Allah preserve him)", I began to think that discussion was futile. It was nice however to watch the other employees talk, the discussion went something like this:
"How do you see the future of Iraq?" the woman asked us.
"There's no use in anything" our biologist whined morbidly, "Iraqis don't deserve a democracy. We need a firm ruler to prevent chaos, anything else is useless".
"Yes, a firm and just leader" the registrar added, "We don't want any new mass graves".
"So you are already quite hopeless?" the woman asked them.
My boss was having a hard time trying to conceal her giggles. I was grinning from ear to ear as well.
"Excuse me, but I think what Iraq needs at the moment is martial laws" ,this was one of my colleagues. "Every nation implements martial laws at such times, it might sound violent at first, but there have to be some firm steps taken to put an end to the lawlessness and anarchy".
"But don't you think some innocents would also be caught up in it?" the man in glasses asked her.
"Not quite.. " a medical aide chimed in. "When you catch someone guilty like a looter or a bandit I say HANG HIM on the spot!". The evident glee in which he pronounced the words 'hang him' made me a bit uneasy.
"So what do you think about federalism?"
"No federalism", "No no", "Of course not" seemed to echo from all around the room.
"Do you understand what federalism is?" the fellow in glasses asked them, "Do you think it's a ploy to divide Iraq?" he offered (it looked like that was what he thought).
"Yes yes", the others replied in unison.
This was where I had to enter the discussion. "Do you actually believe the Kurds are going to agree to anything less than federalism?", everyone remained silent. "I mean they have been virtually independent for 13 years. Why would they give that up?". Some of them nodded in agreement.
"Yes, but Dr., they just want to seperate from Iraq" the medical aide said.
"They didn't say so, even though they have that right. The Kurdish leaders have stated on many occasions that they aren't interested in seperation, they just don't want to be second class citizens". This seemed to have convinced them and they let it go at that.
"So what do you think about the Transitional Adminstrative Law? Is it appropriate for the new Iraq? Has anyone read it?".
No one had read it of course. I gave them a brief explanation about the rights and freedoms granted by the document, they seemed impressed but they objected to the article stating that two thirds of the population of any three governorates could annul the permanent constitution. Some heated discussion followed and we agreed in the end that the law was temporary and could be modified by a future sovereign government and that overall it was a very progressive constitution, while keeping in
mind that constitutions are merely ink on paper and that Iraq had some good constitutions in the past, but that proper enforcement of the constitution was the most important issue.
Iraq and the Arab illusion
(translated article by Dr. Shakir Al-Nabulsi)
During the second half of the 20th century, and after gaining independence, the Arab world lived the illusion of being a great and victorious nation (umma), capable of making history again after the end of colonialism which was purported to be the sole reason for this umma not to play its envisioned historical role.
It was proven later, however, after the end of colonialism, that this umma was extremely weak in its scientific, cultural, economical, and military abilities, incapable of achieving progress in any field, and due to the media blackout, and the absence of vital social statistics and information excluding, of course, the false misleading information regularly released by official governmental circles for appropriate propaganda and political purposes, the Arab society wallowed in their grand illusion.
The Arab world lived the illusion that it would have the power to achieve unity after the end of colonialism. It was proven, however, that the Arab world attempted over 20 unity experiments during the second half of the 20th century all of which were met with failure for several different reasons, the first being the illusion itself of the ability to achieve unity.
The Arab world lived the illusion that it would be able to bring freedom to its peoples after the end of colonialism. It was proven, however, that the Arab world has been ruled for decades by dictatorships and tyrannies which brought even more misery to the Arab people than the rule of colonialists, to the extent that some are now longing for the days of colonialism, wishing they would return.
The Arab world lived the illusion that it would be able to implement socialism after the end of colonialism. It was proven, however, that the Arab world was immersed into a system of state capitalism which dealt with sales and purchases starting from Felafil sandwiches to refrigerators, automobiles, washing machines, and houses. Corruption flourished in industry and commerce, and the 'general sector' was reduced to both a sad and funny example of this economical failure, the Arab world sunk in debts (over 300 billion dollars), when in the past a nation such as Great Britain owed a country such as Egypt over 500 million pounds worth of cotton and other unpaid goods, and now Egypt imports 80% of the ingredients of Felafil as the Egyptian Supply Minister stated days ago!
The Arab world lived the illusion that it would have the power to achieve victory over Israel and return the Palestinian right to its owners after the end of colonialism. It was proven, however, that the Arab world was unable to win not even one battle, or part of one, even though it went through 3 major wars and tens of secondary ones, and that the first half of the 20th century witnessed the loss of a quarter of Palestinian land, whereas the Arabs after gaining independence lost the other three quarters in the second half as we can see now. The Arab world lived the illusion of victory in every one of their lost battles, and to this day we refuse to admit our defeats. We still call the 1967 war the naksa, as we did before in the 1956 Suez war.
The Arab world lived the illusion that it would be able to successfully exploit its vast natural resources after the end of colonialism. It was proven, however, that the Arab world after briefly appearing prosperous during the seventies reverted suddenly to its past poverty due to its flawed financial management, high consumption rates, the explosion of population growth, unemployment, and flourishing of the terrorism market paid in sparkling yellow gold as announced by Bin Laden recently.
Illusion remained the major player of the incredible Arab scene. Illusion remained a drug that allowed us to sleep in delicious numbness until the information revolution exploded and exposed the Arab situation. The Arab world was classified in all fields at the bottom of the list of the world's nations, as revealed in UN reports for 2002-2003. The Arab world was shocked for living under a false illusion.
Religion did not lift us from the bottom.
Pan-Arab nationalism did not lift us from the bottom.
Our glorious ancestors did not appeal to prevent us from falling into the pit.
Our Hamasa and heroism poetry did not save us from falling.
Our Friday prayers sermons which assure us that we are "khaira ummatin ukhrijat lilnas" (the greatest nation brought out to people) did not save us.
The fiery speeches of leaders immortalised in the collective Arab memory did not save us.
Sorcery, magic, djinn, Sufi hymns, Darawish prayers, fatwas, and blessings of saints all did not help save us from falling into the void.
***
Today, the Arab world lives the illusion again in regard to the situation in Iraq, which is an extension to the Pan-Arab, unifying, socialist, democratic, military illusion that Arabs have been living in for over half a century.
A week ago I returned from Beirut where I attended the 'Arab Institution for Intellectual Modernisation' conference in which more than a 150 representatives of the Arab intelligentsia from all over the Arab world participated. I had the opportunity through this conference and my stay in Beirut -which is the mirror of the Arab world- to be closely informed about the different viewpoints of Arab intellectuals on the Iraqi situation. It appeared to me that the Arab world still lives in a huge illusion regarding Iraq, and other Arab issues. The majority of Arab intellectuals still live the illusion of unity, the illusion of freedom, the illusion of democracy that will come from inside on the back of an Arab camel or a white Arab horse, that Saladin will reappear to return the lost glories of the umma, that Al-Mahdi will turn the pitch black night of this umma into shining daylight, and that the destiny of this umma is this bloody conflict with others. It appeared that the rhetoric of the 21st century has not much differed from that of the fifties and sixties of the 20th century, the tongues have changed, but the words remain the same, the masks have changed, but the minds remain the same.
The Arab world, in its entirety, still bets on the return of Ba'athist rule to Iraq, and another part of the Arab world, even more deep in illusion, still bets on the return of Saddam, describing him as the 'the symbol, 'the leader neccessity', or the Shahid who has not died yet. And the Arab world, still living in illusion, believes in the Iraqi muqqawama ('resistance'), which is in fact a terrorist muqqawala (contractors) and not a national resistance, meaning that they are composed of groups of armed contractors, and defeated Arab mercenaries from Afghanistan and the Arab streets, which have lost all hope in the future, and all the bets of the present, dreaming of achieving the myth of the Islamic Khilafa (Caliphate) all of which was oppressive and bloody including the Ottoman Caliphate and the Taliban Emirate. That Arab world believes this terrorist muqqawala will win in Iraq over the will of the Iraqi people, and over the Iraqi future. That same Arab world living in illusion, believed that the army of Muqtada Al-Sadr will join forces with the remnants of the armed 'contractors', posing a significant threat to coalition troops forcing them to pull out from Iraq leaving it to be ruled by these groups. Today the Army of Al-Mahdi is backing and the illusioned Arab world is biting its fingers grieving over its lost hope. That same Arab world living in illusion believed that a scandal caused by a group of sick demented soldiers from the coalition such as the scandal of Abu Ghraib prison will tip the balance in favour of the armed 'contractors' in Iraq which announced recently that it will pay their wages in pure gold, instead of bank notes, fixing the prices of 'necks' in a statement by Bin Laden himself.
The question here is: Why did the Arab world live in all this illusion throughout the last half century?
The answer to this question is that the Arab world acts cowardly with itself, self-delusionary, lacking the neccessary courage to recognise and admit to the facts on the ground as was done in Japan and Germany after WWII, and that the Arab world lacks the necessary courage to admit to its self-insufficiencies, its weakness, poverty, ignorance, and its poor scientific and practical capabilities. Therefore, the Arab world will never advance as long as it regards itself advanced and not behind, it will never learn as long as it regards itself learned and not ignorant, it will never seek power as long as it regards itself powerful and not weak. This neurotic swelling, this pathologic tumour, this nostalgia of submitting in humiliation to the dead glories of the past in the Arab psyche, and this phobia were all reasons that we live such a grand illusion. Since the Arab world believes to this day -as told by its civil and armed religious institutions- that the road to the future passes only through the holy cities, that the past is the nerve of the future, that who has no first has no last, that heritage is better than modernity, that ancestors are better than the inheritors, that the rule of ancestors from the grave is better than the rule of inheritors today. The Arab world believes to this day -as told by its civil and armed Pan-Arab and religious institutions- that Andalus (Spain) will be returned, that Palestine will be liberated from the river to the sea, that Iskenderun will be returned, that Al-Mahdi will reappear, that the rule of Saddam Hussein and mass graves will return to Iraq, and that Saddam as he won before, with the support of Pan-Arab and religious institutions headed by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Ba'ath party- in the first Gulf War from behind trenches, will win again today, from behind bars!
During the second half of the 20th century, and after gaining independence, the Arab world lived the illusion of being a great and victorious nation (umma), capable of making history again after the end of colonialism which was purported to be the sole reason for this umma not to play its envisioned historical role.
It was proven later, however, after the end of colonialism, that this umma was extremely weak in its scientific, cultural, economical, and military abilities, incapable of achieving progress in any field, and due to the media blackout, and the absence of vital social statistics and information excluding, of course, the false misleading information regularly released by official governmental circles for appropriate propaganda and political purposes, the Arab society wallowed in their grand illusion.
The Arab world lived the illusion that it would have the power to achieve unity after the end of colonialism. It was proven, however, that the Arab world attempted over 20 unity experiments during the second half of the 20th century all of which were met with failure for several different reasons, the first being the illusion itself of the ability to achieve unity.
The Arab world lived the illusion that it would be able to bring freedom to its peoples after the end of colonialism. It was proven, however, that the Arab world has been ruled for decades by dictatorships and tyrannies which brought even more misery to the Arab people than the rule of colonialists, to the extent that some are now longing for the days of colonialism, wishing they would return.
The Arab world lived the illusion that it would be able to implement socialism after the end of colonialism. It was proven, however, that the Arab world was immersed into a system of state capitalism which dealt with sales and purchases starting from Felafil sandwiches to refrigerators, automobiles, washing machines, and houses. Corruption flourished in industry and commerce, and the 'general sector' was reduced to both a sad and funny example of this economical failure, the Arab world sunk in debts (over 300 billion dollars), when in the past a nation such as Great Britain owed a country such as Egypt over 500 million pounds worth of cotton and other unpaid goods, and now Egypt imports 80% of the ingredients of Felafil as the Egyptian Supply Minister stated days ago!
The Arab world lived the illusion that it would have the power to achieve victory over Israel and return the Palestinian right to its owners after the end of colonialism. It was proven, however, that the Arab world was unable to win not even one battle, or part of one, even though it went through 3 major wars and tens of secondary ones, and that the first half of the 20th century witnessed the loss of a quarter of Palestinian land, whereas the Arabs after gaining independence lost the other three quarters in the second half as we can see now. The Arab world lived the illusion of victory in every one of their lost battles, and to this day we refuse to admit our defeats. We still call the 1967 war the naksa, as we did before in the 1956 Suez war.
The Arab world lived the illusion that it would be able to successfully exploit its vast natural resources after the end of colonialism. It was proven, however, that the Arab world after briefly appearing prosperous during the seventies reverted suddenly to its past poverty due to its flawed financial management, high consumption rates, the explosion of population growth, unemployment, and flourishing of the terrorism market paid in sparkling yellow gold as announced by Bin Laden recently.
Illusion remained the major player of the incredible Arab scene. Illusion remained a drug that allowed us to sleep in delicious numbness until the information revolution exploded and exposed the Arab situation. The Arab world was classified in all fields at the bottom of the list of the world's nations, as revealed in UN reports for 2002-2003. The Arab world was shocked for living under a false illusion.
Religion did not lift us from the bottom.
Pan-Arab nationalism did not lift us from the bottom.
Our glorious ancestors did not appeal to prevent us from falling into the pit.
Our Hamasa and heroism poetry did not save us from falling.
Our Friday prayers sermons which assure us that we are "khaira ummatin ukhrijat lilnas" (the greatest nation brought out to people) did not save us.
The fiery speeches of leaders immortalised in the collective Arab memory did not save us.
Sorcery, magic, djinn, Sufi hymns, Darawish prayers, fatwas, and blessings of saints all did not help save us from falling into the void.
***
Today, the Arab world lives the illusion again in regard to the situation in Iraq, which is an extension to the Pan-Arab, unifying, socialist, democratic, military illusion that Arabs have been living in for over half a century.
A week ago I returned from Beirut where I attended the 'Arab Institution for Intellectual Modernisation' conference in which more than a 150 representatives of the Arab intelligentsia from all over the Arab world participated. I had the opportunity through this conference and my stay in Beirut -which is the mirror of the Arab world- to be closely informed about the different viewpoints of Arab intellectuals on the Iraqi situation. It appeared to me that the Arab world still lives in a huge illusion regarding Iraq, and other Arab issues. The majority of Arab intellectuals still live the illusion of unity, the illusion of freedom, the illusion of democracy that will come from inside on the back of an Arab camel or a white Arab horse, that Saladin will reappear to return the lost glories of the umma, that Al-Mahdi will turn the pitch black night of this umma into shining daylight, and that the destiny of this umma is this bloody conflict with others. It appeared that the rhetoric of the 21st century has not much differed from that of the fifties and sixties of the 20th century, the tongues have changed, but the words remain the same, the masks have changed, but the minds remain the same.
The Arab world, in its entirety, still bets on the return of Ba'athist rule to Iraq, and another part of the Arab world, even more deep in illusion, still bets on the return of Saddam, describing him as the 'the symbol, 'the leader neccessity', or the Shahid who has not died yet. And the Arab world, still living in illusion, believes in the Iraqi muqqawama ('resistance'), which is in fact a terrorist muqqawala (contractors) and not a national resistance, meaning that they are composed of groups of armed contractors, and defeated Arab mercenaries from Afghanistan and the Arab streets, which have lost all hope in the future, and all the bets of the present, dreaming of achieving the myth of the Islamic Khilafa (Caliphate) all of which was oppressive and bloody including the Ottoman Caliphate and the Taliban Emirate. That Arab world believes this terrorist muqqawala will win in Iraq over the will of the Iraqi people, and over the Iraqi future. That same Arab world living in illusion, believed that the army of Muqtada Al-Sadr will join forces with the remnants of the armed 'contractors', posing a significant threat to coalition troops forcing them to pull out from Iraq leaving it to be ruled by these groups. Today the Army of Al-Mahdi is backing and the illusioned Arab world is biting its fingers grieving over its lost hope. That same Arab world living in illusion believed that a scandal caused by a group of sick demented soldiers from the coalition such as the scandal of Abu Ghraib prison will tip the balance in favour of the armed 'contractors' in Iraq which announced recently that it will pay their wages in pure gold, instead of bank notes, fixing the prices of 'necks' in a statement by Bin Laden himself.
The question here is: Why did the Arab world live in all this illusion throughout the last half century?
The answer to this question is that the Arab world acts cowardly with itself, self-delusionary, lacking the neccessary courage to recognise and admit to the facts on the ground as was done in Japan and Germany after WWII, and that the Arab world lacks the necessary courage to admit to its self-insufficiencies, its weakness, poverty, ignorance, and its poor scientific and practical capabilities. Therefore, the Arab world will never advance as long as it regards itself advanced and not behind, it will never learn as long as it regards itself learned and not ignorant, it will never seek power as long as it regards itself powerful and not weak. This neurotic swelling, this pathologic tumour, this nostalgia of submitting in humiliation to the dead glories of the past in the Arab psyche, and this phobia were all reasons that we live such a grand illusion. Since the Arab world believes to this day -as told by its civil and armed religious institutions- that the road to the future passes only through the holy cities, that the past is the nerve of the future, that who has no first has no last, that heritage is better than modernity, that ancestors are better than the inheritors, that the rule of ancestors from the grave is better than the rule of inheritors today. The Arab world believes to this day -as told by its civil and armed Pan-Arab and religious institutions- that Andalus (Spain) will be returned, that Palestine will be liberated from the river to the sea, that Iskenderun will be returned, that Al-Mahdi will reappear, that the rule of Saddam Hussein and mass graves will return to Iraq, and that Saddam as he won before, with the support of Pan-Arab and religious institutions headed by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Ba'ath party- in the first Gulf War from behind trenches, will win again today, from behind bars!
Funny email of the day
It is not a habit of mine to publish hate mail (death threats are usually my favourite), but this one really made my day and has to be the best I have ever had the pleasure to receive in my inbox since I started blogging. At least, the creative author will now start getting tens of messages titled URGENT BUSINESS PROPOSAL (with the caps) from Mrs. Mariam Abacha of Nigeria, the widow of Abdul (insert name here), the uncles of former Liberian president John Taylor, LOTTERY AWARDS, and of course 31 Kb sized RETURNED MAIL NOTIFICATION emails. Everyone should get spam mail.
From Goekhan.C@t-online.de:
From Goekhan.C@t-online.de:
....which asshole you are pretending beeing an iraqi and pushing up a big show, with your legere stories about how you feel and yeah, how you get used to the occupation, o yeah and that saddam was an asshole...of course...
And of course you made up some lists of moderate house-nigger-style-iraqis, none of them a true muslim, but rather concerned about the electricity and the powder on their ass...
shot the fuck up, you jewish-made hollywood-style sitcom fake duck...brainfarting idiot...
ouw how come, you dont post anymore, did you get lost in Baghdad, cia-agent fuckin bitch...
Thursday, May 27, 2004
Justice
At last, the four soldiers that forced my late cousin into the Tigris at Samarra have been 'REPRIMANDED'. They still insist that no one had died even though Zaydun's DEAD body had been retrieved from the river. Also makes me wonder, if no one died, why did they offer a handsome sum of money to the family in return for their silence? And why did the mentioned Commander (the one who was also 'reprimanded') impede the investigation and LIE to the Army investigators? The stench of cover up is overwhelming. This won't go unpunished.
