I’m not actually sure whether that is the point, at least as intended by Wright and Greenough. Take the putative platitude that e.g. a belief is true if it fits with the ways things are. That’s something that different participants in the debate about truth ought to be able to give some account of (or at least, if a given of truth can’t give any content at all to that claim, that marks it as revisionary of our thought about truth, with corresponding implications for burden of proof, etc). But the kind of elaboration that e.g. a correspondence theory provides might go well beyond what is needed to ‘minimally accord’ with the platitude. A deflationist about truth, for example, might give an account that avoids the type of alethic realism associated with his rival, and yet still take himself to have explained why it’s right to say that truths ‘fit the world’. Both theories are in accord with the platitude, but there’s still a question to be settled regarding the metaphysical nature of truth.

More unusually, a single theorist might hold that there are a number of different realizers of the platitudes which have quite different natures, in ways that are philosophically significant. For example, Wright suggests that the truth of statements about the comic might be constituted by certain norms of assertibility, the truth of statements about simple number theory by certain coherence relations, truth of statements about tables by a type of correspondence relation, etc. Settling the platitudes about truth establishes a constraint on theories that aspire to be non-revisionary, but doesn’t thereby automatically settle the metaphysical issue, or end the philosopher’s part of the job.

A minimal theory made up of such platitudes can be thought of as the ‘shared ground’ between non-revisionary theories of truth. But identifying the platitudes doesn’t automatically establish the nature of e.g. truth or vagueness, since 1) non-revisionary theories still face the question of whether aspects of the nature of e.g. truth or vagueness go ‘beyond’ the platitudes and 2) a revisionary theory of truth, vagueness, etc, might end up being the most defensible position. In both cases there will be implications for burden of proof, etc, so the minimal theory serves to set the starting point for the debate, but doesn’t seem to settle it. (But maybe I’m misunderstanding how you were thinking of the ‘path to a maxinmal theory’? I was taking it that you were assimilating the Wright/Greenough approach to e.g. the Lewis/Jackson approach.)

Yeah I’m just assimilating it to the Lewis/Jackson approach. But I don’t think that approach commits you to minimality in anything like the sense normally used in the truth debates. I think that it could be one of the platitudes about truth that true propositions correspond to the world. Or it could be a platitude that only things with content are true. Or all kinds of things could be platitudes that go beyond a minimal theory of truth. There could be lots of room for debate about the best way of systematising the platitudes, but at one level that’s all there is to do.