Since I’m taking 21 units this semester (15 from classes and 6 from my externship)—my ability to blog is severely curtailed. Nevertheless, I’m trying to stay committed to writing approximately 1000 words a night. Since I’m so heavily invested in my studies, most of my posts will be boring law stuff and mostly for my own edification.
That, combined with the fact that I’m taking a Supreme Court Seminar this semester, will result in a whole lot of SCOTUS blogging. And what could be more interesting to a reader than the uninformed ramblings of a 3L expounding on the land’s High Court? Nothing I tell you, nothing!
So let’s get started.
Issue today: What role should the Senate play in Supreme Court appointments?
Art II, Sec 2 grants the President the power to appoint judges to the Supreme Court “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate”—that’s all fine and good, but what the heck does (or should) it mean?
One argument is that the Senate should focus more on the “advice” aspect of it and basically rubber-stamp a President’s nominees. Essentially this leaves the President with full authority to appoint the members of the Court. For my part, I reject this argument or any variations thereof since it seems to me to vest too much power in the Executive. I like my separation of powers, it’s true. But I also like my checks and balances. I am sympathetic to the notion that the Senate must play some role beyond mere acquiescence.
That being said, what’s the proper approach? If “advice” means something more than a blank check—does it mean that the Senate should have the dominant role in the appointment of judges? After all, if the Senate takes too much of an antagonistic role in giving its “advice and consent”—isn’t it serving not so much as a check on Presidential authority, but an obstacle to the proper exercise of it?
It’s the President that has the power to appoint, not the Senate. If every nominee sent up by a President is struck down by the Senate, doesn’t that have the effect of eviscerating the President’s appointment power? On one hand, yes. But on the other, the Senate must have SOME say in the matter if it is to counter unchecked Executive authority.
Some have suggested that the Senate should actively seek to “balance” the court ideologically. If the court is tilting too far in the conservative (liberal) direction, the Senate should work for a nominee that tilts in the liberal (conservative) direction in order to “balance” out the presumed voting blocs that will arise. The goal of this is to present a more diffuse set of opinions and views on legal matters so the Court will not appear monolithic in its legal approach.
I see a couple problems with this. First, even assuming that the nominee that’s intended to “balance” will vote accordingly—a “balanced” court isn’t necessarily a good one. In fact, it’s almost counterintuitive. If you have 4 conservatives, 4 liberals, and 1 moderate, that single justice has the potential to be the deciding vote in a number of cases. That places an enormous amount of power into the hands of a single justice. So rather than have a Court with diverse views and viewpoints, you have two camps pushing harder and harder to accommodate the single swing vote on a case, giving that swing vote a degree of influence over the court’s opinions far beyond its proportional justification. Such a court is no longer “balanced” in any meaningful way since nearly all decisions must now be channeled through a new ideological camp—that of the “moderate.”
The second problem with a focus on “balancing” the Court is that where you have such a split court and a single vote will often decide the issue, you will have numerous 5-4 decisions. While a 5-4 decision is obviously sufficient for the Court at the time, it is far less compelling for a subsequent court. It is far easier to justify overturning a 5-4 decision than it is a 9-0 decision. Not only is it easier to justify, it’s also easier to do. You only need a single justice to switch his/her vote. And given the inexactitude of predicting a nominee’s voting behavior, one can’t be reasonably assured that such narrowly decided cases will stand up in the future.
A third problem is that in such narrow decisions, extreme compromises must often be reached in order to earn that deciding vote. One can say with a fair amount of legitimacy that such “compromise” decisions are not often made of the sternest constitutional stuff. If you’ve got a “living” constitution, you know what you’ve got. If you’ve got a “dead” constitution, you also know what you’ve got. However, when a court starts writing in all sorts of new fangled “balancing tests” and “weighing of factors” and preserving of “central holdings”—it merely breeds a desire on both sides of the judicial philosophy debate to get rid of this hogwash and reassert at least some type of principled constitutional approach. So in an attempt to strike a balance in the Court to presumably ensure some stability in decisions, the Senate has in actuality reduced the likelihood that decisions made under a “balanced” court will last very long.
Another approach is for the Senate to try to push for nominees that better reflect the times and judicial norms of the era in which they live. I guess this means that if we’re in a judicially conservative (liberal) era, the Senate should help reflect those norms and confirm judicially conservative (liberal) nominees. An example of this is during the New Deal—people wanted judges to uphold the New Deal, hence the Senate was obligated (sort of) to respect that desire.
One glaring problem with this is that it can hyper-politicize the nominating process. This approach runs the risk that people will confuse “judicial restraint” or “judicial activism” with reaching a predetermined outcome on a controversial issue. In pushing for nominees that “reflect the times” there is the risk that the judicial norms relied upon will simply be wrong. If the majority of people want the court to rule a certain way on a gay marriage case, is that a policy norm or a judicial norm? Certainly the people want a specific RESULT out of the case—but is the court the best avenue for that result? Might the people merely be expressing their policy goals and the Senate mistakenly interprets this as an expression of their judicial goals? Certainly. If that is the case, then trying to craft a Court that “reflects the times” is a dangerous proposition.
Further, it isn’t all that easy to define what an era’s accepted judicial norms are. Even you do reach agreement; those norms might well be short-lived. If that’s the case, rather than having a Court which reflected the times, you’d have an anachronistic body of a bygone era.
That is my general sense of why the Senate should neither try to “balance” the Court nor have the Court “reflect the times.”
Next time I’ll discuss what the Senate SHOULD try to do when confirming justices.