____Tuesday, August 10, 2004____________
Election as Aesthetic Shift
Once, while seated on the large patio of a neighborhood restaurant, my wife and I overheard a woman vigorously making the distinction between marriage and cohabitation to her live-in boyfriend. Now, while we own up to a slight compunction for eavesdropping, it was hardly necessary in this instance. Blessed as she was with a divorcee's 20/20 hindsight and no small helping of Dutch courage, the woman's invective was audible to all patrons as she repeated, perhaps a dozen times and in the vowel-rich drawl of Selma, Alabama: "It's not baaad, it's jest diffaarent." She took great pains to make this distinction without offering further explanation: "No, see, I'm sayin it's diffaarent, and yer thinkin that's baaad. But it's not baaad, it's jest diffaarent."John Kerry is like that. His claim that President Bush has mismanaged the US-led campaign in Iraq stands seemingly at odds with Kerry's own nebulous plan to stabilize that nation and region (not to mention his Senate vote authorizing the use of force). The Democratic presidential nominee has, like our intoxicated example, insisted upon a distinction he failed to make. This is now a truism evident to even President Bush, who has challenged Kerry to explain how he might do a better job. In the minds of Kerry's boosters, the candidate himself is argument enough. Theirs is a two-part contention: 1) almost any nabob would be better than Bush and 2) Kerry is a man of measured demeanor and intellectual substance. The presumption being that a Kerry presidency with produce widely different results from another Bush term because of personality, not just policy. Thus I term Kerry's approach to Iraq "aesthetic," a word that suggests something surface but potentially substantive.
Last week, the Washington Post ran this Glenn Kessler analysis of Kerry's tendency to tiptoe around the Iraq issue:
John F. Kerry has mounted a strong effort to erode President Bush's advantage on national security. But on the defining issue of war in Iraq, his shots have appeared oblique at best . . . Kerry has strongly criticized the Bush administration's competence in handling the war, principally its failure to enlist other nations to its cause in Iraq. But he has not questioned the basic tenets of the policy, nor has he outlined a course of action substantially different from the one Bush is pursuing . . . "I know what we have to do in Iraq," Kerry said [at his DNC debut]. "We need a president who has the credibility to bring our allies to our side and share the burden, reduce the cost to American taxpayers, reduce the risk to American soldiers. That's the right way to get the job done and bring our troops home."
The chief plank of Kerry's foreign policy can be summarized: I'll make America popular again. This finds purchase with that small wing of the Democratic party that regards left-leaning, post-Christian Europe as a cultural model. To sell the notion to the majority of Democrats and swing voters (those not suffering an inferiority complex), Kerry explains popularity as pragmatism: If they like us, they'll send troops and donations, helping to keep American tax dollars and troops at home. In recent days, he has reiterated the latter hope in particular. Perhaps all the talk of Vietnam at the Democratic National Convention put Kerry in mind of the bring-the-boys-home stance that followed his service and launched his political career. More to the point, what was an aesthetic distinction, between a stubborn president and a cooperative candidate, has begun to shape policy.Peter Beinart, editor of The New Republic and no friend of the president, seized upon Kerry's DNC speech as evidence of foreign-policy short-sightedness:
Kerry could have said we need more foreign troops in Iraq to buttress the existing American ones . . . Instead, he implied that we need foreign troops to replace American ones. The focus wasn't on America and its allies doing more together; it was on America's allies doing more so America can do less . . . Contrast that with [Senator Joseph] Biden, who said, "When John Kerry is president, our friends and allies will have no excuse to sit on the sidelines." The word "excuse" is significant: Unlike Kerry, Biden didn't lay all the blame for America's estrangement at our door. He implied that the Europeans have failed to fulfill their responsibilities, too. A Kerry administration, he suggested, would change European behavior not only by being more respectful, but also by asking more, not less, of the United States. Biden said Kerry "will inherit a nation and a world that will require him to ask much of us and our allies." But it's not clear Kerry sees it that way.
As a candidate, Kerry must remain deliberately nebulous on some topics. Not only are specifics boring, they are divisive. All politicians do this, and indeed all politicians ask voters to make an aesthetic choice (think Bush's swagger and drawl). But I contend that by placing the aesthetic distinction front and center, as a reason to trust him (think the DNC emphasis on Vietnam and character), Kerry runs a greater risk. In the case of Beinart, he alienated a potential ally. But it is only fair to point out that the TNR editor was in the minority--some say as small as 10%--of DNC audience members who, like Kerry, did not oppose the Iraq invasion. In light of that fact, Kerry's highly orchestrated nominating convention may have followed the only reasonable course. However, an article in today's Post suggests that prodding by Bush and company has forced Kerry to articulate his Iraq stance more clearly in his stump speech, though perhaps with disappointing results for Bienart and others who now believe Iraq is ground zero in an ideological war with Islamism:Responding to President Bush's challenge to clarify his position, Sen. John F. Kerry said Monday that he still would have voted to authorize the war in Iraq even if he had known then that U.S. and allied forces would not find weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the Democratic presidential nominee said that his goal as president would be to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Iraq during his first six months in office through diplomacy and foreign assistance. "I believe if you do the statesmanship properly, I believe if you do the kind of alliance-building that is available to us, that it is appropriate to have a goal of reducing our troops" by August 2005, Kerry told reporters. . . As evidence his goal is attainable, Kerry said fellow senators who have traveled abroad told him that other countries will be willing to provide more assistance if Bush is defeated this fall. He also said Arab countries have a stake in Iraq's future and could lessen the United States' burden.
The last sentence is a reminder of Kerry's troubling potshot at the Saudis (and nod to Michael Moore) at the DNC, which was at odds with his otherwise internationalist rhetoric. Kerry's promise of increased aid following a Bush defeat strikes some as dubious. And though mere insinuation, is an attempt to demonstrate how an aesthetic shift to Kerry might benefit the US. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that Kerry's ability to stroke the wounded pride of European allies is far less important (because they are, in fact, still allies) than his ability to cultivate cooperation with Arab and Muslim leaders. If Kerry could somehow demonstrate that, it would be a great aesthetic argument in his favor.And finally, allow me to offer a tangent in closing. Johns Kerry and Edwards have made much ado about values in recent weeks. Indeed, the subject lent Kerry some of his best lines at the DNC. This focus, too, is an aesthetic one. It's a tactic most successfully exploited on the right, but one Kerry has enthusiastically claimed. At the least, it demonstrates bravado. Kerry is confronting Bush on his home turf. It is a move in keeping with his surprising willingness to wage a campaign at the level of personality rather than policy. Or perhaps it's not surprising, given the president's stubborn carriage while in office and the campaign that put him there (Al Gore's).
posted by Nathan Lott 12:00 PM
____Tuesday, July 20, 2004____________
Photo Essay: A Rustic Virginia Summer
Despite good intentions (and no small collection of interesting links), posts to this weblog have grown fewer and further between this summer. More daylight hours do not amount to more hours in the day, and much of my time is presently devoted to an outdoor-oriented writing project. Not wishing this site to lay fallow, but finding myself with little writing time to spare, I hit upon the idea of a photo essay. The images below were collected in the research process for the aforementioned writing project (a book, actually, which I may yet tout shamelessly here). They have almost nothing to do with politics, current events, culture, or the sort of drivel that typically characterizes this weblog. Still, I hope you find them a pleasant diversion.
A fallen tree rests in Morris Creek Marsh.
A 400-year old wheat field at Chippokes Plantation.
The beach just downhill along the James River.
A boulder garden in the James upriver.
A pair of old barns in Amelia County. The neighboring farmhouse has been abandoned.
There are no hogs on Hog Island today. There are foxes.
A Cypress Stand on the Chickahominy River.
Small crabs thrive in this marsh bordering the York River.
A tattered wing forced this butterfly to rest long enough to be photographed.
The wrought-iron fence of a small, overgrown family cemetery in Powhatan County.
Beaver Lake, at Pocahontas State Park, was not built by beavers but men under 25 earning $30 a month as members of the CCC. $25 dollars were sent home to their families.
posted by Nathan Lott 2:11 PM
____Wednesday, June 30, 2004____________
In Name Only?
Iraq's interim government (not to be confused with the forthcoming transitional and later-still elected governments) unceremoniously assumed control from coalition provisional authority two days prior to President Bush's self-appointed June 30 deadline. The modest proceedings that constituted the handover not only foiled the plans of would-be terrorists, but also caught US newspapers off guard, occurring as it did hours after they went to press. But in the days following, editors and columnists scrambled to make meaning of the events, which the Washington Post characterized as "surrendering authority. . . with a somber air of exhaustion." It seems most--like the wider populace, even in Iraq--regard the shift as potentially monumental or potentially meaningless, just as the toppling of Saddam Hussein's likeness and even his capture each seem a ruse of sorts.The BBC offered this succinct rundown of all that remains to be done in Iraq in the run-up to elections. The tasks of rebuilding infrastructure and building public faith, inasmuch as they are distinct from quelling the insurgency, pale in comparison to the matter of security. The Post's David Ignatius wrote with what might be termed guarded pessimism, while his colleague Richard Cohen took the opportunity to skewer the administration. In the New York Times, Paul Krugman managed to wallow in hopelessness while blaming Bush. The global consensus, as manifest in the Post's roundup of worldwide opinion, wasn't much sunnier.
Fareed Zakaria did contribute an op-ed that cited "good news" (Iraqi support for the interim government, international involvement and aid), but warned:
But all this will mean nothing if Iraq's central problem -- a pervasive lack of security -- remains unsolved. Unless this changes soon, positive trends will turn negative. The new government will be seen as ineffectual, reconstruction will remain halting, radical militias will gain ground and there will be no elections in January. This will end in either a low-level civil war or military rule, possibly both.
I've previously suggested that those spearheading the insurgency hope to secure power through civil strife. This goes for al Qaeda types who would welcome the nation's disintegration into warlordism; their ilk have coexisted successfully with warlords in Central Asia. (I'm now also curious as to the element of organized crime at work in Iraq. Those profiting from drug and gun running seemingly benefit from attacks targeting police.) However, while one stream of conventional wisdom holds that Zakaria is correct--everything hinges on security, or the lack thereof--another emphasizes Iraqi autonomy. Writing in the Times Reuel Marc Gerecht suggests that allowing security to overshadow the march to democracy dooms the latter. New Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's commitment to end civil unrest has sparked murmuring about curfews and marshall law, and Gerecht suggests his eagerness to rebuild the army and his reluctance to repudiate former Baathist's will produce a disenchanted and disengaged populace.America's continued military presence in Iraq may not be as divisive as many predict. The Kurds obviously don't want the Americans, their ultimate protectors against Iraqi Arab nationalism, to leave. It's a good bet that most Shiites don't want Americans, armed and ready to check Arab Sunni revanchism, to leave quite yet, either. Even many Arab Sunnis, still haunted by memories of Saddam Hussein's tyranny and in many cases personally harmed by it, may feel that Iraqis, not foreigners, have always been their worst enemies. . . John D. Negroponte, the new American ambassador in Baghdad, should impress on Mr. Allawi the importance of advancing national elections, not on reincorporating the old Sunni military elite into a new army. Engaging the citizenry in the political process is the best way to bring lasting security and harmony to Iraq.
It remains to be seen if Iraqis are willing to give their interim government a shot, but naysayers have already written it off as a US stooge. Writing in the Guardian Haifa Zangana called the handover "meaningless," and claims the past year has "killed our hope in democracy." Sadly, Zangana's central complaint, "As in the past, Iraqis are denied their natural right to resist the occupier and its imposed form of government," not only fails to reckon with the disparate goals of the insurgency but prompts no suggested alternatives. (Consequently, it approaches the stereotype of Arabs playing the victim to shuck responsibility; though in her defense, Zangana is a credentialed writer.) It seems that in the minds of many commentators the only way for the fledgling government to prove its independence from the US would be to send coalition troops packing. Not only is that unrealistic, it would be a unilateral action in defiance of the UN (a lot like the US-orchestrated march to war, except the US acted without UN approval, not contrary to UN resolutions). As I understand it--and see this Guardian Unlimited interactive guide for detail (albeit scant)--the resolution that established the newly christened interim government also calls for a continued international-troop presence through 2005 to keep the peace.There is an innate tension between security and independence in Iraq. Allawi (with US backing) hopes to establish a reinvigorated and pervasive Iraqi security apparatus in order to obviate coalition troops. The assumption being that with foreign armies gone, or at least less visible, the populace will be easier to control. It may prove that the crucial transition of authority in Iraq is between security forces. It remains to be seen (and depends upon the nature of Iraq's growing army) whether the presence of coalition troops will be read as a safeguard for or hindrance to impending elections. Yet for now all sides acquiesce to the necessity of a continued coalition presence, at least if they are so brave as to conjecture a way out.
posted by Nathan Lott 2:26 PM
____Wednesday, June 09, 2004____________
What's so Great about the Greatest Generation?
(Or, for that matter, what was so bad about Nazism?)
Feeling inundated by Memorial Day, the dedication of the National World War II Memorial, and events marking the 60th anniversary of D-Day, David Greenberg asks what all the hype is about in the latest installment of his "History Lessons" column at Slate,. Greenberg makes some important observations about America's fascination with D-Day:
Obviously, the invasion of Normandy was a crucial event in American history, worthy of commemoration. But so are many of the events of World War II, and it's worth asking why V-E Day, for example, or V-J Day, or for that matter the death of Franklin Roosevelt doesn't serve as the focus of our national remembrance...
The question, "Why D-Day?" is a fair one. Do we simply relish having liberated France?. (Indeed, that's part of it. The son having come of age and rescued the father.) Yet Greenberg's reasons for D-Day's popularity (if it can be called that) are unconvincing: "growing unilateralism" and "a romance with war and militarism" that began with Ronald Reagan and was stoked by Tom Brokaw, Stephen Ambrose, and Steven Spielberg. He finally suggests that boomers romanticize WWII to "atone" for their peacenik college years. Perhaps a year ago the romance of war may have held sway in the popular mind, but given the ongoing travails in Iraq, I dare say the temptation has waned. Ditto any fascination with unilateral action (in fact, the weekend ceremonies in France included the leaders of Russia and Germany).
But this [D-Day-centered] version neglects, among other small details, the importance of the Allies. It especially shortchanges the Soviet Union--no doubt a vestige of Cold War attitudes. For three years, after all, the Germans focused their efforts on their all-important Eastern front… Meanwhile, the United States was pouring its energy into fighting Japan.Greenberg is on to something, but his explanations come up short, especially if applied, perhaps unfairly, to WWII in general. It would be one thing if only Republicans were enthralled over the past week, but that wasn't the case. (And it never has been. Even if the hype started with Reagan, it was so-called Reagan Democrats who got him there.) Granted, President Bush was so pleased with his rhetoric linking WWII and Iraq at the memorial dedication that he reprised it for commencement speech at the Air Force Academy. But, Democrats have no intention of allowing Bush to co-opt the Second World War; they too hold up the European front as a model for intervention in the cause of human rights. I would have it that so many American's relish the story of D-Day and the larger story of the war against Nazism precisely because they stand in contrast to wars before and since. Americans, even college grads, are lucky to come up with the domino theory when asked to explain Vietnam, let alone name Archduke Ferdinand in relation to the Great War. But everyone knows the Nazis. They simply make a better enemy, despite our present allegiance to Germany and the fact that it was Japan that struck Pearl Harbor.
By way of introduction to her recent Books & Culture cover story on, Jean Bethke Elshtain takes up Anne Applebaum's Gulag, which rightly asks why Stalin never entered the popular imagination on par with Hitler.
Perhaps, Applebaum muses, because the Soviets talked about a classless society and a utopian world without division, they seem more attractive to us. "Perhaps this helps explain why eyewitness reports of the Gulag were, from the very beginning, often dismissed" . . . So the subject is repressed. Then too, "no one wants to think that we defeated one mass murderer with the help of another." Better not to acknowledge that in the talks that ended World War II and decisively shaped the postwar world, the Western allies gave their blessing to Stalin's stranglehold over Central and Eastern Europe.
Then, citing Frederic Spotts Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics, suggests that the Nazi flair for spectacle remains entrancing. Yet this answer remains unsatisfactory, as the Soviets wanted neither for spectacle nor power. Nevertheless, in grappling with the notion that Hitler was an educated aesthete, Elshtain happens inadvertently on the simple explanation for America's lingering fascination with WWII: the power of narrative.Hitler specialized in staging spectacular "visuals" and generating an aura of palpable power. Is it possible that something of the original appeal of the Nazi imagination remains potent, seducing even those who genuinely deplore Nazism's monstrous crimes?... Paying attention helps us to recognize the fusion of architecture and aggression as characteristic of the Nazi style--and may help to account for why it remains interesting... Akind of conceit often overtakes the cultivated, that immersion in things of beauty and great classical creations of art, architecture, and music, must, ineluctably, refine the soul and forestall brutalities and cruelties. It doesn't—or shouldn't—take much more than one viewing of films showing orchestras comprised of camp prisoners, hence themselves doomed, playing Mozart as condemned Jews, Slavs, and others marched to be gassed, to dispel any illusion that art will, in the end, spare us much of anything... The upshot seems to be that perhaps we should love art for its own sake because art is no guarantee at all that spiritual and ethical uplift will follow. There is one caveat I dare to utter, however. Hitler was no great reader of fiction.
She goes on to suggest, ever so cautiously, that great literature calls us to empathy and "given a certain prior formation, it may help you to deepen desirable qualities." The topic at hand is not whether literature is more powerful, or rather more instructive, than the other arts. But, recognizing the power of narrative and the widespread desire that story's be instructive, explains the lingering fascination with WWII.The desire for a national narrative, a coming-of-age story, in which good and evil stand in stark contrast (with America, naturally, on the proper side) prompts the retelling of stories from "the good war." The fascination with the European front and the coinciding tendency to portray Nazism as a mechanized menace (something scarcely human, let alone German) stem from this desire. It's true that Japan, not Germany, bombed Pearl Harbor, but Hitler's Final Solution makes him the more compelling bad guy.* His egregious racism even serves to diminish the concurrent establishment of internment camps in the American West and the segregation that characterized US Army and civilian life. And perhaps Japanese nationalism is simply to alien to the American mainstream, something more curious than frightening. Last but not least, the story of the European Theater ends well, with Hitler cowering in a bunker and GIs liberating the Nazi death camps. The Pacific Theater ended in a mushroom cloud that hung over the latter 20th century.
*The need for a nemesis explains why the Civil War does not stand as America's archetypal, coming-of-age war. The cause of liberating the slaves was not unlike that of liberating the Jews and Gypsies. But, the need to mend internal rifts superseded the need for a national war story. And sadly, lingering racial inequality undermines the Civil War as a tale of liberation.
posted by Nathan Lott 9:40 AM
____Monday, May 17, 2004____________
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, on a brief junket to Iraq Thursday, told troops and reporters "We care about the detainees being treated right. We care about soldiers behaving right. We care about command systems working." When the story of prisoner abuse broke, officials blamed rogue soldiers, but it is now apparent that command systems did, in fact, malfunction. The embattled Rumsfeld appears to have weathered calls for his dismissal from Democratic leadership. As indeed he should have, and not merely because this tight-lipped administration puts a premium on loyalty.
Abu Ghraib Demands Accountability, Not ScapegoatsThere are reasons* to fire Rumsfeld (presumptive Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry is quick to point out that he went on record favoring Rumsfeld's replacement months ago). Accountability, however, isn't one of them--yet. Instead, accountability demands first that the pentagon, under the secretary's leadership, follow this scandal wherever it leads.
The prisoner-abuse fiasco is widely viewed as the foremost hindrance to a Westward-looking democracy in Iraq. It is difficult to believe, however, that the departure of a US cabinet official would quell anger on the Arab street. While genuflecting before the Senate last week, the Secretary of Defense humbly acknowledged to South Carolina Republican Lindsey Graham that his resignation might signal a serious US response.
In actuality, demanding a scapegoat at the highest level stops well short of a serious, thorough response. To simply prune Pentagon suits and MP privates is to ignore the vast chain of command in between, precisely where Senators, notably Delaware Democrat Joseph Biden, have demanded the investigation lead. And indeed it has.
Major General Antonio M. Taguba, in a report summarizing the Army's investigation into the matter, attributed the scandal to a small cadre of soldiers freelancing under "a failure of leadership". He told a Senate investigatory panel, "supervisory omission was rampant." Accusations have surfaced, however, that in the absence of Army oversight members of the intelligence community, possibly including private contractors, encouraged MPs to soften prisoners prior to interrogation [Update, 5/18: See this Times story for an example]. Accountability demands that supervising officers and interrogators working at Abu Ghraib also be held responsible for abuses that transpired in their midst.
Moreover, mounting evidence suggests that the road to Abu Ghraib lead first through Guantanamo Bay. Newsweek today unveiled a story drawing links between the interrogation methods used to extract information from enemy combatants (whom the Bush Administration insists are not covered by the Geneva Conventions) and prisoner mistreatment in Iraq.
The Bush administration created a bold legal framework to justify this system of interrogation, according to internal government memos obtained by Newsweek. What started as a carefully thought-out, if aggressive, policy of interrogation in a covert war--designed mainly for use by a handful of CIA professionals--evolved into ever-more ungoverned tactics that ended up in the hands of untrained MPs in a big, hot war.
Thus accountability for prisoner abuse may yet climb the chain of command to the Pentagon, or even the White House. But if Mr. Rumsfeld is ultimately found responsible, it will not be as a scapegoat but as an administrator who critically misunderstood the organization he lead.UPDATE, 5/18: A story by Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker (via Slate) was unveiled yesterday and includes accusations that, if proven true, could be damning for Rumsfeld. one-upping Newsweek, Hersh credits the Secretary of Defense with the knowing approval of questionable interrogation techniques in Iraq:
The roots of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal lie... in a decision, approved last year by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to expand a highly secret operation, which had been focussed on the hunt for Al Qaeda, to the interrogation of prisoners in Iraq... According to interviews with several past and present American intelligence officials, the Pentagon’s operation, known inside the intelligence community by several code words, including Copper Green, encouraged physical coercion and sexual humiliation of Iraqi prisoners in an effort to generate more intelligence about the growing insurgency in Iraq. A senior C.I.A. official, in confirming the details of this account last week, said that the operation stemmed from Rumsfeld’s long-standing desire to wrest control of America’s clandestine and paramilitary operations from the C.I.A.
If Rumsfeld is found to have approved tactics that flouted the Geneva Conventions--not to mention having mislead Congress--then his ouster is certain. It will not be as scapegoat, however, and the advisors and underlings who share culpability must also share in the consequences.*For instance, last week Thomas Friedman alluded to Rumsfeld's bull-headed orchestration of the Iraq war in effort to support his lean-and-mean, high-tech vision of a military reborn. However, also writing in the New York Times, David Brooks suggested that Iraqi resistance is rooted in resentment of US might. If he's right, more troops might not quell insurrection but inflame it. The shortcomings of Rumsfeld's military planning don't prove that the troop-heavy Powell doctrine would see greater success--at least not in the all-important battle for hearts and minds.
To the extent that displays of power do beget resentment and resistance, the unfolding prisoner abuse scandal portends yet more strife in Iraq. Of course, I've asserted before that the forces battling the occupation want a US exodus and the establishment of a weak, unstable Iraqi government, which they intend to co-opt, overthrow, or simply obviate through warlordism. In so far as that's true, strife is inevitable. The various resistance factions will foment violent unrest before, and indeed after, the June 30 hand-over.
posted by Nathan Lott 10:59 AM
____Friday, April 30, 2004____________
An Atheist's Noah
Anthropologists and religious scholars often note that some version of the flood narrative (in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the story of Noah) is common to numerous religions around the globe. There are 300 religious flood narratives according to this religioustolerance.org article, which discusses the contemporary hypothesis that the stories began with a deluge of saltwater into the then-fresh Black Sea circa 5600 b.c. The most famous flood story, Noah excluded, is that found in the Sumerian Epic of Gilgamesh, written in the cunieform you learned about in World History class.An atheist explaining the preponderance of flood narratives probably wouldn't sound far removed from a liberal Protestant, citing either some ancient catastrophe and ensuing proto-myth or perhaps a Jungian archetype. In a comical coming full circle, atheists now seem to have their very own Noah in the person of App Applegate, the subject of a front-page profile in Wednesday's Washington Post. Of course, the only flood environmentally conscious Applegate anticipates is a century off, when global warming finally melts the polar ice caps. However, the 5-foot-tall, 85-year-old Puget Sound eccentric has built a boat, and it's going to take a flood--or as he plans it a pair of bulldozers and accident insurance--to get his boat afloat. A longish exert from the much lengthier piece by Blaine Harden:
Orcas Island, which Seattle millionaires are busily refurbishing as the Martha's Vineyard of the West, is not nearly far out enough for Applegate. So, for the past 15 years, he has been building an escape module.
It's a whopper: An 80-foot, 50-ton, three-masted sailboat. Local sailors say the wooden barkentine is nearly finished, solid and seaworthy, if a bit rough around the gunnels. Applegate built it by hand--outdoors, often in miserably dank weather--and he paid for the whole thing with Social Security checks. He plans to sail east around the world to dock in Cienfuegos Bay, Cuba. He's a fervent admirer of Fidel Castro.
There is a logistical kink. The boat sits where it was built: on the side of a mountain beneath towering Douglas firs, 400 feet above sea level, six miles from a suitable boat launch….
The Aproximada has eight berths and will need a crew of at least five. So far, there is only one sure bet. She is Rivkah Sweedler, 58, a woodcarver and longtime exile from what she calls "the dominant culture." She and Applegate joined forces in 1997, shortly after her husband died. He helped her move on after her loss; she eased his loneliness and turned him into a phenomenally healthful eater. She typically serves him a breakfast that includes triticale flakes, buckwheat groats and pumpkin seeds.
Applegate and Sweedler see eye to eye on religious, environmental and political matters: Her late husband, Walter, was also an atheist. App and Rivkah are outspoken advocates of open-field defecation. They deeply dislike President Bush.
This last bit comes as a big disappointment to Karl Rove, who thought Bush had the outdoor-defecation vote sewn up. Mind you, I wish App', Rivkah, and anyone brave enough to sail around the world with them a safe and happy journey. And though Harden's tone is respectful, a little ribbing comes with the territory. Ask Noah, who was roundly mocked when corralling his menagerie two by two up the gangplank to the dry-docked Ark (not to be confused with same of the Covenant). Our modern Noah and Naamah of the Northwest have instead filled their ship's larder with bulk organic foods (which may yet lure aboard two of every kind of marmot on Orcas Island).Yet the Post is careful to include the comments of friends and neighbors who describe Applegate as a harmless eccentric. In an age when godless communism is no longer menacing (instead we've religious zealots to worry about), Applegate's antiquated beliefs seem laughable, as Noah's surely did. It is, of course, an act of faith to trudge into the woods with a shovel when nature (literally?) calls, but eco-centric convictions didn't stop Applegate from using power tools to construct his craft--and apparently won't deter him from using bulldozers to transport it. In a similar dichotomy, his girlfriend describes herself as an "exile from the 'dominant culture,'" while he's living on Social Security. Perhaps these capitulations to the American mainstream render them less threatening. Certainly, their self-imposed "exile" is less threatening than the highbrow Mensa-member style atheist activism of Michael Newdow, who's grudge against God (and one suspects a few believers he's met along the way, not least of all his ex-wife) has the Supreme Court mulling over the Pledge of Allegiance.
But why, other than a few chuckles, did the Aproximada and it's owner wind up on the front page of the Post? Well, it would seem App is the new face of Green America, at least until he leaves for Cuba. You see, the story came on the heels of two companion articles about life in Red (i.e. Republican) and Blue (Democrat) America. (Those color-coded maps TV networks use on election night have transformed the political spectrum into a chromatic one, leaving most of us in the purple center.) Having profiled stereotypical conservative and liberal Americans in Texas and California, respectively, the paper went to the Northwest for a glimpse of Green life. In that light the story comes off a tad dismissive, but as I said, it goes with the territory.
posted by Nathan Lott 1:25 PM
____Thursday, April 15, 2004____________
Disquieting Convergence
Yesterday, President Bush conferred with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on the latter's controversial plan to evacuate Jewish settlements in Gaza and fortify Israel's citizens against neighboring Palestinians. The foremost criticism levied against the meeting holds that Bush redirected America's Middle East policy without considering the Palestinian view. This is perhaps an overstatement, given that the administration's lip-service for a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict looks more like a non-policy. However, the president's statements vis-à-vis West Bank settlements and the Palestinian right of return (he sided with Israel on both matters) show little regard for Palestinian concerns.Bush seems to grasp that both Israel and the U.S. are threatened by Arab-Islamic terrorists, but has wrongly hinged the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority on it's ability to stop terrorists and under that pretext neglected to hear Palestinian concerns. Moderate, secular Palestinian leaders can no more stop Hamas than can Paul Bremer disband the Sunni militia's now roaming the streets of Najaf. In both cases, a modicum of stability is necessary for resolution, but peace will only follow the establishment of a permanent government.
This BBC analysis misleadlingly refers to Sharon's initiative as the "US-Israeli plan," when in fact Bush did little more than rubber stamp the Israeli PM's legislative proposal--with the aim of easing it through the Knesset. After making the bold step of asserting that Palestinians deserve statehood in 2001, the president has backed off the issue, nominally supporting the roadmap but declining to expend political capital pursuing it. For his part, Sharon lept at the opportunity to dismantle the Palestinian security apparatus when it failed to squelch the current intifada. Both men refused to bargain with Yassar Arafat then neglected to engage his successor.
In a way, Sharon's proposal represents a brave step forward, abandoning the Zionist mentality that an expansion of Jewish enclaves throughout Palestine (and their ultimate annexation into a Jewish state) somehow advances Israeli security. Bush however, has allowed an opportunity for courageous action to pass him by. The president should have applauded Israeli retrenchment toward 1967 borders without acquiescing to Sharon's pleas that, having given up the Gaza settlements, Israel be allowed to retain far more controversial West Bank enclaves. Although the concept of tit-for-tat land trades has been discussed for years (allowing Israel to retain large Jewish settlements on the West Bank by surrendering compensatory land to a newly created Palestine), it has few backers on the Palestinian side.
Simply put, Israel would be better served to relinquish all settlements and resettle refugees there. Bush is correct that Palestinian refugees should not be resettled in Israel. Why should that state accept an influx of citizens who have for generations been indoctrinated to oppose its very existence? (Israel ought to stop treating it's current Arab populace as second-class citizens, but that's another matter.) But, if he intended to make such an assertion publicly, the president should have recognized the anger and disappointment it would stir among Palestinians and accompanied it with a similar call for Israeli sacrifice. By siding with Sharon on all fronts--when he arguably could have kept his mouth shut--Bush abandoned the pretext of being an honest broker, a signal perhaps that he has no intention of assuming the role.
Part Two
Today, in the wake of the Bush-Sharon meeting, comes news of a yet-to-be-authenticated audio statement from Osama bin-Laden aired on Arabic satellite TV stations. The poignantly timed missive includes a threat to retaliate against America for the Israeli assassination of Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Not only does bin Laden attempt to equate the actions of terrorists and insurgents with those of legitimate states and insist the West started it all (to use the schoolyard phrase), but amazingly, he responds to the death of a half-blind cleric by insisting upon eye-for-an-eye violence:It was said: Oppression kills the oppressors and the hotbed of injustice is evil. The situation in occupied Palestine is an example. What happened on 11 September and 11 is your commodity that was returned to you.…we would like to inform you that labeling us and our acts as terrorism is also a description of you and of your acts. Reaction comes at the same level as the original action. Our acts are reaction to your own acts, which are represented by the destruction and killing of our kinfolk in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine.
It's uncanny that bin Laden's message, which so clearly aligns the US with Israel (to the point of an interchangeable reprisal) should surface the day after the Bush-Sharon meeting. In all likelihood, this is coincidence; holed up wherever he is, bin Laden is hard pressed to deliver messages within a day (his last came in September). However, he clearly has access to global media. In fact, the thrust of the recording is targeted at Europeans. Bin Laden offers a truce, with a three-month window, to Europeans who withdraw troops from the Islamic world and stop attacking Muslims (it's unclear whether or not French head-scarf bans constitute attacks). I carefully avoid accusing Westerners with far-left positions of giving aid and comfort to the enemy, but it seems they've given bin Laden rhetorical ammo. He seizes upon accusations of war profiteering in the US to assert the righteousness of the Iraqi resistance and anti-US terror, even mentioning Halliburton by name. And get this: he's even seen the poll numbers:
The act that horrified the world; that is, the killing of the old, handicapped Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, may God have mercy on him, is sufficient evidence.
We pledge to God that we will punish America for him, God willing.
Which religion considers your killed ones innocent and our killed ones worthless? And which principle considers your blood real blood and our blood water? Reciprocal treatment is fair and the one who starts injustice bears greater blame.Based on the above, and in order to deny war merchants a chance and in response to the positive interaction shown by recent events and opinion polls, which indicate that most European peoples want peace, I ask honest people, especially ulema, preachers and merchants, to form a permanent committee to enlighten European peoples of the justice of our causes, above all Palestine. They can make use of the huge potential of the media.
Why court Europe now? It's true many Europeans oppose the US approach to the War on Terror, but most opposed the invasion of Iraq more than a year ago, and most are already highly sympathetic to the plight of Palestinians. First, the Israeli-Palestinian issue is a ruse aimed solely at garnering Arab support; it fits with bin Laden's post-September 11 rhetorical strategy. The simple answer is that bin Laden found promising the post-bombing Spanish election and subsequent promises to remove Spanish troops from Iraq unless the UN steps in. Although the capitulation of Spain's new left-leaning government was over-reported (the leftist opposed Spain's role in Iraq all along and enjoyed great popularity even before the outgoing government bungled the train-bombing investigation), bin Laden is banking on European cowardice. Fortunately, European leaders have answered the challenge with resolve. Per the BBC: " Spain, Britain, Germany and the European Commission have all rejected such a move, with EC President Romano Prodi saying there was 'no possibility for negotiation under [a] terrorist threat'." Their people now must do likewise, despite the fact that bin Laden is learning to speak their language.posted by Nathan Lott 12:32 PM
____Thursday, April 08, 2004____________
To secure victory in Iraq, the coalition must recognize what failure would look like.
If in fact it represents a growing trend of pan-Muslim militancy, then this Washington Post story* may be the most troubling news to emerge from Iraq in weeks--and that's saying a lot given the climate of escalating violence.On the streets of Baghdad neighborhoods long defined by differences of faith and politics, signs are emerging that resistance to the U.S. occupation may be growing from a sporadic, underground effort to a broader insurrection by militiamen who claim to be fighting in the name of their common faith, Islam.
Fortunately, that's a big if. The fact that two marauding bands (or simply wandering mobs that served as cover for militants) elected to share the spotlight does not demonstrate tactical coordination. And while it's conceivable that Sunni and Shiite militants will briefly link arms beneath the slogan "The enemy of my enemy is my friend," it's almost inconceivable that anti-Western Islamist extremism will bridge the centuries-old schism between the sects. There is fertile soil for extremist rhetoric among both groups (recall that Iranian theocrats predate the al Qaeda threat), but conciliatory words between them are scant at most. Just months ago came reports that al Qaeda hoped to incite Sunni-Shiite violence in order to destabilize Iraq. Shortly thereafter, I quoted Princeton's Michael Doran, but it bears repeating : "Many Sunnis, especially religious extremists, hate Shiites more than they hate Israel. Al Qaeda's basic credo puts the matter bluntly: 'We believe that the Shiites are . . . the most evil creatures under the heavens.'"
On Monday, residents of Adhamiya, a largely Sunni section of northern Baghdad, marched with followers of Moqtada Sadr, the militant Shiite cleric whose call for armed resistance was answered by local Sunnis the same afternoon, residents said.Why then the apparent cooperation? It's reasonable to believe that some Iraqi Sunni's don't harbor that level of contempt, particularly elements of the officially secular former regime. Yet the history of baathist repression suggests otherwise. In fact, it is a driving force behind Shiite demands for greater political authority and carries the lingering potential of reprisal violence. It is more reasonable that each side would like to see the other suffer the costs of battling the occupation, reserving its own resources for an impending civil struggle.
Yes, I believe a withdrawal of occupation peacekeepers would precipitate civil war in Iraq. Furthermore, each side is readying itself for such a conflict. Hence Moqtada Sadr and his supporters formed and armed a militia. Having rallied and armed a sizable contingent of disillusioned, ill-education, and poor Shiites, Sadr and company now face the challenge of reigning them in when necessary. Mobs of armed, unemployed zealots are given to escalating violence, which points to the risk of civil strife. Regional warlordship is a possible alternative to full-scale war (with different armies controlling Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish population centers), but a grim one nevertheless.
It is presumptuous to suggest that Sadr's Shiites or any other band of dissidents wants a civil war. What they want is control of a post-occupation Iraq, and the means to assume and assert that control. In doing so, rhetoric will be as important as bullets. Sadr has urged his militia to join the violent resistance in part so that he can lay claim to having ousted the occupiers, or at least to having resisted them. This suits his instinct to exploit nationalism, ethnicity, and religion in post-occupation Iraq. Also, by raising the stakes in this manner, he calls the bluff of other Shiite leaders, namely Ayatollah Sistani. He can vie for leadership of his fellow Shiites (Iraq's majority, and thus a powerful force even in a democratic context, as Sistani understands) as a man of action, painting his reclusive elder as inept.
Stateside, disheartening news from Iraq again produced talk of Vietnam this week. The wars are hardly similar. It is far more instructive, if not more encouraging, to look elsewhere for historical parallels. The scenario for post-occupation struggle I've described above more closely resembles recent wars in Africa and the Balkans. There are also lessons to be gleaned from other Middle East conflicts which may help the coalition avoid a catastrophic debacle--a goal I believe is achievable, even likely, provided the coalition recognizes the threat. I've posited before that a complete Israeli withdrawal to pre-1964 borders (not Sharon's current plan for unilateral withdrawal from Gaza) would likely produce civil war among Palestinians. A recognized Palestinian leader is a prerequisite to peace: first to negotiate a final settlement and subsequently to assume leadership of the newly formed nation. So it is in Iraq.
As outsiders to the current interim council and the transitional government set to assume control on June 30, Sadr and the Sunni extremists are battling to delegitimize not only the occupation, but its replacement. If patient, they will merely foment discord in advance of coalition troop departures (which may be years away), then attempt to topple or co-opt the unstable Iraqi government. In order to avert future violence and authoritarianism, the US interim authority and the Iraqi transitional government must produce a widely respected figurehead and a representative governing body. More important than decapitating the current resistance movements is undergirding the nascent Iraqi government. The US must convince NATO and EU allies to contribute fiscal support to Iraq, as they are doing in Afghanistan.
Likewise, coalition leaders must resist the temptation to prematurely reduce troop levels. Here again, Middle East history is instructive. A hasty departure will echo Lebanon to Islamists--who will no doubt join the chorus claiming credit for the coalition exodus. Bin Laden and other militants cite the US evacuation of Beruit as indicative of the American lack of resolve. Leaving Iraq to civil strife could produce a counter-productive result not only for Iraq, but also for the larger War on Terror. It is clear that abandoning Afghanistan could allow the nation to revert to a haven for terrorists. But who's to say abandoning Iraq might not do the same, especially if warring militias offer jihadis a chance to train in battle. A civil war in Iraq could become a magnet for mujahadeen, and even small-scale fighting would serve as a proving ground for terrorist recruits.**
I've outlined here a nightmare scenario, a spectacular failure for US interventionism. Such a failure is by no means inevitable. Yet a failing to consider the risk is failure too. If there is one thing the US administration should have learned by now, it is to be prepared for any scenario. And whether Bush is granted a second term or replaced, the US role in Iraq will impact the security of both nations well beyond the next four years.
*Update, 4/9: Today the New York Times published this article on the apparent cohesion among Sunni and Shiite radicals. The article suggests that Shiites entered Fallujah in order to join Sunni fighters with the apparent blessing of their mullahs.
**Update, 4/12: This in-flux of self-proclaimed holy warriors is already occuring, as many--myself included--have previously noted and as this story illustrates in the context of the recent flair-up. It also, handily, points to the possibility of outsider-fueled violence between the Islamic sects in Iraq: "The evidence -- Islamic books, pamphlets, tapes and farewell letters in Arabic -- suggested that some of the men were not Iraqis from the area, but foreign Sunni Muslims who had traveled to this urban Sunni stronghold to fight and die in a holy war, both against the U.S. forces and the country's Shiite Muslim majority."
Update, 4/14: Okay, last one, but I can't pass up the chance to quote an Iraqi auto mechanic who represents the vast center of the Iraqi citizenry (neither could the Post): "I was relieved to hear Bush saying that U.S. troops will remain in Iraq because any withdrawal means disaster in my country," he said. "Every militia will try to take control of Iraq. This will lead to a civil war and subsequently Iraq will fall apart."posted by Nathan Lott 2:49 PM
