A sign of hope

An IRIN report suggests that HIV education and preventive measures may be working in Swaziland, with infection rates among teenagers substantially lower than in the country as a whole. In a study of 1000 Swazis in rural areas, the infection rate among girls 19 and over was almost 40 percent, while the rate among girls 15 to 19 years old was only six percent:

Analysts have attributed the decrease in numbers to the differing attitudes towards AIDS between older and younger girls. According to a 2002 focus group in the Northern Hhohho region, older youth, who became sexually active in the late 1990s, took either a fatalistic attitude toward the disease by assuming they were infected and nothing could be done, or a dismissive and conspiratorial attitude by saying the disease was overblown or an intentional plan to eradicate Africans. Younger teenagers who had yet to become sexually active wanted as much information as they could get to avoid infection.

"Our hypothesis is that around 2001 we hit a turn-around point, and our data confirms this. Older teens had been sexually active for four or five years before AIDS education began to bear fruit. They were also victims to the early AIDS message that if you have sex once without a condom, you die," Brody explained. "Younger teens grew up attending the funerals of family members and friends who died of AIDS, and they knew the disease was real. They had also heard there are ways to avoid AIDS."

If similar data is confirmed in other countries in southern Africa - which has historically had the highest HIV infection rates in the world - then the entire region may be turning the corner.

Pollard II?

There may be another Israeli spy scandal in the offing, this one involving the United States:

[I]t was reported that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has launched a probe into allegations that an official in the Pentagon has been passing intelligence information to Israel via AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobbying group [...] The Web site of the Washington Post on Saturday quoted two sources who identified the alleged Pentagon spy as Larry Franklin, a desk officer in the Defense Department's Near East and South Asia Bureau [...] CBS reported Friday that the FBI has been conducting an ongoing investigation and is convinced that an official in the Pentagon has conveyed highly sensitive information to the Israeli government via two representatives of AIPAC.

Israel denies that any espionage occurred but states that it's investigating the matter and acknowledges that Franklin had a working relationship with Israeli officials. AIPAC also denies involvement and says that it's cooperating with the FBI. No arrests have been made, but according to several of the media reports, one or more can be expected within days.

Naturally, the media and the blogosphere are full of the story this morning. Aluf Benn in Ha'aretz argues that comparisons to Pollard are exaggerated and points out that similar allegations against another State Department official three years ago proved unfounded, but says that the Franklin affair "will cause serious damage to Israel's image and obstruct its working relations with the administration." Josh Marshall thinks it may be less about Israel than about Iran. Juan Cole argues that it's symptomatic of AIPAC's influence in Congress. Helena Cobban thinks it might be the tip of a much bigger iceberg. Roger Simon says that "this won't be good for the Jews," and leaves it at that.

I'm going to resist the temptation to play amateur intelligence analyst, because I don't have nearly enough information. This may turn out to be the real thing. Allies spying on each other is part of the game, and I have no doubt that Israeli intelligence has continued to operate in the United States notwithstanding the fallout of the Pollard incident (although if the Mossad is in fact using AIPAC as an asset, they've crossed the line into outright stupidity). It may also turn out to be a repeat of the Felix Bloch affair, where news of the investigation broke before the FBI was ready to make arrests and it was never able to prove that espionage occurred. The Friday-night timing of the story, and the FBI's rapid shift from "no arrests are imminent" to "arrests within a few days," suggests that the news was leaked prematurely. I'll be following the story as, I suspect, will most Americans and Israelis.

Whether or not Franklin is guilty, though, I suspect the leak may have as much to do with American election-year politics as with either Iran or Israel. As can be seen from the number of critical books and letters authored this year by former American diplomats and civil servants, there's a considerable amount of discontentment with the Bush administration's policies within the middle ranks of the intelligence and foreign service communities, and much of that dissension concerns Middle East policy. It's possible that someone saw this investigation as a means of embarrassing both the Bush administration and AIPAC, and wanted to make sure that the news got out before the election.

Alternatively, it could have been a strategic leak designed to bury the story by releasing it on a Friday night going into a news week that will be dominated by the Republican convention. I don't think it will be a one-day story, though, especially if the FBI does make arrests. Regardless of the outcome of the investigation, Israel may have become even more of a wedge issue in American politics.

Labor appeal

Chris Nwachuku updates developments in the ongoing clash between the Nigerian government and the country's strongest federation of trade unions.

Finding a place

The Fijian government is reportedly considering whether to establish a trust fund for the benefit of Fiji's 14,000 non-indigenous Melanesians. Like the Indo-Fijians, the Melanesians are descended from plantation laborers imported during the nineteenth century, but unlike the Indians, they have not developed a presence in business and the professions. This leaves them with the worst of both worlds - they have neither the economic networks of the Indo-Fijians nor the land tenure and government benefits that go to indigenous Fijians and Rotumans. With two thirds of them living below the poverty line, they are among hte poorest communities in Fiji.

They also have little political clout. The 1997 constitution, which apportions 46 of the 71 parliamentary seats by ethnic community, places them in the catchall category of "general voters," a classification they share with Europeans, Chinese and various Polynesian minorities. The political networks and parties of this group are dominated by Fijians of European, part-European and Chinese descent. All three General seats in the Fijian parliament are currently held by part-Europeans, and, although the platforms of both main general voters' parties call for promoting the rights of disadvantaged minorities, in practical terms they have allied more with indigenous Fijian nationalists than with their non-indigenous Pacific Islander constituents. There are some exceptions such as John Sanday, who has lived in Papua New Guinea and tried to establish networks between Melanesian governments and their expatriates in Fiji, but he failed to secure a seat in the last election and his party has no parliamentary representation.

Recently, however, the Melanesians have begun to organize, forming a communal association and demanding an equal footing with indigenous Fijians with respect to scholarship programs and affirmative action. With the help of studies conducted by churches and NGOs, the association has attempted to draw attention to the community's poverty. The prime minister has also met recently with Are Wakowako, the head of the Melanesian Association, and asked him to draw up a proposal for a government trust fund to benefit communal institutions.

Demands for separate representation in parliament - in which the Melanesians could fairly claim one seat by virtue of their population - may not be far behind. In essence, the Melanesians are trying to separate themselves from the "general" category and establish a distinct niche in Fijian ethnic politics, which seems natural given that ethnic representation has been part of the Fijian political system since the colonial Legislative Council was founded in 1904. With a few rare exceptions like the 1987 and 1999 elections - both of which resulted in coups - attempts to forge ideological or economic alliances across ethnic lines have failed in Fiji, and this seems to be as true within the "general" category as in the country as a whole. The elites among the general voters don't represent the Melanesians, so they have adopted a classic Fijian solution - demanding communal rights of their own.

Ominous signs

The latest fallout from last week's massacre of 160 Tutsi refugees in Burundi may threaten the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Azarias Ruberwa, who is one of the DRC's four vice-presidents and who is himself a Tutsi, has withdrawn from the transitional unity government amid allegations that Congolese forces were involved in the massacre. He is now threatening to pull his party out of the peace process unless changes are made to the transitional accords, and some radicals within the party reportedly want to go back into rebellion. The other parties aren't helping matters, rejecting any possibility of revising the transition process and accusing Ruberwa of working for Rwanda. The entire region could be one wrong move away from returning to active warfare.

Untimely withdrawal

Zimbabwe's opposition Movement for Democratic Change has announced that it will boycott all future elections at both the national and local levels until electoral reforms are implemented. In addition, the MDC members of the Harare city council have resigned en masse, leaving only five members of the 50-seat council still in office.

The MDC's announcement has been expected for months, and the party has recently laid the groundwork by engaging in "public consultations" to manufacture consent for a boycott. Given the party's string of recent by-election losses in its urban strongholds, however, withdrawing from politics at this point amounts to a confession of weakness. It will also leave Zimbabwe without an effective opposition; independent candidates or MDC defectors will be able to make strong challenges for a few seats in next year's general election, but there isn't enough time for a new broad-based party to make a serious nationwide run.

And even in an authoritarian system like Zimbabwe, opposition parties play an important role. The MDC lacks the power to block most ZANU-sponsored legislation, but it acts as a pro-democracy voice on the international scene, and as recent events have shown, it retains leverage through its ability to block constitutional amendments. The party doesn't have a serious chance of securing a majority next year, but if it competes in the election, it has a good shot of retaining the 50 seats necessary to prevent unilateral constitutional change. If it doesn't compete, then Zimbabwe will return to the pre-2000 days when ZANU answered to no one, and the MDC will sacrifice what power and moral authority it still has.

The World's Third Greatest African is....Who!

The London-based New Africa magazine published the results of a poll conducted amongst its audience on the 100 Greatest Africans and shockingly the third place went to Zimbabwean old war-horse and Dear Leader Robert Mugabe. As the Mail and Guardian caustically notes :

Mugabe, widely criticised outside Zimbabwe for stifling dissent and crippling the economy of his once-prosperous Southern African nation, is an "interesting" choice because "a high-profile campaign in the media has painted him in [a] bad light", the New African wrote.

The London-based magazine said responses flooded in after the survey was launched last December to nominate the top 100 most influential Africans or people of African descent.

I have to say this is a real shocker, to me at least. I know that Mugabe might still be able to command some residual loyalty for his role (which when put into context wasn’t the most prominent and retrospectively hardly vital) in Zimbabwe national-liberation struggle but after the mis-management of relations with Nkomo and ZIPRA, the Matabeleland killings, suppression of internal dissent combined with the more well publicised recent deterioration of Zimbabwe’s political scene and economic position wouldn’t even guarantee Mugabe a place in the top 100, never mind third place; especially given the realities of everyday life and governance nobody in the region can be unfamiliar with what living under a Zanu-ocracy must be like (for non-supporters of the regime at least). I have the opportunity to be making a trip to Kenya and Nigeria next month to attend the wedding of one very close and old friend and act as the godfather to the newly born daughter of another old family friend, so there will be some limited scope for impromptu polling and I suspect the results will be somewhat different.

Meanwhile New Africa raises some other omissions and points of concern about who was left on and off the poll:

Overall, the results point out certain characteristics about Africans. Why did politicians dominate the poll? Do people tend to vote for men as only a few women were nominated? Or is there a paucity of women to vote for? Over 95% of the nominations were of recent heroes (mostly from the post-independence era). Have people forgotten Africa’s history? Must this worry us, as a people?

All valid concerns and legitimate but I can’t help wondering whether another pressing worry must be why leaders who clearly don’t hold the interests of their people and their nation above their own and on the contrary are positively harmful to both, score so highly. Barring ZANU-PF voting tactics (obviously an unlikely scenario in this case) this is a question to which I can’t think of an immediate or easy answer.

Compensation order

The Niger Delta peoples' quest for compensation for the environmental damage left by the oil industry has advanced, with the Nigerian legislature ordering Royal Dutch Shell to pay $1.5 billion to the Ijaw:

The money was for the severe health hazards, economic hardship, injurious affection, avoidable deaths and sundry maladies which the people have suffered as a direct or indirect consequence of multiple spillages occurring in SPDC's facilities across the eight local government areas of the state since the company commenced operations in 1956.

The upper legislative house approved that $1 billion is payable forthwith while the $500 million be paid within five years period in five equal installments of $100 million per annum commencing not later than one year after the payment of the initial $1 billion aforementioned.

Similar petitions from other groups in the Niger Delta states remain pending.

The cheerleading comes thick and fast

Congratulations to windsurfer Gal Friedman on Israel's first Olympic gold medal.

Two weeks until Arrival Day

This post continues the countdown to Arrival Day 2004. Arrival Day is a non-religious celebration of the founding of the American Jewish community, which occurred with the landing of the first Jewish immigrants in New Amsterdam on September 7, 1654. Every Tuesday until September 7, I will post an essay on American Judaism to mark the occasion. Both Jews and non-Jews are invited to participate in the Arrival Day Blogburst on September 7; if you're interested, let me know via e-mail or in the comments.

September 7, 2054 will be the 400th Arrival Day. Barring a near-extinction-level event such as an ice age or thermonuclear war, it is likely that there will still be a United States and there will still be Jews in it. Both Judaism and the political institutions of the United States are too firmly established for a mere fifty years of gradual change to eliminate; the nature and meaning of both may have shifted somewhat, but in all probability they will still exist.

Beyond that, the next half-century presents a myriad of possibilities. American Jews in 2054 might be a declining community of three million or an expanding one of ten million, politically influential or increasingly marginal, centered around a religious core or defined primarily as an ethnic and cultural group. Which of these they will be depends on how the Jewish community, and its component parts, treat intermarriage, assimilation, social change and technological progress as causes for despair or as opportunities.

One of the debates likely to come to the fore by 2054 is whether Judaism should become a proselytizing religion. The rabbinical bans against proselytizing are deep-rooted, but the conditions under which they were issued no longer exist; at the time the bans were laid down, proselytization was an easy way to get an entire Jewish community killed or expelled, but no such consequences exist in the modern-day United States. In a country where there no stigma attaches to Judaism and where mass-market forms of Jewish mysticism are big-ticket items, there are few valid reasons to refrain from sharing the Jewish ethical message; indeed, it could be argued that Judaism's shift from a tribal to a universalist religion over the past few centuries requires this message to be shared with those who are not Jews by birth.

There is a certain amount of soft-core proselytizing taking place now, under the guise of finding "lost" Jewish communities and reacquainting them with their roots. In many cases, these communities' historical connection to Judaism is tenuous at best, and what is in fact being done is bringing new converts into the Jewish fold. There is also some degree of outreach taking place among those who have already set one foot in the Jewish community by marrying its members. To proceed from this to a general outreach effort is only a matter of degree, and if the American Jewish community continues to experience attrition due to intermarriage or secularism, proselytization may become an attractive option to bring in new blood.

This is a process that is already beginning in 2004. Some rabbis and community leaders are already starting to actively encourage conversion; organizations such as the Conversion to Judaism Resource Center provide information for those interested in becoming Jews and encourage members of the Jewish community to publicize their religion. At the moment, this and similar movements cannot be called mainstream, but by 2054 they might well be. Converts now make up about five percent of the American Jewish population; a half-century from now, they might be a quarter, a third or even a majority. If this happens, it will underscore the healthy fact that Judaism is a matter of choice and self-identification rather than blood.

These converts, if they exist, will likely enrich the more liberal branches of Judaism. At present, a plurality of American converts choose Reform Judaism, simply because the Reform movement is most open to converts and to intermarriage. This isn't likely to change much by 2054; liberal Judaism will still be more open to the outside, and Orthodox Jews' endogamy and higher natural increase rates will reduce the pressure to replenish their community from without. A side effect of this would be to reinforce the mutual exclusivity of Orthodox and non-Orthodox Judaism; if a plurality or majority of non-Orthodox Jews are non-halachic converts, then most Orthodox Jews will not consider them marriageable. The result might be a division between a liberal, culturally and ethically Jewish community in which Jews by choice predominate and a halachic community united by kinship and religious observance.

Halachic Judaism, though, will also undergo changes. One of the key challenges facing the Orthodox rabbis of the 21st century will be technology, particularly in the areas of medicine and information delivery. Rabbinic legislation has generally taken a pragmatic approach to technologies that improve health or extend life, but there are already fierce debates over techniques such as cloning or genetic engineering. The emergence of technologies that directly alter the human body or involve the creation of life will fuel these debates, leading to intense disagreement over what can be done to preserve human life.

Information will be an increasing concern of the ultra-Orthodox, as improved communications combined with increasing extra-communal employment threaten religious authorities' control over what haredim see and read. Jews aren't known for adopting an Amish approach and rejecting technology, but some haredi communities have made exceptions in the area of communications by banning television and Internet use. Such bans will become harder to maintain as communication technology becomes more sophisticated and miniaturized, and ultra-Orthodox rabbis will be faced with the choice between making rational use of these technologies or enforcing an increasingly repressive insularity. The Jerusalem Post (via Lynn B.) suggests that this is already starting to happen in Israel:

Before our eyes, two types of ultra-orthodoxy are forming. One consisting of those who still steadfastly refuse to have anything to do with the Zionist state and modernity, out of fear that even the smallest crack will bring the walls tumbling down. Another one will be made up of those willing to play a productive role in the workplace and take part in deciding on the country's future, without inferiority complexes and proud of their haredi heritage.

Shorn of the debate over Zionism, the same dynamic is likely to play out in the United States. Haredi communities aren't self-sufficient, so they can't totally cut off contact with the world, but ultra-Orthodoxy in 2054 may well be divided between insular, self-disenfranchised communities and those that increase their involvement in the larger world at the inevitable price of having to defend or modify their world-view.

The Chabad movement, which is already changing from a sect to a denomination, will be one of the latter. Chabad, in fact, may be a full-fledged branch of Orthodox Judaism by 2054; rather than a unified movement as it was during the Rebbe's lifetime, it will be a collection of independent congregations, schools and charities loosely united by his teachings. It also may be the wild card in Orthodox Judaism's general reliance on natural growth. The Chabad movement has actively proselytized among non-Orthodox Jews and will continue to do so; whether it will extend its active outreach to non-Jews is less certain, but radicalism is in the Chabadniks' blood, and some of its daughter congregations may seek out non-Jewish converts by 2054 in order to maintain their growth and dynamism.

Where will this leave the community as a whole? If it finds some way to replenish itself - whether through proselytization, natural growth or embrace of "ethnic Jews" as full partners in American Judaism - it will remain an influential and well-placed minority. If the American Jewish population is fragmented and in decline, Jews are still likely to be well placed in American society but their influence will be less. In that event, the Jewish vote will no longer be key to winning national elections and, outside a few states, Jews will exercise influence more through political contributions and senior appointed positions than electoral power.

Whether this will matter is yet another question. In domestic policy issues, the Jewish community won't have to act on its own; its concerns will be shared by other religious minorities that will make up a growing percentage of the American population, and the range of available alliances may even be greater than today. Foreign policy, though, may be another story. It may be that Israel is no longer a concern for American Jews in 2054, either because the Israeli-Arab conflict has been resolved or because American Jewish identity has become divorced from Israel. If the conflict is still active and of concern to American Jews, though, they may be in less of a position to make their voices heard on foreign policy matters - and clashes over foreign policy may impair their ability to make domestic alliances or even create damaging rivalries. Worst of all would be a catastrophic failure of the state of Israel at a time when American Jewish identity is heavily invested in Zionism; the loss of a foundation necessarily affects the entire structure, and a loss of this magnitude might result in a communal sense of vulnerability and loss of self-confidence. If that happens, then "golden age of American Jewry" could be over.

More likely, though, will be an intermediate state in which American Judaism and Israel continue to flourish but in which each is constantly redefining itself and its relationship to the other. Among the things that have contributed to the success of both American and Israeli Judaism are their diversity, openness and ability to respond to change, and as long as they retain these talents, the prospects for the future are good.

Next: September 7, 2354.

Driving a wedge?

The ruling party of Zimbabwe, which has thus far failed to win the opposition support it needs to amend the electoral provisions of the constitution, is now trying to convince female opposition MPs to desert their party. ZANU is three votes short of the two-thirds majority it needs to enact its electoral program, and is reportedly ready to propose an expanded parliament in which fifty seats are reserved for women. Five of the 52 members of the MDC delegation are female, and Mugabe is evidently hoping that his promise of guaranteed representation can convince at least three to cross the floor.

This is something of a change for a party that has consistently opposed legislation to guarantee women's property and inheritance rights, and once made female MPs kneel to greet Mugabe when he returned from trips abroad. ZANU's new proposals, however, seem more cosmetic than anything else. The presence of more women in Parliament will not guarantee either that they are elected fairly or that they are given meaningful roles, and ZANU's track record on both counts leaves much to be desired. The female MDC legislators seem unimpressed, and if the party stays together, it may get a last chance to demand real reform.

First step

The Somali transitional parliament has finally been inaugurated - sort of. Sixty-one of the 275 seats remain vacant, because several of the subclans who will be represented under a complicated power-sharing formula have not yet nominated their representatives. The parliament will also sit in Nairobi for the time being, with no set schedule for returning to Mogadishu. The process of re-establishing a functioning Somali state may have begun, but it still faces hard work and long odds.

Sharing the Past, Dividing the Present: India and Pakistan at 57

I want to thank Jonathan, for kindly extending me this opportunity and invitation to guest post in the wake of the recent 57th Independence Anniversary celebrations and commemorations in India and Pakistan. I had initially thought of exploring some of the problems India faces today and how far it has come in redeeming what its first Prime Minister termed ‘our tryst with destiny’; perhaps if time and other pressures permit I will have a chance to do so at a later date. Instead, Jonathan has thoughtfully, opened up another vein of discussion and debate and one that is probably of more interest to those who don’t have direct connections to the South Asian region: namely the aftermath of Partition and its consequent impact on inter-state relations and Pakistani/Indian nationalisms. Some of the reasons why this is important are obvious, as two nuclear states, engaged in at least one bloody proxy war and periodic mobilisations and heightened states of military preparedness for war; it is a matter of concern that this might escalate into a full-blown nuclear exchange. Other more long-term factors also play a role, as a recent demographic projection in the Guardian showed, in a few decades India will overtake China as the world’s most populous nation, and Pakistan will also be amongst the top ten; the former is a growing industrial, financial and technological power with increasingly supra-regional ambitions, situated next to China; whom many see as the world’s next Great Power. So some level of interest, in what has usually been a relatively less pressing, and arguably less than glamorous area of the globe is understandable.

In the interests of brevity and the spare any excessive rambling I will constrain myself to listing some of the major lessons and points of significance in what both achieving Independence and Partition has resulted in. Obviously my view is one that is Indian, strongly Secular and very Left-orientated; I won’t pretend to be speak or represent other viewpoints, which are in anycase, well represented both the real world and in the blogging one.

Games without frontiers

Things are starting to get interesting on the Maldives. President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, who has ruled the archipelago for 26 years and was re-elected without opposition last fall, has called in Madeleine Albright to help reform the Maldivian political system. The question is, will Albright and her National Democratic Institute actually have a meaningful role in promoting democracy in the Maldives, or are they simply Gayoom's patsies?

Bringing in an expert from out of town is often a sign of seriousness, but it's also a well-known way to stall. Once an expert is hired to study a problem on behalf of a government, the government is absolved from acting until the expert's report is delivered, and the report itself can generate endless commissions and follow-up studies. Gayoom, who is an expert at waiting out pro-democracy movements, knows this very well and has played the game before with domestic reform commissions.

All the other signs also indicate that Gayoom's promise of openness is a false one. Two months ago, he responded to rising civil unrest with a pledge to legalize opposition parties, strengthen the powers of the legislature and create an independent judiciary. The council he called to examine these issues, however, disbanded before finishing its session. More ominously, Gayoom declared a state of emergency last Friday and detained hundreds of pro-democracy demonstrators on the pretext that they were planning to stage a coup. The announcement that Albright has been hired as a consultant seems designed to deflect growing international criticism of the crackdown, and once that purpose is accomplished, her recommendations are likely to be cast aside.

An unwelcome import

A Kiribati government study examines the role of the sea trade in HIV transmission in Pacific countries.

Diamonds in the rough

Former South African diamond auditor Todd Majaye discusses the lack of local participation and skill transfer in the services ancillary to Botswana's diamond industry.

Constitutional challenge

Professor Brij Lal, one of the authors of Fiji's 1997 constitution, has called for the repeal of one of its key provisions: a power-sharing clause mandating that any party receiving more than 10 percent of the vote be offered cabinet representation. This provision, like similar clauses in certain other Pacific and African constitutions, was intended to serve a dual purpose, encouraging government by consensus and ensuring that major ethnic stakeholders would not be frozen out of power. In Fiji, however, the major parties have proven incapable of working together, due in part to the personalities of their leaders and partly to a hardening of ethnic rivalries over land and power politics.

The result has been virtual paralysis, with the courts acting as the government of last resort and continuing litigation over the makeup of the cabinet. Indeed, the litigation stemming from the 2001 election may still be in court when the next general election is held in 2006. To Professor Lal, the prospect of a government in permanent ligitation is untenable:

LAL: "Well I think the intent was noble given the history, the political history of Fiji where one ethnic group was always in power and the other was not in power. And you know the hope was that political leaders will be able to set aside their differences and make it work. Mr Chaudhry tried to do that when he won elections in 1999, but of course the parties which were in coalition with his party have now disintegrated.

"The Fiji Association Party is dead and the VLV(?), the Christian Democratic Party is now effectively part of Labor. But Mr Qarase and Chaudhry are so far apart in their ideology, in their political outlook that if they persist with this then I think you're going to have more and more acrimony, frustration and friction in the country."

HILL: You suggested it was like a marriage that wasn't working?

LAL: "Exactly, it's not working and it's better for peace if a marriage is not working then it's better for people to separate and go their own ways, and hopefully achieve a measure of peace and calm. But with these two at the helm I don't see any possibility of that kind of amicable sharing of power."

Even if the nonfunctional power-sharing clause is repealed, though, that won't be the end of ethnic politics on Fiji; given the events of the last two decades, any restructuring of politics along traditional ideological lines will be a long and difficult task. The challenge, then, is to find another arrangement - possibly a decentralized state with regional Indo-Fijian majorities in the west and the urban canton of Suva - which will prevent control from falling into the hands of one ethnic group.

Notes on a two-state solution

Last weekend, India and Pakistan celebrated the 57th anniversary of their independence, Pakistan on August 14 and India a day after. It was also the 57th anniversary of the Indian-Pakistani conflict - or maybe it wasn't.

The conflict between India and Pakistan is driven by a rare political phenomenon: the post-colonial partition. Since the Second World War, there have been seven instances in which the principle of uti possidetis juris was violated and colonial possessions were partitioned prior to independence. In three of these cases - India-Pakistan, Israel-Palestine and Indonesia-Papua - this has led to protracted and violent conflict. In the others, conflict has simmered rather than boiled, or not arisen at all.

What can be learned from this, other than that partition is a bad idea when one region begins with I and the other with P? For one thing - and you probably didn't need me to tell you this - partition works best when it's arranged through mutual consent and where the peoples involved can be neatly divided. The Polynesians of the Ellice Islands didn't live among the Micronesians of the Gilbert Islands, and neither particularly cared if the other lived under its rule, so it wasn't any problem for the one to become Tuvalu and the other to become Kiribati. The breakup of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was likewise negotiated amicably, carried out smoothly and done with not only the acquiescence but the insistence of its component parts.

The next best way to accomplish a partition is for the partitioning agency to have overwhelming power. The Comoros can't do much about France holding on to Mayotte, for instance - especially since, despite Comoran rhetoric about self-determination, the Mahorais want to stay French. When the Chagos Islands were split off to form the British Indian Ocean Territory, the imbalance was similar - Mauritius on one side, the United Kingdom on the other. Neither partition has been conflict-free - particularly Chagos, where the problem of the displaced ilois still lingers - but tensions have been subdued and nonviolent, and at least the Comoran partition might fairly be described as successful.

The three I-P partitions are the messy ones, and they have at least two characteristics in common: each was carried out despite varying degrees of unwillingness from key stakeholders, and none was enforced over the long term by any entity with overwhelming power. The Dutch no doubt had the best of intentions in retaining the culturally and religiously distinct West Papua after Indonesia became independent, and they were able to enforce the partition as long as they maintained direct rule over the territory. By the time the Netherlands granted independence separately to West Papua in 1962, though, sovereignty had become an issue of national pride for Indonesia. The result: an Indonesian invasion in 1963, an "act of free choice" that ratified Indonesian rule under highly dubious conditions, decades of insurgency, thousands dead and 750,000 to 850,000 Javanese settlers brought in to firm up Jakarta's control.

The conflict over West Papua (or Irian Jaya) has avoided becoming an international flash point mainly due to its marginal victims. Not many people care about Melanesians besides other Melanesians, and even within Melanesia, only Vanuatu has consistently supported the West Papuans' cause. Talks on autonomy are stalled, the near-majority of Javanese settlers aren't about to sever their links with Indonesia. Partition has definitely failed, although much of the resulting evil came not from the partition itself but from its undoing.

That leaves India-Pakistan and Israel-Palestine, both of which are conflicts of global significance, the former for the sheer size of the nations involved and the potential for WMD use, and the latter for its centrality to the Islamic world and its position as a fault line between the West and the developing world. There are obvious commonalities between the two: historically antagonistic peoples, religion-based nationalisms, stakeholders outside the two proto-nations, political and ethnic cleavages within the nationalist movements on each side and, most of all, no easy way to separate the component populations. The results are familiar to all - bloody exchanges of populations, decades of intermittent warfare and protracted cross-border terrorism. Nor have the Muslim participants in either partition fared very well; Pakistan fought its own civil war and is arguably on its way to becoming a nuclear-armed failed state, and we all know what happened to the Palestinians.

With such a track record, it's inevitable that many people would question whether partition was a wise idea in either case. Randy McDonald, for instance points to a pair of recent Outlook India articles [1, 2] arguing that a united India might have evolved into a peaceful secular state. It's impossible to tell for certain absent travel to alternate timelines, but I'm far from sure things would have worked out that way.

The reason is that the Indian-Pakistani conflict didn't start in 1947 - it only got a new name. Violence and rivalry between Hindus and Muslims existed during the colonial and even the precolonial era; indeed, if this were not so, partition would never have become a serious option in the first place. The division of the Raj into India and Pakistan internationalized the conflict, but it was already an old one long before.

And, poor as the track record of partition may be, the history of attempts to force antagonistic peoples into a single state against their will isn't any more successful. One need only look at Lebanon, Cyprus or Nigeria to see that establishing a unitary state under such conditions merely confines a conflict within national borders - and, if civil war breaks out, not even that. Lebanon has continued to exist and even prospered after a fashion with Syria as peacekeeper, Nigeria has muddled through as a federal republic, but Cyprus' belated partition seems on its way to becoming permanent - and of the three states, Cyprus is the one where the fewest people died. Partition may be a mess, but it's at least arguable that a partitioned Lebanon, with the Beka'a valley annexed to Syria, might have been less of one than the state that exists today.

It's easy to imagine dystopic scenarios in India's case as well. Instead of being 12 percent Muslim, a unitary Indian state including Pakistan and Bangladesh would be more than 30 percent Muslim with Islamic majorities in several states and the population growth rate likely favoring the Muslims. This sort of population balance - especially a shifting one combined with historic minority nationalism - often makes majorities feel threatened and minorities restive. Any number of flash points - a major riot, a Delhi takeover of a Muslim-majority state, an electoral victory for a nationalist demagogue on either side - could spark a Muslim insurgency to add to those India is already facing in outlying areas. Partition exacted a heavy price, both in the initial blood toll and the subsequent decades of border conflict, but a unitary solution might have resulted in a colossal failed state rather than a smaller failing state and two others that more or less work. I have no more proof of this than Amitava Kumar or Ainslie Embree have of their more hopeful scenarios, but it's arguable that, for all the tragedy it exacted, partitioning the Raj was actually the lesser evil.

And even if Kumar and Embree are right, partition is now a fait accompli. As the West Papuan example shows, any attempt to forcibly undo a partition is likely to lead to all the same tragedies that resulted from partition in the first place. The Raj, like the Mandate of Palestine, cannot be recreated whole; India, Pakistan and Bangladesh exist, and unless the people of all three someday come to desire a common destiny, each will have to make its own.

Federalism the wrong way

A new poll indicates that two thirds of Ugandans oppose federalism, which is one of the options currently being considered in the country's protracted constitution-drafting process. The main reasons given for objecting to federalism were that it might "lead to regional imbalance in development and increase insecurity," both of which have occurred in other African federal states, but the breadth of opposition may also have to do with the identity of its supporters.

The main proponents of Ugandan federalism at the moment are the traditional leaders of the Buganda kingdom, which would be the largest federal region and which has a checkered role in the history of modern Uganda. The last time the kingdom had political existence, during the period immediately after independence, the king brought the country to the verge of civil war with his forceful opposition to the lost counties referendum, and arguably precipitated the crisis that led to the Obote coup of 1966. There is still an active dispute over land between the kingdom - which is currently a quasi-public corporation - and the Bunyoro kingdom, which has similar status.

In other words, federalism would not only result in Buganda obtaining a disproportionate share of national resources, but would transform the land ownership controversy between Buganda and Bunyoro into a territorial dispute between two political entities. Given that Uganda has already experienced civil unrest and a coup because of exactly this dispute, it makes sense that a majority of Ugandans would oppose a federalist plan that carries the potential for a built-in border war. Another contentious issue is the role of the Buganda king in a federal state - would the corporation currently headed by the king continue to exist alongside the Buganda province or be melded into it? A formal political role for the king is something that even many Buganda oppose and that would induce other traditional leaders to demand similar status.

The Buganda king may end up getting his way - he can deliver hundreds of thousands of votes in the 2006 election, so the president is conducting negotiations on federalism in the hope of obtaining his support. If Uganda wants to decentralize, though, a better way to do so might be on the basis of the four existing administrative regions, with traditional leaders retaining a consultative role.

Still more cheerleading for Israel

Congratulations to Arik Ze'evi on his bronze medal in judo, Israel's fifth medal overall and its first in the current games.

The Fur of Cairo

Yasmine Fathi profiles the Darfur refugees in Cairo, a community of thousands that has existed in the Egyptian capital for years. Those who can make it out of the refugee camps in Chad, Libya and western Sudan often head for Egypt, which has liberal entry rules for Sudanese citizens and where an established Fur ethnic association and network of NGOs are available to help new immigrants. Although life in Cairo is infinitely preferable to the camps, much less the massacres of the janjaweed, it is often bleak:

It was [...] harsh living conditions that led to the creation of the Fur Social Cultural Association, in an attempt to provide assistance and services to Darfurians residing in Egypt. "Life as a refugee is difficult. We are on our own here. We needed to be strong and create unity in order to safeguard our traditions, and try to make our lives a little easier," explained Hassan Haroun, founding member of the association and a resident of Egypt for 15 years.

After settling down most refugees would find themselves facing the next big hurdle: finding a job. "This is not easy to do since the visa stipulations often do not allow Sudanese refugees to work in Egypt," said Maki. Further, Sudanese qualifications are not recognised in Egypt, thus forcing most refugees to seek work as vendors in informal markets. "Some of those who work as vendors now had very good jobs in Sudan," explained Haroun. "But when you have kids and mouths to feed you have to forget what you were, and accept this new reality, however difficult it may be," he continued.

[...]

Further, refugees who come with their families find it difficult to provide their children with an education. As a rule, Egyptian schools do not accept non-Egyptian children unless they are registered with the appropriate authorities. For the Sudanese refugees, this would mean being registered at their embassy in Cairo. Given that most of them left Sudan illegally, according to Ibrahim Mohamed, father of three, this is a step they are not willing to undertake, through fear of deportation. As a result, when the refugees' papers expire, they are more often than not left with nothing, for neither their government nor the Egyptian authorities can come to their assistance.

As the number of Sudanese refugees in Cairo increases, NGOs are stepping up to fill the gap, with organizations like the Sudanese Development Initiative and Sudanese Community Association providing education and help in finding jobs. Some of the refugees' employment difficulties may also be alleviated by the "four freedoms" agreement recently signed between Egypt and Sudan, which gives Sudanese nationals the right to work and move freely in Egypt.

Those refugees who had to flee Darfur without their identity papers, though, may find it hard to take advantage of this legislation, and the UN's recent decision to suspend refugee-status interviews for six months is preventing some of them from re-establishing their identity. Also, many Fur of Cairo feel that the Arab world does not support their cause, and like poor immigrant communities the world over, must contend with racism and hostility from the police. Nevertheless:

In spite of all the trials and tribulations faced by the Darfur refugees day in, day out, most of them are grateful just for being here. Compared with life in Darfur, life in Egypt is more than bearable. If their children are not accepted in school, "it doesn't matter because education in Darfur is a luxury anyway," said Mohamed, father of three. If they are cramped together in apartments, "at least we are free to move around. Walking from street to street is dangerous in Darfur," pointed out Maki. If they can't see their families, things are "not much different: I couldn't see my family for 20 years because I lived in Khartoum and they were in Darfur. It was too dangerous to go," said Degal.

The refugees hope for something better for their children - but given that those who arrived in Cairo years ago can tell the same horror stories as those who arrive today, that hope may take a long time to be realized.

Joining up is hard to do

Professor Helen Hughes, a member of an Australian right-wing think tank who has previously suggested that Nauruans resolve their financial crisis by selling their country, has once again proposed that Nauru go out of business. In a report entitled "From Riches to Rags," Hughes argues that Nauru "should consider surrendering independence or adopting free association with either Australia, New Zealand or Fiji:"

Nauru has two principal options: it can continue on its past and current trajectory and become a poverty and ill health stricken Pacific beggar and pariah, or it can choose healthy, modest standards of living for its 11,000 people.

The first step toward the latter would be to recognise that Nauru is not a nation in the sense that China or India are nations, but a small community. It has a common history, language and cultural ties, but it is the size of a small country town. Such recognition is necessary for Nauru to abandon the inappropriate, costly political institutions with which it has been saddled.

She proposes, among other things, that Nauru replace its parliament with an unpaid local government council, withdraw from all international organizations and ultimately consider association with a more prosperous Pacific nation.

Thus far, Australia has refrained from adopting such a radical solution, preferring to assume partial control of Nauru's government while providing economic aid and helping restructure its debt. At this point, though, Australia is developing severe donor fatigue, and its sense of responsibility as Nauru's former colonial master is becoming attenuated. If a future Australian government cuts the purse strings, Nauru may yet have to choose between accepting a catastrophic decline in its living standard and becoming the first post-colonial nation to formally surrender its independence.

In that event, the most obvious country for Nauru to associate with is Australia, with which it has a long association and which is already home to a significant Nauruan diaspora. It isn't clear, however, that Nauru would want to become an Australian territory, given its lingering resentment of Australian colonialism and latter-day financial dependence. New Zealand, which has a significantly better relationship with its associated territories, may be the Nauruans' first choice, but New Zealand itself might not want to take on responsibility for an impoverished territory outside its historical sphere of influence.

Fiji would be an intriguing choice. The Fijian government has some experience in dealing with associated territories; the Polynesian island of Rotuma is a Fijian dependency that is autonomous and generally enjoys good relations with Suva. On the other hand, while Fiji is prosperous by Pacific standards, it may not be large or rich enough to take on responsibility for Nauru, and Fijian citizenship wouldn't be as attractive to Nauruans as Australian or New Zealand nationality. There's also a cultural difference; Nauruans are a Micronesian people while Fijians are Melanesian, and Fiji may in fact be more alien to them than the Australian culture to which they were exposed during the colonial period. If Fiji took on Nauru, it would become the only Pacific country to incorporate Melanesian, Polynesian and Micronesian populations, but the mix would be an unwieldy one.

If Nauru decides to become associated with a First World country, maybe it should join the United States. America has a historic relationship with Micronesia and maintains possessions in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, but doesn't carry the colonial baggage on Nauru that Australia does. If Nauru can't survive as a nation, it might do worse than to become another Guam, although, with sound management, it hopefully won't come to that at all.