Brian Weatherson

1. Indicatives and Subjunctives. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2001): 200-216.
2. Intrinsic Properties and Combinatorial Principles. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 365-380.
3. Keynes, Uncertainty and Interest Rates. Cambridge Journal of Economics 26 (2002): 47-62.
4. What Good are Counterexamples? Philosophical Studies 115 (2003): 1-31.
5. Many Many Problems. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003): 481-501.
6. From Classical to Constructive Probability Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (2003): 111–123.
7. Morality, Fiction and Possibility . Philosophers Imprint vol 4, no 3.
8. True, Truer, Truest. Philosophical Studies 123 (2005): 47-70.
9. Epistemic Modals in Context. (with Andy Egan and John Hawthorne), in Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter (eds) Contextualism in Philosophy, OUP 2005, pp. 131-69.
10. Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research forthcoming.
11. Scepticism, Rationalism and Empiricism Oxford Studies in Epistemology, forthcoming.
12. Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment? Philosophical Perspectives, forthcoming.

1. Begging the Question and Bayesianism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30 (1999): 687-697.
2. Misleading Indexicals. Analysis 62 (2002): 308-10.
3. Are You a Sim? Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003): 425-31.
4. Epistemicism Parasites and Vague Names. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003): 276-9.
5. Nine Objections to Steiner and Wolff on Land Disputes Analysis 63 (2003): 321-8.
6. Luminous Margins. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2004): 373-83.
7. Chopping up Gunk (with John Hawthorne) Monist 87 (2004): 339-50.
8. Cloning and Harm. (with Sarah McGrath) forthcoming in the proceedings of the 2003-4 LSU Symposium on Theoretical and Applied Ethics, to be edited by James Stacey Taylor and published by Kluwer.

1. Review of Michael De Paul and William Ramsey (eds) Rethinking Intuition. Ethics 112 (2002): 361–4.
2. Review of Ted Lockhart Moral Uncertainty and Its Consequences. Mind 111 (2002): 693–6.
3. Review of Rosanna Keefe Theories Of Vagueness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
4. Review of David Wiggins Sameness and Substance Renewed. In Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
5. Review of Roy Sorensen, Vagueness and Contradiction Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2003): 290-2.
6. Review of Bill Lycan, Real Conditionals Philosophical Review 111 (2002): 609-11.
7. Review of Christopher Gauker Words Without Meaning. In Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
8. Review of Christopher Peacocke, The Realm of Reason Times Literary Supplement Oct 15, 2004, 8-9.
9. Review of Frank Jackson and Graham Priest (eds) Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis. In Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
10. Review of Daniel Nolan, David Lewis Mind forthcoming.
11. Intrinsic vs Extrinsic Properties. A survey of recent theories of intrinsicness in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
12. The Problem of the Many. A survey of responses to the problem in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy

Three Objections to Smith on Vagueness. Nick Smith recently defended a definition of vagueness in terms of blurred boundaries. I argue that (a) vague predicates need not haveany boundaries and hence no vague boundaries, (b) some vague predicates have lumpy rather than blurry boundaries and (c) some things that aren’t predicates are vague, so the definition won’t work.

Vagueness Without Toleration: Reply to Greenough. Patrick Greenough has argued that a predicate is vague iff it is epistemically tolerant. I show that there are some counterexamples to this analysis, and that it rests on some fairly contentious theories about the behaviour of vague terms in propositional attitude reports.

Growing Individuals and Temporary Intrinsics. I argue that ordinary objects are fusions of past and present, but not future, temporal parts. This theory provides the neatest solution to some puzzles concerning intrinsic properties, and is supported by some surprising linguistic data. (This paper is probably inconsistent with some other papers I've written, but the line it runs is at least amusing and original.)

Knowing and Understanding: Reply to Pettit (with Adam Sennet). Dean Pettit recently argued in Mind that understanding a word did not require knowing what it meant. Adam and I show that his core arguments, which mostly turn on showing that some particular cases are cases of understanding without knowledge, do not work.

Solving an Infinite Decision Problem. In a recent paper in Theory and Decision, Barrett and Artzenius propose a puzzle concerning a particular infinite series of choices. The puzzle turns out to be easy to resolve once we distinguish between use-value and exchange-value.

Conditionals, Predicates and Probability. Adams's Thesis is meant to explain our judgements about the validity of arguments involving conditionals. I note it goes wrong in some simple cases involving quantifiers.

Stages, Worms, Slices and Lumps. Assume, for fun, that temporal parts theory is true, and that some kind of modal realism (perhaps based on ersatz worlds) is true. Within this grand metaphysical picture, what are the ordinary objects? Do they have many temporal parts, or just one? Do they have many modal parts, or just one? I survey the issues involved in answering this question, including the problem of temporary intrinsics, the problem of the many, Kripke's objections to counterpart theory and quantifier domain restrictions.

Vague Decision Theory. Many smart people (and me) think that partial beliefs are best represented by sets of probability functions rather than single probability functions. There is no consensus as to how these sets of probability functions should enter into decision making. I survey the field, find all the proposals lacking, and suggest an alternative.

Doomsday and the Extinction of Baseball. John Leslie's Doomsday argument uses the frequency interpretation of probability to argue that the end of the universe is closer than we might have thought. Oh well - all the worse for the frequency interpretation.

Week One: Introduction
Week Two: Psycho-Analysis
Week Three: Eliminating Analysis
Week Four: Physicalism and Entailments
Week Five: What Analysis can do for You
Week Six: The nature of counterexamples
Week Seven: How to handle counterexamples
Week Eight: Strategies for beating counterexamples
Week Nine: Pragmatics, Metaphysics and Possibility
Week Ten: Two-Dimensional Modality
Week Eleven: Objections to Australian-style analysis
Week Twelve: Ramsey sentences and Moral Realism
Week Thirteen: More on moral realism