Papers:

• "Why I am Not a Dualist" -- in progress
  
• "Composition, Coincidence, and Metaontology" -- in progress
  
• "Metametaphysics" -- in progress
  
  
• Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Supervenience (with Brian McLaughlin)
  
  
• "Exclusion Again" -- (revision coming someday)
  Abstract: Philosophers of mind use the exclusion problem both to argue for physicalism, and to argue for reductive physicalism. The former is a good argument; the latter is not. The exclusion problem does not have the same force against nonreductive physicalists that it has against dualists. Nonreductive physicalists can easily escape the argument as long as they keep their physicalism firmly in mind (regardless of their views about the nature of causation).
  
• "Two Axes of Actualism" -- forthcoming in The Philosophical Review Abstract: Actualists usually express their view by means of the slogan 'everything is actual'. But it's far from clear what that is supposed to mean. This paper is a critical examination of the various things it might mean (and has been taken to mean). I argue that the actualist faces two key choices--and explain which choices she should make.
  
• "Proxy 'Actualism'" -- forthcoming in Philosophical Studies
  Abstract: Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta have recently proposed a new form of actualism. I characterize the general form of their view and the motivations behind it. I argue that it is not exactly new--it bears marked similarities to Alvin Plantinga's view--and that it definitely isn't actualist.
  
• "Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem" -- Philosophical Studies 118:3, pp. 339-371 (April 2004)
  Abstract: A lot of people believe that distinct objects can occupy precisely the same place for the entire time during which they exist. Such people have to provide an answer to the 'grounding problem'--they have to explain how such things, alike in so many ways, nonetheless manage to fall under different sortals, or have different modal properties. I argue in detail that they cannot say that there is anything in virtue of which spatio-temporally coincident things have those properties. However, I also argue that this may not be as bad as it looks, and that there is a way to make sense of the claim that such properties are primitive.
  
• "Global Supervenience and Dependence" --- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68:3 (May 2004)
  Abstract: Two versions of global supervenience have recently been distinguished from each other. I introduce a third version, which is more likely what people had in mind all along. However, I argue that one of the three versions is equivalent to strong supervenience in every sense that matters, and that neither of the other two versions counts as a genuine determination relation. I conclude that global supervenience has little metaphysically distinctive value.
  
• "Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable, and How, Just Maybe, To Tract It" --- Nous 37:3, pp. 471-497 (September 2003)
  Abstract: A growing number of people try to solve the exclusion problem by claiming that an effect can have distinct mental and physical causes without being overdetermined. I argue that those who hold this view bear a significant burden of proof that they have not discharged. I show how they can do so, and develop a strategy for defending this sort of response to the exclusion problem.