What Does a Recession Look Like?

When I think of recessions, I tend to think that the only bad years are the ones within the recession dates. For example, if the NBER dates a recession as January 1 to December 31, I tend to think the only bad dates occur within those dates, and that the time before and after those dates are great times economically.

I decided to take that perception and put it to the test. Below are charts for the last five recessions, along with the preceding three to four quarters and the first three to four quarters after the recession ended. The dates for the recessions are from the National Bureau of Economic Research and the charts are from the St. Louis Federal Reserve. All the GDP data has been adjusted for inflation.



January 1980 - July 1980 and July 1981 - November 1982


I've included both of these periods in the same chart for convenience. First, notice the period of four quarters leading up to the first recession showed incredibly slow growth. The quarter to quarter rate of growth for this period (1Q79 to 4Q 79) was .7%, .4%, 2.9% 1.1%. respectively. This was followed by three quarters of recession, during which the first quarter showed positive growth. Then came the brief recovery where we saw two quarters of incredibly strong growth and a third quarter of contraction. This was followed by the second recession during which we had two quarters to non-sequential positive GDP growth. Coming out of the recession we had incredibly strong rates of growth beginning in the second quarter after the end of the second recession.

There are several points that need to be made about this period. First, there were four years of incredibly difficult times, during which we had two recession (or perhaps one long recession). Either way, this was an extended period of difficulty for the country. Secondly, the four quarters before the recession showed incredibly slow economic growth. Growth at this pace probably felt like a recession to the country. Third, there were quarters of growth during the recession, indicating not all the events during these periods were bad.

July 1990 - March 1991



Notice that in the four quarters that led up to the recession there were two quarters of weak growth with one below 1% and the second below 2%. The quarter that began the recession printed a 0% growth rate followed by two quarters of negative growth. However, the three quarters coming out of the recession had incredibly weak growth, with two quarters below 2%. Over a period of nine quarters, there were 8 (or two years) of incredibly weak growth.

March 2001-November 2001


As the chart shows, this was a very shallow and short recession, lasting less than a year during which there were two quarters of negative growth. The contraction was very mild, with the first quarter of 2001 contracting 1.3% and the third quarter contracting 1.1%. But notice the two preceding quarters were also very weak and the five quarters after the recession ended were also very weak. The above chart shows 10 quarters or two and a half years of very weak growth. In other words, the official recession dates cover some of the downturn, but certainly not all of it.

December 2007 - July 2009


First, the NBER has not officially dated the end of the last recession. However, the St. Louis Fred's system uses July 2009 as the end point, which would be the first quarter of positive growth after four quarters of contraction. This falls in line with general previous NBER methodology. In addition, the economy has had four quarters of positive GDP growth -- a statistic that has never been classified as a recession.

Second, notice that the three quarters preceding the recession also showed slower growth. The contraction was at least as deep as the second recession in the early 1980s. Coming out of the recession, we see three quarters of growth, although the pace is quarter to quarter improvement is declining.

Conclusions:

1.) The double dip recession in the early 1980s was the last recession where the economy experienced strong post-recession momentum. The quarters after the 1990 and 2001 recession were weak and the current rate of growth -- while higher than the 1990s and 2001 rate of growth -- is not as strong as we'd like to see.

2.) The 1990/91, 2001 and current recessions saw 10 quarters of weak growth, indicating the official dates of the recession only tell part of the economy story.

3.) The current environment has more in common with the early 1980s and 1990s recessions. Like the early 1980s, the latest recession saw an extremely negative growth rate in the economy. Like the early 1990s recession, this recession was in part caused by negative development in the financial sector of the economy.

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Australian Elections Preview: An Uneventful Campaign Heads for an Eventful Finish

It’s election day in Australia, and all signs point to a close result, with a narrow national lead for the ruling Labor party. Nevertheless, the very narrowness of that lead is a testament to the limitations of an incumbent government campaigning not on its own achievements, but with the warning that its opponent is far worse.

When the election was called five weeks ago, it was widely expected that the new Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, would figuratively waltz to victory. Basking in the glow of a novelty honeymoon, Australia’s first female Prime Minister had outlined a series of tough policies on immigration, and massively scaled back the talk of a new carbon taxes on mining which had so damaged Rudd, effectively leaving little for the opposition to attack the government on policy-wise. Australia had largely escaped the effects of the economic downturn, and the government's record on the economy seemed solid. Perhaps equally importantly in a system where preference voting is vital to the outcome, Gillard achieved an unprecedented deal with the Greens to receive their preferences in virtually every seat. While Green preferences have traditionally gone to Labor at about a 70/3 clip, it was expected that this agreement would help maintain that level with a massive rise in Green support.

Expectations, however, were to be rapidly dashed. Some of this was an inevitable result of the contradictory impulses inherent in Labor’s campaign strategy. Faced with an opposition leader viewed as non-viable due to his far-right views, the Labor campaign plan seemed to be to actively move right, with Gillard going so far as to repeat Rudd’s position of delaying any action on climate change for the foreseeable future. Yet these impulses were contradictory with an effort to form a de facto coalition with the Greens, and when, in particularly serious case of bad timing, Labor announced its climate change priorities at the same time as the Green preference deal, an-all-out revolt broke out in the Green ranks, with more than dozen local parties refusing to recommend their voters  preference Labor second.

In itself this would not have been fatal. But Gillard and Labor more generally seemed to have no campaign theme, no proposals and no strategy for the campaign other than daring the public to vote for Coalition Leader Tony Abbott, and with Abbott denying the media his usual supply of gaffes, the campaign lacked a storyline. In its absence, Labor lost control of the campaign, as more damaging stories came to dominate. First was the spectacular collapse of the Green preference deal, which by drawing attention to the mutual dislike between Labor and the Greens likely did far more damage in terms of causing Green voters to consider voting Coalition “above the line” than if Labor had left well enough alone.

More damaging still was the fall-out from Rudd’s overthrow. A series of angry and speculative leaks dribbled out. On one hand, there were suggestions that Rudd would return in a new government as Foreign Minister, suggestions that were waved off by Gillard. That might have been the end of the story had it not been for senior Labor officials publicly accusing Rudd himself of leaking the rumors in desperation. A whole-scale feud of competing leaks soon broke out that dominated media coverage. And claims surfaced that Gillard lied to Rudd’s face only days before the coup, accepting a deal whereby he would stand down in the middle of the summer to allow her to take over before an October election, only for Gillard to overthrow him a few days later.

Weeks three and four seemed to bring a rally, where the race, which had turned into a narrow Coalition lead for a few days, swung back to Labor as the government’s campaign turned negative against Liberal leader Tony Abbott, arguing he would be among the most right-wing leaders ever elected in a Western democracy, and pointing to his denial of climate change, and suggestions that he felt “threatened” around gays. These attacks, and possibly the prospect of Abbott as Prime Minister, helped Labor regain a narrow lead, though its position remains precarious.

Labor seems to have seen the damage, and consequent swing, concentrated in Rudd’s home state of Queensland, and all important New South Wales, where a third of the seats are located. While the last two polls, a Roy Morgan and a Essential Research poll, both showing a 51-49 lead for Labor had a national swing of 1.7% from 2007, the swings in Queensland were 3.6% and 4.4% respectively. In New South Wales, the swings ranged from 3 to nearly 5 points. By contrast, Labor was actually recorded as gaining significant support in Victoria and South Australia, as much as a 5% swing in the latter, but the losses in Queensland and New South Wales were more than making up for it.

It is perhaps not surprising, however, that Labor’s losses have been concentrated in Queensland and New South Wales, because the hidden third rail of the campaign is the continued unpopularity of Labor state governments in both States. The Queensland government narrowly survived last year by less than a percentage point against a deeply flawed opposition, and the New South Wales Labor government is facing extermination in 2011 with recent polls showing a 61-39 lead on the two-party preferred vote.

As a consequence, the election is looking less national as the outcome looks to come down to whether the Coalition can gain enough to seats in Queensland and New South Wales to gain the majority, and whether the Labor party potentially gain enough seats in South Australia or Victoria to off-set those losses, with the added potential that 2-3 seats may change hands in Western Australia or Tasmania. In such an environment, national polls might not be the best guide, as there is a strong possibility that the party that wins the majority of the two-party vote will not win the majority. This is far from unheard of. It happened in both 1990 and 1998 at the federal level, and it happened again earlier this year in South Australia, where the Labor government survived a lopsided 53-47 result to hang onto office.

While at the federal level this has favored both parties, there is reason to suspect that in a close result, it will favor the coalition.

Labor 2PP	Coalition 2PP	Labor Seats	Coalition Seats
53	47	90	57
52	48	81	66
51	49	75	72
50	50	69	78
49	51	68	79
48	52	61	86
47	53	59	88

As is demonstrated, there is a danger zone for Labor in the 51-49 zone, which unfortunately seems to be where they are headed.

Poll	Labor	Coalition
Roy Morgan August 18th – 19th	51%	49%
Essential Research August 13th-19th	51%	49%
Newspoll 17th – 18th August	50%	50%
Nielsen 17th -19th August	52%	48%

What’s missing here is the incumbency effect. Incumbency tends to matter more in Australia than in other parliamentary systems and its no coincidence that “minority vote victories” have always gone to incumbent governments. This time it will play to both sides, as the last seat redistribution moved six Coalition incumbents into seats that nominally voted for Labour in 2007, most of whom need swings of less than 1% to hang on. Otherwise incumbency should favor Labour, though state polarization will likely make things worse for the government here, with Labor supposedly writing off as many as ten seats in Queensland and New South Wales, with the expectation of three gains elseware.

That would give Labor 81 seats, at the high-end of estimates, which seem leaning towards the high seventies, but nevertheless a majority. It is still far too close for comfort for those who believed that Abbott’s reactionary social views would result in a blowout. Its worth noting however, that at this point in 2004, John Howard looked to be in a similar spot before rallying and winning his second greatest victory when his opponent proved too erratic for voters. It will ironically be to Howard’s example that Labor will be looking in the next eight hours in order to avoid being the first one-term government in over half a century

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How the Generic Ballot is Used to Estimate Votes and then Seats in Congressional Elections

In response to some comments by Brendan Nyhan and Alan Abramowitz, Nate writes about the generic congressional ballot, those surveys that ask randomly-sampled Americans a question like,

Looking ahead to the Congressional elections in November, which party do you plan to vote for if the election were being held today?

Nate's remarks are reasonable and I just wanted to add a bit of clarification.

The bottom line is that, yes, you can use generic congressional polling to predict the national election results. But you don't just take the generic ballot as is; you have to use it in stages, as part of a district-by-district forecast.

(1) Nate discusses the generic ballot (the percentage of survey respondents who say they would vote for the Democrat or the Republican) as a predictor of the actual ballot (the average share of the votes received by the two parties in the general election). I'd just like to emphasize that the prediction of actual from generic vote is done using a statistical model. For example, in October, 2006, Bafumi, Erikson, and Wlezien wrote: "Based on the current average of the generic polls (57.7% Democratic, 42.3% Republican) the forecast from this equation is a 55% to 45% Democratic advantage in the popular vote." The shift from 57.7% to 55% came from a model that Bafumi et al. had fit to earlier congressional elections.

In particular, Bafumi et al. fit different models to predict the election outcome from generic ballot polls taken 300 days before the election, 240 days before the election, 180 days before the election, and so forth. One thing they found was that, when the incumbent president is a Democrat, the Democrats' vote in the off-year congressional elections tends to be much lower than the generic polls taken 200-300 days before the election. The generic poll taken hundreds of days before the election is a good predictor of the ultimate outcome--as long as the prediction is made using a fitted model rather than merely by taking that generic poll number as is.

Here's an example. In September, 2009, Chris Bowers wrote, "Republicans not in a position to retake the House (yet)," based on his observation that the Democrats had a 41-38 lead in generic House polling. But, having read Bafumi, Erikson, and Wlezien, I knew that Bowers was wrong, and I said so right here on fivethirtyeight: given the generic polls at that time, the best forecast was a 53-47 popular vote win for the Republicans.

(2) Nate writes, "the national House popular vote is an imperfect predictor of the seat count" and illustrates with a seats vs. votes scatterplot. He's right, but this is less of a problem than you might think. The right way to do a congressional forecast is at a district-by-district level. The generic ballot (and other information) can allow you to predict the average district vote at the national level. And then, separately, you can predict the relative positions of the different districts (from most Democratic to most Republican), given district-level information (most simply, previous election results, corrected for incumbency, as in my papers with John Kastellec and Jamie Chandler from 2006 and 2008, or else maybe something more sophisticated using more up-to-date district-level information). Since Nate is doing district-by-district forecasting anyway, this isn't a problem.

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When Good Enough Isn't Good Enough: On House Forecasts and the Generic Ballot

Emory's Alan Abramowitz, by way of Pollster.com's Brendan Nyhan, has a reaction of sorts to our post from Tuesday in which I talked about some of the ambiguities of the generic Congressional ballot. Here's Abramowitz:

Nate provides a lot of excellent analysis. But there are two pretty silly statements here. First, the generic ballot is a pretty good predictor of both the national popular vote and the national seat results. Second, the national popular vote is a very good predictor of the overall seat results. It definitely is not "relatively irrelevant" to those results.

Let me warn you that some of the ensuing discussion boils down to semantics. What do we mean by a "pretty good" predictor and a "very good" predictor, for instance? There are a lot of times when a particular equation might have a reasonably high R-squared, for example, but would not be all that useful to us in terms of our ability to make predictions about the sort of questions that are most interesting to us, such as what the likelihood is of a Republican takeover of the House.

If we wanted to take the generic ballot today, August 19th, and use it to project out the number of seats that Republicans will gain (or lose, I suppose) in the House, there are basically three sorts of uncertainties that we face.

1. The generic ballot today is an imperfect predictor of the generic ballot on Election Day.

As I wrote on Tuesday, and as others like Columbia's Robert Erikson have found, this is not actually all that big a concern, as the generic ballot is relatively stable as compared with most political indicators. Still, this does produce some additional uncertainty. The generic ballot moved several points toward the Republicans by election day 2004 as compared how it was printing during the summer, and several points toward the Democrats in 2006.

But suppose that we ignore this, for now. Suppose that we take Pollster's current trendline estimate of the generic ballot, which has Republicans winning by 5.6 points, and assume that this is exactly the margin that will separate the two parties on Election Morning. There are still two additional problems that we face.

2. The Generic Ballot on Election Day is an imperfect predictor of the national House popular vote.

This is probably the most significant source of error. In addition to the normal ambiguities surrounding any poll -- the consensus of polls is often wrong in one or the other direction -- we also have the fact that with very rare exception, the generic ballot is framed as presenting "the Republican candidate in your District" against "the Democratic candidate", or some variation of this, rather than naming the candidates specifically. Some voters might react differently if they knew what the names of the candidates were. Also, some voters literally won't have the chance to vote for the candidate from their preferred party, because there are usually several dozen Congressional districts -- and there have been as many as 100 in some past election cycles -- in which one or the other major parties doesn't nominate a candidate. Finally, some states like Florida don't even bother to tally the results when a candidate runs uncontested, so their votes won't count toward the national popular vote at all.

For all these issues, the generic ballot certainly tells you something about the House popular vote, particularly if you make certain adjustments to it, like recognizing the difference between registered voter and likely voter polls. But this contributes a significant amount of uncertainty.

3. The national House popular vote is an imperfect predictor of the seat count.

It's true that if we knew exactly what the popular vote were, we could come up with a not-bad estimate of the seat count. From the chart that Abramowitz posted, it looks like the average error in projecting the seat count from the popular vote is something just a wee bit north of 10 seats, which would imply a 95 percent confidence interval of about X ± 20 or 25 seats. Again -- semantics! -- I would call that "pretty good" rather than "very good": saying, for example, that the Republicans will with 95 percent confidence gain somewhere between 25 and 65 seats, doesn't seem to impart all that knowledge. But even though the distribution of votes into seats is somewhat uneven -- for example, Democratic districts tend to have lower turnout, which somewhat contradicts the fact that the generic ballot tends to overestimate their standing in the national popular vote; but on the other hand, Democratic voters tend to be more concentrated into particular Congressional districts than Republican ones, usually in urban centers -- this is less problematic than Step #2.

But of course, we don't have any knowledge of what the popular vote is in advance -- instead, it has to be estimated from the generic ballot (and perhaps other factors). What happens in the real world where when we have to go directly from the generic ballot to projecting a seat count, processing steps #2 and #3 in one fell swoop? Well, we get a big mess. Here is the direct translation from the parties' generic ballot standing, as inferred from the trendlines that Charles Franklin has generated, into the number of Democratic-held seats in the House, for all elections since 1946.



The forecast misses on average by about 20 seats, which translates into a 95 percent confidence interval of about ±48 (!) seats. At a generic ballot reading of Republican +5.6, for example, where Pollster.com has it now, the regression line above projects a Republican gain of 41 seats -- which sounds reasonable, I suppose -- but the 95 percent confidence interval runs between a gain of 90 seats and a loss of 7 seats. Not very helpful! And of course, this assumes that we know what the standing of the generic ballot on Election Day, which we don't, since there are still 75 or so potentially volatile political days to occur before then.

(As an aside, if you were to apply the same technique only to data from 1994 onward, the regression equation would project Republican gains of between 36 and 107 seats; if you were to use data from 1980 onward, it would project somewhere between a 14 seat loss and a 104-seat gain.)

I don't mean to slam all macro-level attempts at Congressional forecasting: there are significantly more sophisticated versions of macro-level forecasts that political scientists like Abramowitz have worked on. But the generic ballot alone is a very blunt instrument. It basically tells us, "okay, things are probably going to be pretty bad for Democrats, and they could be really bad," something which any sentient observer of politics would already have known.

That's why we're going through the trouble of building a ground-up projection of the House, which attempts to predict the outcome of individual seats, while also understanding that the outcomes and uncertainties in different congressional districts are correlated. This has required collecting lots and lots of data: essentially, every district-level poll, every fundraising record, and every independent forecast since 1998. Although I'm not quite ready to tease at the results, it does seem reasonably clear that taking into account a multiplicity of indicators is helpful -- for example, the generic ballot does have some influence, even if you have lots of other information about the races you're attempting to forecast, but the same is true of each of the other indicators I just mentioned.

I'm sure that even a perfectly-constructed model (and ours won't be) would still be subject to a significant amount of error -- and anecdotally, I suspect that this is a very tricky election to forecast. But given that a lot of this data -- which granted, took weeks and weeks to compile and is not exactly sitting at our fingertips -- has essentially gone unexamined, I hope you'll appreciate my desire to demand a greater degree of precision.

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Palestinian Refugees Get Qualified Right to Work in Lebanon

he more than 425,000 Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon, who yesterday received a qualified right to work in the country, have a long and complicated history in the country. Unlike those in their neighbors Jordan or Syria, Palestinians in Lebanon have never obtained significant political or social rights, such as citizenship, rights to work, or the ability to own property.

While he bill passed by the Lebanese Parliament formalizes the legal status of Palestinian workers in a number of lower tier occupations, the larger issues of nationality, land and property, and access to Lebanese public social benefits and higher level professions remain unresolved.

Somewhat ironically, the leadership of the many politico-religious communities in Lebanon are in largely in harmony on one element this issue: everyone agrees that the registered Palestinians refugees in Lebanon should not be given Lebanese nationality, nor the trappings of permanent residence, such as the right to own land or major property. It is for very different reasons, however.

When the Palestinians were initially forced from their land by the Israelis during and just after the 1948 war, about 126,000* of the 726,000 total refugees ended up in Lebanon, representing a little over 17 percent. Throughout the next decade, most Christian Palestinians, about 50,000 in total, received Lebanese citizenship. Following the conclusion of Lebanese Civil War in 1990, another group of Palestinians, almost all Shiites, along with a few remaining Christians, received Lebanese nationality, numbering about 60,000. This in concession to the vastly improved political position of the Shiites following the Taif Agreement, which changed the confessional distribution of power in the country.

The more than 400,000 refugees that remain today in Lebanon, in 12 official camps, among other places, are almost entirely Sunni Muslims, their Lebanese brethren being the confessional group that lost the most political power in the wake of the 1975-1990 civil war.

Polling numbers from 2007 shows a remarkable level of agreement about the Lebanese confessionals that an improvement in civil and political rights for the Palestinians, without full citizenship, is the appropriate way forward. That said, there is a definite split between the Christian and Muslim communities, with a significantly larger Muslim minority in favor of citizenship, as well as more vigorous support for improved civil and social rights.

Accordingly, it's unlikely in the foreseeable future that the Sunni Muslim Palestinians in Lebanon will gain citizenship, as they have in Jordon, or full civil rights and semi-nationality, as they have in Syria, in the years ahead. Across confessional groups, there is strong support for the right of return for the refugees to areas that is now part of the Israeli state -- among Christians to avoid upsetting the gentle confessional balance against them, while for Muslim Lebanese it is for reasons of Muslim/Arab solidarity. Giving nationality or full residential rights to the Palestinians, they argue, would admit defeat in this effort, regardless of how fruitless it may seem.

From the outside, of course, it looks far more like political expediency: excluding an unwanted and marginalized community from the benefits that the majority enjoy, regardless of the rhetoric that underpins it.

---
Renard Sexton is FiveThirtyEight's international affairs columnist. He can be contacted at sexton538@gmail.com

* 1950 figure from UNRWA

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Hatred of Congress

Americans hate their Congress. They hate the long-winded, blowhard speeches, and the parochialism, and the pork-barreling--except, of course, when they like it. As political scientist Richard Fenno once noted, that hatred helps explain why so many candidates--initially as challengers, but even as incumbents--run for Congress by running against it.

As for how this hatred translates into seat losses or gains this November, or any other year, we have been hearing a lot of talking points about how general congressional approval is falling. True. And how the approval of Democrats in Congress is falling. Also true. And how the approval of congressional Republicans isn't much better. True yet again.

Let's take each of these in order to see what we might reasonably infer about the implications for November 2.

First, and without muddying the post with two many pre-existing charts, you can see here that, according to Gallup numbers dating back to 1973, as it has for a long time Congress ranks last in terms of citizen confidence in institutions. (Citizen confidence is not identical to approval, of course, but is very similar.) Looking more closely at approval during the past year, you can see here that, again according to Gallup, the congressional approval has been hovering around the abysmal level of 20 percent throughout 2010.

Not so good.

Turning next to approval of the respective parties, the chart I presented at the top of this post above shows the approval and disapproval ratings for each party since President Obama took office, as reported by the Pew Research/National Journal Congressional Connection Poll and tracked by PollingReport.com for the Democrats and Republicans. It confirms that, indeed, the Democrats in just 18 months have blown a net +10 congressional approval rating, turning it into roughly a 20-point net disapproval rating. The key moment of inversion came in late spring 2009, in the wake of the passage of the stimulus bill and at the outset of sometimes nasty debates on Capitol Hill (and back home in those town halls) about health care reform. The only good news for Democrats is that they've fallen to the depths Republicans have been wallowing at for some time--again, with about net 20-point disapproval score.

So, we can reasonably conclude that the early 2009 high hopes for Congress, no doubt boosted by the high approval ratings and excitement or hope that attended the start of the Obama presidency, have been dashed. Overall congressional approval has turned south, largely because voters now feel about as positively (or rather, negatively) as they do the Republicans. To Americans, the nation's least trusted and least liked political institution has returned to its earthly, dismal levels of scorn and disappointment.

What does all this mean for November? There are (at least) three possibilities to consider:

1. The Democrats are in serious trouble. This is the conventional wisdom, and there is ample reason to subscribe to it. Yes, the GOP's approval numbers stink, but hey, they're not in charge of anything. Their low approval means nothing because the Dems are running the show and their heads are on the electoral chopping block this autumn.

2. The Democrats are in some trouble, sure--but less than people think. Here the logic goes something like this: "The voters are disgusted with the Democrats, but that doesn't mean they like or trust the GOP to do any better. This wasn't the change they were looking for, but they know the change back to what came before is definitely not what they are looking to return to." This is the current political meme being spread by the White House and other national Democrats, a more sophisticated version of saying, "Yup, we suck but they really suck."

3. These congressional approval numbers are meaningless. One can reach this conclusion not only because both parties are suffering the same, 20-point net negative approval, but simply because approval for the Congress is distended from how people will vote on a district-by-district, state-by-state basis. The strongest piece of evidence here is this: If you think the public's view of Congress as a whole is bad now, according to Gallup it was basically the same this time in 2008 when Democrats also controlled both chambers and still picked up seats, not to mention it was higher still in 2006 right before the Republicans had their majorities erased by voters. The counter argument to this is that Democrats, though running Congress two years ago, still had George W. Bush to contend with, so they were not being held responsible for governmental failures then in the way they are now...which more or less brings us back to point #1.

I'm not a polling expert (would love to hear Nate weigh in on this), but I suspect that in this postmodern era of hyper-partisanship these approval numbers, collectively for Congress as an institution or separately for each party, matter less than how voters feel about the president--and how they then express their pleasure or displeasure during midterms toward the one set of national elites they have available to reward or punish via the ballot: members of Congress.

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Late Night Returns From the West

Returns from today's primaries in Wyoming and Washington have been rolling in for a while, with some interesting results but no big upsets.

In Wyoming, as expected, Leslie Peterson won the Democratic gubernatorial primary over Pete Gosar, by a 48-38 margin. But it doesn't appear there will be an all-female general election: in the GOP primary, with just nine precincts still out, Matt Mead seems to have edged out Rita Meyer by just over 1300 votes; hard-core conservative Ron Micheli finished a strong third, just 840 votes behind Meyer at present. (Colin Simpson finished well back in fourth). Those who consider Mead a RINO will undoubtedly lament the split in the "true conservative" vote.

In Washington, as expected, Patty Murray and Dino Rossi finished first and second in the U.S. Senate primary and will advance to a clawhammer duel in November. With about 55% of precincts reporting (and nearly half of King County--Seattle--still out), Murray leads Rossi 46-34; Tea Party favorite Clint Didier's way back at 12%. Sarah Palin had another bad night with Didier's and Meyer's losses.

In the most competitive House race in WA, in the 3d district, the conventional wisdom won out again, with Democrat Denny Heck and Republican Jaime Herrera moving on to the general election. Would-be conservative spoiler David Castillo is currently running fourth.

Finally, out in California, the special election runoff to fill Lt. Gov. Abel Maldonado's state senate seat looks like a probable win for Republican Sam Blakeslee over Democrat John Laird. I mention this not only because I happen to live in Senate District 15, but because more votes were cast in this special state legislative election than in today's entire Wyoming primary. This central coast district, which runs from Santa Clara all the way to Santa Barbara, is represented by one state senator. Wyoming, as you may know, is represented by two United States Senators. Such is our system.

UPDATE, Wednesday AM: Sean Trende of RealClearPolitics has an analysis of the Washington vote based on the relationship of primary and general election votes in prior "blanket primary" elections, suggesting that Murray's in trouble, the 3d district is almost certain to go Republican, and a couple of Democratic congressmen should be nervous. I haven't had the time or inclination to second-guess Sean's research, but I do wonder if he's noting that Washington has changed back-and-forth from August to September primary dates in the past. You'd figure September primaries would produce higher turnout and a closer relationship to November public opinion, while August primaries would have somewhat less predictive value.

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Mild West Preview

With most of the chattering classes focused on next week's wild primaries in Florida, this Tuesday's entries, Washington and Wyoming, are not receiving a great deal of attention. That's partly because Washington's "top two primary" system has made many contests essentially a positioning exercise for November, and partly because Wyoming politics just get missed nationally on occasion.

But there is some intrigue surrounding the performance of Republican Dino Rossi in Washington's Senate primary, and there's a close race among Republicans for a spot in the general election in the open 3d congressional seat. In the Cowboy State, there are competitive gubernatorial primaries for both parties, with the Republican race being a close three- or four-way battle in which out-of-state endorsements have been significant.

All year long, Republican long-shot prospects of winning control of the Senate have depended heavily on recruiting a strong candidate against Democrat Patti Murray. DC GOPers got the candidate they wanted in Dino Rossi, who lost two very close gubernatorial races to Christine Gregoire. And while Murray has usually led in general election polls (49-46 in an August 1 PPP poll; 49-47 in a July 28 Rasmussen survey), Rossi has kept it very close.

But two other Republicans with some significant backing have also jumped into the Senate race. Almost no one thinks Rossi will fail to finish second and advance to the general election, although his margin could be lower than originally expected. Rossi has studiously avoided Tea Party events, which have been dominated by former NFL player (for the team in that other Washington, the Redskins) Clint Didier, who has secured endorsements from Sarah Palin and Ron Paul while calling for the phasing out of Social Security and elimination of several federal Cabinet agencies. Conservative businessman Paul Akers, who has also been on the Tea Party circuit, has spent enough of his own money to make a mark, too. The most recent PPP poll showed Rossi at 33%, Didier at 10%, and Akers at 4%, while Murray leads the field at 47%.

The other big primary contest in WA is in the very competitive 3d congressional district, where Democrat Brian Baird is retiring. Former state legislator Denny Heck, a Democrat, is very likely to finish first, but the intra-Republican battle for the second spot has become close and unpredictable. The consensus Republican front-runner is state representative Jaime Herrera, a 31-year-old Latina who is a prize national GOP recruit. But former state legislative staffer and Bush administration bureaucrat David Castillo (not, despite his surname, a Latino) has worked the Tea Party circuit and sports a FreedomsWork endorsement, while a third Republican, disabled veteran David Hedrick, is running to the right of the rest of the field. Interestingly, Herrera has explicitly opposed partial privatization of Social Security, an unusual position for Republicans this year.

In all but one county in Washington, all voting is by mail, which means the primary has been underway for some time. The official estimate of expected primary turnout is 38%, a bit above average for midterm primaries.

In Wyoming, the very popular outgoing Democratic Gov. David Freudenthal decided against a third-term bid (which would have required a legal challege to the state's term limit laws) relatively late, leaving Democrats scrambling for candidates. Ultimately state party chair Leslie Peterson decided to run, with her major competition being former University of Wyoming football star Pete Gosar. A Mason-Dixon poll at the end of July showed Peterson up over Gosar 30-22. There's not a lot of difference between the two candidates on issues; both pledge to continue Freudenthal's legacy.

The Republican primary, however, has had a few ideological flashpoints. The two front-runners have been former U.S. Attorney Matt Mead and State Auditor Rita Meyer. Mead has drawn fire from other candidates for entertaining the possibility of a fuel tax increase, and in general, is suspected by some conservatives of being excessively moderate. Meyer, whose military service in both the Gulf War and in Afghanistan is a key credential, has won backing from Sarah Palin and also from the Susan B. Anthony List, the anti-abortion counterpart to Emily's List. A third candidate, former state legislator Ron Micheli, has been bashing Mead's position on fuel taxes and generally comporting himself as the "true conservative" candidate, obtaining endorsements from Wyoming-based anti-abortion groups. And finally, state House Speaker Colin Simpson, son of former Sen. Alan Simpson, has secured an endorsement from his father's old friend George H.W. Bush.

The late-July Mason-Dixon survey showed Meyer leading leading the field at 27%, with Mead at 24%; Simpson at 17%; and Micheli at 12%.

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How Stable is the Generic Ballot?

I'm fairly deep in the weeds of building our House forecasting model, which we hope to debut for you at some point late next week. We're basically taking a "kitchen sink" approach -- that is, looking at five or six different sources of information (polls, ratings by professional forecasters like Cook and CQ, fundraising data, etc.), and seeing what has had the most predictive power over the past six election cycles. This is not an easy thing to do -- the data-collection efforts alone are formidable.

One of the challenges I've faced is in coming to grips with the generic ballot, which is the primary indicator of the nationwide standing of the two major parties. The basic question is to what extent the generic ballot ought to take precednece over local-level indicators: for instance, if the generic ballot looks really bad for one party (as it does for the Democrats this year), but the local polls are more favorable, which indicator tends to prevail? I don't have an answer to that yet -- you'll have to tune in next week, I suppose. Still, there are some questions about the generic ballot that I'm now in a better position to address.

For instance: how stable is the generic ballot? I don't mean individual polls of the generic ballot, which in the case of Gallup and some other organizations, can be quite "bouncy" from week to week. Rather, suppose that you're able to remove most of this noise: how quickly can the underlying, macro-level dynamics change when it comes to elections to the Congress?

The way that I've evaluated this is to collect all generic ballot polls since 1998 and looked at what they would have told us at certain intervals before each election. Specifically, I built Pollster.com-style LOESS regression curves around the generic ballot polls, and evaluated the result they would have projected on the morning of the election, and then at 10, 20, 30, 45, 60, 90, 120, 150, 200, 300 and (where there is sufficient early polling) 400 days beforehand. There is no "cheating" allowed: for instance, if a poll came out 199 days before the election, it isn't used in the 200-day forecast, since it wouldn't have been available to us at that time.

The one "fancy" thing I have done is to build in an adjustment to translate registered voter polls into likely voter polls, as we now do for our Senate forecasts. This is worthwhile: although there are some cycles (2006, 2008) where there is little systemic difference between registered voter and likely voter polls, there are other cases (1998, 2000, 2010) where likely voter polls tend to be 4 or 5 points more favorable to Republicans, and accounting for this as early as possible tends to improve the stability of one's forecasts. (There have been no cases recently in which Democrats performed demonstrably better in likely voter polls than in registered voter polls: in years where Democratic mobilization is strong, the two say about the same thing; in bad years for the party, registered voter polls lowball the Republican position by several points.)

Here, for instance, is what the trendline would have looked like at various points during the 2008 election cycle:



As you can see, 2008 was a rather stable cycle. Democrats maintained a consistent lead of about 10 points throughout the entirety of the cycle, and that carried forward to election day, when they won the national popular vote by 11 points.

Several other cycles were also quite stable. For example, 2002:



In spite of the potential idiosyncrasies resulting from redistricting (not to mention 9/11) that cycle, the generic ballot remained quite well-behaved all year.

Likewise, in 2000:



A generic ballot projection a year in advance of election day would have told you pretty much the same thing as one on Election Eve. This is in spite of the fact that the Presidential race that year was one of the more volatile in recent memory.

Nor did the generic ballot move very much at all in 1998, a low-turnout year in which Democrats arguably underperformed given Bill Clinton's favorable standing at that time:



On the other hand, the generic ballot moved a fair bit in 2004. Over the summer, the Democrats built up a generic ballot lead of as large as 8 points, but it evaporated by November; adding insult to injury, the Democrats underperformed their generic ballot standing (losing the national popular vote by 3 points) on Election Day:



There was also a fair amount of movement in 2006 -- and this time, it was uniformly in a direction favorable to Democrats -- although there were some weird polls late in that cycle that perhaps overshot the mark a bit:



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In spite of these partial exceptions, the generic ballot is generally fairly stable -- almost certainly more stable than something like Presidential polling. This makes a certain amount of sense: whereas something like a gaffe or a victory in a debate can considerably altar the outcome of a Presidential race, there are 435 separate elections to the House, and gaffes in individual districts tend to cancel one another out. Instead, things usually boil down to the national mood that was established during the first half of a Congress's two-year term.

This is basically bad news for Democrats in the context of this cycle: a last-minute reversal of fortunes is unlikely. Where we sit right now, about 75 days before the election, the generic ballot will be off, on average, by only about 2 points from what it will read on Election Morning. The Democrats' standing is poor enough now that a 2- or 3-point shift in their direction would not really be enough to prevent the party from enduring significant losses in the House.

With that said, there is another issue at hand: how much does the generic ballot really tell us about what will happen on Election Day? It might be the case that the generic ballot is fairly stable, but that doesn't necessarily mean it's all that useful an indicator. In addition to the fact that the consensus of polls (however careful we are about calibrating it) might be off in one or the other direction, there's also the fact that the thing which the generic ballot is ostensibly trying to predict -- the national House popular vote -- is relatively irrelevant to the disposition of the chamber, or the number of seats that each party earns. Instead, what we want to know is how the generic ballot translates into each of the 435 congressional districts; this is the sort of problem that we're hard at work upon.

Still, to expect that the national environment will just spontaneously get better for Democrats is probably not realistic. They'll have a poor hand to play, and the task is basically in figuring out exactly how bad the current milieu will translate in terms of a loss of seats.

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More on FiveThirtyEight's Moving Plans

This has not been the most relaxing summer for me -- lots of Saturday nights spent staring at a spreadsheet, and lots of time on the 2 train shuttling back and forth to Midtown -- but you should start to see the fruits of that labor very soon. We are now planning to migrate FiveThirtyEight to NYTimes.com on Tuesday, August 24th. This is roughly a week later than we had originally planned, but our feeling is that we want to be rolling at pretty much full speed from the very outset of our re-launch there, and so we have indulged in a few extra days of development time.

The next update to our Senate model will likely come on launch day, the 24th. The forecasts will be significantly more rich, interactive and navigable than they are now. The plan is then to debut our House and gubernatorial forecasting models within a week or so of launch -- tentatively, we have the our first House forecast scheduled for Thursday the 26th, and the first gubernatorial forecast scheduled for Monday the 30th, although these dates are subject to change. The House forecasts in particular are, we think, pretty innovative, and will involve our forecasting the outcome of all 435 individual House races as well as the disposition of the entire body. Updates to the Senate, House and gubernatorial forecasts will then begin to cycle through on a regular basis, with each being updated approximately once a week. (For instance, there might be an update to the House forecast each Thursday.)

We also plan to run a quick update of our pollster ratings before re-launching at the New York Times, likely sometime toward the end of the upcoming week.

To answer several further questions about our move to the Times that I've gotten over e-mail:

-- All of our current freelance contributors will be migrating to the New York Times along with me.

-- The main changes you will notice to the content flow are that I will begin posting more frequently after having been on a somewhat reduced schedule for most of the summer. Also, I will be working out of the New York Times newsroom most days and that may somewhat affect the timing and pacing of posts, with a relatively higher percentage of content to be posted on weekday mornings and afternoons; it is unlikely, on the other hand, that you'll be seeing as many posts at times like these, at 1 in the morning.

-- Although, as of the 24th, the front page of FiveThirtyEight.com will re-direct to NYTimes.com, the archives of this site will remain browsable in their entirety.

-- Comments at NYTimes.com will be moderated, which I hope will be a welcome change for 99 percent of you.

-- We will retain our current Twitter feed and it will continue to alert you when new articles have been posted.

-- We will continue to run posts occasionally on non-politics topics, like sports and science, although these will be relatively infrequent at the outset given the immediacy of the midterm elections.

-- As with all content that appears at NYTimes.com, our posts will receive an edit before being published. The most obvious impact of this should be that our copy will be a bit crisper, and that we'll begin to start referring to people as Mr. John Zogby or Mrs. Michelle Bachmann. This is not to say that our teammates on the edit desk will never raise questions when we come to conclusions that are not adequately supported by the evidence -- the Times has high standards, as we do. But the blog should continue to have a strong "voice" and an independent perspective.

-- Finally, I have heard some concerns about the New York Times's metered model, which it says it will implement at some point after the midterms. I would encourage people who have worries about this to browse the entirely of the comments that the New York Times has made on the public record about the model, which is quite different from the versions used by some other news organizations. For example, in addition to the free allotment of pages, users who come to the site through third-party referrers, like other blogs or social networking platforms, will not trigger the pay wall. With that said, I of course hope that you'll at least consider subscribing to the New York Times in print, or one if its various e-reader or digital editions. Having gotten an up-close-and-personal view of the newsroom, I can't emphasize enough how much dedication the New York Times has to its craft, and how much support it provides to its writers in the form of things like editors, photographers, news assistants, its international bureaus, and its exceptional team of graphic and interactive journalists.

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We very much appreciate your patience and your loyalty to this site and hope you will continue to join us as we embark on new adventures at the Times.

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