Build the Mosque; Help Defeat Al Qaeda Posted by The Editors

This post is by Matthew Alexander and originally appeared on the Huffington Post.

The debate over the mosque in lower Manhattan has caused our country’s political volcano to erupt.  Republicans and Democrats, among them Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, have argued that the designated site for the Cordoba House, a Muslim community center and mosque, is too close to hallowed ground.  President Obama defended the mosque supporters’ Constitutional right to build it where they choose.

But there is a much larger rationale for building a Muslim community center near the former site of the Twin Towers:  It can be used as a weapon to defeat al Qaeda.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, our counterterrorism strategy has focused on stopping terrorist attacks.  That’s an important goal, but only part of the equation. A comprehensive strategy should include a greater focus on removing the root causes of terrorism. The only way to deliver a sustainable defeat to al Qaeda is to both destroy its leadership and cut off its ability to recruit.

Building a Muslim community center near the site of Ground Zero will bolster our ability to do the latter.  Imagine an al Qaeda recruiter attempting to sway a potential charge by citing an imaginary American war against Muslims but having to face the counterargument that Americans built a Muslim community center near the site of the Twin Towers.

The Cordoba House would be a powerful symbol of U.S. tolerance and freedom that will stand in direct contradiction to al Qaeda’s narrative that Americans hate Muslims.  As a symbol, its construction demonstrates that the U.S. is not at war with Islam and that Muslims are welcome in America.  It communicates a message of moderation that stands in stark contrast to al Qaeda’s bankrupt ideology.

As I discovered as a high-level interrogator of al Qaeda members in Iraq, symbols like this matter.  Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay and the policy of torture and abuse handed al Qaeda its number one recruiting tool. Those who think al Qaeda will not be able to spin this controversy to their advantage are disastrously mistaken – but it can be a victory for America as well.

The political uproar over the Cordoba project, and in particular the use of harmful, bigoted rhetoric by some opportunists, leaves America facing a choice.  It can project one of two symbols: One of integration, acceptance and positive affirmation of American values; or one of intolerance, rejection, and animosity.  The former will work to undermine al Qaeda as part of a long-term strategy to defeat them. The latter will bolster Islamic extremists’ arguments that America is an intolerant country hell-bent on war with Islam, aid recruitment efforts and add support for more terrorist attacks.

The choice is obvious.  Let’s build the Cordoba House.

Matthew Alexander is a former senior military interrogator who led the interrogations that located Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq. He is the author of How to Break a Terrorist: The U.S. Interrogators Who Used Brains, Not Brutality, to Take Down the Deadliest Man in Iraq.

New Brookings Policy Brief on Radicalization of Islamist Groups Posted by Shadi Hamid

I have a new Brookings policy brief suggestively titled "The Islamist Response to Repression: Are Mainstream Islamist Groups Radicalizing?" You can read it here (PDF). While the Obama administration tries to resolve conflicts and crises in Iran, Palestine, and Iraq, there are some troubling developments taking place in Egypt and Jordan, two of our most strategically vital Arab allies. Egypt, for one, might be on the brink. And, well, Jordan might also be on the brink, though of what no one can be sure. Both countries have critical parliamentary elections coming up at the end of the year.

So what's the problem? Over the last 15-20 years, and particularly since 9/11, mainstream Islamist groups have moderated their policies and rhetoric. But just as they've been adopting democratic precepts and modernizing their election platforms, they've found themselves facing mounting legal restrictions, widespread electoral fraud, and mass arrest. If we want to persuade Islamists to channel their grievances through peaceful, democratic means, this may serve as the most useful encouragement. Any number of studies have warned that the marginalization of nonviolent Islamists can have a radicalizing effect. But has it?

In the paper, I try to gauge how Islamists are responding to these new, unprecedented challenges while exploring implications for U.S. foreign policy and regional security. Here is the relevant section for U.S. policymakers, who, one hopes, are keeping a close eye on developments in both countries:

With much-anticipated elections in both countries scheduled for 2010 and 2011, the Obama administration as well as the U.S. Congress have the opportunity to weigh in and address the question of Islamist participation, something they have so far avoided doing. Doing nothing has consequences, as evidenced by Jordanian Islamists’ announcement in early August that they would boycott the November parliamentary polls due to the likelihood of fraud. The briefing concludes with several practicable steps the United States should take, including:

• Publicly affirm the right of all opposition actors, including Islamists, to participate in upcoming elections. The Obama administration should begin by clarifying U.S. policy toward political Islam by clearly affirming the right of all nonviolent political groups to participate in the electoral process. This should be coupled by a consistent American policy of opposing not just the arrests of secular activists but Islamist ones as well. By treating both groups equally, the United States can counter the (largely accurate) claim that its support for Arab democrats is selective. In Jordan, the United States should pressure the government to reach out to opposition groups and issue guarantees to that the elections will be relatively free.

• Empower U.S. embassies to begin substantive engagement with Islamist groups. The Obama administration has emphasized its belief in engaging a diverse range of actors. Yet it has failed to reach out to many of the largest, most influential groups in the region. As Islamist groups work to reassess their strategy and resolve internal divisions, American officials need to be aware of how such developments might affect broader regional interests. At a later stage, open channels of dialogue may allow the United States some influence over strategies Islamists adopt, particularly regarding participation in elections.

As they say, go read the whole thing. 

Will Moving the Park 51 "Mosque" Empower Extremists? Posted by Shadi Hamid

Some liberals are arguing that failing to build the Park 51 "mosque" will somehow empower extremists. Jon Chait's coverage of the "ground zero mosque" controversy has been excellent. But I'm not really sure what to make of this claim of his:

The key fact is that we are fighting a war for the hearts and minds of non-radical Muslims, and the Park 51 uproar is helping drive potential allies into the arms of the enemy. It is madness.

Elsewhere, Ruth Massie, a supporter of Park51, puts it this way:

It would be giving in to bigotry and intolerance to demand that it be moved and I think in the end, it makes us less safe because we need to show the world that we are a tolerant, open society.

I don't really understand this. Will the mosque/community center send a powerful message that America is a land of freedom for Muslims, even 2.5 blocks from the site of the 9/11 attacks? There are good arguments in support of Park51. This, I suspect, is not one of them. No one ever decided to join a terrorist group in Egypt because they were reading New York Times articles about civil liberties abuses against Muslims in Alabama. If this is about helping diffuse Muslim anger abroad, then I wish supporters of this odd hypothesis would clarify the causal mechanisms involved. Arabs aren't angry at us because American Muslims get racially profiled in airports. They're angry at us because our policies in the region, um, are pretty bad. 

So let's not pretend that we can build a better relationship with the Muslim world by "cultivating moderates" like Imam Rauf, or that America can lead by example by peppering fuzzy mosques all over Manhattan. Arabs aren't concerned about our lack of freedom in America. They're concerned about the lack of freedom in their own societies, something which we haven't been particularly helpful with.

How's That Whole Afghanistan Strategy Going? Posted by Michael Cohen

Today we have several fresh reminders of how increasingly FUBAR our mission in Afghanistan actually is.

First, Dexter Filkins piece on how the Pakistanis used the arrest of Mullah Baradar last February to continue playing their own game in Afghanistan - one that is very different from the strategy underpinning US efforts:

They (Pakistani officials) say they set out to capture Mr. Baradar, and used the C.I.A. to help them do it, because they wanted to shut down secret peace talks that Mr. Baradar had been conducting with the Afghan government that excluded Pakistan, the Taliban’s longtime backer.

In the weeks after Mr. Baradar’s capture, Pakistani security officials detained as many as 23 Taliban leaders, many of whom had been enjoying the protection of the Pakistani government for years. The talks came to an end.

. . . "We picked up Baradar and the others because they were trying to make a deal without us,” said a Pakistani security official. “We protect the Taliban. They are dependent on us. We are not going to allow them to make a deal with Karzai and the Indians.”

The Pakistanis even seem comfortable taking cheap shots at the CIA:

The Pakistanis refused to allow the C.I.A. to interrogate Mr. Baradar or even to be present when they spoke. Another Pakistani official said Mr. Baradar was taken to a safe house in Islamabad, where he was debriefed. It was only several days later that the C.I.A. learned of his identity and were allowed to question him.

The Pakistani official even joked about the C.I.A.’s naïveté. “They are so innocent,” he said.

The thing about this story is that even if isn't true and even if, as one US official claims, the Pakistanis are "trying to rewrite history to make themselves appear more influential" the very tone of this article is basically a screw you to the United States.  But considering the obvious duplicity of the Pakistanis in not going after al Qaeda and in tacitly supporting the Afghan Taliban's insurgency in Afghanistan, which stretches back to 2001, none of this should be a surprise.  How many times are the Pakistanis going to be keep moving the football (a la Lucy) and we fall flat on our ass (Charlie Brown) before we realize that they do not have the same goals that we do in Afghanistan? As long as the Pakistanis are supporting the Afghan Taliban - and providing them with sanctuary across the border - we're just not going to make much progress in a counter-insurgency fight.

Now speaking of unreliable allies - how about Hamid Karzai and his efforts clamp down on corruption in Afghanistan? Well first it turns out that he intervened personally to free a high level aide accused of corruption; next he is establishing new rules to restrict the power of two US-backed anti-corruption agencies and now, according to his spokesman, Waheed Omer the real corruption problem in Afghanistan lies not with the Karzai government, but with foreigners:

Mr. Omer said that much of Afghanistan’s corruption was the fault of foreign contractors spending Western reconstruction money, and called on the international community to do more to help Afghanistan combat the problem, which he depicted as more serious than the problem of Afghan official corruption.

. . . Mr. Omer insisted that the Afghan government remained committed to combating corruption, but that most official corruption was petty, such as bribes to provide services or licenses.

There is even this precious quote from an unnamed US official reflecting on Karzai, "In the end, we’re hoping he’ll do the right thing.”

I tell you, we Americans are adorable - I mean just adorable. Look, even if Karzai does the "right thing" how much more obvious could it be that he has little actual interest in curbing corruption in his government. If it takes another round of US arm-twisting to get him to come around that only puts a band-aid on a gushing wound.

I hate to sound like a broken record on this, but no matter how much the US military thinks it "gets" COIN there are far more important factors that determine success in a counter-insurgency fight.

Strike one is not having strong or even legitimate host country support. Strike 2 is when your insurgent opponent has an unmolested safe haven.

And strike three is when six out of ten of your own citizens oppose the war you're fighting.

The very fact that General Petraeus is talking about extending the US presence and pushing back withdrawals to after June 2011 is mind-boggling. It's like Vietnam all over again. At what point do US policymakers wake up and realize our strategy in Afghanistan simply isn't working?

That is no way to make America safer Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

Stephen Rademaker has a point.  The debate in the Senate over the New START Treaty has been devoid of long, detailed discussions about formal Senate procedures. 

Other than the obvious explanation—it’s dull, boring and painful so no one wants to talk about it— there’s another glaring explanation:  New START is a no-brainer. 

The Secretary of Defense didn’t testify that he would support New START if the U.S. goes back to the Russians and chats some more about missile defense.  No, Bob Gates said, unequivocally, "The New START Treaty has the unanimous support of America's military leadership."

James Schlesinger, the GOP’s nuclear yoda, didn’t say that the Senate should ratify New START after we’ve gotten some things off our chest about our long-range conventional strike capabilities.  No, James Schlesinger said that it is “obligatory” for the Senate to ratify New START.  Full stop.   

Seven former commanders of U.S. Strategic Command didn’t say that they would support New START provided the administration coughs up some more money for our nuclear complex.  No, the men who used to be in charge of all of our nation’s inter-continental ballistic missiles assured Senators, "We strongly endorse its early ratification and entry into force."

Over 70 of our nation’s leading military and national security experts, from both sides of the aisle, have voiced their support for New START and they have done so without setting conditions or recommending that the U.S. go run a few things past the Russians before moving forward. 

After 20 hearings, 3 classified briefings and the submission of nearly 800 questions for the record, Senators have honorably upheld their Constitutional duty to thoroughly review this treaty.  In addition to hearing from a multitude of current administration officials, Senators heard from high-ranking officials from the Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush 41, Clinton, and Bush 43 administrations as well as six former secretaries of state, five former secretaries of defense, the chair and vice chair of the 9/11 Commission, and numerous other distinguished Americans.  The record that has been established throughout this process is truly impressive. 

On top of all of this support, the leadership of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—the committee that is responsible for reporting to the full Senate when treaties are being considered— has been extremely respectful and sensitive to the concerns of its members.  After pushing back the Committee vote to give members additional time to review all of the materials that were submitted along with the treaty, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. John Kerry told the Washington Post, "If we forced a vote today, I would have won. But I would have angered some people and made them feel they weren't being included," Kerry said. "I think it's important to build a broader consensus."

What’s more, Sen. Kerry wrote to committee members before the August recess and specifically asked for suggestions for the draft resolution of ratification.  “The Committee is currently drafting a resolution of advice and consent, and members who wish to suggest language for inclusion should do so during recess…Your input is welcome as we work to craft a resolution that can enjoy broad support.”

Funny that Mr. Rademaker didn’t mention that.  He also seemed to conveniently gloss over the fact that the person who was most adamantly calling for a committee vote was Sen. Richard Lugar, the committee’s Ranking Republican.  On the day that Chairman Kerry announced he would delay the vote, Sen. Lugar told the Cable, "We ought to vote now and let the chips fall where they may. It's that important."  Aware of the tight floor schedule and of the need to quickly ratify the treaty, Sen. Lugar urged the full Senate to take up the treaty as soon as possible.  "If not [before the election], then whether it works out in December or not is no longer a matter of parliamentary debate, it's a matter of national security," he said, citing the fact that U.S. inspectors have not been able to verify Russian behavior regarding nuclear weapons deployment since the original START agreement expired late last year.

Ultimately, this is where Mr. Rademaker falls short.  Formal Senate procedures are to be respected and utilized properly, but they should not be used as a delay tactic or a political tool, particularly when our national security is on the line. 

Let’s face it, that is no way to make America safer.

The Left's Selective Praise Posted by Michael Cohen

The other day, my blogmate Shadi Hamid raised a point on his Twitter feed that's been gnawing at me as well; "Why do liberals get excited when politicians defend things that are pretty basic & should be beyond question - like, um, the 1st amendment?"

Shadi was of course referring to President Obama's speech last Friday defending the Ground Zero Mosque and the glowing, initial response it received in the liberal blogosphere.

Glenn Greenwald called it an act "that deserves pure praise"; Mark Kleiman says Obama's remarks made him "proud to be an American citizen" and Greg Sargent said it was one of the "finest moments" of Obama's presidency. And there was even more where that came from.

Call me and Shadi cynics, but "meh." It's not that I'm unpleased by what Obama said, but jeez this is what Presidents are supposed to do. Hell, George Bush stood up for American Muslims repeatedly - and, to some extent, in language more forceful than that used by Obama. I understand that the Burlington Coat Factory Mosque doesn't exactly have a great deal of support among the American people, but upholding basic American principles like religious freedom sort of comes with the job description of being President of the United States.

But what I find striking about all this momentary praise from the left is that it seems a bit more effusive than the praise that Barack Obama has received from these same allies for his actual legislative accomplishments. (And in no way do I mean I to focus these comments exclusively on Greenwald, Kleiman and Sargent).

Now I realize that the health care bill didn't contain a public option, which of course invalidated the entire effort (#sarcasm). However, it seems to me that ensuring guaranteed health care for 30 million Americans is a pretty significant progressive accomplishment - in fact, it's a heck of a lot more momentous, and more difficult to achieve, than simply delivering a speech extolling the virtues of religious freedom.

Now granted the health care bill is not perfect and there are legitimate areas for criticism in the final legislation. But for tens of millions of working class and middle class Americans (you know the people that liberals are nominally supposed to be fighting for) this bill is a critical step forward in ameliorating America's growing inequality gap and could literally make the difference between life and death for many of them. In short, it is precisely the sort of landmark, incremental and yet initially imperfect social legislation that has come to define significant progressive, legislative accomplishments throughout American history.

So there is something that tends to rub the wrong way about such unconditional praise for Obama's speech in support of religious freedom, but tepid praise - even anger - for legislation that fulfills what has basically been the policy lodestar of modern progressivism for six decades. Of course, this isn't even to mention the president's efforts to pass various pieces of legislation that improves regulation of Wall Street - including the creation of a consumer protection agency - revamps the student lending program and puts more resources into education reform, public transportation and other progressive priorities.  (And to be sure, praise for these efforts has little to do with Barack Obama; it has to do with consolidating support and mobilizing public opinion so that Congress will not only maintain support for these programs but build upon them. To paraphrase Clemenceau, legislating is too important to be left to politicians.)

Along these lines, in a smart piece in this week's Nation Theda Skocpol makes a good argument about nature of liberal disappointment in Obama's significant policy accomplishments:

Since the 1960s, progressives in the United States have often been more interested in racial, gender, foreign policy, cultural and environmental issues, and not so concerned about socioeconomic redistribution. So it is perhaps understandable that for many upper-middle-class progressives, who cluster on the East and West Coasts, the past two years just look like failure.

This isn't to say that cultural, environmental and foreign policy issues are unimportant (after writing for more than a year about our failed Afghanistan policy the importance I place on these issues should speak for itself). And this isn't to suggest that the left should stop focusing on "unpopular" issues like torture and rule of law abuses where the president needs to have his feet held to the fire. But liberals do great harm to the causes they care most deeply about if they ignores the bread and butter issues that not only animate American politics, but matter so much to lower and middle class Americans for whom progressivism must speak. Because after all, if we don't, who will?

The left should and must applaud the President when he speaks up for religious freedom and against the bigotry and intolerance directed at Muslims that is an all too prevalent part of our national discourse. But when he accomplishes the more difficult task of bringing social justice to millions upon millions of Americans shouldn't the praise from his nominal supporters be even greater and more enduring? 

I fear sometimes that my progressives compatriots lose touch with what it is exactly we're fighting for.

Historical Hypocrisy: Paula DeSutter Talks Verification Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

Puh-lease.  Paula DeSutter’s attempted criticism of the verification measures in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is hypocritical, untrue, and in clear contradiction to her not-so-stellar track record when it comes to verification.

As Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation (VCI), Paula DeSutter was the Bush administration’s go-to person for all things verifiable—which makes her sudden concern for stringent verification measures seem just a teensie bit disingenuous.   

First, her assertion that the Obama administration “could have extended the START treaty,” is well, a lie.  In 2007, it was DeSutter who announced that the United States would not seek to extend the START Treaty.  Check this out:  

While the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or START "has been important and for the most part has done its job," Assistant Secretary of State Paula DeSutter told Reuters the pact is cumbersome and its complicated reporting standards have outlived their usefulness.

In the post-Cold war era, many provisions of the 1991 START accord, which mandated deep nuclear weapons cuts, "are no longer necessary. We don't believe we're in a place where we need have to have the detailed lists (of weapons) and verification measures," added DeSutter.

As someone who thought all of those boring details and provisions in START were “cumbersome” and “no longer necessary” it’s quite ironic that DeSutter is now going after the Obama administration for allegedly agreeing to “gut the monitoring and verification measures and limitations necessary to render [New START] effectively verifiable.” How odd. 

Multiple military and national security experts from both sides of the aisle have testified before Congress that New START—and its strong verification regime— is essential to our national security.  After 18 hearings, three classified briefings, the submission of nearly 800 questions for the record, and an extended review period, DeSutter’s accusation that the administration is seeking to “ram New START through the Senate with minimal examination…” is once again, a bit disingenuous.  Especially when compared to the review process for the 2002 Moscow Treaty (trust me…I’ll get to that in a second) which passed on a 95-0 vote, after just six hearings.   

Finally, let’s not forget that DeSutter has a track record when it comes to verification and arms control treaties.  And it ain’t pretty.  The Bush administration, for whom DeSutter served, repeatedly took long-standing verification measures, threw them out the window, and flipped them the bird as a final farewell.  This much is clear in at least three major instances:   

Strike one:  Verification and the Biological Weapons Convention

Courtesy of my friends at ACA, this little nugget sums it all up:  “Beginning in 1995, states-parties to the BWC began negotiations to fashion a legally binding protocol of verification measures, including on-site inspections, for the instrument…Six months after taking office, the Bush administration announced its opposition to the proposed protocol, sinking it.”

Strike two:  Verification and a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

Washington had subscribed since 1995 to negotiating an effectively verifiable FMCT, but the Bush administration reversed course in July 2004 and announced that it no longer thought an FMCT could be effectively verified, a reversal that once again, sank any hope for progress. 

Strike three, you’re out:  Verification (or lack thereof) and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

Perhaps the number one reason why Paula DeSutter has absolutely no authority to speak on New START’s verification regime is the fact that in 2002, the Bush administration—for whom she served—negotiated a three-page treaty with Russia that contained no verification provisions, no definitions, and frankly, no real substance.  Commonly called the “SORT-of-a-treaty,” the pact relied on the verification provisions of START 1, which as we all know, expired on December 5, 2009. 

DeSutter openly admitted that SORT is not effectively verifiable, but said that mattered little because of the friendlier U.S.-Russian relationship.

So this all begs the question—why, given DeSutter’s flagrant disregard for verification measures in the past, is she suddenly so concerned with telemetry exchanges, re-entry vehicle on-site inspections, limits on the number of re-entry vehicles that can be loaded on ballistic missiles—and all of that other “cumbersome” crap that as of 2007, she said was “no longer necessary?”  

Sure beats me.

UPDATE:  Kingston Reif over at Nukes of Hazard reminds us of all of the lovely things conservatives said about the "simplicity and brevity" of SORT.  Greg Thielmann has also weighed in on DeSutter's commentary in his new piece for ACA. 

9-11 -- Then and Now Posted by David Shorr

Of the many disorienting things on 9/11/01, it was particularly strange to find myself living 1,000 miles away from the two cities where, up to then, I'd spent all but one of my years. As we know, New Yorkers are famous for not being very attuned to the rest of the country. Of course that has been a two-way avenue, too, with plenty of suspicion from beyond the Hudson River looking at New York City as a kind of foreign land (not to mention the nation's capital). That sense of distance may have narrowed during the years since, but as a then-newly transplanted Midwesterner the solidarity was palpable and appreciated.

Fast-forward to the current political circus over a neighborhood I'll always remember as the site of my first job after college. Which prompts a new version of the question about the relationship between "The City" (sorry) and the country. How much first-hand knowledge do these people have of Lower Manhattan, with their passionate views about its real estate should be zoned?  I don't mean this as a question of what gives someone the standing to have an opinion about the mosque. Instead my point is about the relationship between all this intense symbolism and an actual place where people work and live. What do those streets really represent? What should they? As I point out in a post over at TMPCafe, the poet Andrei Codrescu addressed these issues much more eloquently (not to say presciently) back in September 2002.

[Update: There was more to say about the Cordoba opponents' slippery relationship with basic constitutional rights and religious liberty.]

Politics of National Security: Five Juicy Stories We're NOT Following Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Instead of Newt Gingrich comparing American Muslims to Nazis, here are five stories that meet the August demand for tabloid-style reporting AND are of profound significance to our national security (ok, yeah, Newt is of profound significance to our security, but in the same way hurricanes are.)

How 'Bout those North Koreans?  A shadowy new candidate to succeed Kim Jong Il.  Nuclear weapons, Kremlinology, and weird personal habits... doesn't get much better than that.

Where In the World Is Hosni Mubarak?  Speaking of father-son transitions, we give you the healthwatch on one of the US' longest-lived allies in the Middle East.  Egypt's President is finding new ribbons to cut every day, as his health is rumored to be poor and his son rumored to be ready to assume the presidency.  

The General Petraeus Show.  'Nuf said.  With added bonus report that General Stan "he said what?" McChrystal will be lecturing at Yale next year.  Maybe he'll help out with labor disputes, too.

Related item: The Secretary Gates Show.  "Sometime in 2011," he tells Fred Kaplan, but not very convincingly.

And, oh yeah, then there's China's growing economy.  I guess I should be glad that's not being subjected to Ground Zero-style demagoguery.  So never mind, nothing to see here.

Why I Miss George Bush Posted by Michael Cohen

Honestly, these are words that I never thought it possible for me to type. But in my latest column for AOL, I argue that as America slowly descends into a vicious spiral of bigotry and fear over the fact that Americans Muslims want to build a cultural center near Ground Zero . . . I kind of miss the guy's rhetorical defense of religious tolerance:

Now to be clear I don't really miss the George Bush who "won" the 2000 election; who plunged our country into the worst foreign policy disaster in American history in Iraq; who sanctioned the use of torture and other rule-of-law abuses; who believed in intelligent design but not the science behind climate change; and who largely fiddled while the U.S. economy burned. Him, I don't miss all that much.

 . . . But, for all of Bush's faults; one of the good things he did as president was to ensure that the country did not engage in a witch hunt against American Muslims, simply because it was a radical Islamic group that attacked America on 9/11. As president, Bush spoke consistently and effectively about the importance of respecting religious differences in American society and not turning hatred of al-Qaida into a broad-based attack against all Muslims. And for the most part, other Republicans begrudgingly followed his lead.

Just a few days ago when President Barack Obama spoke up in support of the basic notion that religious freedom for Muslim-Americans is an unimpeachable American ideal he was, ironically, following in post-9/11 rhetorical footsteps first trod by Bush.

If only we had a Republican Party today that could live up to the example set by Bush. There is literally no one in a position of power within the GOP willing to stand up for the ideal of religious freedom in America and against the naked bigotry that defines the opposition to the ground zero mosque.

Read the whole thing here!

The Craziest Thing I've Read In A Very Long Time Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at the Atlantic Council blog there is a wrap-up of Stephen Biddle's recent trip to Afghanistan - and it features this utterly head scratching quote from Biddle:

Now, the threat if the worst-case scenario unfolds is pretty serious. I mean, you may or may not have worried about nuclear weapons in Soviet hands during the Cold War. But bin Laden would probably use the things if he got them. And if an American administration that could reasonably have waged this war with some prospect of success instead decided to withdraw -- if that scenario played out, Pakistan collapsed, and bin Laden got a nuclear weapon and used it on the United States, it would be regarded by generations of historians as the single biggest foreign policy blunder in the history of the nation.

Now, a variety of bad things have to happen in sequence for that worst case to play itself out. That is why I think this is a close call, rather than an obvious one. But, especially with respect to the guy in the Oval Office who has to bear the responsibility for this, I suspect that worst case looms fairly large. But all indications are that the president is pretty ambivalent about this, in part because I suspect he sees the costs and benefits as being closer on the margin than one would, in some ways, like.

I read things like this and I really start to believe that the entire foreign policy community has completely lost its mind. Stephen Biddle is a smart guy - and I simply can't fathom the notion that he actually believes this (except of course for the fact that he said basically the same thing last year). 

Ignoring the fact that the notion of Pakistan collapsing is deeply far-fetched; does Biddle really think that a cratered al Qaeda, on the run in NW Pakistan, with about 200 key operatives has a snowball's chance in hell of getting a nuclear weapon. And even if they did, that they would be able to transport it to the United States with no one finding out - and then exploding it. This isn't the one percent doctrine. It's the 0.000001 doctrine.

Now granted Biddle sees this as a close call (which is itself gobsmacking) and actually criticizes the Obama Administration for not being more concerned about it. As for how our leaving Afghanistan makes this one in billion scenario a bit more possible . . . well your guess is as good as mine. But the very notion that we need to keep 100,000 troops in Afghanistan to guard against this remote possibility (and I use the word "possibility" guardedly) is . . . well words fail to describe how insane this actually is.

Statements like these are perhaps further evidence that we have lost any and all perspective on the actual threats facing this country - and that there are practically no discernible limits applied by members of our foreign policy elite on when and how we utilize our armed forces to "protect" American security.  (The nuclear bogeyman, notwithstanding, it's insane enough already that we are maintaining a 100,000 troop presence in Afghanistan just to combat al Qaeda.)

The very fact that $100 billion a year wars can be justified on this sort of microscopically thin reed while far more significant challenges - like catastrophic climate change basically go ignored by our elected leaders- is as clear a sign as imaginable that the US isn't just entering a period of imperial decline. We're in complete free fall.

Another COIN Myth - "We Get COIN" Posted by Michael Cohen

So a few weeks ago I wrote a post titled the Afghanistan Exist Strategy Watch about how I was beginning to believe that the US was turning the corner in Afghanistan - away from trying to win there to preparing to get out. 

Um . . . never mind:

American military officials are building a case to minimize the planned withdrawal of some troops from Afghanistan starting next summer, in an effort to counter growing pressure on President Obama from inside his own party to begin winding the war down quickly.

With the administration unable yet to point to much tangible evidence of progress, Gen. David H. Petraeus, who assumed command in Afghanistan last month from Gen.Stanley A. McChrystal, is taking several steps to emphasize hopeful signs on the ground that, he will argue, would make a rapid withdrawal unwise. Meanwhile, a rising generation of young officers, who have become experts over the past nine years in the art of counterinsurgency, have begun quietly telling administration officials that they need time to get their work done.

“Their argument,” said one senior administration official, who would not speak for attribution about the internal policy discussions, “is that while we’ve been in Afghanistan for nine years, only in the past 12 months or so have we started doing this right, and we need to give it some time and think about what our long-term presence in Afghanistan should look like.”

"Only in the past 12 months or so have we started doing this right" is such a laughable quote that the senior Administration official who recounted should have started guffawing afterward.  

It's one of the essential COIN myths that the military didn't "get" counter-insurgency in Afghanistan until 12 months ago; just as it's an essential COIN myth that we weren't doing counter-insurgency in Iraq before the surge and that once we did, everything turned around there. As a friend said to me last night. "It's the Better War Part 2: Even Betterer!"

But in reality we've been doing some variation of these policies since 2003 and actually after 2007 what we were doing in Iraq looked very little like what is popularly described as COIN today. The turnaround in Iraq had far less to do with the surge and a change in US tactics than it did specific events on the ground (in particular Sunni militias turning on AQI and a general decline in the ethnic slaughter that had defined the country in 2005 and 2006).

The conceptual problem with the "we get COIN" argument is that it presupposes what the American military does from a tactical perspective actually matters - and that the enemy and our allies has little actual agency. For example, let's say that in Iraq every military officer memorized FM 3-24 in 2003 (an impossibility I know but work with me). It wouldn't have made things any easier as far as stabilizing the country then - because the challenge in stabilizing Iraq went far beyond what the US military was possibly able to accomplish on a tactical level. In other words, a COIN-led surge in 2004 would not have succeeded. 

Same goes for Afghanistan today. It doesn't matter if we've started doing COIN right in the last 12 months or the last 12 years. What influences the long-term effectiveness of the mission there has to do with a set of factors completely out of the control of the American military: things like the performance of the Afghan military and police, the inclination of the Afghan government to crack down on corruption, the continued presence of Afghan Taliban safe havens in Pakistan, the level of political and popular support in the United States and yes, even the ability of the Taliban to adapt to US and NATO's tactical changes.

Whether the US gets COIN or doesn't get COIN is not relevant to the much larger question of whether the US mission - as currently formulated - can hope to succeed. And if the last year has taught us anything it is that it cannot. That's the question that the White House needs to be addressing; not the silly proclamations of military officers that they suddenly get counter-insurgency.

Of course, it would help if the President would actually address these issues and make clear to his national security team what he believes the the US commitment to Afghanistan should be and what is his timetable for achieving US goals.

It's something that he continues to fail to do. With such questions seemingly remaining open-ended it's small wonder that military officials are doing what they always try to do - ask for more troops and more time. It's up to the Commander-in-Chief to set limits; so how about it Mr. President?

Another COIN Myth Exposed - Protecting the Population Posted by Michael Cohen

One of the more pernicious myths of the modern COIN fad is the focus on protecting civilians as an end goal in itself for COIN operations. As the argument goes, by protecting civilians counter-insurgents are able to shift the balance of popular support toward the government and away from the insurgent forces. The more people feel protected, the better chance they will reject the insurgent force and ally themselves with the government. The population is the center of gravity we are told.

For example, last spring here is how General McChrystal defined the fight in Afghanistan: 

“Central to counterinsurgency is protecting the people,” he said. . . Effectiveness is measured in “the number of Afghans shielded from violence.” 

The New York Times endorsed this view, making the argument:

Protecting Afghan civilians, and expanding the secure space in which they can safely go about their lives and livelihoods must now become the central purpose of American military operations in Afghanistan.

According to a new UN report, more than a year later, things are not working out too well:

In its midyear report, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan said the number of civilians wounded and killed had increased by nearly a third in the first six months of the year, as coalition forces raised the level of military action against insurgents. In that period, 1,271 civilians were killed and 1,997 wounded, the report said, with more than three-quarters attributable to what it called “antigovernment elements.”

So what we have here is compelling evidence that our COIN strategy has been an dramatic failure; the US has largely been unable to protect Afghan civilians. In fact, their lives are now at greater risk than before we began to carry out a policy specifically geared toward protecting them.

None of this should be a huge surprise. As I noted last year, "By making civilian body counts the top metric you are waging war on the enemy's terms - and you are allowing them to dictate how you judge the success of your operation. If anything, you are actually giving incentive to the Taliban to kill more civilians."

This isn't to say that the Taliban are purposely targeting civilians, but it does suggest that the Taliban can easily undermine US strategy by placing civilians at greater risk. Indeed, violence against civilians has a multiplier effect because it cedes fear and uncertainty among the civilian population and convinces them not to take sides in a conflict.

The simple truth is that we have a fairly good sense - from studying COIN history - how you protect civilians from insurgents: you forcibly separate them. A tactic used to great success in Malaya and Kenya and to a different degree in Iraq. The current US strategy in Afghanistan of using a carrot, rather than a stick is not the path to success. In fact, if anything it seems to be causing more harm than good. 

None of this, of course, is to suggest that protecting the population is a bad thing or should be discouraged. Instead the experience of waging so-called population centric COIN in Afghanistan provides compelling evidence that military escalation, in general, is a poor means of achieving that goal. 

One would hope that the consistent failure of COIN theory when it is put in practice would lead the military to shelve the pseudo-science and unsupported arguments underpinning modern COIN doctrine, as described in FM 3-24. But to be honest, I'm not holding my breath.

Diplomatic Solution for Iran -- Whoa Nellie Posted by David Shorr

As you probably heard, last week President Obama briefed journalists on the new economic sanctions against the Iranian regime. Here's the short version. The White House wants everyone to know that there's more to the sanctions' impact than meets the eye. And while this could help pave the way to a diplomatic resolution, there's less than meets the eye in terms of an immediate pay-off. In other words, the administration is playing a diplomatic long-game, and the latest breathless anticipation about diplomacy misunderstands the strategy.

Two Washington Post columnists took part in the briefing, and offerred contrasting views of the link between progress on sanctions and on diplomacy. Robert Kagan drew a careful distinction between the two, whereas David Ignatius went an extra step or two in anticipating the diplomatic possibilities. Personally, I found Bob's account much more plausible.

Reaching a happy diplomatic ending with Iran is contingent on three things: the regime's willingness to verifiably keep their nuclear program strictly civilian, a substantive deal to that effect, and deft diplomacy to reach a deal satisfactory to both sides. Much of the debate over policy toward Iran stresses the first, Iranian leaders' bottom-line decision about acquiring nuclear weapons or capability. No, the real problem is that Tehran's ultimate calculation is unknowable until put to the test, and the entire enterprise is basically a process of peeling the onion of their intentions. In this sense, I agree with the critique Peter Feaver of Shadow Government makes against the "it's useless to negotiate with these people" school of Iran policy. Feaver argues that whether you end up bombing Iran or learning to live with their bomb, either way you have to exhaust your diplomatic options.

What we have to overcome in the meantime is Iranian foot-dragging. Iran's default diplomatic approach will always be to try to run out the clock. This doesn't mean they've decided to build the bomb, it only means that only under duress will they submit to constraints. That's why the international community has to insist on meaningful commitments and actions rather than vague declarations -- and why the solid international front behind the sanctions is crucial in ensuring Tehran has no interlocutors to give them cover and help deflect pressure. [Even with all the attention paid to the role of Russia, I don't think the main point comes through; President Obama didn't merely secure Russia's vote in the Security Council, he drove a big wedge between them and Iran and a instilled a genuine sense of ownership by Moscow.]

Perhaps paradoxically, this diplomatic dynamic ensures the process will be a steeplechase rather than a sprint. I think Cliff Kupchan gets ahead of himself when he argues that the window is open for a final deal on Iran's nuclear progam. It's not that we have the luxury of time for diplomacy to work; the clock of Iranian technological progress is indeed ticking -- the only question is how fast. We'll need interim measures and deals to allow enough time to reach the final deal.

Which brings us to sad tale of the agreement reached last October in Geneva by which Iran would have shipped its enriched uranium out of the country to be turned into fuel rods for civilian nuclear energy. The essential point of the agreement was to alleviate internaional concerns about how close Iran was coming to having a nuclear weapon capability -- to add to the clock by putting their nuclear material in international custody and constraining their enrichment activities.

I'm guessing a similar deal will be the key to any further progress, rather than a dramatic sprint toward a final resolution. Having renegged on that earlier bargain, the ball is in Tehran's court. While the US and others must be genuine in their desire for a peaceful outcome, to ardently pursue Iran is to play their game. I think Blake Hounshell makes an excellent point in highlighting how new the sanctions are. This is probably the main underlying message from the Administration, including Secretary Clinton's interview with David Sanger.

The Geneva agreement and the sanctions have everything to do with one another -- i.e. the administration would not have been able to get the sanctions without Iran having been put to the test. And here is where I disagree with Peter Feaver's analysis. Feaver laments the lapse of time before the international pressure on the Iranian leadership was ratcheted up and attributes it to Obama's belated recognition that carrots won't work. His administration can perhaps be faulted for not being clearer in declaring the Geneva terms null and void, but I see no epihany on their part. In a sense, they were following a similar logic to Feaver's own argument about the necessity of trying diplomacy first. In order to get to sanctions -- and the international supported needed to enact them -- they had to test Iran's sincerity first.

The Wikileaker's DADT Isolation Posted by Jacob Stokes

The more we find out about Pfc. Bradley Manning, the intel analyst who allegedly leaked thousands of classified documents and at least one video to Wikileaks, the more sad and desperate the whole situation appears to be. The NYT fleshes out some details today:

[Pfc. Manning] spent part of his childhood with his father in the arid plains of central Oklahoma, where classmates made fun of him for being a geek. He spent another part with his mother in a small, remote corner of southwest Wales, where classmates made fun of him for being gay.

Then he joined the Army, where, friends said, his social life was defined by the need to conceal his sexuality under “don’t ask, don’t tell” and he wasted brainpower fetching coffee for officers.

The second paragraph really caught my attention because it gets to the heart of the most fundamental reason why the DADT policy is broken: because it asks soldiers—those tasked with fighting and dying for their country and those tasked with safeguarding sensitive national security information—to lie. It asks them to purposely misrepresent who they are. That flies in the face of the military’s culture of honor, courage and equality. The policy means that even an otherwise upright soldier who is gay can never be fully himself or herself to fellow service people.

This argument is not to excuse what Pfc. Manning allegedly did, which was against the law and almost surely endangered the lives of Americans and Afghans in the field while revealing little new information about the war in Afghanistan. Nor am I saying that the DADT policy was the sole driver behind Pfc. Manning alleged decision to leak the information. It’s clear that there were a number of factors and motivations at work.

But the story clearly states how Pfc. Manning’s homosexuality isolated him within the force. Manning had joined the army, as the article says, “to try to give his life some direction and to help to pay for college.” He sought guidance from the military and was met with institutional discrimination. Surely the imperative to hide his homosexuality pushed Pfc. Manning further and further into isolation, and he eventually (allegedly) cracked. Pfc. Manning did what he could to gain acceptance within the community of hackers who had befriended and accepted him when the military wouldn’t—he leaked the material.

Bombing Iran Is A Bad Idea, No Matter Who Does it Posted by Patrick Barry

Should Israel bomb Iran?  That's the question outlets like the Weekly Standard and the National Review have been asking lately. The most recent entrant to the conversation is former Bush NSC official Elliot Abrams.  In today’s Wall Street Journal, Abrams - after spending an inordinate amount of space discussing how regional politics in the Middle East are more complicated than they appear - reaches a simplistic conclusion: Arab countries would support an Israeli attack on Iran.

Perhaps the enemy of my enemy is not my friend, if he is an Israeli pilot. In that case, all gestures of friendship will be forsaken or carefully hidden; there will be denunciations and UN resolutions, petitions and boycotts, Arab League summits and hurried trips to Washington. But none of that changes an essential fact of life well understood in many Arab capitals this summer: that there is a clear coincidence of interests between the Arab states and Israel today, in the face of the Iranian threat.

The major problem with this argument is not that it’s wrong (though I suspect it is). It’s that it only makes sense in a world in which a military attack on Iran - whether by the U.S., Israel, or even an Arab state – is a reasonable option. It is not.  Judging from the most commonly cited implications of military action, they would be just as severe whether a strike was launched by the IAF, the USN or the Rebel Alliance.

Iran’s asymmetric response: Ambassador Nicholas Burns, former Bush administration Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, offered the Senate Foreign Relations Committee grim summation of how Iran might respond to an attack: "Air strikes would undoubtedly lead Iran to hit back asymmetrically against us in Iraq, Afghanistan and the wider region, especially through its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. This reminds us of Churchill's maxim that, once a war starts, it is impossible to know how it will end."

Inability to eliminate nuclear program:  A military strike would not substantially set back Iran’s nuclear program, and may even incentivize Iran to build a weapon. In February, Brookings Institution Fellows Michael O'Hanlon and Bruce Riedel wrote, “even a massive strike would not slow Iran's progress towards a bomb for long. We cannot be sure we know where all existing Iranian facilities to enrich uranium are located - as the revelation of yet another previously unknown site near Qom last year reminded us." Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Colin Kahl took this a step further, suggesting that a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities might “incentivize the Iranians to go all the way to weaponize.”

Consequences for Iran’s opposition movement: Fareed Zakaria recently cited noted Iranian dissident Akbar Ganji, who wrote: “Even entertaining the possibility of a military strike, especially when predicated on the nuclear issue is beneficial to the fundamentalists who rule Iran.  As such, the idea itself is detrimental to the democratic movement in my country."  Similarly, when he was CENTCOM commander, General David Petraeus warned that the military option risks unleashing a popular backlash that would play into the hands of the regime.  “There is certainly a history, in other countries, of fairly autocratic regimes almost creating incidents that inflame nationalist sentiment,” said Petraeus. “So that could be among the many different, second, third, or even fourth order effects (of a strike),” he added.

Having failed to persuade anyone to support a U.S. military strike on Iran, American war hawks now are trying to re-locate the campaign for ‘war with Iran’ to a third-party.  Yet, the consequences of military action remain just as severe.  A venue change won’t alter that.

 

Afghanistan Exit Strategy Watch - Our (Corrupt Man) in Kabul Version Posted by Michael Cohen

If President Obama is looking for another excuse to shift the US mission in Afghanistan away from counter-insurgency to something that looks a bit more like an exit strategy today's article in the Washington Post about corruption in the Afghan government should be helpful:

Obama administration officials fear that a move by Afghan President Hamid Karzai to assert control over U.S.-backed corruption investigations might provoke the biggest crisis in U.S.-Afghan relations since last year's fraud-riddled election and could further threaten congressional approval of billions of dollars in pending aid.

The concerns were sparked by Karzai's decision this week to order a probe of two anti-corruption units that have been involved in the recent arrest of several senior government officials on graft and bribery allegations. Karzai said the investigators, who have been aided by U.S. law enforcement advisers and wiretap technology, were acting outside the Afghan constitution.

I've long been a member of the "Let Hamid be Hamid" school of thought, but doing so also requires a somewhat sober recognition of the kind of leader with which you're dealing. It's fascinating that only a week after Dick Holbrooke extols Karzai's commitment to fighting corruption today's article features this little tidbit: 

But this official and others, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter, expressed certainty that the real basis of Karzai's concern was the threat that corruption investigations posed to the government itself. Despite the task force successes, U.S. officials have cited repeated instances in recent months in which top government figures intervened to quash corruption investigations of politically connected Afghans.

"If I were in his shoes," the defense official said of Karzai, "I would also be concerned about it. Those high-profile arrests were done by Afghans, reviewed by Afghan judges. . . . They're finding things, and becoming more aggressive. There are people who are corrupt throughout the government who are upset about it. I think [Karzai's] feeling the pressure."

This isn't complicated. Hamid Karzai is not interested in curbing corruption. Allow me to repeat: Hamid Karzai is not interested in curbing corruption.

No matter how much we cajole him; how much we plead; how much we talk about its importance it isn't going to matter. At the very least, it won't matter enough to shift the fundamentally corrupt nature of his government. 

The key is to accept that fact and work within the limitations of a host country government, not hope against hope that things will change. That means focusing the US mission on stabilization and containment of the Taliban; not the dangerous belief that we, the United States, can extend the legitimacy of a government that is fundamentally illegitimate. A good place to start might be in paring back our objectives in Kandahar.

The Prague Project Crunches the Numbers Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

Our friends over at the Prague Project whipped up a nice visual reminder that the support for the New START accord runs deep.  Heritage counts six people who oppose the treaty--though it is worth mentioning that Eric Edelman and Robert Joseph both testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and neither one could actually bring themselves to recommend that the Senate reject New START.  Not too hard to do the math on this one.     

Courtesy of the Ben Loehrke, here's the graph:

The Real Lesson Of Iraq - We Never Learn Posted by Michael Cohen

A couple of days ago President Obama gave a speech about the Iraq War that has led to some soul searching on the meaning of that conflict. Over at Time Magazine, Joe Klein declared the lesson of the Iraq War is that "We should never go to war unless we have been attacked or are under direct, immediate threat of attack. Never. And never again." I'm not sure I buy that notion - it seems a bit too absolute. And as Jon Chait points out if applied through history would have prevented the US from intervening militarily in places where we probably should have (WWI, WW2, Korea, the Iraq War to name a few). But I do sympathize with the sentiment.

But over at the Economist blog, Matt Steinglass (h/t to Kevin Drum) makes a very different - and unfortunately - very wrong observation:

There haven't been many examples lately of people learning from their mistakes, but the invasion of Iraq appears to be a mistake from which some lessons have been learned. It's difficult to imagine America returning to fantasies of easy conquest and democracy-building anytime in the next few decades, anywhere in the world. 

Clearly Matt is not a regular reader of democracyarsenal! In fact, we are at this exact moment doing the specific thing that Matt thinks we should never, and will never, do again - deluding ourselves into believing that we can effectively engage in nation building in far-flung corners of the world like Afghanistan. The lessons that the military - and its cheerleaders in the punditocracy - have taken from Iraq is not "let's never do that again" but instead, let's do it better the next time. And of course that next time is now Afghanistan.

Indeed, the entire counter-insurgency mission in Iraq was formulated around the idea that the US had "figured out" how to fight counter-insurgencies and that the lessons of what worked in Iraq could be applied to the Hindu Kush. The same delusion and hubris that convinced America it could "win" in Iraq and that its interests were at stake there is what is driving our escalation in Afghanistan today.

Of course, predictions like Matt's are nothing new - after Vietnam the US had clearly "learned" the lesson that fighting overseas wars with uncertain objectives, lack of popular and international support support and less than overwhelming military superiority was a bad idea. In fact we created a whole new military doctrine (Weinberger/Powell) to mitigate against another Vietnam. And yet here we are . .  again, making the same mistakes and misjudgments that we made, albeit on a larger scale, 45 years ago.

Steinglass even doubles down on the "lessons learned' argument noting the work of the Sustainable Defense Task Force and their plan for a trillion dollars in defense spending cuts - and suggests that this represents "public stirrings" of support for a small defense budget. Apparently Matt missed this "bipartisan report" from the QDR Independent Panel, which suggests we need more not less money for the nation's defenses. I know I too am shocked that a report of prominent DC-based national security experts recommends more defense spending. Who could have seen that one coming? And in the end whose recommendations do you think will end up having more currency in Washington?

I would really like to believe that Matt Steinglass is on to something here, but the simple reality is that for many years now the American Way of War is that we either learn the wrong lessons from the wars we fight or we forget the right ones.  Afghanistan is our current example - something tells me there will be others.

Why We Fight -- Countering the Conservative Foreign Policy Critique Posted by David Shorr

A lot of debate lately on the question of whether conservative foreign policy thinking (and politics) have been taken captive by a wild-eyed form of neoconservatism. The recent round -- which has drawn the most response from conservatives themselves -- was sparked by Jacob Heilbrunn's piece on the Foreign Policy site, arguing that the current generation foreign policy Republicans have banished moderates and moderate ideas.  Among the reactions over on the Shadow Government blog, Jamie Fly's is fairly thorough. His last two paragraphs are especially action-packed:

What Heilbrunn fails to grasp is that his desired foreign policy (and President Obama's) is at odds with the views of the American public. Americans don't accept that the United States is in decline. They like the idea that there is something exceptional about their country. They have no problem cuting deals with China and Russia, but they want their President to make sure that we get the best deal possible and only cede as much as necessary. They want their president to speak out in support of those fighting for democracy and human rights. And they don't like to see their government neglect democratic allies while negotiating with repressive regimes.

Americans want a values-based foreign policy, not a cold, calculating one. This, not a neocon sponsored coup, is why there is a broad foreign policy consensus on the Right today.

Some of Fly's points offer a basis for constructive dialogue. On the other hand, the charges that the Center-Left embraces decline and rejects all notions of exceptionalism are self-serving caricatures -- which is ironic in a post that pushes back against caricatures of neoconservatives. The 'declinist' tag is one I've addressed before, so I'll summarize. A genuine declinist has serious doubts about American strength and power; our national strategic fundamentals are headed irreversibly downward. The point is that it's possible to retain faith in American dynamism and, at the same time, believe that changes in the world have made it harder for America to exert leverage over problems and achieve our aims globally.

Now, there are exceptionalists, and there are exceptionalists. I'm afraid our friends on the Right don't own the franchise. A hat tip goes to Greg Scoblete of RealClearWorld Compass Blog for highlighting David Frum's response to critics who took issue with the idea of US global leaderhip in Frum's mission statement for conservatives. As someone who considers myself a moderate exceptionalist, I largely agree with what Frum says, which he best summarizes as follows:

Just as even the most self-equilibriating markets need a lender of last resort, so even the most stable international system needs a security guarantor of last resort.

My one quibble is that I believe in the longer-term that global security public goods could be provided collectively by major powers, assuming they ultimately converge as responsible stakeholders. Since this is far from a safe assumption, Frum and I are unlikely to part ways on the basic idea for at least a decade or three.

But back to Jamie Fly's rallying cry. For me, the interesting underlying issue in the debate between Right and Left is the question of what we're really fighting about. There are a couple good ones here -- issues where liberal and conservative views could complement one another quite nicely. First, striking worthy bargains with China and Russia. As broad guidelines, let's agree that we have to deal with them, and we don't want to be pushovers. Recently there was another interesting Shadow Government post from Daniel Blumenthal on US-China relations emphasizing the need to deal with China from a position of strength.

Blumenthal may be right that the Obama administration hasn't gotten it quite right and has been a little too solicitous of Beijing. But let's not forget that down the they-only-respect-strength road lies no deal at all. I have my doubts about what deals conservatives might think can be squeezed from the other side. So lest we get too excited about getting tougher, I have a couple questions. Do conservatives believe that pressing Beijing more impatiently and publicly on letting the RMB float upward would have achieved the desired result? And don't their US sovereign debt holdings boost China's own bargaining power?

Last is the issue of "a values-based foreign policy" versus "a cold, calculating one." OK, there's definitely some calculating going on. Don't be so sure, though, that it's the heartless, national interests-focused calculations of the Realists. It might just be a clear-eyed assessment of pragmatists. For my part, I feel like an accidental Realist rather than a real Realist. I think I'd be much more enthusiastic about the values agenda if we didn't have these other gigantic problems like the economic downturn, fraying of the NPT, and global warming all staring us down.

Still, with that said, I take the point about the importance of pressing issues of human rights and democracy not only in China and Russia, but also Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Egypt. Heck, I've even (slightly) tempered my security mono-focus with regard to Iran. And I agree with Heather in her recent TNR piece that "the effort to find a post-Bush language for the promotion of democracy and human rights remains a work in progress." I'd only add that the Obama administration probably doesn't get credit for the things it is doing, owing not only to the conservative critique, but also the overloaded bandwidth of public diplomacy.

The September Vote Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will vote on the New START Treaty when Senators return from recess in September.  Sen. Kerry released a statement today, saying, “We have the votes to report the treaty out of Committee now. However, in consultation with Senator Lugar, I chose to reschedule the vote to be responsive to the concerns of our members so that we can build bipartisan consensus around a treaty that our military leaders all agree will make America safer.” 

Through months of hearings, Senators have meticulously reviewed the treaty and its accompanying documents.  An impressive record of bipartisan support has been built by Sens. Kerry and Lugar, who have worked with their colleagues on the Committee and elsewhere to answer questions and facilitate the passage of this important treaty. 

Once New START is voted out of committee, the treaty will move to the full Senate where 67 votes are needed.  In an interview with the Cable, Sen. Lugar highlighted the importance of finding the floor time to ratify the agreement, and of doing so quickly.  "If not [before the election], then whether it works out in December or not is no longer a matter of parliamentary debate, it's a matter of national security," he said, citing the fact that U.S. inspectors have not been able to verify Russian behavior regarding nuclear weapons deployment since the original START agreement expired late last year. "We ought to vote now and let the chips fall where they may. It's that important."

"The problem of the breakdown of our verification, which lapsed December 5, is very serious and impacts our national security," Lugar said. Members may want to take extra time to consider the treaty, but if they are really concerned about Russian activity, ratifying the treaty is the way to address that, he added.

New START has the unanimous support of America’s military leadership.  Prominent national security experts have come out in spades to support this treaty and call for its quick passage.  Even in this partisan environment, Senators from both sides of the aisle have expressed interest in supporting New START.  Last week during a Senate Armed Services hearing, Sen. Lieberman (I-CT) explained that he, like others, hope to support New START.  “Most people I talk to, members in the Senate, would like to get to a point of a vote to advise and consent to the new START treaty. I certainly would,” Lieberman said.   

Sen. Lieberman and other GOP senators have indicated that if the price is right for funding our nuclear complex, they will support the treaty.  Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell said earlier this week during an interview with Reuters, “The only way this treaty gets in trouble is if it’s rushed.”  McConnell continued, “My advice to the president was, don’t try to jam it, answer all the requests, and let’s take our time and do it right,” he said. “All they have to do is find enough money to satisfy Senator Kyl that they are prepared to do what they said they would do,” he said.  “If it’s important to you, you can find a way, in an over a trillion dollar discretionary budget to fund it. In my view they need to do that, because without that I think the chances of ratification are pretty slim,” McConnell said.

Sen. Bob Bennett (R-UT) has also said that he wants to vote for the treaty, but is waiting for the final nod from his leadership. "I'm waiting for Senator Kyl to finish his analysis, but he's leaning yes and I'm leaning yes," Bennett said.  In an interview with Laura Rozen, Sen. Bob Corker (R-TN) “was, overall, somewhat encouraging about prospects for START ratification. He said with a more detailed administration commitment to modernizing U.S. nuclear facilities and language in a resolution that clarifies that the treaty does not restrict U.S. missile defenses, he would be comfortable with it. “To me there’s a way to get there to quell the concerns of people regarding this point,” Sen. Corker explained.

Senators will have the next six weeks to review the advice of our nation’s most respected national security experts.  As Sen. Kerry explained in his letter to committee members, the record is clear:

We had the opportunity to hear from—and to question—the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State, the head of U.S. Strategic Command, and the director of the Missile Defense Agency. In our effort to provide a wide range of views, we heard from high-ranking members of the Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush 41, Clinton, and Bush 43 administrations. We also heard from the directors of the nation’s three nuclear weapons laboratories, and received written testimony from the man who oversaw them for President George W. Bush. We had a closed hearing with high-ranking intelligence officials. And we questioned the Treaty’s negotiators on multiple occasions, in open and closed sessions.

Overwhelmingly, these witnesses supported timely ratification of the New START Treaty. Some of the strongest endorsements came from America’s military leaders. Admiral Mullen testified that the Treaty has “the full support of your uniformed military.” Secretary Gates confirmed in an article he published in May that “[t]he New START Treaty has the unanimous support of America’s military leadership.” And General Chilton, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testified that “our nation will be safer and more secure with this Treaty than without it.”

Come mid-September, Senators had better be ready to act, and to do so rapidly.  Our national security depends on it.

Egyptians are Getting Angry Posted by Shadi Hamid

Last time I reported from Cairo, in May, I quoted the Islamist writer Ibrahim el-Houdaiby saying: "There's a moment of real change this time." Maybe now is still too soon. Certainly, Egypt's fractious opposition has a long way to go. But it's starting to get its act together. In particular, the cooperation between former IAEA chief Mohamed El Baradei and the Muslim Brotherhood is starting to pay dividends. 

I have a new piece in The National that looks at these developments and asks what they might mean for Egypt's future course. I pay particular attention to the interesting interplay between economic growth, rising expectations, and political discontent. You can read it here. Here's a teaser:

According to a Solidarity Centre report published earlier this year, from 2004 to 2008, more than 1.7 million Egyptian workers participated in over 1,900 labour-related protests. The riots, the strikes and the sit-ins have gone largely unnoticed by the West, in part because they do not appear to be explicitly political – at least not yet.

It is interesting, then, that observers so often fault Egyptians for their apparent passivity. This, conveniently, allows western policy makers to persuade themselves that Egypt will not become another Iran or another, well, Egypt, circa 1952. Egyptians might want change, so the thinking goes, but they don’t seem particularly interested in actually doing anything.

But, again, the numbers belie such claims. The short-lived “Arab spring” in the first half of 2005, after all, saw Egypt’s first ever mass-mobilisation in support of democracy, with over 150,000 participating in protests, demonstrations and campaign rallies. Presumably that counts (and, presumably, suggests that American pressure does, in fact, matter). 

As they say, read the whole thing.

The Failure of Perry-Hadley and the Growing Debate Over the Defense Budget Posted by The Editors

This post is by Gordon Adams, Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center. 

The struggle to discipline the defense budget and reign in the Department of Defense has begun.  Growing concern about the deficit, combined with growing disenchantment over the situation in Afghanistan and concern about the endlessly expanding role of DOD in US foreign policy have combined to put this issue squarely on the table.

The latest round in this debate is the report of the Independent Review Panel on the DOD Quadrennial Defense Review.  This report, chaired by former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former National Security Adviser Steven Hadley, is longer than the Quadrennial Defense Review itself. It is also a great disappointment, as was the QDR.

It betrays the continuing "suspension of disbelief" already painfully evident in the QDR.  Instead of bringing realism and discipline to defense planning, the report simply "doubles down" on the QDR’s analysis, calling for even more forces and more spending. The report willfully avoids three pressing national security realities.

The first is our looming fiscal crisis, which JCS Chairman Mike Mullen has called "our biggest national security threat." The report simply waives this issue aside; DOD planning, it seems to argue, must be done outside this context, as if budgets and the need for restraint did not exist.

Hard Is Not Hopeless Posted by Michael Cohen

This week the New Republic has a series of articles on Afghanistan - the aforementioned piece by Anna Badkhen on the perilous situation in the north and Ahmed Rashid's argument for writing off the south and east are focusing US energies on the north and west perhaps the two best. But worthy of mention (not necessarily for the right reasons) is David Rieff's submission. After correctly and cogently summarizing all the reasons why the US endeavor in Afghanistan is likely to fail, Rieff makes the following observation: 

In all likelihood, God help us, we will be staying in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. That much seems obvious, and, while I am all for opposing the mission as a matter of conscience, I have no hope at all that this opposition will have any effect. That’s OK. Historically, being on the losing side in such battles has rarely been a dishonorable place to be. 

I am somewhat more hopeful— comparatively, anyway—that the fact that almost everyone knows the Obama administration’s stated goals in continuing to prosecute this senseless war are unachievable will further the American people’s growing disenchantment with expeditionary wars and humanitarian and human-rights-based military interventions. There may be nothing that can be done about Afghanistan, but perhaps its pointlessness will at least serve as a caution when, as will certainly happen, a future administration proposes yet another adventure in imperial idealism somewhere down the road.

This is, to put it mildly, a particularly unhelpful addition to the current national debate on Afghanistan. 

First, it ignores the many pressure points that exit to shift the direction of US policy on Afghanistan. There is the all-important year review that is supposed to take place this December as well as June 2011 when the first contingent of US troops are supposed to come home from Afghanistan. Of course, there is also public opinion, perhaps the most important anti-war lever, which is increasingly moving in opposition to the conflict.

Second, it oddly disregards the shifting national debate on Afghanistan. Over the past few weeks there has been a rising chorus of voices offering alternatives to the current failing policy. I chronicled several of them here; Jack Devine offered another new one yesterday arguing for a CIA-focused, smaller US footprint approach.

Whether you like these alternatives or think they're all bunk the growing and long overdue intellectual ferment on Afghanistan is extraordinarily important. The more that the policy community can provide alternatives to the current COIN-focused course favored by the military the better the opportunity for an actual shift in strategy (ironically this is sort of what happened in Iraq in 2007 with the surge). Moreover, if and hopefully when the Administration shifts course on Afghanistan it will need the support of today's critics to counter what will almost certainly be pushback from the military. Coalescing around alternatives to the current strategy will give that effort more legitimacy and more traction. 

The notion that a critic of the current policy would throw up their hands and argue that all is lost; let's worry about stopping the next humanitarian intervention is both ill-advised and ill-informed.

Thirdly, Rieff's "honorable" course glosses over the national security imperatives - not to mention moral responsibility -- of getting Afghanistan right. Rieff, to his credit, has been a fervent opponent of humanitarian interventions and frankly with good reason. Often when the US intervenes militarily bad things happen, particularly for the civilian population in the country where we determine our national interests are threatened. (The first Iraq War and I suppose Kosovo are obvious modern exceptions).

But the issue in Afghanistan is not whether we go in - it's how we get out. And how we leave Afghanistan matters a great deal. I fear that if we continue on the same course that we are currently headed the calls for withdrawal will increase and we will depart hastily from Afghanistan. That's why a national debate about Afghanistan right NOW is so important; because it will hopefully offer ideas for how we can get out while also leaving our interests protected and the Afghan state in as stable a place as possible. 

I don't believe - and never have - that we can transform Afghanistan into anything other than a slightly less failed state than it already is. Nation building in the Hindu Kush is nothing more than a fool's errand - and our responsibility to Afghanistan only stretches so far as our actual and rather limited ability to affect it's long-term development trajectory (Peter Bergen's argument in TNR that we must "fulfill our promise" to the Afghan people with New Deal-style works programs is as a rather Panglossian take on this theme). 

But if we can ensure that a Taliban takeover is not possible (and that already seem pretty unlikely); that a somewhat stable functioning government in Kabul can take hold; that the potential for a return to the horrible civil war of the 1990s is minimized; that a healthy percentage of Afghans will not have to live under the Taliban's medieval edicts; that al Qaeda will not be able to use the country as a base for operations . . . well frankly that makes for a smarter approach than the current policy and one that might actually further US interests and help the Afghan people. And that's a rather minimal goal that seems achievable and realistic.

But the fatalist approach advocated above is quite obviously not the way to get there. It's a useful reminder to the progressive community - and those who believe that the current effort will not succeed - that this is precisely the moment when we should be placing even more pressure on the Administration to shift course on Afghanistan. None of this will be easy - and the pushback both from the military and the GOP - will be furious, but hard is not hopeless.

Like Rieff I hope that the lesson from Iraq and Afghanistan will be to never again attempt what he calls "adventures in imperial idealism." But in the mean time, there's a war going on.

The Trouble Up North Posted by Michael Cohen

If one wants further evidence of how misguided the current focus of US military efforts in southern and eastern Afghanistan has become, today's NYT piece about the worsening security situation in Baghlan province is a good place to start:

Almost unnoticed, this strategic northern province is slipping away from government control. Baghlan Province contains two of the crucial north-south routes inAfghanistan. As night falls on this provincial capital, the city turns dark and silent. The Taliban have decreed that the cellphone signals go down at night so the main cellphone companies switch off the signals from dusk to dawn.

Men with guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers guard illegal checkpoints just north of the capital, waiting for convoys of trucks or other lucrative prey. Shootings erupt almost every day across the province. Deprived of jobs and local government services, people here are turning to Taliban courts for speedy justice and drifting toward those who will pay them — either local strongmen or the Taliban.

In the New Republic, Anna Badkhen tells a similar tale of Taliban encroachment in Afghanistan's northern provinces. The story line here is one that we've been seeing for several months. As the US devotes more energy and resources to a losing battle in the south and east the security situation in previously stable (ish) parts of the country is beginning to suffer. As Badkhen notes, the US is spending six times more capita in Helmand province than in the northern Takhar province. 

Yet, with a withdrawal deadline looming, a population sympathetic to the Taliban, a security situation that undermines any development efforts and the lack of any real government influence on the ground, there is little possibility that the US efforts in Helmand will produce any sort of dramatic pay-off. Quite simply, continued US engagement in areas where there is virtually no hope of the ANSF taking over any time soon is just an example of throwing good money after bad. 

But in the north, more aid and improved security would almost certainly bring tangible results. The Times mentions that the in recent weeks the 10th Mountain division was moved to Baghlan, which is a step in the right direction. As I've written here recently the US efforts in Afghanistan seem to be moving toward an exit strategy-focused approach (i.e. from winning to getting out). But to really shift the mission it means shifting the regional orientation of US troops. 

Improving security in places like Baghlan or Kunduz - and improving aid delivery - is a good way to start. Calling off military operations in Kandahar would definitely be another.