Ethiopian Airlines Crash, Mabhouh Assassination Related

There is a common element between the Ethiopian Airlines crash off the coast of Beirut and Mahmoud al Mabhouh’s assassination in Dubai. In both cases evidence is publicly revealed offering proof of what actually occurred.

As Joshua Hersh notes, Lebanese media and politicians responded to the Ethiopian Airlines disaster with usual hysteria, accusations, and wild speculation. The retrieval of the airliner black boxes from the ocean floor and the analysis of the data now puts to rest many of the more ludicrous theories about why the plane crashed shortly after takeoff.

Unlike most major crimes and disasters in Lebanon, with regard to the Ethiopian Airlines crash, the public can put aside the usual political squabbling and place their trust in black box technology and investigative competence.

As Michael Young argues, the Lebanese state must be capable of investigating crises. The Lebanese government called upon a team of international investigators who succeeded in finding the black boxes, wreckage, and remains in stormy waters. However, the Lebanese government should have the competence and capacity to do this itself, thus allowing citizens to trust their government and justifying the taxes spent on the public bureaucracy.

Mabhouh’s Assassination: A Wake Up Call for Lebanese

The investigation of the assassination of Mahmoud al Mabhouh proves the competence and capabilities of the Dubai and Emirati governments. Watch the video. The Dubai authorities, supported by ordinary security cameras and the best image tracking software available, weaved together the sophisticated plot.

Dubai’s successful investigation shows what rule of law, economic and technical advancement, and training in modern police work can do for an Arab country.

For the first time in recent memory, the perpetrator’s of an assassination in an Arab country are caught on camera; their conspiracy revealed. The Dubai government did not try to cover up the crime or broker a secret political deal with the perpetrators. The Dubai authorities provided the evidence to the public and the international community, building ever more confidence in Dubai’s sophisticated law enforcement capabilities.

Hopefully, this investigation will caution any organization or government against executing shadowy business and intelligence deals in Arab countries. If other Arab countries institute similar measures to Dubai, the days of cavalierly taking advantage of Arab governmental incompetence will be nearly over.

Dubai’s successful investigation brings me joy, but also a bit of anger. For if former Prime Minister Rafiq al Hariri could have executed his plan for the modernization of Lebanon, the Lebanese government might have been able to track down his killers.

The Lebanese wartime law enforcement vacuum continued through the Syrian and post-Syrian eras. Since 2005, Lebanese government institutions are slowly becoming more competent and technocratic. However, the pace is taking too long, and there is too much infighting between political camps worried that the other side will use the new governmental power and authority to expose, humiliate, and weaken their foes.

In the midst of wrangling over control of General Security and creating new intelligence units within the Internal Security Forces, the Lebanese people suffer daily humiliation and injustice. Crimes are never solved. Accusations echo through the media, and heighten tensions.

Meanwhile, foreign countries infringe on Lebanese sovereignty, and use the country as an intelligence and assassination playground.

The United Arab Emirates and the Emirate of Dubai have provided the Arab world with an excellent law enforcement example.

Daily Star Open!

I don't have any details, but the Daily Star is back open.  Hopefully, they will reform quickly and be better than ever.

Daily Star Stops Publishing

As long-time readers know, I am highly critical of the Daily Star, Lebanon's English-language daily newspaper.

The Star never seemed interested in addressing any of the major problems it faced. The management would come up with a quick-fix solution, which did nothing to solve any problems, and generally added more burden to the troubled paper.

It is with sadness, however, that I watch the Daily Star's troubles plunge it into bankruptcy and a cessation of publishing.

Despite its flaws, the Star provided a needed service. The dire need for a competent English-language paper was the main reason I so criticized the Star. No other Lebanese publication provides nearly as much to English-language audiences.

NOW Lebanon, Naharnet, and Ya Libnan are not newspapers.

NOW Lebanon does little reporting, and rarely follows up on a story. It does not break news (an exclusive interview does not count as breaking news). There is no diversity in the opinions found in NOW's pages, and there is far less content than that provided in the Star. Contrarily, Michael Young did a phenomenal job editing the Daily Star's opinions page. Diverse opinions were ubiquitous, and interesting articles originally published in other publications found their way to Lebanese audiences.

NOW provides interesting analysis long after an event occurs, but rarely has reporters covering beats and reporting from scenes of importance. Almost all of their stories can be written from the safe confines of an office, and are thus more analytical than journalistic.

NOW Extra provides a unique service, but is not comparable to the Daily Star's culture page, which regularly provided useful information and commentary.

NOW does not want to be a newspaper. It does not profit from its publication, and is arguing on behalf of a specific agenda, as noted by the "AGENDA" heading under which many articles appear on the main page.

NOW could be much better than it is, but it does not want to be a newspaper, and definitely not a "paper of record."

Naharnet provides a newswire service on events, but like all wire services, leaves readers with more questions about what happened and why. There is no analysis.

Ya Libnan survives by pilfering newspapers, magazines, and blogs of their content and repackaging it. It depends on the activities of other publications.

I'm sad to see you go, Daily Star. :(

Arabs and Israel

Robert Kaplan has an interesting article about Israel, Gaza, and Iran in the Atlantic. He argues:

Israel won its audacious military reputation during the age of Arab state armies. Because Arabs never believed in their own secular states, their armies were never very good in the first place, and thus Israel had no trouble impressing the world in its wars against them. But at the sub-state level of movements like Hamas or Hezbollah, the Arabs very much believe in their cause, and thus Israel has a real challenge on its hands.

He provocatively contends:

Iran has built its dominion on a combination of anti-western ideas and the dynamic wiliness of its intelligence operations (which, in turn, are a reflection of a civilization more developed and urbanized than that of the Arabs). Iran’s message of anti-Semitism and hatred toward the United States plays well across sectarian lines in the Sunni Arab world, which identifies its own fatigued, uninspiring, and detested rulers with the side of the U.S. and Israel. Sunni Arabs hate their own rulers, but despairing of changing their own lot, they channel that hatred toward us: thus the potency of the Iranian message. A nuclear weapon will only supply Iran with more prestige among the Arab lumpen faithful.

...

And yet the one place where Moslems are cynical about Iran is in Iran itself, where the regime relies on a narrow base of support amid a state that (despite its vast oil reserves) is in economic shambles. Thus, the supreme irony of the Middle East is that the place where anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism are least potent is in the Iranian heartland.

Also, see Max Boot's opinion piece about Gaza in the Wall Street Journal. He contends that Israel, being a liberal democracy, cannot crush its opponents, like the Russians, Syrians, and Burmese do. It simultaneously cannot tolerate attacks on its citizens from Gaza. Thus, the Israelis must fight a long-term war of attrition. Victory is not a possibility in the current calculus. Retaliatory measures will continue for a long time.

Proportionality in War: Israel and Gaza

Shmuel Rosner has an interesting article discussing proportionality in war, and Israel's objectives in Gaza.

Rosner contends, "No reasonable, moderately compassionate human being can ignore the suffering of Gazans under Israeli attacks. But such is the tricky nature of modern warfare: How do we measure proportionality without reducing the concept to an impossibly pedantic tit-for-tat?"

The trickiness involved in proportionality comes from the original 1907 Hague Convention language: "a state is legally allowed to unilaterally defend itself and right a wrong provided the response is proportional to the injury suffered. The response must also be immediate and necessary, refrain from targeting civilians, and require only enough force to reinstate the status quo ante."


An Aside
When thinking about proportionality, I am always reminded of the Vietnam War. Defense Secretary McNamara and General Westmoreland's strategy against the North Vietnamese Army led to escalating violence, instead of ending the conflict. Nixon's Operations Linebacker I and II hit the North Vietnamese with overwhelming force, which allowed for the US to pull out.

The conflict ended with US failure, and left the Vietnamese to fight regional wars against Cambodia and China.

Parallels to Israel and Gaza? Not really.

Fisk On Gaza

Robert Fisk's column about Israel's attacks on Gaza are rather balanced and perceptive.

Here's a taste:

We hear the usual Israeli line. General Yaakov Amidror, the former head of the Israeli army's "research and assessment division" announced that "no country in the world would allow its citizens to be made the target of rocket attacks without taking vigorous steps to defend them". Quite so. But when the IRA were firing mortars over the border into Northern Ireland, when their guerrillas were crossing from the Republic to attack police stations and Protestants, did Britain unleash the RAF on the Irish Republic? Did the RAF bomb churches and tankers and police stations and zap 300 civilians to teach the Irish a lesson? No, it did not. Because the world would have seen it as criminal behaviour. We didn't want to lower ourselves to the IRA's level.

Yes, Israel deserves security. But these bloodbaths will not bring it. Not since 1948 have air raids protected Israel. Israel has bombed Lebanon thousands of times since 1975 and not one has eliminated "terrorism". So what was the reaction last night? The Israelis threaten ground attacks. Hamas waits for another battle. Our Western politicians crouch in their funk holes. And somewhere to the east – in a cave? a basement? on a mountainside? – a well-known man in a turban smiles.

Read the whole thing.

Synagogue Update

Supposedly, the Lebanese Jewish community has raised funds to restore the synagogue, but the global financial crisis has prevented immediate restoration. See the whole article.

Apologies for not posting the pictures, yet... :(

Beirut Synagogue

I broke into the Beirut synagogue.

It wasn't hard. The gate has a lock on it, but it was knocked down, and the security guards no longer patrol the place as vigilantly. The Ottoman era buildings around the synagogue have been destroyed, and the edifice poses no security risk to the Prime Minister's Grand Serail or Future Movement leader Saad Hariri's future residence.

My friend and I climbed over the trees growing in the courtyard and walked into the main hall, decorated with 6-point stars. The front of the synagogue was desecrated. The holy documents were intentionally removed, but the other ornamental structures were destroyed.

Twenty foot tall trees grow where pews should be. The support beams of the roof still exist, but the tiles are destroyed. The staircase to the upper women's section remains intact.

Hebrew graffiti adorns the walls. I don't know what it says, but I assume Jews from abroad journeyed in and wrote on both the side walls and the front area where the arc is supposed to reside.

Jews are not the only group to have a downtown religious establishment remain in shambles. Two Greek Catholic churches lie in disarray in Beirut's downtown. One of them is in stumbling distance of the parliament, and the other is closer to the Parliament building than the synagogue.

However, the Greek Catholic community has fully operable churches in Beirut and is a functioning sect in Lebanon's confessional democracy.

Sadly, Jews remain in hiding in Lebanon.

Media reports about Beirut's synagogue, such as this, are heartening. Unfortunately, I doubt that much action will be taken to restore the synagogue in the coming months.

M14 Did Not Assassinate Aridi

Hezbollah-led March 8 alliance spokespeople suggest that forces opposed to them assassinated Druze March 8 member Saleh Aridi.

They argue that Druze leader Walid Jumblatt is moving away from his anti-Hezbollah allies, and is thus being sent a message not to ally with Hezbollah. It is suggested - and sometimes openly claimed - that the Saudi-backed March 14 coalition is responsible for assassinating Aridi.

Members of Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) have argued that Israel assassinated Aridi; thus, blaming the Arab world's perpetual rhetorical enemy instead of provoking a confrontation with either the March 8 or 14 coalition.

It is unlikely that M14 assassinated Aridi because:

1. M14 members know Jumblatt. This is the leader whose political decisions did not shift when a key PSP member, parliamentarian, policy maker, and negotiator, Marwan Hamade, was nearly assassinated in 2004. Jumblatt did not reverse his political decision. He merely stopped voicing it as loudly, while working ever harder with Rafiq Hariri to win the 2005 parliamentary elections and oust the Syrians.

2. Assassinations and threats to his life did not stop Jumblatt from advocating his positions over the last three years. Assassinations of March 14 coalition members only amplified and intensified Jumblatt's words.

3. Jumblatt refused to bow to Hezbollah's demands, even when his house in Clemenceau was under attack during the May events. Why would he be afraid of an assassination targeting someone who, until May, was a hated political opponent?

4. M14 generally uses money to buy allies (for example, quieting the Jund al-Sham conflicts with Saida residents, and also the "freezing" of the Salafist memorandum of understanding with Hezbollah). Aridi would not be the first person on M14's assassination list if it decided to take up that heinous policy.

5. The kind of bomb used to assassinate Aridi is similar to the kind used to assassinate Georges Hawi, and used in the failed assassination attempt against May Chidiac.


This fifth point is of particular significance. In 2005, press reports claimed that Georges Hawi was assassinated because he was acting as an emissary between Jumblatt and the Assad regime. This would suggest that Hawi's assassination was a clear message to Jumblatt that the Syrians have no interest in reconciliation with him.

LDP leader Talal Arslan was recently in Syria meeting with Assad at the Syrian presidential palace. Arslan and Jumblatt have reconciled their differences and are isolating some of Syria's closest Druze allies, like Wiam Wahhab, in preparation for the 2009 elections.

Recall that the Hamade assassination attempt occurred after the 2004 presidential elections, but before the 2005 parliamentary elections. The Aridi assassination occurred after the 2008 presidential elections, and before the 2009 parliamentary elections.

Something else to consider is the upcoming national dialogue, during which Lebanese parties will discuss critical issues about defense policy, national unity, and the 2009 electoral law. During the 2006 national dialogue, Jumblatt was the most anti-Hezbollah leader. His position has moderated since then, but Jumblatt is still no ally of Hezbollah or the Syrian regime. Arslan is.

Given that Jumblatt is significantly more powerful than Arslan - the junior member of this alliance, Syria is losing an ally while another close ally (Wahhab) is entirely isolated. The regime gains nothing from this alliance, but can preserve some influence in the Druze community if it prevents Arslan from moving closer to Jumblatt.

Arslan knows that he will lose support and credibility in his community if he does not work in coordination with Jumblatt, but will also lose his independence from Jumblatt if Syria removes its support. The Aridi assassination was most likely a message to Arslan that support might not be the only things the Syrians take away from him.

Arslan is allied with Syria's worst enemy. Secondly, he is the first influential pro-Syrian figure to attempt an independent political move.

These are all indications suggesting that the individuals who began assassinating anti-Syrian Lebanese leaders beginning in 2004 could possibly also be responsible for Aridi's assassination.

Nothing will completely exonerate the March 14 coalition in the opposition press. Try proving a negative. However, nothing suggests that M14 had anything to do with it.

Russia Supports Jordan More than Syria?

Tony Badran argues that the relationship between the Syrian regime and Russia might not be as strong that President Assad insinuates.

Badran argues:

Far less media attention was given to another visitor to Russia at around the same time that Assad arrived there: Jordan's King Abdullah. The king's visit was focused mainly on military and technical cooperation. Jordan has developed a number of joint military ventures with the Russians in recent years.

A few days later Premier Vladimir Putin - who had met with King Abdullah but not with Assad - also received Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan. The Saudis began discussing arms deals with the Russians last year, when Putin made his historic visit to the kingdom when he was still president. Meanwhile, Saudi-Syrian relations have sunk to their lowest levels in recent history. Whatever the purpose of Bandar's visit, the Russians were clearly not giving Syria any special privileges, and seemingly they were not interested in placing all their eggs in Bashar Assad's basket.

Badran provides a close look at President Assad's recent overtures toward Russia, and Russian relations with other (pro-US) Middle Eastern countries. Must read.

Targeting the Druze?

The first assassination after the May conflict and the Doha agreement is yet another attack on a Druze target. A car bomb in the village of Baisour killed Lebanese Democratic Party politburo member Saleh Aride.

This was no accident. Car bombs are not meant to be subtle, especially when used in the quiet, mountainous Druze heartland.

Hezbollah made the Druze community as a whole their target during their May campaign. Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt reinforced his alliance with rival Druze leader Talal Arslan during and after the Hezbollah attacks on their community. Arslan is a friend and supporter of the Assad regime and the March 8 coalition. However, he is the junior partner in his alliance with Jumblatt

The assassination of one of Arslan's core supporters might be a message to Arslan to move away from Jumblatt and not provide him with pro-Syrian cover as Jumblatt tries to move away from the March 14 coalition. From 2004-8, Jumblatt was the most vociferous critic of the Syrian regime. The Damascus regime detests him more than any other Lebanese leader.

This assassination might be a statement from the Syrians to Jumblatt and Arslan that an entente between Jumblatt and Damascus is impossible. It might be a message to Arslan to realign himself. It might be a message to pro-Syrian Shia Amal leader Nabih Berri not to align himself too closely with Jumblatt, because Jumblatt is still persona non grata in Damascus. It has recently been reported that Jumblatt and Berri are trying to create a third way that opposes both the March 14 coalition and Hezbollah.

Some Lebanese claim that March 14 forces are responsible for the assassination to send a message to Jumblatt not to stray too far. However, this seems unlikely.

It is possible that Aride was involved in other activities that might have made him a target. We will most likely find out more in the coming hours and days.

The Russia/Georgia Conflict: The Syrian/Israeli Connection

The Russian invasion of Georgia caught much of the Middle East by surprise, but political actors here were quick to try and capitalize off of it.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech comparing the West's support for Georgia to the West's support for Israel. Just as the West could not prevent the righteous Russians from invading sovereign Georgia, he argued, the West would eventually fall to the might of Hezbollah and other forces opposed to Israel.

Given Hezbollah's May putsch in Beirut against the internationally supported Siniora government, some Lebanese saw Nasrallah's remarks as justifying the forceful takeover of a democratically elected, Western supported government. The Beirut press filled with reports about Hezbollah acquiring sophisticated new weaponry - advanced anti-aircraft systems and missiles - from the Russians.

Syrian President Bashar Assad made a grand play, going to Moscow to ask the Russians for a major weapons deals. Assad offered the Russians Syrian soil on which to locate missile batteries.

The Lebanese and Israeli press, as usual, briefly went berserk. However, the news that the Russians were sending an aircraft carrier to Latakia did not ruffle many feathers because, allegedly, the aircraft carrier in question is old, should have been decommissioned, and might not be fit for combat.

Israel, however, used the Georgia invasion to tacitly and the effectively maneuver its way into a better regional bargaining position than their opponents.


The details:

Hezbollah was eager to score a rhetorical victory. They – allegedly in coordination with the Syrians - planted many of the news items about Russian military acquisitions scare their local opponents, knowing that the March 14 press would embellish the story even further.

The Syrian President saw an opportunity, but had nothing to give the Russians in return. The Syrians like to present themselves as eager allies of the Russians, and continuously mention the important Syrian relationship with the Soviet Union.

However, Assad never made the case as to why the Russians would want to plant missiles in Syria, or why the Russians would want to sell weapons to the Syrians. He assumed, like many others in the Middle East, that the Russians – historic supporters of Arab Nationalism and the Palestinian cause – would be eager to take an opportunity to support the most anti-American regime in the Arab world.

Yet, what interests do the Russians have in upsetting Turkey (a NATO member), the European Union, Arab regimes in the Middle East, the United States and its forces in Iraq, and the Israelis? Russian missiles in Syria would provide greater credibility to Assad, but how would the Russians benefit from that, given the immense amount of opposition they would face.

The Russians quickly dismissed Assad’s advances, and agreed to sell him minor weapons systems and sent the carrier as a show of support.

The Israelis were always one step ahead of the Syrians.

Before Assad crafted his plan, the Israelis had already negotiated a deal with the Russians.

Israel was an ardent supporter of Georgia’s nascent democracy, and was one of its main suppliers of advanced weaponry. Media outlets regularly noted that Georgia’s defense minister is Jewish. Israeli officials vocally supported Georgian President Saakashvili… until a few weeks ago.

According to a number of reports, the Israelis made a deal with Russia that they would stop providing weaponry and rhetorical support to the Georgians. In return, the Russians agreed not to change the security status quo in the Middle East. They refused to sell any weapons systems to the Syrians or Syria’s regional allies that would change regional dynamics.

Russia strengthened its sphere of influence, sending a message to the United States and Europe. The Israelis sent a message to Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah that the Russians have no interest in changing the regional balance. Then, Condoleeza Rice went to Libya…

Show your anger and cry for Tripoli..

He’s only 8 years old. He does not go to school. Despite his very early age, he works, all day long, giving a shine to the Tripolitan businessmen’s shoes, and injecting hope into his daily struggle to assist his family financially. He is one of many similar poor children in the streets of the capital of North Lebanon; but now he is unique, different.. He died today.. not because of an ever threatening hunger, but because he was killed in one of the harshest Baghdad-style explosions in the history of Tripoli.


But the unfortunate kid of Tripoli's Banks street did not leave this life alone: Nine hero soldiers from the Lebanese army in addition to nine civilian victims shared his bloody destiny.. As their passenger bus was crossing this usually-busy arterial of the "Tell" district, 1.5 kgs of TNT explosives diffused their hatred in a city that has witnessed continuous conflicts and tensions recently.


Today's martyrs join 23 other victims that died in the Sunni-Alawi clashes that dominated the Bab el Tebbaneh-Baal Mohsen areas few weeks ago. Some fundamentalist pockets in Tripoli grew an increasing hatred against the Lebanese National Army especially after the army's determined eradication of Fath el Islam movement from the Nahr el Bared Palestinian Refugee camp. There have been many attempts to demoralize the army -not only in Tripoli-, and today's attempt is another episode of this long Tripoli-based anti-armed forces drama. It is worth mentioning here that this week, veiled women were loudly protesting against keeping people who were arrested during the Nahr el Bared operations, in prisons "without real reasons or accusations, other than their belonging to Islam" - according to the protesters. Despite all that, the Lebanese authorities and the Lebanese army remained firm and maintained their presence in the North's capital with a solid commitment to keep peace and restore security all around the city.



The growing Salafi currents in Tripoli's poor pockets is a real concern for the whole spectrum of the city's political and influential figures. Tripoli's Mufti, Cheikh Malek el Chaar, did all his best to gather Tripolitan figures from all confessions in a unified stand against the danger threatening the city. The moderate Tripolitan political powers (Future Movement, Mohammed el Safadi's Tripolitan Bloc, Former PM Najib Mikati, MP Musbah el Ahdab and even Former PM Omar Karami) are the big losers amidst all this mess. Moderation is being slowly replaced by fundamentalism and agressivity in Tripoli. All the city's politicians and even its -moderate- religious figures are becoming increasingly powerless and their control over the situation became negligible. It is believed that Tripoli has Qaeda cells and members today, it is also believed that there are several Nahr el Bared-like pockets around the city. But who is supporting those, who is bringing them to the Lebanese North and who is turning Tripoli into Qandahar? The simplistic and superficial answer would accuse Sunni figures of empowering those terrorists in order to face the threat of Hezbollah's "shia weapons" that were used against the People of the Sunnah last May in Beirut. But given that the so-accused Sunni figures are all losing ground and control over Tripoli, this explanation cannot be a logical one. Moreover, burning the streets of one of the largest Sunni agglomerations of the country, killing many Sunni people, and attacking the Lebanese army are not what political powers who gave full political support and cover to the Lebanese Armed Forces against [again] the Sunnis of Nahr el Bared would do. Therefore, the Sunni political powers are all falling into a virtual accusatory trap in an attempt to divert the attention from the fact that when Sunnis were attacked in Beirut, they had no militia to defend them- They put all their trust and faith in the Lebanese Army.

But who would benefit from this negative picture of the Sunnis? In the heated debates that marked the parliamentary discussions of the Governmental declaration, there was particularly a loud and harsh exchange of comments between Tripoli's MP Musbah el Ahdab and Amal's MPs Ayyoub Hmayyed and Ali Hassan Khalil. Hmayyed was accused by Ahdab of favoring one side in Tripoli's latest conflicts- the Alawis of Baal Mohsen. Hezbollah's general sceretary Hassan Nasrallah had drawn red lines in front of the army's intervention inside Nahr el Bared's camp. The army was further targeted when some of its officers were condemend and trialled after having tried to put an end to a destabilizing demonstration in the Chiyah area by pro-March 8 supporters.

An interesting noticeable fact is that the Lebanese Shia community mainly supports a fundamentalist Shia entity: that is Hezbollah and its Wilayat el Fakih Iranian Khomeinist agenda; while the majority of the Sunnis of Lebanon, and despite their good relations with KSA for example, remain more under the moderate political umbrella of slogans such as "Lebanon First". The Tripoli changes are an attempt to turn the largely moderate Sunni image into a fundamentalist picture that would not leave Hezbollah as the lonely fundamentalist islamist "army" in the country. The Tripoli repetitive events are an attempt to plant Baghdad-like and Tekrit-like terrorist Qaeda sunni fundamentalists to counterbalance Hezbollah, the equivalent of Muqtada el Sadr's Mehdi Army on the shia end. Sad but true, there are continuous attempts to turn the Lebanese Summer 2008 paradise into a bloody Iraq.

In the meantime, President Michel Sleiman is having serious discussions in Damascus: diplomatic relations, mutual agreements and most importantly, the destinies of Lebanese prisoners in Syria are on the table. Tripoli's disaster was not the only attempt to destabilize President Sleiman's firm mission and clear goals; in fact, a very limited regime-orchestrated Syrian protest in front of the Syrian Ministry of the Interior gathered "parents and friends of Syrian workers who disappeared in Lebanon", in an attempt to reduce the pressure of the eternal file of Lebanese political prisoners in Syria. Those are expected moves from a regime that has always denied the presence of a sovereign and independent Lebanese Republic, a regime that oppresses whoever tries to speak against its actions, a regime that contributes to the destabilization of all its neighbors.

As long as people will easily bypass laws in Lebanon, there will always be 8-year old children working in the streets of Tripoli, and as long as regional interventions will keep on haunting our country, those children will not only be threatened by hunger - Explosions can burn their fragile lives anytime...

Hide your anger and Smile for Beirut...

2 a.m.. Long lines are filling the hallways of the only functional airport of the Land of the Cedars.. Women, men and children are enthusiastic, happy, smiling.. Life is abundant in that terminal that links Lebanon to the whole world.. But is this shine real? Are those smiles only temporary summer masks for a deep problem that can re-emerge and shake the country at any point? One thing is sure: the happiness of a succesful summer season - despite all its economic and moral benefits- cannot unfortnuately bridge any gaps between widely diverging views in the country: starting from the very name of our international airport, every social, economic or political item is a source of divides. Are those daily discusssions and harsh arguments worth it though? Why are some people still refusing to endorse the "Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport" label; did you hear any American ever complaining about the JFK airport in NYC or the Ronald Reagan airport in DC? Regardless of your opinion -or mine- about late Premier Rafic Hariri, the man gave Lebanon, worked for Lebanon and died in the harshest way possible in the heart of Lebanon's capital.. Deservedly or not, giving his name to the airport in memory of his martyrdom is not against anyone. Sadly enough, people continuously use that issue for useless attacks against the martyr leader and his followers. It is unacceptable to use the name of the airport in order to create biases, increase sectarian tensions or attempt to mark political points.. Few months ago, when Hezbollah and its allies were taking over Beirut, some enthusiastic March 8 supporters celebrated their "victory" and declared the airport as "Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's airport" through a Facebook group that is still maintained until today. The display picture of the group shows a Hezbollah militant on his motorbike at the airport, brandishing a Hezbollah flag, and the picture says "Al Matar tahta Akdamina - The airport under our feet". This group was launched when March 8 militiamen were attacking Beiruti homes, burning Future TV and forcefully imposing a blockade on all of Beirut's vital centers.
The military domination of Beirut was used by Hezbollah and their allies in order to strengthen Hezbollahland at the expense of the Lebanese government.
But hold on, keep this dark period away for now, and let us focus on the very active airport this summer.. Tourists, Lebanese immigrants: everyone is coming to Beirut this summer and everyone forgot about Hezbollah and their invasion.. Is it really everyone? Or..emmm what about those with killed family members or burned houses?
Hopefully the touristic season will bring back some of the much-needed morale to the Lebanese people.. Lebanon offers the best but Lebanon also deserves the best.. Even from far away now, I will still "Welcome you to the Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut"!

Foreigners in Beirut, Karadzic, and Lebanese politiciansTribunals

Foreigners are running all over Beirut. I'm not talking about the Khalijee. They are doing just fine sitting in the downtown, in hotels, and making a few appearances in the neighborhoods.

Western visitors are running all over town. I don't call them tourists, because plenty are not. Some are summer Arabic students, some are backpackers, others are doing internships at the Daily Star, others are foreign freelance journalists, some are tourists (but it is harder to notice them because they do not regularly stop in areas frequented by locals), and some wear high and tight haircuts that bring to mind careers in less pleasant areas of the Middle East.

They are an interesting addition to the normal Beirut mix, yet reminiscent of the sorts of people I assisted in evacuating the country in 2006. Some claim that foreigners are a good sign. 2006 reveals that such opinions are merely that... opinions.

On another note...

Karadzic

Conspiracy theories are welcome in the Middle East. In the West, conspiracy theories sell books (JFK, UFOs, Hitler's bunker, Jimmy Hoffa), but the predominant frame is believed. In the Middle East, the conspiracy theories command more attention.

Former Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan Karadzic attests that the United States promised him a deal, but they are now possibly interested in murdering him.

In Lebanon, there is always talk of assassinations, foreign intrigue, American "meddling," and immoral realpolitik deals. Often, as is perhaps true in Karadzic's case, this is just talk.

However, what strikes me as highly intriguing is how the warlords of 1975-1990 ended that war filled with massacres, atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity without a single major international charge.

Obviously, no international tribunal, like the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) currently prosecuting Karadzic, existed to prosecute Lebanese crimes. The International Court of Justice existed, but did not prosecute such cases. The International Criminal Court was not formed until 2002.

The Lebanese civil war ended during the Cold War. One might argue that the United States and the Soviet Union were much more interested in global political maneuvering than in prosecuting Third World crimes, some of which these powers are implicated in. Also, the Soviet Union was collapsing, while the United States was seeking Middle Eastern allies to confront Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

The Arab League took and takes no interest in prosecuting criminal behaviors.

In 2001, a case was brought before Belgian courts under a new law to try Ariel Sharon for the Sabra and Shatila massacre. It was later overruled in 2002. However, to my knowledge, no one has ever tried to prosecute the crimes of the Lebanese civil war that involved Lebanese/Palestinian/Syrian actors.

South Africa, El Salvador, Argentina, Chile, and other countries in which trauma occured during the 1980s, all had Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. Lebanon received Syrian overlordship.

The Serbians, who were recently mired in war and committing atrocities, are on the way to being admitted into the European Union. Croatia, just as active a participant in that war, is almost qualified for entry. Slovenia, the country which first broke away from Yugoslavia and helped begin the conflict, is one of the most successful countries in the EU. Romania, a country destroyed by Ceaucescu and without the human capital available in Lebanon, is an EU member. Albania, the country that suffered from the most oppressive form of authoritarianism, is rapidly improving, and can dream of EU membership.

In Lebanon, the memories and hatred remain, the warriors are members of parliament (not just the leaders, but also the henchmen, like Tony Zahra of the Barbara checkpoint), and those injured by the conflict continue to suffer under the whims of those who injured them in the 1980s.

There are plenty of people in Lebanon who support the Serb radicalist cause, and generally for misguided reasons: anti-Americanism, anti-Muslim sentiment, pro-Orthodox Christianity unity (which is the most ridiculous given that Orthodox Christianity never condones murder).

There are others in Lebanon who argue against tribunals. Like Karadzic and some Serb radicals, they argue that international tribunals are politicized. Tribunals go after heroes of the anti-American resistance, while they let others go free. Tribunals give America everything it wants, but deny local citizens their dignity, sovereignty, and justice.

Tell that to the Bosnian Muslims. Tell that to the families of assassinated Lebanese whose families have not received justice. Just because one murderer is not caught does not mean that 20 other murderers should be let off. Just because one crime against humanity is not tried does not mean that all crimes should not be tried.

Lebanon needs to make sure that, domestically, murderers are tried. That sounds obvious to others outside of Lebanon, but you will be surprised by how many people here (including those you think are your allies) agree that murderers should be set free for political reasons.


Middle East Sectarianism

It seems Egypt, too, is suffering from sectarianism.

Democracy in the Middle East: Beirut, Lebanon, and the Need for a Constitution

Lee Smith reviews Brookings Institute scholar Kenneth Pollack's new book in Slate this week.

Smith argues, "The paradox is that one of our [America's] sharpest limitations is that we believe democracy is a universal cure-all, good for all people at all times, when that is almost certainly not the case."

Sadly, I agree, to a certain degree, with Smith.

Smith seems to believe that Arab culture and society are not prepared for democracy because Middle Eastern states do not exist. In countries that could be described as states, like in the Gulf, the countries are by no means liberal, and primarily operate through local familial connections. Their visa and citizenship requirements guarantee that the foreign working populations develop no long term attachments to their places of residence, or if they do, that they understand and abide by how the local system works.

Where I differ with Smith is in my idealism. I would like to believe that democracies are predicated on constitutions. The Arab nationalists of the 60s, and even many pro-Syrian and pro-Western Lebanese politicians today also believe this, which is why they argue so vehemently over government policy statements (as is happening in the Beirut Serail as I write).

Americans are not incorrect to believe in democracy. In some places, democracy is an easy fix to a constitutional/ governmental quandary. After the fall of the Soviet Union, many Central and Eastern European countries saw the value of joining their Western European brethren in a democratic community. Social networks and cultures crushed under the weight of Soviet oppression desired a panacea and found it in joining the democratic world and the European Union.

However, these people had an incentive to join. They had something to gain. The Soviet Union, on which they relied, failed, and they needed an immediate fix to their desperate problems. The United States and Europe came along.

Nothing is promised for democracies in the Middle East. If anything, the Lebanese example tells the Emirati that they are better off without a democratic system. Could they have done nearly as much in the last 20 years if they were like the Lebanese, a playground for regional actors, rife with corruption.

As MP Farid el-Khazen noted, in 1975 when Franco died, would Spain have become a functioning democracy if the countries around it were not? Would it have become a democracy if France was struggling with a civil war?

In the end, this post is more about Lebanon than Middle East democracy. This should not be surprising given that Lebanon is the only Arabic speaking Middle Eastern country with a heritage of democracy, regardless of how plagued and dissimilar to Western democracy it is.

The primary problem with Lebanon is that the Constitution is not applicable to the society it governs. The Francophone constitution represents a model in which one faction can rule benificently over minorities, from the center/ capital with no other form of representation. However, even the majority faction was divided when the Constitution came into being, and the minority was more of an opposition than a pliant recipient of majority good will.

Taef was not the solution for Lebanon. Lebanon is in need of a constitutional convention to re-evaluate the management of the country.

The end of foreign occupation of the country - which happened both in 2000 and 2005 - could have been a useful opportunity for such a discussion. However, in 2000 the occupation of only one party ended. In 2005, the occupation of another party ended, but the interests of that party remained.

Given the activities of foreign actors and foreign-allied actors in Lebanon (a senior member of Fatah was assassinated today in Ain el Helwe), this period is one of crisis, rather than a post-occupation calm, like that experienced in the United States, Eastern Europe, and many other post-Colonial democracies. Also unfortunate, is the fact that years of war entrenched warlords in power rather than enlightened warriors fighting for their people, not just for themselves.

President Sleiman will convene a national dialogue. Hopefully, something will come of it. If not, the hope of Lebanese nationalists, idealists, and supporters of Arab democracy will die.

The Middle East has been very good at murdering idealism and forcing individuals to conform to the tribal, sectarian rubrique.

We could be left with an international opinion about the Middle East similar to Smith's. If we want to support Lebanese democracy, now is the time to do it.

If we want war, there are far more interested parties willing to supply us with weapons than those willing to support our democratic gambit.

Lebanese Reactions to Qantar's Release

My friends and I were in a pub this evening when Samir Qantar spoke.

I wanted to see and listen to the speak, but the pub owner intentionally turned off the television to prevent just such viewing and conversations.

Regardless, friends arriving late (which is expected in Lebanon), told us about the contents of the speech. I apologize to all those offended, but I was not expecting much. Samir Qantar was imprisoned in his teens. Unlike most of my friends, who doubt Qantar's intellectual capabilities based merely on his presentation, I am willing to give the man a second chance. According to al-Akhbar, he reads the Arabic press on a daily basis.

Regardless, the man has been imprisoned for years, and has not been honing is speech making abilities. If any, Qantar in Naqoura looked surprised by his reception. He truly appreciated the welcome he received.

Unfortunately, Lebanon does not provide much more than this day to him. Hezbollah might try to nominate him for a parliamentary seat, but his speech today manifests that he must take a few years to practice his political skills. Obviously, this is a man who has been imprisoned since his teens. If Antoine Zahra and Gebran Bassil have trouble giving proper interviews to a perspicacious Lebanese interviewer, imagine what the Lebanese media would do to Qantar.

Prisoners in Helicopter

The 5 former prisoners are getting in a helicopter on the way to the Beirut Airport.

None of the prisoners spoke to the crowd in Naqoura.

Return Celebration Occuring in Naqoura

The 5 former prisoners are wearing Lebanese Army uniforms. None these people fought for the Lebanese Army when they were caught, thus their uniforms suggest an coordinated effort to brand this event as one that unifies Lebanon.

The international media is heavily covering the events. The events in Lebanon are getting far more coverage than on the Israeli side. The jubilation on the Lebanese side is being compared with the somber tone on the Israeli side.

No live prisoners were returned to Israel.

5 Prisoners Back in Lebanon

The five Lebanese prisoners are in Lebanon. Soon, they will take a helicopter to Beirut to meet:

the Lebanese President,

Prime Minister,

Speaker of Parliament,

Lebanese cabinet,

the heads of all branches of Lebanese security and intelligence services,

other Lebanese leaders and dignitaries,

the Iranian Ambassador,

the German Ambassador,

the commander of UNIFIL,

and others.

Qantar is a Criminal

I am glad that the Lebanese in Israeli prisons will be returned to Lebanon.

The soldiers captured in the 2006 war were pawns in Hezbollah's scheme, and it is good that they will return to their families. However, Samir Qantar is a different story.

It is true: many Lebanese who committed horrific crimes during the civil war should be imprisoned. The murderers of Sabra, Shatila, Bhamdoun, Souk al Garb, Damour, Tell al Zaater, the wars of the camps, and more go unpunished. However, few of those civil war crimes were specifically identified. Individual A was never accused of being guilty of killing Victim B.

Regarding Samir Qantar, the crime is evident. Qantar killed Israeli government personnel and civilians during a raid in the middle of a war. However, he also killed a four year old girl by smashing a rock into her head. There is no excuse on Earth to justify that action, and there is no way that I can ever say that this man is a hero. Any man willing to smash in the head of a 4 year old child with a rock should remain in prison for the rest of his life.

My disgust has no words... My tears...

War is horrible. Horrible things happen. Many of the most horrible events go undocumented. When horrendous events are documented, one has a moral duty to take those issues into account. If one does not, one is morally worse than his enemy and spiritually bereft. Any moral arguments for war and a righteous cause evaporate when one accepts disgusting, horrendous, reprehensible acts as normal, or even heroic.

Now, we hear in al-Akhbar newspaper that Hezbollah wants Qantar to run for parliament. Obviously, Druze leader and PSP chief Walid Jumblatt might oppose this. However, Qantar might run with Hezbollah's support.

Nothing would say more about Hezbollah's ethics than for them to nominate Qantar. The party claims moral legitimacy, but their actions defy their rhetorical claims.

New Cabinet: Not that Great

I'm glad there is a new Lebanese government (for information on political affiliation, see NOW Lebanon. However, their data is not entirely correct. For example, they list both Ibrahim Shamsedine and Tarek Mitri as Information Minister). I am not happy with the cabinet composition.

Last year, Michael Young predicted in the Daily Star that if Saad Hariri wanted to assume the office of prime minister, he would be forced to appoint a cabinet of ministers composed of major sectarian political players from different regions in Lebanon. Although Saad is not PM, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's cabinet seems to have this composition, which is a major disappointment.

The good:

1. Ziad Baroud, Minister of Interior. Baroud brought together a diverse and encompassing group to create a new electoral law for Lebanon that represents minority and majority interests from all different perspectives. The law is infeasible in Lebanon's current climate, but sets the standard for humane, ethical, and equitable democratic representation in Lebanon.

I have no doubt he will ethically and competently serve Lebanon in his capacity as the chief law enforcer in Lebanon. [Full disclosure: I know the Minister personally, and happen to like him].

Baroud's appointment is also a statement of President Sleiman's commitment to Lebanon. Baroud is one of President Sleiman's 3 cabinet appointees. I know nothing of their personal or familial relationship, but the fact that Baroud is serving in this cabinet is encouraging.

2. Elias Murr, Minister of Defense. Minister Murr is a political appointee, but serves as if he is a technocrat. He was an excellent Interior Minister, and even better as Minister of Defense. He knows the political obligations of his position, but ensures that his ministry is constantly improving and working to meet international standards.

Politically, he and his father, Metn MP and za'im Michel el-Murr, balance between the competing influences in Lebanon. He supported former President Emile Lahoud, then support the 14 March Coalition when the situation required it of him, and is now representing President Michel Sleiman.

This could be interpreted as political opportunism or the machinations of a political family trying to constantly maintain their grip on power, however, the excellent job Murr has done in his position suggests a realistic and competent defense of Lebanon and Lebanese sovereignty.

President Sleiman appointed Murr, as well.

3. Raymond Audi, Minister of the Displaced. I know little about Raymond Audi's political background. I have an account with his bank, and I have met him on a few apolitical occasions. The Minister collects and appreciates art, which is a shared interest.

Regardless, a banker and financier assuming a ministry allegedly reputed as one of the best for graft and embezzlement, could be a positive development.

However, it is not necessarily a positive development that one of the wealthiest and most prominent Lebanese citizens is filling a position that could go to a less prominent and wealthy expert in the field.

4. Muhammed Khalifeh, Minister of Health. Khalifeh was an excellent Health Minister in the previous government. Unfortunately, his Amal political affiliation forced him to resign from his position before the end of his term, but he still upheld the highest of standards.

A few months ago, Hezbollah spread rumors that the Future Movement would support Khalifeh as Minister of Health in the next government, given his capabilities. This was not just a swipe at Amal (rumored to actively endorse embezzlement), but a vote of confidence in a capable minister.

5. Tarek Mitri, Minister of Information. I am not sure what the Minister of Information does. I know that journalists receive their press credentials from the Ministry. PSP MP Ghazi Aridi has occupied the position for so long, I generally associate it as the ministry for eloquent government spokespeople.

Regardless, Mitri is a technocrat par excellence. He joined the previous government as one of President Lahoud's appointees, but continued to serve in a prominent capacity in the 14 March government as the "opposition" resigned.

Mitri was the best post-war Minister of Culture, and (no insult to Minister Aridi - who has received a portfolio boost) will probably be the best post-war Minister of Information. He's competent, qualified, dignified, and highly competent.

The bad:

1. Elie Skaff, Minister of Agriculture. Do I need to explain? It has been publicly alleged that Skaff profited massively from his previous Ministerial posts.

Skaff dominates Zahle and West Bekaa politics. The man is quite genial. He has an excellent sense of humor, and his politics are not sectarian. Future Movement Sunnis in the West Bekaa love Skaff just as much Greek Catholics in Zahle.

However, naming him to this portfolio is a blatantly political attempt to provide aid to Bekaa farmers in an effort to win over votes in the next parliamentary elections for himself, Michel Aoun, and pro-Syrian allies (perhaps, Abdel Rahim Mrad), against supporters of the Future Movement and other 14 March parties.

2. Gebran Bassil, Minister of Telecommunications. Telecommunications? Seriously? Why, because he dominates the Lebanese airwaves so much?

Bassil is regularled criticized for being ill-prepared for television interviews. His political rise is entirely tied to his marriage to Michel Aoun's daughter. FPM members claim he is brilliant, and singlehandedly crafted their "Memorandum of Understanding" with Hezbollah. 14 March supporters claim the man is the incompetent scion of the Aounist establishment.

Such an important Ministry? Really?

At this time, Lebanon needs a truly competent person in this position. Why not the allegedly competent Issam Abu Jamra? (Oh, yeah. That's because Aoun wanted to steal the ceremonial "deputy prime minister" from Elias el-Murr).

Former Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamade was reputed to leave the majority of day to day business to his operations officer, who is also the head of Ogero. However, Hamade's political view - primarily his interest in safeguarding his personal safety (he was a target of assassination in 2004) and that of his associates - provided impetus to guarantee that the Interior Ministry and UN investigating team had access to the necessary telephone files.

I know the former Minister personally, and he is a highly intelligent man. His political view, however, might have also stifled the privatization of Lebanon's telecommunications networks, as his Future Movement chief operations officer is rumored to be making present decisions based on an interest in becoming the future CEO of a privatized Ogero. The head of Ogero is competent, but I hear there needs to be a bit more oversight in the ministry. Will Bassil provide it?

Hamade's son also owns a telecommunications firm, which was a blatant conflict of interest for the former minister, which is sadly expect in Lebanon (please don't cancel my internet account).

If Bassil takes aggressive action, I will support him the entire way. If, while in this position, he behaves like the Aounist political partisan he has for the last three years, I will be utterly disgusted, especially at this crucial time.

Thankfully, the heads of Ogero, MTC, and Alfa are highly intelligent and competent individuals. Given their competence, if Bassil decides to use his post for political purposes alone, Lebanon will be fine. If he chooses to stifle March 14 investigations into assassinations, his post will be devastating for Lebanon.

3. Talal Arslan, Minister of Youth and Sports. Seriously? Arslan? Come on, opposition. Do you really hate Waleed Jumblatt that much? I guess so. Thanks for letting him know where you stand. If you nominated Wiam Wahhab during the cabinet negotiations for the position, you would have even more blatantly let all of us know your fealty to the Syrian regime. Oh, wait. You did that by annointing Ali Qanso as a Minister of State.


The expected:

1. Bahia Hariri, Minister of Education. I understand the political calculations for naming Hariri to this position, but is there any way she could be construed as a technocrat? Sadly, I don't think so.

Hariri has suffered significantly with the assassination of her brother, the daily attacks on her family's reputation, and the threats to her personal safety. Regardless, I can think of no other reason to appoint her to this ministry other than in preparation for the next elections. Hezbollah, the Saad family, and other powerful families in Saida have the strength to sweep Bahia Hariri out of her seat in the qada during the next elections, if 14 March is not aggressive.

But seriously, education? I guess the Hariri's used to give a lot of education grants, but they significantly decreased those efforts in 1998.

Hariri deserves a cabinet seat. My disappointment is that there are so many qualified educators in Lebanon who truly deserve this position who would make it their personal priority to better the quality of education in Lebanon. If Lebanon produces anything, it is educated and brilliant minds, many of whom serve as teachers and professors in Lebanon, and also the majority of others who pursue careers abroad.

2. Muhammad Chattah, Minister of Finance. Chattah is a smart man. He is dignified and loyal.

He also happens to be from Tripoli, which will be the sight of a major electoral battle during the next elections, especially if Muhammad Safadi, Najib Miqati, and Omar Karami unite and throw money at the locals.

Chattah has the required experience for this crucial position. He is also one of the most trusted Hariri/Siniora aides. Yet, Jihad Azour was excellent as Minister of Finance. He won international awards, was loved by his staff, and has international credibility.

I understand that the Future Movement was limited in the number of Christian ministers it could appoint. I understand that Hezbollah/Amal tried to name all of the Shia ministers, so Future tried to name all of the Sunni ministers. I understand that Chattah is competent and credible and will probably do an excellent job. But shouldn't Future fight to be able to appoint competent Christian ministers, or at least urge Future's Christian political allies to lend a spot to a technocrat? Shouldn't the Future Movement award competence?

I am happy that a competent person is in the position of Finance Minister. I am also happy that Chattah was named as a member of the cabinet. He would serve well in any cabinet position.

However, I do not like that his appointment can be construed as being made for blatantly political and sectarian reasons, and that a highly competent, technocratic, successful, admirable person was removed from the cabinet.

3. Khaled Qabbani, Minister of State. Seriously, Future Movement, what does Qabbani do for you? I'm being entirely serious.

In the previous government, he was education minister. Did he serve with particular distinction?

In the previous government, he made a ridiculous fuss about the Habtoor Grand Hotel being a story too tall. It was a non-decorous move.

Is he that important for the next elections? Siniora, is he that good of an adviser? Or, do you just like his tinted glasses, and the fact that he follows you around everywhere and looks like a pious Muslim when you pray in front of television cameras?

4. Tamam Salam, Minister of Culture. Come oooooooon, Future Movement. This move is so blatantly political, it is ridiculous.

Salam is a good guy. He's from a prominent Sunni Beiruti family. Getting him on your side helps you prevent Salim al-Hoss and other pro-Syrian Sunnis in Beirut from winning a seat or two in the newly apportioned Beirut parliamentary districts.

However, after an excellent technocratic Minister of Culture like Tarek Mitri, Salam seems like an entirely political appointee. I'm not saying that he will not do a phenomenal job. He might. But your reasons for choosing him, Mitri's excellent tenure, and the huge possibility that he will use the trappings of his office without returning the favor to the Lebanese people who democratically elected the parliament that appoints him is reason enough for me to be disappointed. Please, please, please, surprise me with your competence, sense of duty, and interest in defending Lebanon's cultural freedom, Minister Salam. I apologize for my skepticism in advance.

5. Everybody else. Pretty much all of the other ministers are expected and their appointments made for political reasons, so I won't comment on them. The above ministers are the ones that most inspired/ disappointed me.


Obviously, many ministers received their positions based on pragmatic politics, not competence. However, this cabinet is much better than it would have been if political views were the only justification for appointments. There is plenty of competence.

Obviously, I am also much more disappointed with the Future Movement than with other parties. This, obviously, shows my bias and the fact that I expect more from PM Siniora than I do from, say, Elie Skaff and Ali Qanso.

I have come to expect a certain type of behavior and a certain display of moral and ethical values from Amal and Hezbollah, which makes me surprised when a compentent and qualified person like Muhammad Khalifeh is appointed as a minister.

The PSP cabinet selections are expected. I am surprised that Marwan Hamade is not a minister in the current government. However, losing a seat to Talal Arslan was probably a difficult compromise to make, as well.

I do not know why Waleed Jumblatt continues to appoint Wael Abou Faour to positions. This is not to say anything about about Minister of State (ie, without portfolio) Abou Faour. I have never met him. However, he is obviously providing value to his party and people. I say this merely because I do not know much about Abou Faour, which is entirely my fault.

The ministers representing the Free Patriotic Movement, the Lebanese Forces, the Kataeb, and the Qornet Shehwan Gathering are untested commodities. Much would be expected of Qornet Shehwan cabinet member Nassib Lahoud. However, he does not have a portfolio. This means that he will probably dominate Lebanese microphones between now and the next parliamentary elections. His cabinet seat might also put him in a better negotiating position with Amine Gemayel, Michel el-Murr, Karim Pakradouni, and Hagop Pakradounian in getting elected as a parliamentarian from Metn.

Best Araq?

Tripoli is under attack, and no one knows what will happen in Lebanon come the end of summer. However, summer is tourist/ araq season.

Grapes ripen in the autumn, however, summer always reminds me of copious cups of araq.

Sure, sure, araq baladi is the best. I am sure your uncle makes the best brew on top of some mountain somewhere, and only the best cousins can get their hands on the stuff. I have a big jug of the stuff sitting in my pantry.

There needs to be a corporate Lebanese araq ranking. Michael Karam wrote a book about araq, but there needs to be a practical list.

Lebanese abroad love bringing the sexy blue Massaya araq bottles and the Rif "traditional Lebanese" logo araq bottles back to Liberia, Australia, and Canada. Yet, which are the best? Does the best araq come in the best branded bottles? Can one purchase an amazing bottle of branded araq?

1. Kefraya - Kefraya's araq is creamy and smooth. Unlike other brands of araq, Kefraya's is not watery. The beverage is consistent and cool. The taste of Kefraya araq, unlike araq baladi, is consistent from year to year. The araq flavor is excellent, but it is the texture that puts Kefraya over the top and into hte number one position.

2. Le Brun - Le Brun is the Lebanese standard. Brun began producing araq in Zahle in the 19th Century, and the current owners, the Issa family, continue the tradition. Like Kefraya, Brun araq is consistent and delicious. Brun is the perfect araq to accompany a meal. Brun araq accompanies dishes well, but will hardly provide a unique araq experience.

3. Touma - This inexpensive araq brand is the best quality for the cost. The bottles are ridiculously cheap. The content is watery and provides a bit of an aftertaste, but does the job, as long as one is looking for the right amount of alcohol to kill the bacteria in kibbeh nayyeh during a Sunday afternoon lunch.

There are plenty of other araq brands:

Pricier:
Ksarak
Massaya - the blue bottle
Rif - the traditional Lebanese/ baladi logo

Mid-range:
El Beit al Araq
As Samir
Fakra
Kouroum
Wardy
Chateau Khoury (I haven't tried it, but if it is as good as the wine, then it should be in the top three)

Inexpensive:
Gantous
Litani
Hasbani


What are your favorites?

Deals? Lebanon, America, and the Middle East

Lebanese have been talking about a deal between America, Iran, and Syria for years. From 2005-2007, this deal seemed unlikely.

2008, however, is the year in which quite a few Lebanese analysts believe some deal has "actually" occurred.

One professor at the American University of Beirut argues, "Look at the violence in Iraq. It has decreased tremendously. This could not happen without Syria and Iran taking action.

"Look at Israel's negotiations with Syria under Turkish eyes. America definitely knows about this, not just on the intel level, but on the diplomatic level. Something is happening."

Is there a deal? I have no idea. For a long time, I did not think it would even be possible. Now, however, there are military movements. What does it mean? Still, no idea, and yet what local politically connected analysts are saying is that the Tribunal matters less and less.

For quite a long time, many Sunni in Beirut were interested in toppling the Syrian regime. That language is gone. They seem to believe the regime in Damascus is here to stay, not because of an American deal, but because of a confluence of interests, much of which emanates from the Arabian Gulf.

Is it possible that the US is urging the Gulf States to take an easier line on Syria? Yes. Is it possible that the Turks and Israelis are involved in influencing the American position? Yes. Is this true? I have no idea.

My read:

1. After the Hezbollah campaign in Beirut in May 2008, it seems that the Europeans are willing to placate the Iranians and Hezbollah. The EU was never aggressive in the first place, and now seem far more willing to normalize relations.

2. It is regularly mentioned that the Israeli government is weak, and Prime Minister Olmert is looking for minor gains. He has Ehud Barak's example to follow. Olmert might be perceived as a failure now, but if he can craft some sort of deal, his political life could last long after this term as Prime Minister.

3. The Saudi government realizes that its efforts at international diplomacy have only brought disgrace to the King in situations where he has put his credibility on the line, ie the Mecca Agreement and support for Hariri and the Siniora government. Iran/Syria have checked him at each advance.

4. President Bush's term is coming to an end, and it is more important to justify and guarantee a free and stable Iraq than it is to crush other American enemies.

5. From what I hear from Europeans, there is an international belief that the Middle East conflict can be contained at the moment, given the price of oil. The US, Europe, India, and China have an interest in preventing a Mideast cataclysm, and Iran and Russia perhaps believe that their currently profitable interests would be hurt if there is any more instability.

I have no idea, but what I hear indicates that the US, and especially Europe, are taking a much less aggressive stance when it comes to Mideast politics. And "deal" rumors are spoken about in Beirut as if it verified fact...

Physician Elections

I have seen no press coverage regarding the League of Physicians elections. Then again, I haven't really been looking.

Over the past two weeks, I've received myriad text messages:

"Dear Dr., for the election on July 6, don't forget your LOP card or ID, Tazkara, Ikhraj Kaid less than 1 year, or passport. These are the only ID paper [sic] accepted." - 30 June 2008

"Dear Dr., the Lebanese Order of Physicians is pleased to grant you for the coming 2 weeks a free Dr.s platinum Mastercard with free benefits." - 1 July 2008

"Dear Doctor, You are the voice of wisdom, of pride. You are Lebanon best [sic]. Lebanon will appreciate to hear your voice Sunday for our brothers the doctors candidates of 14th of March. Confirm your choice for the best Sunday 7th until 13:00. Make the difference. God bless you. The friends of 14th of March." - Signed Doctors14th 3 July 2008

I accidentally deleted the first half of this message, but here is the second half:
"Make the difference. Please vote, Lebanon needs you. We need you [sic] vote for the candidates of 14th of March. God bless you. The friends of 14th of March." - 6 July 2008

"Get a USD 5,000 loan from BLC Bank and repay only USD 135 a month." - 7 July 2008

On the day of the election, I received a personal call from one of the candidates.

He was surprised and angered to hear that I had no intention of voting. I do not believe that syndicates and professional associations should be governed by the usual Lebanese political refrains. This might anger many of you readers. One (more specifically, you) may argue that Lebanese politics is such that these minor elections make politically significant something that should remain parochial; therefore, by your logic, I should manifest my political beliefs in a professional situation.

Unfortunately, I do not believe in politicizing healthcare. Labor unions throughout the world are political, but in Lebanon their politics have little to do with bettering the conditions of their constituents (doctors, construction workers, hotel and services workers, plumbers, etc.), and more to do with making a political statement for a particular political faction.

Don't forget, Hezbollah invaded Beirut under the pretext of a labor strike to raise the minimum wage.

Still No Peace in Lebanon

Apologies for not blogging over the past few weeks. After the conflict, I needed a break.

As predicted, the Doha Agreement merely ended the chaos in Beirut, elected President Michel Sleiman, and provided tourists and Lebanese abroad with the semblance of stability.

Violence continues to break out across Lebanon. Tripoli is the most recent site of full-scale sectarian, political violence.

Violence rages in Palestinians camps. As usual, the Lebanese media inflates rumors and scares the Lebanese population into believing the next Nahr al Bared is upon us.

Sectarianism is the highest I have ever seen it. Many older residents of Beirut believe the discord between Lebanese sects is the greatest they have ever seen in their lifetimes. Of course, the Lebanese media continues to fan sectarian flames.

For a time after Doha, it seemed that Hezbollah and Amal would make sure that a new Lebanese government would come together quickly. However, they have since decided that the most politically expedient action for them is to allow MP Michel Aoun to block any government formation. This accomplishes two things:

1) Prime Minister-designate Fouad Siniora and the March 14 Coalition is undermined and once again their political power is in the balance.

2) President Michel Sleiman is being undermined and shown that he better not make any decisions the opposition dislikes. Right now, the opposition is testing to see if Sleiman will bend/break when pressured. Fortunately for Sleiman, he has powerful allies in March 14. Unfortunate for Sleiman, his main ally and the chief architect of his election, Michel el-Murr, is being targeted by Hezbollah, Amal, and Michel Aoun for his March 14 biases, and for his political break with Aoun's political bloc.

Once again, the opposition shifts the debate time and again away from compromise. When March 14 leaders concede a point to the opposition, they instantly demand something else. Take for instance this effort to try and tie the formation of the new government to negotiations over the electoral law, negotiations which will be trying and drawn out.

The Icing on the Cake

Hezbollah now contends that it has no interest in ever giving up its weapons, regardless of a return of all Lebanese prisoners in Israel and Israel conceding to the Syrian invented claim that the Shebaa Farms are Lebanese.

Even worse, Hezbollah is preventing full, peaceful negotiations with Israel over myriad issues, even though both Hezbollah and Syria are negotiating with the Israelis right now.

Negotiations with Israel over the southern border are extremely important. Areas like the Shebaa Farms and the village of al-Ghajar are neither completely Lebanese or Syrian territory. As the late Syrian President Hafez al Assad noted, the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Golan was never defined. Al-Ghajar, literally, lies on both sides of the border. Technically, part of the village is Lebanese, but the residents are primarily Allawi and publicly announce that they consider themselves Syrian.

Syria is currently negotiating over the Golan, which is most likely why they refuse to sign any legal documents to support their claim that the Shebaa Farms are Lebanese. This is also why Syria's Lebanese allies refuse to allow direct negotiations between Lebanon and Syria. Syria wants to be in charge of all negotiations, and a settlement between Lebanon and Israel removes more than one of Syria's negotiating cards.

Just as Syria refuses to demarcate the eastern border between Lebanon and Syria, if the Golan is returned to them, they will most likely use that territory to their advantage.

Syria wants to make sure that there will be no peace between Lebanon and Israel before Syria is able to extract everything they want out of the Israelis, and probably also extract everything they want out of the international community (which definitely includes diminishing Lebanese sovereignty in favor of Syrian hegemony).

UEFA Cup and Beirut Politics

The Italians wore blue. The Dutch wore Orange. The referees wore yellow.

But what some viewers of the UEFA Cup in Beirut saw on Monday 9 June was Lebanese politics.

"Ahhh, the Aounniye are beating Mustaqbal," said one observer noting that the Dutch team, wearing the colors of Lebanese Christian opposition figure Michel Aoun, scored two goals in the first half while the Italians scored none, despite wearing blue uniforms, the color of Saad al Hariri's Future (Mustaqbal) Movement.

Another woman responded, "What do you expect when Hezbollah sets the rules." Hezbollah's color is yellow, and the party has a "Memorandum of Understanding" with Michel Aoun.

The current fury over football reminds locals that sport is as much of a Lebanese passion as politics. Beirut's downtown came alive in 2004 when the Greeks won the European football competition. In June 2006 Beirut's streets turned to utter chaos with World Cup fever.

One longtime Beirut residing Dutch observer walking through Beirut's downtown noted, "It's as if everything that happened between the end of the World Cup 2006 and the UEFA Cup 2008 did not take place. It's as if nothing happened."

For all the revelry surrounding President Sleiman's election and the first conflict free summer, there are still violent acts occuring throughout Lebanon. Sunday night, a battle was fought between Hezbollah supporters and Future supporters in the Bekaa. A skirmish also took place in the Chouf mountains between rival Druze factions.

The security situation has not improved. The Palestinian camps are entirely unregulated, and strange stories routinely crop up about unknown individuals living in the camps becoming involved in violent activities.

Aoun Blocking Cabinet Formation: His Last Stand?

According to members of the Amal Movement, Michel Aoun is needlessly blocking the creation of a new Lebanese cabinet. Amal officially denied these claims today, but party activists claim what they told me yesterday is true.

Christian opposition leader Michel Aoun intentionally requested particular ministries in Prime Minister Siniora's government to block the formation of the cabinet. Aoun has long been interested in the Justice Ministry, so it was immediately suspicious to Siniora's staff and Future Movement members that Aoun requested the ministries of Finance, Public Works, Health, Labor, and one other (possibly agriculture?).

These ministries are the few that have publicly been spoken for. Current Finance Minister Jihad Azour strongly requested that he continue in the job. He's done a phenomenal job, and Siniora and Amal thought that there is no reason he should not continue. Tripoli MP Muhammad Safadi has made it known that he is interested in the Public Works ministry, which he presided over in the previous government. The most skilled and reputable Amal minister in the previous government Khalifeh, presided over the Ministry of Health and Amal publicly made it know that the party wants him to continue the excellent job he did previously. The Ministry of Labor always goes to an extreme pro-Syrian figure.

According to Future and Amal members, Aoun is disingenuously engaging in the formation of the cabinet. He had no interest in electing Michel Sleiman president. He did not want Siniora to return as prime minister, and he knows that his political party and support will forever be transformed if the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) takes part in the government.

According to Amal sources, Aoun is doing this because he is taking orders from Syria, which is furious that it no longer has a stranglehold on Lebanon. My take is different:

First, Aoun is the sole leader of the FPM. According to the press, the FPM is divided between followers of Aoun and idealistic Christian technocrats who do not like the direction sectarian, feudal Lebanon is headed. Recently, party divisions came to light during the FPM internal elections, which were postponed.

Second, the FPM is not alloted 5 ministries in the next government. Hezbollah originally insinuated that it would give Aoun its share of seats in the next government, but then reversed their decision.

Had Aoun been elected president, he would have had tremendous power. He could have solidified his domination over the FPM and begun digging further into the support bases of other Christian leaders. He would have been able to appoint all of the members of his family and inner circle to well-paying positions (ministries, advisers, generals, ambassadors), but also have plenty of room to provide positions to supporters from the other side of the party.

Now, Aoun's choices are limited. He was not allocated enough ministries to do what he wants to do, which is:

a) appoint his relatives, like Gebran Bassil, as ministers;

b) appoint two opposing FPM leaders from the non-inner circle camp to ministries and bait them to feud with one another, thus maintaining Aoun's position as undeniable party leader, moderator of internal party conflicts, and also preventing any other FPM leader from using his ministry/power base to begin rising in the party and becoming a leader in his own right;

c) appoint non-Christian ministers to advance Aoun's secular, non-sectarian credentials;

d) minimize the influence of Hariri, Siniora, Jumblatt, Geagea, and Gemayel and steal press time away from, while also coming closer to dictating the terms of the new cabinet;

e) to further expand Aoun's and the FPM's base throughout all of Lebanon, including all sects and regions. If Aoun could do this, he would simultaneous become i) the only truly national Lebanese leader, thus the most powerful politician in Lebanon, ii) the undeniable Christian leader, including in Koura and Zahle which are still ruled by allies, iii) the unopposed leader of the FPM, iv) in a position to challenge the constitutionality of Sleiman's election and call for a new election, v) fully advance his own agenda, and become the savior of Lebanon.

It's a nice dream. However, there is no room to compromise in Aoun's vision. He wants power to implement his dream. FPMers defend Aoun because they believe in his dream. March 14ers cannot get beyond Aoun's tactics, and for obvious reasons like intentionally blocking the formation of a new cabinet, undermining negotiations, destroying opportunities for compromise and unity, and not requesting what he really wants, all while claiming moral superiority.

In the cabinet negotiations, Aoun probably doesn't have much of a plan. His advisers are probably competing amongst themselves.

Aoun cannot honestly negotiate, because specific ministries are not what he wants. He wants it all, and asking for ministries others have already spoken for is only a stalling device. He doesn't really want the ministries of Finance, Justice, or Foreign Affairs. What use to him are ministries like Labor, Agriculture, Environment, and Youth & Sports, if every March 14 journalist in Lebanon is waiting to catch the FPM in instances of government graft. His cabinet seats won't even be enough to delay a vote, let alone block anything. He will become just like everyone else.

The Amal people claim Aoun is targeting Future for obvious reasons, but also targeting them because Aoun is angry about the Doha negotiations in which Amal leader and Parliamentary Speaker Nabih al-Berri forced Aoun's hand, and allegedly disrespected the FPM leader. Berri emerged as the leader of Lebanon after the Doha round to a greater extent even than Hezbollah.

Aoun has been parochialized. He no longer has the support powerful Metn MP Michel el-Murr, and is watching President Sleiman steal away Aoun's multi-sectarian support in the military, in Jbeil, and in the Christian community at large. During the next parliamentary elections under the new electoral law, Aoun will undoubtedly lose seats to the local leaders he empowered in 2005, like Murr, Skaff, and Franjieh, lose blocs who supported him in 2005 like Nemattallah Abi Nasr's bloc in Kesrouwan, lose the entire kada of Jbeil to President Sleiman, and watch former loyalists peel off and join with more powerful camps.

Not only this, but Aoun is too old and too senile to envision many more years of dominant power and clout. The FPM cabinet ministers will form their own bases of support separate from Aoun. The TV cameras will flock to them before making the trek to Rabieh. Aoun's own OTV is failing so miserably that it might not be on the air for long if it continues in the same way, and if it changes, Aoun probably won't have nearly as much influence over it.

Aoun thinks of himself too highly to take a minor position like that of a minister. He was commander of the Army, for crying out loud! He has more support than Amine Gemayel or Michel Murr. Gebran Bassil should be his Pierre Gemayel or Elias Murr, while he gives commands from above and accepts visits from ambassadors and foreign dignitaries.

This is a last minute effort to appear powerful and influential, but no one is playing Aoun's games any more. Amal and Hezbollah used Aoun when they needed a Christian spokesman and Christian cover to do Syria's bidding. Now, they no longer need him and are just as irritated at his antics as March 14 figures have been for years.

Aoun has a dream, but he has no idea about how to get there. In the meantime, he is creating nightmares for his countrymen, but he might not even be able to do this for long.

A Modest Proposal: Bringing Question Time to Lebanon

Nearly all parties in Lebanon claim that their opponents are irresponsible, unjust, and stifle the ability of hardworking politicians to make Lebanon a better place. This happens in every democratic political system. However, unlike in other countries, Lebanese citizens only hear rhetoric without the accompanying evidence.

A great way to prove to the Lebanese people that the Lebanese government is working on their behalf would be to institute the parliamentary mechanism of Question Time.

In Lebanon, unlike in Britain, the government is made up of disparate political factions who use the media, not the parliament, to air grievances. Sadly, this has little effect on governing, but incites violence, sectarian anger, and trepidation in the Lebanese population. The politicians continue to operate as normal, while the Lebanese population changes their personal behaviors, friendships, and economic choices.

To make the Lebanese government more transparent and appear as if it is working on behalf of the electorate, parliamentarians should air their grievances to the prime minister and his cabinet publicly.

Finance Minister Jihad Azour does a phenomenal job. His ministry is the most transparent and is persuading other ministries to follow the same path. Yet, most Lebanese citizens believe that the Finance Ministry is troubled, steals money, and fails to work in the interests of Lebanese citizens. Opponents of Azour nominate buffoons to serve in the post Azour commands brilliantly. Question time will give the public the opportunity to hear Azour’s opponents attack him, and allow Azour to explain that he is doing an excellent job.

Ministers improperly executing their jobs will most likely be motivated to take a more active role in daily ministerial operations. Individuals unqualified to lead a cabinet post might be dissuaded from hubristically demanding a highly complex and important portfolio.

Hopefully, technocrats of all sects and stripes would be the beneficiaries of this mechanism.