The Skeptics

Those pesky Iranians are at it again:

Iran confirmed on Tuesday it was helping with the reconstruction of Afghanistan, even though it had originally denied reports it had given "bags of money" to its war-devastated neighbor.

On Monday, Afghan President Hamid Karzai said the country had received money from several "friendly countries" and specifically named the United States and Washington's diplomatic adversary, Iran, describing the money as a "transparent" form of aid.

Karzai said his office received sums up to 500,000-700,000 euros ($360,000-$975,000) once or twice a year from Iran and that he would continue to ask for Iranian money.

This is déjà vu. Of course, much like the last time, my grouse is with American, not with Iranian, involvement in the region. Why?

Well, Iran is right next to Afghanistan. So it strikes me as absurd that if the United States claims to have interests in Afghanistan—a faraway country on the other side of world—that Iran, which lies adjacent to Afghanistan, would not have interests there, too.

But the bipartisan consensus in Washington is that only America gets to exert its political influence over strategically peripheral regions of the world.

Aside from simple geography there are historical factors at play too. After the United States helped fund the rise of modern Islamic fundamentalism in the 1980s during the anti-Soviet jihad, countries in the Middle East, as well as South and Central Asia, were left to clean up the mess. Given this track record of America swooping in, creating turmoil, and rapidly extracting its forces, why wouldn’t Iran want to pursue its own interests in Afghanistan, even with U.S. forces there? Iran, Pakistan, India, et cetera, all vividly remember being stuck holding the bag; thus, these countries have little incentive to wait on the sidelines until U.S. forces withdraw.

In the context of recent history, it seems that Iran is greasing the wheels with Karzai simply to hedge its bets. (There are unconfirmed reports that Iran is also providing limited assistance to the Taliban.) But it has long been an open secret that Iran has given foreign aid to Afghanistan’s Hazara and Tajik populations; I can attest to Iranian assistance to Herat province in particular.

Given all of this, it appears that the regional “Great Game” (a cliché but it works well nonetheless) is certainly afoot. Countries in the region are intensifying their scramble for influence among other competing regional powers. Of course, peace and prosperity in Afghanistan would be to the benefit of all surrounding states. However, one country's perception of a threat is not always shared with other states, and this cuts against the notion of a common “peace.”

In the end, mitigating Iranian threats to U.S. interests in Afghanistan assumes that we should be there in the first place. We should not.

Mexico’s ambassador to the United States, Arturo Sarukhan, is as sensitive as his boss, President Felipe Calderon, about suggestions that Mexico might be in danger of becoming a failed state. Responding to my op-ed in USA Today documenting how drug cartels have intimidated and often silenced the Mexican press, Sarukhan vehemently denied that Mexico even faintly resembled a failed state. Indeed, he scoffed at the notion that his country faced an organized insurgency—although Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had invoked that very term during her speech to the Council on Foreign Relations.

Ambassador Sarukhan’s principal piece of evidence to rebut the failed state notion was Mexico’s successful bond issue earlier this month. “A failed state,” he argued, “could never have issued an oversubscribed 100-year maturity bond in the international financial markets as Mexico did.”

But that is a rather weak argument. Investors make ill-advised decisions all the time. Just consider the number of supposedly sophisticated types who bought bonds (or stocks) in such enterprises as Enron, WorldCom, Bear Stearns, or Countrywide Financial. Indeed, international investors were enthusiastically purchasing bonds from the Greek government just months before the onset of the budgetary crisis that engulfed Athens. Their judgment about the health of the Mexican state could be equally faulty.

Even if Mexico can avoid becoming a failed state—and odds are still against such a dire scenario—it faces a much greater danger of becoming a country in which the drug cartels are the de facto power in major areas. Indeed, that is already happening to portions of northern Mexico. Ambassador Sarukhan and President Calderon are merely whistling past the graveyard when they minimize the significance of the turmoil that has taken more than 28,000 lives in less than four years.

North Korea is a nuclear power. The United States should get used to it.

Nonproliferation is a sensible objective. But Washington’s drive to prevent the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons is dead. The North will remain a nuclear power irrespective of who ends up on top in the ongoing transition of power in Pyongyang.

Not that the Obama administration wants to acknowledge reality. Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, recently opined: “We need to see a very clear signal that this new leadership—or some structure in North Korea—accepts the very clear commitments that North Korea made in 2005 to denuclearization.”

There’s little reason to believe those commitments were ever sincere. Nuclear weapons offer the Kim regime obvious advantages: deterrence against a much stronger South Korea backed by Washington, status for an impoverished and otherwise unimportant country, and opportunities for extortion from its neighbors and the United States. There’s likely a domestic reason as well. How better to run a “military first” policy than to give the armed services the ultimate weapon?

Whether Kim was ever willing to trade away his nuclear program may never be known. But it’s doubtful that he now envisions a nuclear-free future. Maybe he’s prepared to yield up future production. But he has given no indication that he is willing to turn over his existing arsenal.

Indeed, North Korean officials have ostentatiously claimed the status of a nuclear power. The regime equally ostentatiously left the so-called six-party talks, supposedly permanently.

These could be negotiating tactics, of course, but the regime appears to have restarted construction activity at the Yongbyon nuclear site, where in 2008 it demolished an old reactor’s cooling tower. Perhaps the North is simply attempting to frighten the West. But Seoul is concerned. Kim Tae-hyo, the South Korean deputy national security adviser, said: “We have judged that North Korea is currently operating all its nuclear programs, including highly enriched uranium processing and the nuclear facility in Yongbyon.”

Christopher Hill, the Bush administration’s chief negotiator with the North, also is pessimistic. “I think it’s very clear at this point that it is a more difficult proposition than ever before,” he said. “They have continued to work on their systems for delivering nuclear weapons.”

The North’s recent policy toward the South has been unreservedly hostile. Last March the DPRK sank a South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, killing forty-six sailors. Pyongyang has dismissed all South Korean attempts to win an acknowledgement or apology for the sinking. At the recent Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Congress three officers thought to be involved in the attack were promoted.

Unfortunately, the situation is only likely to worsen as “Dear Leader” Kim Jong Il attempts to pass power on to his son, Kim Jong-un. The process may not be smooth.

“Great Leader” Kim Il Sung spent more than two decades moving his son, Kim Jong Il, into positions of influence. The latter held important party roles before he was unveiled at the 1980 KWP Congress. He then had another fourteen years to strengthen his position before his father’s death.

In contrast, Kim Jong Il only began rushing Kim Jong-un into position as heir apparent after the former’s stroke in August 2008. The latter has been promoted to a four-star general, member of the KWP Central Committee, and vice chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission. Earlier he was given a mid-level position with the National Defense Commission (NDC), the most powerful organ of state power. And for the first time the man known in the North Korean press as the “Brilliant Comrade,” “Young Captain,” “Young General” and “Our Commander” has appeared in public, and near his father.

Some hope that the younger Kim might prove to be a reformer—he reportedly speaks English and French, attended school briefly in Switzerland and was addicted to American basketball. However, former-KGB head Yuri Andropov proved to be a hard-line Soviet Communist Party general-secretary despite supposedly loving jazz, poetry and whiskey.

Moreover, Kim Jong-un has been blamed for last fall’s currency “reform,” which destroyed most of what passed for a middle class. He also has been tagged—a claim obviously impossible to verify—as responsible for cyberattacks on South Korea last year and even the sinking of the Cheonan.

However, it could get a little crowded near the top. Kim Jong Il also made his sister Kim Kyung-hui a four-star general and member of the Party’s Politburo. Her husband, Chang Sung-taek, seen as the regime number two, earlier was made vice chairman of the NDC and an alternate member of the Politburo. A previously obscure vice marshal, Ri Yong-ho, also was promoted to full membership on the Politburo; he won some other offices and sat between Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong-un in an official photo. Kim Jong Il’s current wife/consort and daughter also made the photo, though not as close to the Dear Leader.

The common presumption is that the first three, at least, are tasked with shepherding Kim Jong-un towards ultimate power. However, all may have ambitions of their own. There also are other potential claimants—an older brother criticized as effeminate by his father and an even-older half-brother living in disgraced-but-luxurious exile in Macau. Plus numerous party and military officials who have been waiting for years for their turn at the top.

Indeed, there are indications that a brutal power struggle already may be underway. Chang is said to be unpopular and at odds with some top generals. Earlier this year, two high officials suffered suspicious deaths—supposedly in a car accident and of a heart attack. Rumors of Kim Kyung-hui’s involvement have circulated. Another official allegedly retired for reasons of age in a system dominated by the aged. (The Dear Leader himself is 69, and his father was in control until his death at 82.)

Some more moderate officials also were promoted at the recent Party conference, but none appears to have significant political influence. There is no evidence of either glasnost or perestroika.

Moreover, an uncertain political environment discourages any serious effort at accommodation with the West, and especially serious negotiation over nonproliferation. A weakened Dear Leader dependent on military support is not well positioned to abandon his aggressive policies, let alone sacrifice the nuclear weapons developed at enormous expense. No one struggling for power after his demise is likely to stand against the military.

Thus, the best hope in the next several years likely is the status quo. The DPRK has invited U.S. officials to visit and even intimated that it is prepared to restart the six---party talks. These or other negotiations may not hurt, but they are unlikely to provide any discernible benefit. An alternative approach is needed.

Christian Whiton of D.C. International Advisory advocates “political warfare” against Pyongyang. However, the United States has virtually no arrows in its quiver. Given Seoul’s vulnerability to North Korean attack, military strikes are a nonstarter. More and more intensive sanctions will have little effect on the already isolated North absent meaningful Chinese support. Most everything else would be the equivalent of Uncle Sam huffing and puffing and holding his breaths till he turns blue.

Washington could redouble its efforts to enlist the DPRK’s neighbors in one stratagem or another. However, none are inclined to be particularly helpful.

South Korea’s policy has ranged from isolation of to engagement with the North, including generous subsidies, while relying on America for its defense. Even after the sinking of the Cheonan, Seoul refused to close the Kaesong industrial park, which provides Pyongyang with substantial hard currency.

Japan has subordinated policy toward the North to resolving the status of Japanese citizens kidnapped by Pyongyang’s agents in past years. Doing so has satisfied public demands but effectively sidelined Tokyo as a diplomatic player. The continuing turnover in prime ministers and cabinets has further marginalized Tokyo.

Malign has been the behavior of an ever more assertive Beijing. Despite U.S. efforts to enlist the People’s Republic of China’s help in moderating the Kim regime’s behavior, the PRC has remained aloof, even after the attack on the Cheonan. Beijing obviously believes that stability matters more than anything else. Indeed, China has been expanding investment in the North. The result has been to strengthen Pyongyang and discourage reform.

Nothing is likely to change in the near future. Washington should step back and drop the issue in the laps of the North’s neighbors.

Looking at a map demonstrates who has the most reason to be concerned about the DPRK. The only Americans within easy reach of Pyongyang’s arms are those stationed in South Korea. Given the ROK’s manifold advantages over North Korea, an American military garrison is unnecessary. The troops should come home.

Then America should adopt a policy of benign neglect towards the North. Let Seoul engage in frenetic attempts to bring someone in Pyongyang to the negotiating table. Let Japan fixate on decades-old wrongs committed against its citizens. Let China bear the risk of implosion, war or nuclear proliferation.

In particular, Washington should point out to Beijing that North Korea remains a potential national powder keg, with a rushed power transfer in the midst of a continuing economic crisis. Moreover, a regime willing to risk war by sinking a South Korean vessel may be tempted to escalate and perhaps miscalculate in the future. Only the South’s pusillanimous response avoided a potentially violent confrontation this time.

Moreover, Washington should indicate to Beijing that the United States does not intend to allow nonproliferation policy to have the same effect as gun control in America—ensuring that only the bad guys are armed. Should the North continue with its nuclear program, America would reconsider its opposition to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Korea and Japan. Proliferation in Northeast Asia might be a nightmare, but if so, it will be a nightmare shared by all, including the PRC.

Then the United States should turn its attention elsewhere.

Washington’s policy towards the DPRK has failed. Whether nonproliferation ever had a chance of success in Northeast Asia is unclear. But North Korea is a nuclear power and is unlikely to voluntarily surrender that status.

Rather than continue a fruitless campaign to denuclearize the North, the United States should hand off the problem to those nations with the most at stake in a peaceful and stable North Korea. Someone else should take the lead in resolving Northeast Asia’s problems.

The Obama administration has explicitly sought to “reset” the relationship with Russia, which had become quite dysfunctional during the final years of the Bush administration. Although Washington has not used the reset terminology with respect to the troubled U.S. relationship with China, the substantive goal appears to be similar. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ effort to restore the dialogue between the militaries of the two countries is one indication of that intent.

Both goals, however, are encountering headwinds for a key reason. Policy makers seem unwilling to accept the reality that any great power in the international system expects, and will seek to enforce, a sphere of influence in its immediate region. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice famously (or infamously) insisted that the concept of a sphere of influence was both obsolete and pernicious. But that viewpoint is dangerously erroneous. The tensions between the United States and Russia and those between the United States and China confirm that point.

The latest, clumsy provocation is Moscow’s agreement to help Venezuela build a nuclear-power plant. Predictably, that move has caused hawks in the United States to thunder about perfidious Russian contempt for the Monroe Doctrine. There is more than a little hypocrisy in that outrage, since many of those same hawks successfully lobbied for adding the Baltic republics to NATO and now advocate deploying ballistic missile defenses in Eastern Europe and offering NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia—as though Russia has no justifiable reason to object to such moves in its geopolitical back yard.

Like the proverbial broken clock that is right twice a day, however, the hawks are correct with respect to the Russian-Venezuelan nuclear deal. The United States has an important interest at stake in making sure that Latin America, currently a nuclear-weapons-free zone, stays free of nuclear weapons. Moscow’s willingness to help Hugo Chavez, the Crazy Eddie of the Western Hemisphere, acquire nuclear capabilities—even if they are ostensibly for peaceful power-generation purposes—is an unfriendly act in our geopolitical back yard.

Both sides need to back off. Russia needs to find a graceful way out of its increasingly cozy relationship with Chavez, and the United States needs to stop talking about deploying missile defenses or expanding NATO eastward. Washington and Moscow must acknowledge that the concept of spheres of influence is alive and well, and that gratuitous violations of that concept will negate any prospect for a reset in relations.

U.S. leaders must also comprehend that cordial relations with China require a willingness to accept that East Asia’s rapidly rising great power will seek to establish a sphere of influence in its neighborhood. Beijing’s expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea and the recent spat with Japan over disputed islets in another body of water are signs of that process. China’s growing power and assertiveness means that the United States will need to tread softly regarding such territorial disputes, as well as the even more sensitive Taiwan issue, if Washington wants to avoid nasty confrontations with Beijing.

Condoleezza Rice could not have been more wrong. Whether we like it or not, spheres of influence will be a crucial feature of international politics—and especially of great power relations—in the twenty-first century. It is imperative that U.S. policy makers understand and adjust to that reality.