There's a
surprisingly detailed piece in the Times today about efforts in Iraq and the U.S. to marginalize the political influence of radical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, the kind of in-depth political analysis that rarely makes it to mainstream reporting. The man who Newsweek recently dubbed "the most dangerous man in Iraq" has a militia of approximately 60,000 and a devoted following in the millions, as well as the single largest Shia bloc in Parliament. On the one hand, he is extremely fundamentalist (Sharia law, allegedly a "twelver", etc.) and vehemently anti-American; on the other, he is committed to a unified Iraqi state, opposes the proposed southern Shia super-province (which would likely hasten a tripartite split and infuriate Sunnis), and, for a Shia cleric, has decent ties to Sunni leaders.
The report indicates that a loose coalition of Shia, Sunni, and Kurd political parties may try to mitigate his influence by forming a coalition, either within or outside the Parliament. Apparently the U.S. is pushing it as well. This would reportedly include SCIRI, the Shia party that controls the other significant Shia militia (the Badr Corps) and is led by Hakim, who recently met with President Bush; both major Kurdish parties; and the most influential Sunni party. The fact that these groups are even talking about such an alliance to counter Sadr gives you an idea of his power, but I would think such a coalition would be fraught with difficulty.
Any anti-Sadr movement hinges upon the strong participation of SCIRI, as they're the only (non-Kurdish) group with a militia. The Badr Corps are trained by Iran, fairly competent, and, though widely believed to be involved in sectarian violence, under a relatively strict command and control system (unlike Sadr's Mahdi Army, much of which may or may not ultimately carry out the orders of Sadr and his lieutenants). But SCIRI still has, I think, more priorities in common with Sadrists than the Kurds and Sunnis -- the Sunnis violently oppose the southern Shia super-province favored by Hakim, for example, and it's hard to imagine the Kurds putting themselves on the line to get in the middle of an intra-Shia battle far away from the relative peace of Kurdistan in the north.
Except . . . except if these parties really do see Sadr as an existential threat to the future of the state, which I suppose is possible. It's interesting that a SCIRI-led alliance would ask Prime Minister Maliki to join, as they reportedly have, since SCIRI was deeply unhappy with his selection over SCIRI's Abd al-Mahdi (in the article "Adel Abdul Mehdi"). It was Sadr's support that won the contest for Maliki over al-Mahdi, but the Sadr-Maliki relationship has recently shown signs of strain.
This it the kind of "grand bargain" or "national unity government" that the U.S. tried to impose last year following Iraq's elections, and despite significant hype, that obviously failed miserably. With the motivation of countering an increasing malignant political and military power, there may now be more motivation to have cross-sectarian agreements. Based on the fact that the U.S. seems to be pushing it, this may be for domestic consumption as much as actual Iraqi effect, but I'm very curious to see if it continues to develop.
None of which addresses the fact, of course, that every several months the U.S. finds a new person to blame for the situation in Iraq. It was Jaafari, then it was Sadr, then Maliki . . . at one point is was -- wait for it -- those dastardly Iranian-trained SCIRI crazies who want to implement total de-Ba'athification and carve out a Shia state in the south. Now they're the good Shia. And round and round it goes.
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