The White House's Credibility Gap on Afghanistan Deepens Posted by Michael Cohen

I've been watching State of the Union speech for for probably 30 years and I've yet to hear a memorable one - and tonight will not break that streak.

What a snoozer. Although frankly from a political perspective I thought it was actually pretty effective - makes Obama look like the adult-in-chief who is willing to work across the aisle with Republicans. But from a policy perspective there was very little of interest and it took all my energy to stop playing online scrabble . . . and in the end, scrabble won.

But then there was the foreign policy section, which actually wasn't boring . . . but instead blood-boiling:

We have also taken the fight to al Qaeda and their allies abroad. In Afghanistan, our troops have taken Taliban strongholds and trained Afghan Security Forces. Our purpose is clear – by preventing the Taliban from reestablishing a stranglehold over the Afghan people, we will deny al Qaeda the safe-haven that served as a launching pad for 9/11.

Thanks to our heroic troops and civilians, fewer Afghans are under the control of the insurgency. There will be tough fighting ahead, and the Afghan government will need to deliver better governance. But we are strengthening the capacity of the Afghan people and building an enduring partnership with them. This year, we will work with nearly 50 countries to begin a transition to an Afghan lead. And this July, we will begin to bring our troops home.

I'm not sure how this could be any more misleading (or insulting with the obligatory 9/11 reference):

• Training of the Afghan security forces is not progressing well or did the President miss the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan testify this week that our efforts on this front are failing badly.
• Fewer Afghans might be under the control of the Taliban but far more Afghans live in provinces where security is deteriorating and in 2010 far more of them were killed in the war-fighting.
• Building an "enduring partnership" with the Afghan people; somehow I'm thinking the part where Hamid Karzai today lashed out at the international community "for fomenting a 'crisis' by pressing him to inaugurate parliament" is not what he had in mind.
• As for the notion that the Afghan government will deliver better governance . . the less said about that the better.

I'm a former speechwriter so I get that the President wants to offer American people a rosy view of the war - but nothing about how he described the situation in Afghanistan provides an accurate assessment of what is happening in Afghanistan. And there was no sense at all - beyond mere platitudes - of what troop withdrawals in Afghanistan will look like or under what conditions they will occur (just that they will happen, even likely in truncated form).

Two paragraphs of platitudes about a conflict being waged by 100,000 US troops is embarrassing and the lack of candor and public forthrightness from this White House about the war in Afghanistan should be downright scandalous. This Administration seems content to kick the can down the road and cede public diplomacy efforts to General Petraeus whose public pronouncements of progress are not even considered credible by other US officials.

There was once a time when I defended this president from the public pressure being placed on him by his military officers to escalate in Afganistan; but there is no defending him now - he seems tragically content to wallow in the same pool of generalities and misleading claims of progress about the war as they do.

*Oh and while I liked the section on Tunisia; the failure to mention anti-government demonstrators in Egypt kind of took the bloom off that rose.

Foreign Affairs Portion of the SOTU Posted by Jacob Stokes

The State of the Union Address has been leaked to the National Journal. Here's the foreign affairs portion. What do you think?

Text below:

Just as jobs and businesses can now race across borders, so can new threats and new challenges. No single wall separates East and West; no one rival superpower is aligned against us.

And so we must defeat determined enemies wherever they are, and build coalitions that cut across lines of region and race and religion. America’s moral example must always shine for all who yearn for freedom, justice, and dignity. And because we have begun this work, tonight we can say that American leadership has been renewed and America’s standing has been restored.

Look to Iraq, where nearly 100,000 of our brave men and women have left with their heads held high; where American combat patrols have ended; violence has come down; and a new government has been formed. This year, our civilians will forge a lasting partnership with the Iraqi people, while we finish the job of bringing our troops out of Iraq. America’s commitment has been kept; the Iraq War is coming to an end.

Of course, as we speak, al Qaeda and their affiliates continue to plan attacks against us.  Thanks to our intelligence and law enforcement professionals, we are disrupting plots and securing our cities and skies. And as extremists try to inspire acts of violence within our borders, we are responding with the strength of our communities, with respect for the rule of law, and with the conviction that American Muslims are a part of our American family.

What’s Next After the “Palestine Papers”? Posted by Jacob Stokes

Last September when I read Charlie Kupchan’s op-ed in the International Herald Tribune telling the Palestinians that they should “just say yes” and make grand diplomatic concessions in the hopes of jumpstarting the peace process in the Middle East, I didn’t necessarily like the conclusion, but I agreed with it. Kupchan wrote:

The Palestinian Authority should make Israel an offer it can’t refuse by leapfrogging the logjam and declaring publicly that it is prepared to accept the outlines of the deal that successive Israeli governments have put on the table.

To the end of securing its main objective — statehood — the Palestinian Authority should acquiesce to major Jewish settlements in the West Bank in a swap for territory in Israel; it should give up the right of return for most Palestinian refugees and instead secure monetary compensation; it should accept effective demilitarization of a Palestinian state in order to meet Israel’s security needs; and the Palestinian Authority should aim to locate its capital in Arab East Jerusalem.

Now, if the “Palestine Papers” released today by al Jazeera aren’t debunked as a fraud – as Palestinian leaders are now claiming in a frantic effort to backpedal – it appears as though Palestinian leaders had come to much the same conclusion as Kupchan, and years before. And unfortunately, both they and Kupchan were wrong: They recognized their relatively weak bargaining position, made grand gestures and got nothing for it.

What will the release of these papers mean? Matt Duss has a good first take. He writes that the papers “seriously challenge the theory that unquestioning U.S. support for Israel is necessary to give Israel the confidence to make concessions for peace”; that the papers “reveal the massive disparity in power between the two sides” (again, Kupchan); and that they will only serve to weaken an already embattled Palestinian leadership.

The Price Being Paid Posted by Michael Cohen

In recent weeks I've been trying quite unsuccessfully to write less about Afghanistan. The reason is simple; how many times can one keep making the same argument over and over again - without seeing any sort of change in strategy - before it becomes simply exhausting. For nearly two years I have been writing about the strategy underpinning the war in Afghanistan both here at Democracy Arsenal and elsewhere - sometimes cogently, other times not.

And I have to say it has been nothing but a constant and unceasing source of frustration as assumptions continue to go untested, mistakes are repeated, missions creep in the direction of further escalation, military and political leaders obfuscate and purposely seek to inflame the public, and platitudes have taken the place of anything resembling rigorous analysis. 

Sometimes when you focus so much energy on strategy and tactics the human toll is forgotten. Then I read stories like this one in the Los Angeles Times, which recounts the devastating impact of the war on just one Marine regiment, and I realize that voices must continually raised against the war in Afghanistan and the manner in which it is being prosecuted:

When the Marines of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, deployed to the Sangin district of Afghanistan's Helmand province in late September, the British soldiers who had preceded them warned the Americans that the Taliban would be waiting nearly everywhere for a chance to kill them.

But the Marines, ordered to be more aggressive than the British had been, quickly learned that the Taliban wasn't simply waiting. In Sangin, the Taliban was coming after them. In four years there, the British had lost more than 100 soldiers, about a third of all their nation's losses in the war.

In four months, 24 Marines with the Camp Pendleton-based Three-Five have been killed. More than 140 others have been wounded, some of them catastrophically, losing limbs and the futures they had imagined for themselves. The Marines' families have been left devastated, or dreading the knock on the door.

Please read the entire article. It packs an emotional wallop; but it also tells a story that needs to be re-told - about a war that is tangential to US interests; that is being poorly prosecuted by our military leaders; that has been sold by our political leaders as though it is in this nation's vital interests when it is anything but; and that is wreaking a terrible toll on both our fighting men and women in uniform and their families.

But above all, it is a reminder that this terrible and unnecessary war that is, in reality, doing very little to keep Americans safe is ruining too many young lives, both here and in Afghanistan.

Neocons Make the Sovereignty Argument for China Posted by Jacob Stokes

Nina Hachigian of the Center for American Progress explains how American neoconservatives undermine the argument that China needs to be a responsible global stakeholder:

At base, however, Washington and Beijing have divergent ideas about how a great power should conduct itself in the 21st century. In that battle of ideas, China gets support from an unlikely corner: American neoconservatives.

China ducks international responsibility by citing its sovereignty. Neoconservatives unwittingly support that view when they insist the U.S. compromises its own sovereignty if it engages fully with today’s international institutions and abides by international laws. This sends Beijing a dangerous message: Stewardship of the international order is not the business of a great power.

She goes on:

Yet some American neoconservatives find themselves on the side of China’s Communist leaders in this debate. Though they have tended to criticize the Obama administration for not being adequately tough on Beijing, their own ideal of national sovereignty supports China’s.

John Bolton, President George W. Bush’s U.N. ambassador, lays out a current conservative view in his book, “How Barack Obama Is Endangering Our National Sovereignty.” Bolton argues that those who advocate for the U.S. to engage with international organizations to address global problems are really saying we should “cede some of our sovereignty to institutions that other nations will also influence.”

“That,” Bolton warns, “is unquestionably a formula for reducing U.S. autonomy and reducing our control over the government.”

So while China invokes a 19th-century ideal of sovereignty to justify decisions that harm U.S. interests, some neoconservatives are championing the same antiquated notions — legitimizing China’s rejection of international standards and rules.

In other words, unless America chooses to engage with and participate in international institutions and global governance, forefeiting a small amount of sovereignty and putting up with the frustrations inherent in multilateral diplomacy, there’s very little chance China will play by the rules either – and that will mean more than just little frustrations.

Is the Fuel Swap Back? Again? Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

Could it be?  Is the Zombie fuel deal back?

With the P5 + 1 talks kicking off tomorrow in Istanbul, rumors of a revived fuel swap are surfacing.  Again. 

Iran has denied claims that it intends to propose new terms for a fuel swap and the U.S. is saying that it’s open to the idea but not sure it wants to be the one to bring it up. It’s hard to remember, but despite all of the hype, the original Tehran Research Reactor deal was never intended to solve the Iranian nuclear question.  It was however, supposed to serve as a confidence building measure.  A big baby step of sorts.  If the reports are true and parties are once again considering a fuel swap, it’s possible that this time around there could be some progress on the enrichment debate. Or at least the appearance of progress. 

In December, Hillary Clinton confirmed that Iran is "entitled to the peaceful use of civil nuclear energy," if and when Iran can demonstrate that that it is complying with its international obligations. A few Iran hawks on the Hill decided they didn't agree with this and announced instead that they preferred to "continue ratcheting up" the pressure on Iran, which for the record, is ridiculous. 

The U.S. and its partners have the right to demand that Iran temporarily halt its enrichment, but Iran’s hardliners can be counted on to torpedo any agreement that advertises such a requirement.  The original TRR deal went south after Western diplomats publicly congratulated themselves for pulling a fast one on Iran and Ahmadinejad ran into trouble at home. It's hard for some to remember, but even Ahmadinejad has a base.

"China as Behemoth" Has a Military Edge Posted by Jacob Stokes

Dan Drezner has a good roundup pushing back on Forbes magazine’s random and stupid article contending that Chinese President Hu Jintao is the most powerful man in the world. (Harry Reid also made a similar mistake, calling Hu a “dictator”.) Drezner tags the “Hu as powerful dictator” line as part of bigger “China as rising hegemon” meme. I’m not sure I agree with Drezner’s argument that the scope of Hu’s power is the argument that those who want to rebut the “China as hegemon” crowd need to target.

It seems to me the more pernicious line is that China’s military is out of control. That argument contends that no matter how peaceful China’s civilian leaders seem, the military’s continual modernization and technological progress shows China’s desire to challenge American power the world over (forget the fact that the American military is still vastly superior and no one should be surprised by a rising country modernizing its military). And even if China's civilian leaders wanted to stop them, they couldn't. FPI has trumpeted this line, as does Max Boot.

That line is convenient because it hedges (and everyone knows China fear-mongerers love hedging!) against any softening of the line coming from the civilian leadership. If the line softens – and I’m not saying it will necessarily, but it could -- it’s harder to trump up China as an enemy and make the case for increased defense spending to ensure the security of American allies in the Far East.

Finally, it has the imprimatur of being intellectually aware, as there’s been widespread debate and analysis about the free-for-all going on in Beijing when it comes to conduct of Chinese foreign policy. Of course, by insisting that China’s rise cannot possibly be peaceful and therefore American power should be used to subvert its rise in all forms, peaceful or not, American conservatives are empowering the hardliners in Beijing – self-fulfilling their prophecy.

Tactics vs. Strategy in Afghanistan Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at abumuqawama and registan.net, Josh Foust and Andrew Exum have posted a rather interesting exchange that examines the tactical efforts of the US military in Afghanistan. It's a fascinating debate between two smart people and one that I highly recommend.

But, and I mean this not to be insulting to either, it's a digression even diversion from the real issues regarding the current US mission in Afghanistan. To explain check out this quote from Andrew:

U.S. counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level were some of the best I had ever seen. Caveat lector, I do not know whether or not these improved tactics will yield a strategic effect. There are too many phenomena that we cannot even observe much less measure. And we still have a lot of known pains in our asses (like Afghan governance and sanctuaries in Pakistan) that could render tactical gains ephemeral.

It's good that Andrew makes this connection (because there seem to be a lot of folks who don't) but he's dramatically downplaying it's importance. In the end, it doesn't really matter how good the US military gets at counter-insurgency and it doesn't really matter if the Arghandab Valley is more secure than it was a year ago; particularly if the larger strategic impediments to success in Afghanistan remain in place. Indeed, our fetishization of tactical "successes" has become a distraction from our abundant strategic failures in Afghanistan.

Over the 18 months we've seen no evidence that the Afghan government is seriously interested in clamping down on corruption or is able to provide more effective governance for its citizens. We've seen no evidence that Pakistan has any interest in turning against the Afghan Taliban (in fact quite the opposite). We've seen little evidence that the ANSF will be able to take over from ISAF in providing security any time soon and the same goes for the police. And on the latter point, the lack of an effective judiciary system in the country tends to demonstrate how uselss a police force we are likely creating. All of this is happening while the clock is ticking on US engagement and NATO allies are becoming increasingly wary of their commitment to the fight in Afghanistan.

In short, from a strategic perspective we've seen very little progress on our larger objectives that are (and this is rather crucial) supposed to support the tactical gains that folks in the US military love to brag about. (And if I sound like a broken record on this point . . . it's because I am).

This is elemental to the success or failure of our mission and speak to the sustainability of our current operations. Indeed, if there are no guarantees that the ANSF can take over security in the Arghandab valley any time soon or that the government can provide vital services or that the spigot of fighters from Pakistan can be turned off . . . then all we doing here is "mowing the lawn."

The worst part of this is that by believing enhanced security in the Arghandab valley or elsewhere in southern and eastern Afghanistan is a metric of success not only distracts us from our real challenges, but it allows military commanders and in turn political leaders to resist needed shifts in strategy.

So for example, the recent "success" in killing Taliban insurgents is used, in part, as a justification for not embracing a more robust political strategy of reconciliation. Why should we if the enemy is on the run? We're winning, or so the story goes, and thus it's not a good time to open up a political channel or embrace confidence-building measures that might bring the Taliban to the table.  From this perspective, believing that we are winning tactically in Afghanistan is our greatest curse; in fact, it's the root of all our problems. You see, if we recognized we weren't winning, we might shift course a la surge 2007 in Iraq, but instead we see progress where there isn't and ignore the many signs of failure.

This brings me to the final point: Andrew's evoking of the Wire (aka the best TV show in history):

I use The Wire a lot to explain everything from Lebanese politics to counterinsurgency, and I would liken the U.S. Army to the character Ellis Carver: when we meet him in Season One, all he wants to do is kick ass and take names. By Season Five, though, he’s become a much smarter police officer. He’s taken the time to get to know the people he’s trying to protect and can thus better separate the bad guys from all the people just trying to get on with their lives.

We could spend a whole week making a connection between international affairs and the Wire, but I think this misses the crucial takeaway from the Wire. Carver is not a smart police officer . . . he is a tragic figure. He doesn't realize that knowing the neighborhood better and separating the bad guys from ordinary folk does not change the fundamental nature of the Drug War, which overwhelms all efforts at effective policing. 

You bust one corner boy, another one sprouts up; you take down a package, another comes in; you arrest a drug lord, guess what another one takes his place. Unless you try to change the very strategy a la Bunny Colvin and Hamsterdam, you're just spitting against the wind.

So if there is a lesson from the Wire it is that the tactical efforts of the cops is a waste of time and resources. It doesn't matter how good they get at their jobs because ultimately the game is the game . . and the game is rigged.

Sounds like Afghanistan, doesn't it?

Wanna Tighten the Screws on China? Focus on Coalition Building Posted by Jacob Stokes

Chinese President Hu Jintao visits Washington this week amid much hang-wringing about continued obstinacy from China on a range of issues. So the question of the day is: What’s the best way to get China to play ball and become a more responsible power? One school of thought suggests the U.S. continue to ratchet up its responses to Chinese actions. But as Les Gelb points out, too much ratcheting on either side will empower the hawks in each country, leading to recriminations and a souring of relations between the two nations. That dynamic serves the interests of neither country.

In order to avoid that fate, and to more effectively pressure China, the U.S should avoid the G-2 framework which frames problems as bilateral. Instead, the U.S. should focus on doing the diplomatic spadework to build coalitions to lobby the Middle Kingdom to change its behavior. There are three reasons why this approach makes sense.

First, almost every issue cited in discussions of a U.S.-China rift affects countries beside the U.S. And those countries largely want to see the same policy solutions as the U.S. Talking currency? Engage other developing countries whose export sectors suffer from the artificially low value of the renminbi. Worried about the protection of intellectual property and indigenous innovation? Enlist our European and other Asian allies to push China to pay for licensing of software and remove regulations that force companies to release proprietary technology in order to enter the Chinese market. Feeling hot in here? Engage the Global South and other developing countries – those who will feel the effects of climate change most dramatically – to pressure China to continue to improve its environmental policies. Oceans feeling a little tense? Follow Secretary Clinton’s lead and pick up the pieces via ASEAN and other Asian regional fora when Chinese aggression spooks its neighbors; that would create a united international front, backed but not necessarily led by the U.S., against sprawling Chinese territorial claims. I could go on. But the point is: When possible, encourage others to lead the way.

On Village Razing . . . and Counter-Insurgency Posted by Michael Cohen

There's been a lot of back and forth between Paula Broadwell and Josh Foust about the issue of village razing in Afghanistan. Those who need to catch up can follow the debate here, here and here.

I won't bother to summarize the entire discussion, but it began with what I think can be charitably described as Paula's less than empathetic response to an Afghan village being destroyed. What I find most striking about this is not the rather bloodless manner in which Broadwell describes the incident (although that is notable) but rather the fascinating, and unintentional, insight into how dramatically the war in Afghanistan has shifted in opposition to the population-centric policies being espoused a year ago.

A lot of COIN advocates will tell you that kinetic action is integral to war-fighting and that even though airstrikes are up 300% and targeted killings are on the rise and more homes are being destroyed since General David Petraeus took over command . . . it's still just counter-insurgency.

But for those with long memories the operational approach of ISAF forces in Afghanistan under General McChrystal was to avoid civilian casualties and even property destruction at all costs, even at the risk of putting US troops in harm's way. (Some even argued that protecting civilians was actually more important than killing insurgents).

Indeed as Foust points out, when ISAF troops went into Marjah last February they appeared to be far more concerned about village destruction then what you are seeing in the Arghandab Valley today - and at the time went to far greater lengths to avoid bringing harm to both person and property there.

But look if you don't want to believe me; how about believing the guidance issued by General Stanley McChrystal to his troops:

Conventional military action against insurgents consumes considerable resources with little real return and is likely to alienate the people we are trying to secure. Large scale operations to kill or capture militants carry a significant risk of causing civilian casualties and collateral damage. If civilians die in a firefight, it does not matter who shot him - we still failed to protect them from harm. Destroying a home or property jeopardizes the livelihood of an entire family - and creates more insurgents. We sow the seeds of our demise.

I find myself in violent agreement with Stanley McChrystal even if I think trying to fight a war on these terms is nearly impossible. But what McChrystal says here is also in violent disagreement from what Broadwell is describing happened in the Arghandab Valley. Indeed, it's hard for me to imagine that had this occurred in Marjah or elsewhere in Afghanistan when he was commander McChrystal would have been supportive of such actions. They appear to run directly counter to his guidance to troops - and yet I haven't seen anyone from ISAF publicly criticize the methods that are being employed in the Arghandab Valley.

Indeed, look at what Broadwell says about the clearing operation that razed a village to the ground: "Clearing operations are a necessary evil to weed out the Taliban, and they often leave devastating destruction in the wake. But what Aziz [President Karzai's advisor, Mohammad Sadiq Aziz] failed to note is the tremendous effort some units, like 1-320th, have made to rebuild his country." Does anyone really believe that because the US threw some money at the villagers this just washed away the sense of anger and frustration these individuals felt toward Americans?

You don't get a mulligan because you rebuilt the town you leveled.

But it's a far cry from what COIN advocates were saying a year ago. Then US/ISAF destruction of property was a bad thing because it "creates more insurgents." Today, destroying property, not such a bad thing because we helped the people whose homes were destroyed to rebuild them i.e. building trust.

It's perhaps another example that COIN advocates tend to define COIN by whatever definition furthers their arguments at that exact moment.

Armed Social Work in Action Posted by Michael Cohen

This might be the greatest, most depressing and yet bizarrely symbolic picture depicting the US effort to stabilize and pacify Afghanistan. Here in an article from the New York Times that references a "humanitarian assistance patrol in Ghazni Province" which handed out "crank-powered radios, books, candy and drinks."

But check out the title of the book in the picture below:

That's right, US soliders are handing out English-language copies of "Chicken Soup for the Soul" for Afghan villagers.

Truly, you can't make this stuff up.

More Ideas For A Constructive Foreign Policy Debate Posted by David Shorr

I spent last weekend at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School for a conference the Stanley Foundation co-sponsored with three of our favorite colleagues. The main subject was the prospect and challenge of international cooperation amidst pervasive change, but there were a couple of nuggets for the domestic politics of foreign policy. The first came from Rich Williamson, a highly accomplished practitioner and pillar of the Republican FP establishment. Rich's comment offers a sort of truce for some of the most contentious strains of the debate, one well worth exploring:

America’s foreign policy properly is driven in the first instance by national security concerns and then by vital interests, many of which will be economic.  Yet human rights are integral to the American character.  And a world in which human rights are respected is a safer, more secure and better world.  At the very least we should speak out for voiceless victims and in behalf of human rights.  During my many diplomatic jobs I have spoken the truth to many bad actors who have done bad things, and they have never been surprised.  They know they are doing bad things.  Rather they are surprised when America does not speak up.  And when America is silent on such trespass of basic human rights it gives them more space to continue their abuse of human rights.

It sure would be nice to reach some consensus about dealing with repressive foreign leaders who present other problems for us besides their abuse of rights. The "coddling dictators" trope is classic political point-scoring. And those who argue that resolute-ness is all you need to whip bad guys into line are selling Americans unrealistic ideas about how we can achieve our aims in today's world. I know for a fact that many of my conservative friends don't believe this, and I appreciated Rich saying it.

Don't anyone worry, though, about the new civility stifling all debate and eliding all differences. For a start, I have a slight unease over how Rich's above paragraph is weighted -- it pivots pretty quickly from the acknowledgment of other policy objectives to several sentences on the upholding of human rights. Now back to my Princeton conference story. In a memo that Bruce Jentleson wrote for the conference, I was struck by the following excellent summary of the Bush and Obama administration approaches to US leadership and international legitimacy, as well as the response and results they elicited:

Debating the Tunisian Uprising on Bloggingheads.tv Posted by Shadi Hamid

Issandr El Amrani and I took to bloggingheads.tv yesterday to debate Tunisia's almost-would-be revolution. What does it mean for the region, and what, if anything, should the US do about it? Issandr's twitter feed and website, The Arabist, has been one of the best places to follow events in Tunisia. A special bonus for viewers: Issandr and I offer predictions on which regime might fall next. We know that people like predictions, even when they're wrong. So we obliged. It is worth noting, however, that no one Middle East analyst on the planet predicted the fall of Tunisia. This, I hope, will be one of the main lessons of Tunisia: No autocratic regime is immune. Everyone is at risk - even the most "stable" among them. In any case, here's our debate. Enjoy:  

It Isn't All About Us Posted by Eric Martin

I cannot recommend enough my colleague Michael Cohen's piece on the need to take account of, and accommodate, Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan as part of our own strategic approach going forward. Cohen's assessment is realistic, thorough and takes care to recognize what Pakistani leaders (rightly or wrongly) views as its vital interests in Afghanistan, without falling into the trap of projecting our own goals onto Pakistan's leadership, or simply assuming that Pakistan will abandon its interests in a country it shares a border with for the sake of a mission undertaken by a power half a world away. 

In the present context, Pakistan has long cultivated influence in Afghanistan via its Taliban allies as a means to counterbalance its larger, and more territorial vast, rival: India.  In fact, as Cohen points out, the Pakistani security apparatus views almost all issues through the prism of India. Says Cohen:

Yet, for a policy that is so apparently solicitous of Pakistani needs, it is quite disconnected from actual Pakistani interests, particularly with regard to Afghanistan. In fact, the campaign to coax the Pakistani military into turning against its Afghan Taliban allies as well as the U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan that seeks to defeat the Taliban and strengthen the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai undermines rather than furthers Pakistan's interests. In essence, U.S. policy consists of political and diplomatic efforts to convince Pakistan to act against its perceived interests. Instead, the United States needs to more seriously address Pakistani concerns about Afghanistan's future.

Pundit Accountability - What I Got Wrong Posted by Michael Cohen

One of my biggest pet peeves as a denizen of the think tank and blogging world is the propensity of my fellow foreign policy analysts to make mistakes and errors of judgment - and never be held accountable for them.  Why should we be above reputational scrutiny for making errors in what, after all, is our primary occupation - analysis? And after all a little humility is probably a very good thing, especially when you are regularly standing on a soap box telling other people what they don't know or what they got wrong.

So just to show that I am willing to put my money (or in this case reputation) where my mouth is, I, a bit belatedly, decided to review the lion's share of my blog postings at DA from 2010 and pick out the worst ones for public exposure. (I would encourage other bloggers and analysts to follow suit - it's actually quite cathartic.)

For the most part I feel pretty good about my track record and I think most of my writings hold up to scrutiny - of course is things start going well in Afghanistan I may have to revise this entire post! But there are a few stinkers out there - and while I'm sure I've missed some errors along the way these are the ones that really leaped out to me.

Let's start with this post from May of last year about the attempted Times Square bombing, which is just plain embarrassing and was indeed wrong about where responsibility lay for that foiled attack. I jumped to some overwrought conclusions and my rhetoric was really a bit over the top. I wish I could delete it.

In April, Jim Arkedis wrote what I thought was a rather harsh assessment of a piece I'd written about Afghanistan in Dissent. It seemed a bit unfair . . . but that doesn't really excuse the rather d***ish tone I took in my response. So if you're reading this Jim, my apologies.

In November I wrote this rather blistering attack against Wikileaks. Now I still think that the basic approach of Wikileaks is dangerous and undermines US national security in ways that Julian Assange and his band of cohorts don't truly understand. But, I'm chastened a bit by the fact that Wikileaks has responsibly not leaked all the cables they have and has wisely redacted the names of those who might be affected. I'm hardly a Wikileaks supporter but I think there is reason to believe that my initial take on them was perhaps too dogmatic.

Ok, now to some more substantive critiques related to Afghanistan. I wrote this in January 2010:

"'The more there is talk of negotiation, the more the Taliban view it as a sign of weakness. How do you make sure the reconciliation process does not embolden the Taliban to go on the march?'" It's a good question and it seems like the answer would be to put greater military pressure on the Taliban, but that isn't the strategy being espoused by General McChrystal."

Careful readers of this blog would know I've switched my position on the necessary precursors to negotiation - and I'm now generally opposed to putting greater military pressure on the Taliban. Honestly, it's a case of my view about the conflict evolving, but there is an apparent contradiction here that should be acknowledged.

Then there is this from April:

The idea that we are able to provide security in places like Helmand and Kandahar is nothing less than sheer folly; that we believe it will turn the tide of the war is far worse.

I stand by the turning the tide argument; but the US has been able to provide somewhat improved security in some parts of Helmand and Kandahar so I should admit that I was perhaps too skeptical in some of my earlier assessments. Of course, I still think those security improvement are mere tactical gains that don't fundamentally shift the strategic deficit in Afghanistan.

This post from June, which postulated that the "worm had turned on Afghanistan" was, um, wrong - and dramatically so. Even worse was my response to the McChrystal firing last June and what it might mean on the ground in Afghanistan:

And while this is unlikely to lead to a wholesale - and much-needed - change in strategy one would imagine that it might lead to other important tactical changes around the margins. For example, it will be very interesting to see if the long-planned offensive in Kandahar, which would almost certainly lengthen US involvement in the Afghan fight, still happens. Or perhaps there will be new efforts to open political negotiations with the Taliban. And I'll even be even more curious to see if the current, restrictive rules of engagement for US troops are relaxed by a general who hardly practiced the same sort of population centric COIN so favored by McChrystal. Quite simply, there is going to be enormous pressure on Petraeus to show results, particularly by December when the first major review of the Afghanistan policy is supposed to occur.

In the end, what matters perhaps more than anything else is that Obama is now quite firmly in charge of Afghan policy - and the longer, even open-ended, commitment favored by the generals is on the outs . . . Petraeus will now be under enormous pressure to stick by his promise to Obama and begin troop withdrawals by 2011. Maybe at one point Obama might have bended the rules or even been flexible if McChrystal or Petraeus were able to show "progress" in Afghanistan; not anymore.

I got the change in the Afghan rules of engagement part correct (but that was kind of an easy one) and I was right to suggest that there would be pressure on Petraeus to show results by December . . . but the how part was off 180 degrees. And the argument that Obama was back in charge of Afghanistan policy; chalk that one up to wishful thinking on my part. I completely misjudged and misunderstood Petraeus and what his ascendancy would mean to the war effort.

I doubled down on this silliness in July with a post postulating that we had hit an inflection point in Afghanistan that leaned toward de-escalation and not escalation. Yeah, not so much.

These were perhaps my two worst pieces of prognostication . . . well except for this post that I wrote after the capture of Mullah Baradar by Pakistan:

Not only is this enormous as far as the US war in Afghanistan, but it suggests for perhaps the first time that the Pakistan government is willing to cooperate with the US in going after the Afghan Taliban.  One can only imagine the impact on Taliban feelings of security and reliance on Pakistani support: that safe haven ain't feeling so safe anymore. One has to think this will affect the drive toward political reconciliation in a dramatic way - because if you're the Taliban this news suggests that time is no longer necessarily on your side.

I don't think it's an exaggeration to say this may be the most important to thing to happen to the US war in Afghanistan.This has the potential to change the entire complexion of the war in Afghanistan - and for the better. For the first time in a very long time, there is reason for optimism.

Jesus, that is awful. This is a great example of trying to write something that is absolutely outside my lane of knowledge (which is already a fairly narrow country road). At the time, I had a rather poor understanding of Pakistan internal politics . . . and it showed. I just had no idea what I was talking about (perhaps it reflected some desperate desire to say something good about the war).

To that last point, I can't help but note that the three worst blog posts of the year; the ones that most wildly missed the mark; the ones that put the greatest egg on my face - what they each had in common, was that they were perhaps the only three times all year I wrote something that offered an optimistic view of the war in Afghanistan. And as I now know that optimism was sorely misplaced.

I think there might be a lesson there. 

Anyway, sorry for the navel-gazing; I'll get back to pessimistic Afghan blogging toot suite.

Accommodating Pakistan's Interests in Afghanistan Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at World Politics Review I have a new piece looking at the disconnect between America's political and military strategies for dealing with Pakistan:

At the heart of the U.S. war in Afghanistan lies a striking and unresolved contradiction. While the U.S. has sent approximately 100,000 troops to this impoverished, landlocked country to combat a fearsome local insurgency, the actual focal point of U.S. policy in the region largely revolves around protecting and stabilizing a country just across Afghanistan's eastern border: Pakistan.

It's an ironic but not altogether surprising strategy. After all, Pakistan remains home to Osama bin Laden, his key lieutenants and other terrorist organizations intent on striking American targets. The country maintains a significant nuclear capability, and its ongoing conflict with India has the potential to spark a regional conflagration.

Yet, for a policy that is so apparently solicitous of Pakistani needs, it is quite disconnected from actual Pakistani interests, particularly with regard to Afghanistan. In fact, the campaign to coax the Pakistani military into turning against its Afghan Taliban allies as well as the U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan that seeks to defeat the Taliban and strengthen the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai undermines rather than furthers Pakistan's interests. In essence, U.S. policy consists of political and diplomatic efforts to convince Pakistan to act against its perceived interests. Instead, the United States needs to more seriously address Pakistani concerns about Afghanistan's future.

You can read the whole thing here

A More Civil Discourse -- Foreign Policy Wonks' Edition Posted by David Shorr

As the country gropes for ways to lower the temperature and make political disagreement less disagreeable, I thought I'd look back to a 2006-07 initiative that brought together a bipartisan group of 20 foreign policy experts. The Stanley Foundation's Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide project was the brainchild of Derek Chollet, who is about to move from the State Department Office of Policy Planning to the White House NSC staff. Together with our our conservative friend and colleague Policy Review Editor Tod Lindberg, we recruited ten bipartisan pairs of co-authors who were commissioned to find points of agreement on different areas of policy.

In the preface for the resulting book, I explained how the project worked and offered some reflections on foreign policy bipartisanship and the possibility for a more constructive debate about policy. I quote a couple passages below, but if you'd like to read the preface, it's pages ix-xiii at Google Books.

Here's how I described our consensus-seeking enterprise:

Politics today leaves little room for deliberation over issues; by and large, it is total war between sworn enemites. Rather than winning arguments on the particular merits of a matter, each side seeks to thoroughly discredit the other. As a result, what the public sees primarly are the caricatures that both parties draw to define their counterparts.

and

As a shared frustration with the low level of political discourse, many of the essays set aside the false choices that many politicians have sought to use as domestic political wedges: international law or power realities, China as partner or adversary, arms control regimes or the direct disruption of some nations' efforts to acquire the bomb, preservation of due process or the aggressive pursuit of terrorists suspects. In the place of these either/or choices, the authors stress the importance of managing inherent tensions and striking careful balances.

I'm not sure precisely how to apply these observations (though I took a stab recently at a respectful exchange on the question of sanctions), Maybe the key thing to say is that a resevoir of goodwill, personal relationships, and experience with cooperation do exist within the foreign policy community.

When Pro-Western Regimes Fall: What Should the U.S. Do? Posted by Shadi Hamid

This is the second in a series of posts on the ongoing Tunisian uprising. You can read the first here. 

One month ago, Tunisia seemed quiet, stable. Quiet and stable is generally what Western governments like to see in the Middle East. But Tunisia may be on the brink of the first genuine Arab revolution in recent memory. Talk of revolution tends to get US policymakers jittery, as it should. There is a lot at stake here. If Tunisia falls, it will likely embolden the opposition to pro-American regimes throughout the region. It already has, with solidarity rallies in a number of capitals and, more recently, a sort of awed fascination that what last month seemed impossible is, as we speak, happening. If change is going to happen, it's probably going to happen. There's only so much the US can do now that the ball has been rolling, with increasing speed, for 3 weeks (or depending on how you look at it more than 30 years). But it still can do something. And that something may make the difference in a delicate situation. 

Some might argue that this is not about America but about Tunisians fighting for Tunisia. Accordingly, Obama and anyone else should just stay out of it. But the notion of democratic transitions as organic, homegrown – a post-Bush platitude – while technically true, is also misleading. What we know about democratic transitions suggests that Western support – in this case, the lack of it – can prove decisive. In their new book, noted political scientists Steve Levitsky and Lucan Way provide extensive empirical support to what many have long argued. They write, “It was an externally driven shift in the cost of suppression, not changes in domestic conditions, that contributed most centrally to the demise of authoritarianism in the 1980s and 1990s.” 

The US may very well have limited leverage in Tunisia. But France and other EU nations have close relations with the Ben Ali regime. Tunisia depends on Europe for trade and tourism. So, first of all, the U.S. should be coordinating with its European allies. Maybe this wasn't so important yesterday. But now it is, and so it should call for serious, determined action on the part of the international community. 

A phone call to President Ben Ali might be worth considering. Preferably tonight. Phone calls from American presidents to Arab autocrats do sometimes work, as the famed Bush-Mubarak call in 2005 did. What should Obama say? That, while the U.S. understands the security concerns involved, the U.S. will not tolerate the police/military shooting into crowds. And that any excessive loss of life will permanent damage Tunisia's relations with the West. For starters, the US could withdraw its ambassador in protest of mass killing (already around 50 are reported dead). 

But some of this isn't about actual leverage, but optics. In the Arab world, perceptions sometimes matter more than reality. Protestors, after all, act not according some objective reality but to reality as they perceive it, in the moment. Here, the colored revolutions are instructive. 

During Ukraine’s second round of elections in November 2004, President Bush sent Senator Richard Lugar as his special envoy. Lugar issued a forceful statement condemning President Leonid Kuchma’s government for election fraud. Soon after, Secretary of State Colin Powell refused to recognize the results and warned that “if the Ukrainian government does not act immediately and responsibly, there will be consequences for our relationship, for Ukraine’s hopes for a Euro-Atlantic integration, and for individuals responsible for perpetrating fraud.” The protestors in Maidan Square applauded when the Powell’s statement was read. Meanwhile, Lech Walesa, Poland’s first democratically elected president, assured the crowd that the West was on their side. 

The West would be well-advised to show that, while it may not necessarily be on the side of the protestors (somewhat incredibly, Hillary Clinton already said the US won't take sides - talk about pre-emption), it will vigorously support their right to protest, assembly, and that it will not stand by while those fighting for freedom are shot to death. The protestors, who are, in fact, risking their lives, need to know that the world is watching. And that the world cares. This, presumably, is US policy, or maybe it used to be US policy. I'm not entirely sure. I do know, however, that President Bush said the following in his 2003 speech to the National Endowment for Democracy: "Militarism and rule by the capricious and corrupt are the relics of a passing era. We will stand with these oppressed peoples until the day of their freedom finally arrives.” I suppose this is the time to stand? 

Of course, when Bush said this he put himself in a difficult position. How does one go about supporting both a regime and its opposition simultaneously? How does one take sides in such a fight? Morally speaking, there is a right side and a wrong side. Practically speaking, Ben Ali, however brutal, has been an "ally" for a considerable amount of time. This is why US policy in the Arab world has always struck me as fundamentally untenable in the long-run. Autocracies, to my knowledge, do not last forever. But we never took even preliminary steps of distancing ourselves from them, to prepare ourselves for the eventuality that they might fall. So now when tens of thousands of Arabs all across the region are stating, with unmistakable clarity, that they will no longer accept the authoritarian status quo, they are forcing us to take sides, testing our so-called "moral clarity." What they are really doing, I suspect, is forcing us to fall on the wrong side of history. This is not a good place to be. 

Tunisia on the Brink of Revolution? Posted by Shadi Hamid

There are revolutions that happen. There are revolutions that almost happen. And then's there's Algeria. 

Today, we are witnessing a remarkable series of events in Tunisia, long considered one of the most stable Arab countries. But it isn't. It wasn't. As we speak, protests and riots have spread throughout Tunisia, including in the capital. Protestors have taken over a mansion of one of the Presiden's relatives and tried to storm government buildings. On many occasions, they've overwhelmed police. Western coverage is still somewhat spare, although a good place to start is Brian Whitaker's blog and the hashtag #sidibouzid on Twitter. 

We are entering a critical phase, and the Western response - which so far has been lacking, to say the least - may very well prove decisive in pushing Tunisia in one direction or the other. But let me be clear, as some of my colleagues have criticized me for overestimating U.S. influence in the Arab world. What America does may not decide whether the revolution actually happens, but it will be crucial in the aftermath. Even if the Ben Ali regime falls, it does not mean it will be replaced by a functioning democracy. The most likely outcome, at least in the short run, is chaos. To turn chaos into something more constructive will require something beyond half-hearted Western statements of "concern." What will happen to Ben Ali and his family, if the presidential palace is overtaken? Will factions or remnants of the regime fight back? 

The Tunisian regime has already shown that its willingness to "shoot into crowds" (something that less repressive regimes, like Egypt and Jordan would have more difficulty stomaching). The willingness to shoot is correlated with the perception that one is likely to get away with it. With France, Tunisia's former colonial master, tacitly (and not-so-tacitly) supporting the regime and military, the consequences of brute repression have been limited. So far. 

It’s the Optics, Stupid: Why and How Hizbullah is Spinning the Lebanese Government’s Collapse Posted by The Editors

This guest post by Anthony Elghossain, who blogs at Page Lebanon and is a J.D. candidate at The George Washington University Law School.

After months of parading a purportedly imminent “Saudi-Syrian initiative” aimed at averting a crisis, Hizbullah and its allies have withdrawn from, and thus toppled, Lebanon's government. Meanwhile, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, having just concluded private talks with U.S. President Barack Obama, is en route to Paris for a meeting with French President Nicolas Sarkozy to shore up international support for the pro-Western March 14 coalition.

The parties’ inability to resolve their dispute over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is not surprising. After all, any prospective deal would have involved core interests and first principles. It is unlikely, then, that Hizbullah’s toppling of the government was a reaction to a Hariri reversal.

To placate Hizbullah, March 14 would have had to denounce the anticipated STL indictment before its issuance, politically abort the STL. Over the past few months, however, various March 14 figures had made clear that a “resolution” could not come at the expense of justice.

For its part, Hizbullah would have had to accept the risk of an adverse indictment without total political cover from the Hariri camp. Not content with Hariri’s public withdrawal of past “political accusations” against Syria, nor with reassurances that March 14 would disentangle prospectively accused Hizbullah members from the party as a whole, Hizbullah had been pressing Hariri to denounce the indictment outright.

Is President Obama Weak in the Eyes of Arab Leaders? Posted by Shadi Hamid

Neoconservatives are likely to be wrong on any number of issues. But there is one critique of theirs that, somewhat to my dismay, has struck me as more compelling than I would have originally hoped. There is an argument to be made that the United States is weaker – and by this, I mean less admired, less respected, and more likely to be perceived as irrelevant – than it was under the Bush administration. It is difficult to establish causality here, since the original cause was President Bush’s failed policies. We are still paying the price for those failures today.

That said, there are some things we do know. According to recent polling, the United States, under Obama, has lower favorability ratings in several Arab countries than it did in the final years of the Bush administration. It was possible, and in some cases fairly easy, to separate Bush from the United States. Arabs seemed to understand that his policies did not necessarily reflect anything true or essential about America’s character. Moreover, those of us who strongly opposed Bush policy told our Arab (or Latin American or European) friends that it was just a matter of time before America regained a sense of prudence.

As I’ve written before, there is little I can now say to my Arab colleagues. We all got what we wished for (even the Muslim Brotherhood was rooting for Obama) – someone who seemed one of the more brilliant, inspiring, and unique American politicians in recent memory. He had a Muslim name, a Muslim family, lived in the Muslim world, and seemed to have an appreciation for the place of grievance in Arab life. What many Arabs have taken away from this is that the problem with U.S. foreign policy is a structural one. Because even with a “good” president, American foreign policy, as they see it, is quite bad. In short, the U.S. is now irredeemable in a way it never would have been under a President McCain. 

Moving on to the neoconservative critique, the argument, as far as I understand it, is that if you go around talking nice, apologizing, and going on about engagement, then this somehow invites bad behavior. Autocrats will take advantage of you. I don’t buy this particular line, but I do think there’s something to be said for Obama’s perceived lack of “toughness” on the international stage. By toughness, I don’t mean projection of power, bluster, or the over-reliance on the American military. I mean more foreign policy “ideology,” the projection of a clear, semi-consistent set of principles and beliefs, and the willingness to consistently articulate them to the international community. And once they're articulated, to stand behind them. 

The week before the recent Egyptian elections, the State Department called for “fair” and “credible” polls. In response, the Egyptian government, traditionally the second largest recipient of US aid, had the gall to stage-manage what was quite possibly the most rigged election in Egyptian history. In the past, as I argue here, Egypt would at least pretend, allowing a semblance of competition. But, this time, the Mubarak regime didn’t even have the decency of playing along with the charade (US pretends it cares about Egyptian democracy. Egypt pretends too). This suggests a certain level of Egyptian disrespect toward the Obama administration.

Issandr El Amrani, in a new policy brief, notes “the unwillingness of Egypt to show even token consideration for U.S. democracy promotion goals.” When the ruling party, presumably a close ally of the US, wins 209 out of 211 seats in the first round, despite our public calls for a “credible” election, it suggests a perception that people can both defy and disrespect the U.S. and get away with it.  As much as I hesitate to say it, that election result would have never happened under Bush, at least in his 2004-5 guise. People hated Bush but at least he was sufficiently frightening to instill a sense of prudence (however brief) among Arab autocrats.  

Trends In Multilateral Cooperation - Part I Posted by David Shorr

I have a small backlog of posts starting to accumulate, all having to do with the shape of future multilateral cooperation. I'll start with David Bosco, "The Multilateralist,"and his analysis of the Sarkozy visit in light of the French president's ambitions as host of G-8 and G-20 summits later this year. David raises some great questions about whether Sarkozy's eyes are too big for his stomach. As he faces an impending re-election campaign, President Sarkozy's will no doubt face a temptation to prize flash over substance. With so many ideas for the summit agenda swirling, it's not clear that the French hosts have figured out what they really want and whether they have a realistic plan.

 

Where Bosco loses me, though, is his assessment that the G-20 is on a steep slide to irrelevance. We probably agree about the proper yardstick to measure the value and success of these summit meetings: are they focused on worthy agenda items and making headway on those problems? In this vein, David scores the last round of G-20 consultations as a failure because of the stalemate over the valuation of the RMB and the dim prospects for a near-term shift away from the dollar as a global reserve currency (in the event Sarkozy goes down that road).

But this analysis mistakes the political buzz surrounding the G-20 for the group's actual agenda: macroeconomic rebalancing and stabilizing the global financial system. The G-20 summits have launched or sponsored initiatives in other areas, but they have really put their stamp on financial stability and reaching better balance between export- and consumption-oriented economies. If one accepts that these are worthwhile subjects for high-level international cooperation, then they constitute the fairest tests of G-20 effectiveness. Fair and, at this point, far from conclusive.

On financial stability, the G-20 mandated the tightened Basel III standards for banks' capital requirements, drove IMF governance reform across the finish line, and set up a new Financial Stability Board (which is still finding its legs). Hardly a disastrous record. Clearly the G-20 has been wrestling with how to spur export-led economies to boost domestic consumption. The first hurdle was to gain China's acknowledgment that rebalancing was even a fit topic for multilateral discussion (they relented in September 2009 in Pittsburgh). Now G-20 governments are trying to decide what metrics should be used to measure -- and thereby spur -- rebalancing. That's what the Seoul summit mandate for finance ministers to draw up "indicative guidelinds" was about. If the question of how to quantify imbalances becomes another of those round-and-around debates, that would be a strike against the G-20, but as I say, it's far too early to reach a verdict.

Suspicions are mounting that lowballing expectations for the G-20 is simply a dodge. That's the implication in this passage of David Bosco's post:

Even some French officials have been seeking to temper expectations. "We have to adapt the G-20 to a new environment, from high frequency management of the world economy to low frequency management. The pace is likely to be slower because we are tackling deeper and more difficult issues," a senior official told the Wall Street Journal.

The problem for the French -- and for the world -- is that a creation like the G20 may not be able to operate for long at a low frequency.

But I think there's a substantive argument for cutting some slack. First, the G-20 was bound to suffer from being compared to its dramatic early successes in mounting a coordinated response to the worst of the financial crisis. This is the exact same issue that arises for the political response to any tough issue: how do you take difficult steps without a sense of urgent crisis to spur you on? Second, the G-20 has shifted focus from putting out the fire to some more structural issues, which also argues for a longer-term view and greater patience.

In future posts, I will talk about UN Security Council reform (in light of an excellent recent report from the Council on Foreign Relations) and the consensus rule at the UN.



Afghanistan: What Can We Achieve? Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at Dissent I have a new article that offers an alternative perspective on what the US and NATO should do in Afghanistan. Short version: adopt a political strategy:

The U.S. war in Afghanistan started off with rousing optimism in the fall of 2001, but by the end of the decade has devolved into a quagmire for U. S. troops and potential disaster for the Afghan people. For all its twists and turns, it has had one striking constant—nearly every decision made by Western policymakers and Afghan leaders in fighting it has been the wrong one.

. . . It is a mind-numbing tale of failure that has brought the United States and NATO to a painful decision point about the war in Afghanistan. They must realize that it is time to move beyond the U.S. military’s dreams of winning in Afghanistan and focus instead on best preparing the country for a partial drawdown of U.S. troops and a shift in mission from population-centric counter- insurgency to counter-terrorism and stabilization.

. . . After more than nine years of war, few good options remain on the table. The Taliban insurgency has gained momentum across the country at the same time that falling support for the war at home will constrain the president’s ability to sustain a long-term military commitment.

“Winning” in Afghanistan is no longer in the cards, if it ever was. Instead, the president and his advisers must choose from a set of worst-case scenarios. Picking the least worse one—which protects U.S. interests while, one hopes, stabilizing Afghanistan—must be the focus of U.S. policy going forward. That begins with laying the groundwork for a political strategy to spur reconciliation between the Afghan government and Taliban insurgents.

You can read the whole thing here or if you want check out the link here and if you don't already have one, buy a subsciption to the magazine.

What Does It Mean To Support Terrorists? Posted by David Shorr

Thanks to a New York Times op-ed Monday by Georgetown law professor David Cole, debate has been renewed over last summer's SCOTUS decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project and the question of what constitutes "support" for terrorists and can be prohibited. Can you, for instance, outlaw efforts aimed at steering terrorist groups toward seeking redress via peaceful means?

The news hook is the recent backing from prominent Republicans for an opposition group of Iranian exiles designated by the United States as a terrorist organization. Rachel Slajda reported for Talking Points Memo about a trip to Paris last month by Rudy Giuliani, Michael Mukasey, Tom Ridge, and Frances Townsend to express their support for the Iranian group.

The case -- and Cole's op-ed -- raise important issues of free speech. What interests me, though, is the decision's gross misunderstanding of how political legitimacy works. Here's Cole explaining the way the Court equated outreach to terror groups undertaken with the best intentions as tantamount to material support:

Chief Justice John Roberts reasoned that a terrorist group might use human rights advocacy training to file harassing claims, that it might use peacemaking assistance as a cover while re-arming itself, and that such speech could contribute to the group's "legitimacy," and thus increase its ability to obtain support elsewhere that could be turned to terrorist ends.

In other words, there's no such thing as an interchange that encourages groups with a history of terrorism to work via peaceful political means. Whatever the intentions -- indeed, regardless of the specific content or activity -- it will be subverted and have the net effect of enabling acts of terrorism. Before I get hit with the "liberals want to give terrorists therapy" line (maybe it's already too late), let me say that any such outreach to bin Laden's Al Qaeda would indeed be hopelessly naive, a fool's errand that few if any fools would undertake.

But the Supreme Court's reasoning isn't focused on bin Laden's grandiose death cult, effectively it's a claim about all movements that have resorted to terrorist attacks. No, it actually reaches further; it says that all elements within those movements must be considered monolithic, irredeemable, and untouchable for Americans. For one thing, I'd like someone to explain the process that led to peace in Northern Ireland, in light of the Court's theory of terrorism. More broadly, a monolithic notion of such movements seems at odds with any divide-and-conquer strategy, thus tying our own hand behind our back.

The White House's Growing 'Credibility Gap' on Afghanistan Posted by Michael Cohen

A couple of months ago I wrote an article for Foreign Policy that argued only the US military is optimistic about the situation in Afghanistan. I noted that the apparent disconnect between public statements by the military and pretty much everyone else in Afghanistan is "increasingly bringing into question the very credibility of U.S. military statements about military progress in Afghanistan." 

Since then, things on this front have only gotten worse and the credibility gap has extended from the Pentagon to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. In recent weeks, the Obama Administration has followed the military's lead by putting out a number of optimistic statements about the war in Afghanistan that, as difficult as it is to say, are misleading the American people about the actual security situation in Afghanistan.

First there was the White House's Afghan Strategy Review, which made the following assertions:

in Afghanistan, the momentum achieved by the Taliban in recent years has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in some key areas.

The surge in coalition military and civilian resources, along with an expanded special operations forces targeting campaign and expanded local security measures at the village level, has reduced overall Taliban influence and arrested the momentum they had achieved in recent years in key parts of the country. 

In Afghanistan last month, President Obama said; 

"Today we can be proud that there are fewer areas under Taliban control and more Afghans have a chance to build a more hopeful future."

And Secretary Gates was even more specific:

"As a result of the tough fight under way, the Taliban control far less territory today than they did a year ago."

Nowhere in the review, and as near I can tell, the remarks of Gates and Obama is it reflected that in many parts of the country the security situation has actually deteriorated or that Afghan civilian deaths have increased significantly over the past year.

In fact, the statements above are contradicted by a litany of facts that offer a far more pessimistic view on the progress of the war. In fact, over the past week or so there have been several major pieces of evidence that demonstrate the extent to which the US military and now the White House are misleading the American people about the tenuous security situation in Afghanistan.

First the Wall Street Journal reported on a UN report about security in Afghanistan:

Internal United Nations maps show a marked deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan during this year's fighting season, countering the Obama administration's optimistic assessments of military progress since the surge of additional American forces began a year ago.

In the October map, just as in March's, virtually all of southern Afghanistan—the focus of the coalition's military offensives—remained painted the red of "very high risk," with no noted security improvements. At the same time, the green belt of "low risk" districts in northern, central and western Afghanistan shriveled considerably.

The U.N.'s October map upgraded to "high risk" 16 previously more secure districts in Badghis, Sar-e-Pul, Balkh, Parwan, Baghlan, Samangan, Faryab, Laghman and Takhar provinces; only two previously "high risk" districts, one in Kunduz and one in Herat province, received a safer rating.

Today, McClatchy reports on the findings of the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office and in particular its reporting on deterioration in northern Afghanistan: (I heard similar things from their representative in Mazar in September):

"Absolutely, without any reservation, it is our opinion that the situation is a lot more insecure this year than it was last year," said Nic Lee, the director of the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, an independent organization that analyzes security dangers for aid groups.

While U.S.-led forces have driven insurgents out of their strongholds in southern Afghanistan, Taliban advances in the rest of the country may have offset those gains, a cross section of year-end estimates suggests.

Insurgent attacks have jumped at least 66 percent this year, according to the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office. Security analysts say that Taliban shadow governors still exert control in all but one of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.

"I can't understand how they can say it is more secure than last year," said Hashim Mayar, the acting director of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, an umbrella group that represents more than 100 Afghan and international aid groups working in Afghanistan. "Insecurity has extended to some parts of the county that were relatively safe last year."

Perhaps most damningly, a recent Pentagon report to Congress drew similar conclusions:

The insurgency’s capabilities and operational reach have been qualitatively and geographically expanding, as evidenced by a greater frequency and wider dispersion of insurgent-initiated attacks; however, that spread is being increasingly challenged by the ISAF surge forces conducting operations.  Despite the increase in ANSF and ISAF capabilities to counter insurgent attacks, the insurgents’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) continue to evolve in sophistication.  In addition, the insurgency continues to inhibit the expansion of a legitimate Afghan Government through an effective shadow governance process that provides dispute resolution, rule of law, and other traditional services in a number of areas.  

Keep in mind, this is a Pentagon report - and it appears to directly contradict the words of the President and the Secretary of Defense. 

So what you have is a mountain of evidence indicating that the security situation in Afghanistan is worsening; that in particular, insurgents are making serious in-roads in the north and west of the country and putting once secure regions in greater risk; even as the US is putting greater pressure on Taliban insurgents in the South and East. 

While it may be factually correct for Obama and Gates to suggest that the Taliban "control" less territory than they did before the surge this is a highly dubious claim since the Taliban's effectiveness is not really defined by territory as much as it is the ability to intimidate and influence the population, exert its influence in local communities and spread instability. This is a fact that is almost certainly understood by our military commanders in Afghanistan.

The simple fact is that the Administration's efforts to put a more positive spin on the increasingly tenuous security situation in Afghanistan is to gloss over the truth. Perhaps the most important story of the past year in Afghanistan is that even with the inclusion of more than 30,000 more US and NATO troops the security situation has worsened dramatically.

Now one can argue that this is a means to an end; a first stop on the road to progress. I don't find that personally credible, but it's certainly a legitimate argument for the Administration to make.

But it's quite another thing to play down the deterioration around the country; to cherry-pick improvements in areas of the country inundated with US troops as a reason for overall optimism; and to provide the American people with a decidedly one-sided and incomplete view of the war in Afghanistan. This, unfortunately, is what the White House and the military are trying to do. 

To be blunt, it's becoming increasingly difficult to take anything the White House or the military says about the war in Afghanistan seriously.