Unnecessary Tension

Regarding Turkey’s rapidly escalating crises with three Eastern Mediterranean neighbors: Israel, Cyprus and Syria, Yigal Schleifer rounds up some smart analysis (click here).

…Turkey’s strategy is not smart vis-à-vis the White House or the Department of State, because they’ve broken the rules of democratic engagement. The current escalation creates unnecessary tensions; is based on unmediated, unilateral interests instead of searching for viable compromise; and has no longer-term perspective. And it goes beyond the question of whether or not Turkey’s government has a legitimate point in its criticism of Israel. The present oratory also undermines Turkey’s economic and security interests. This type of posture provides space for destabilizing actors in the region, ultimately endangering the country’s newly established political recognition in regions other than Europe…

Turkey’s First Mosque Designed By a Woman

This post was updated.

Zeynep Fadillioglu is the first woman in Turkey to design the interior of a mosque (the architect was Hüsrev Tayla). She also recruited other women artists to help in the construction of the Sakirin Mosque in Istanbul. The project was recently completed. (click here and here) I think it’s beautiful:

Capital Cat Is Back — With Whiskers

Image from Radikal

The debate over Ankara’s city logo continues. Recently the court ruled that the original logo of a Hittite sun should be reinstated and the logo with minarets with which the Islamist Welfare Party had replaced it should go into the trash heap of history.  (click here)

Last year the AKP mayor Melih Gökçek introduced the image of the Angora cat with contrasting eye color as the new logo. The court didn’t accept the argument that a cat had taken the place of minarets. In response to the court decision that the Hittite logo must return, Gökçek has just introduced yet another new logo — the cat with whiskers. He then asked the city council to vote. The cat with whiskers won 59 to 31. The court had already voted — for the Hittite sun. The battle of the logos continues. Stay tuned.

Would Ataturk Have Approved?

Leon T. Hadar has a sensible essay in The Huffington Post that puts Turkey’s recent foreign policy decisions in an historical and comparative perspective. What has Turkey done in the past (under non-AKP governments) vis-a-vis Israel and the region, and why? A brief excerpt below. Read the entire essay here.

…Indeed, the earlier notion that the Netanyahu-Lieberman duo were advancing — and that was echoed by their allies in Washington — that Erdogan and the AKP were pursuing a foreign policy based on an Islamist agenda reflected a common fallacy, that ideological principles — as opposed to considerations of national interest — are the main driving force behind the foreign policy of Turkey, or, for that matter, of other governments ruled by political movements committed to secular or religious doctrines…

From this perspective, it is very likely that Ataturk would have approved much of the foreign policy agenda being pursued by Erdogan. Or to put it in more concrete terms, most of the decisions made by Erdogan — remaining in NATO while improving strategic ties with Turkey’s neighbors; continuing to campaign for EU membership while strengthening Turkey’s economic position in the Middle East; the “trust-but-verify” approach towards Iran’s nuclear military policies; conditioning the maintenance of the partnership with Israel on its treatment of the Palestinians — fit very much with the kind of Realpolitik foreign policy embraced by Ataturk and his secular political successors…

“Turkey Is Wiping The Floor With Iran”

The Financial Times believes that Turkey and Erdogan are the hottest trends in the Arab world right now:  80 percent approval in Morocco, 98 percent in Saudi Arabia. And Turkey is wiping the floor with its rival and sometime friend Iran (approval rating of 14 and 6 percent respectively). Click here for the article.

Erdoğan Needles Muslim Brothers

This post has been updated THREE TIMES.

Erdogan with rapturous Tunisians. Photo from Hurriyet

I read this article in full in the Wall St. Journal when it first came on the web today, but it has since retreated behind a paywall (here, excerpt below). Nevertheless, it indicates an interesting contradiction between the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s expectations of the Turkish “model” — that it’s Islamic — and Erdoğan’s insistence that the Turkish model is secular, respecting all religions equally. To make his point, Erdoğan, who is in Egypt, visited the elderly Coptic patriarch. The Muslim Brothers, who had been happily following him around until his secularism remarks, were not amused.

I learned from a source this summer that the Egyptian military has said it too is enamored of the “Turkey model”, by which they mean the old Kemalist model of a powerful military keeping religion under its thumb.

The “Turkey Model” is like a Rorschach blot — it means something different to everyone.

CAIRO—The Muslim Brotherhood objected to statements by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan telling Egyptians not to fear building a secular state, in a rare clash that exposes the gap between the so-called Turkish model for building a Muslim democracy and what Islamists in the region believe when they invoke it…

OK, here’s an account of Erdoğan’s Egypt visit, what he said in his speeches, and what the Muslim Brotherhood thinks about Turkey’s secular system. Turkey’s policy toward Israel is helping Turkey (and Erdoğan) gain regional leadership despite suspicions about its “secularism”. The Muslim Brothers contend that “Turkey … violates Islamic Shariah law” because in Turkey “when a man finds a woman in bed with another man, he can’t punish her by law because it is permitted there”. It is striking that the MB impetus is to build a nation on punishment and sex rather than on tolerance and development. Turkey (and the AKP) has its faults, but it has its priorities straight. (click here)

Erdoğan said in an interview with Turkish reporters that the Egyptian saying the above was a FORMER member of the MB and doesn’t represent their views. As far as he’s concerned the Muslim Brotherhood doesn’t have a problem with what he said. (click here, in Turkish)

UPDATE 2: Erdoğan is continuing his Arab Spring tour, after a rapturous reception in Egypt and Tunisia, and waxing eloquent on Turkey’s secular model: “Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state of law. As for secularism, a secular state has an equal distance to all religious groups, including Muslim, Christian, Jewish and atheist people… this is not secularism in the Anglo-Saxon or Western sense; a person is not secular, the state is secular. A Muslim can govern a secular state in a successful way. In Turkey, 99 percent of the population is Muslim, and it did not pose any problem. You can do the same here.” (click here for the article.) Next stop: Libya.

“Forget About It, My Friend…”

Tracey Emin's "Bosver Bosver Arkadasim Aglamak Guzel" (2004), neon , image from ArtInfo

My translation of the neon art piece above: “Forget about it, forget about it, my friend. Crying is beautiful.”

Excerpt from an interview with Arhan Kayar, director of Art Beat Istanbul Fair (for full interview, click here)

What are the strengths of the Turkish art market?

Turkey’s economic transformation has played a key role in the expansion of its art market and in the development of a new breed of art collectors keen to invest in tangible assets. There is a mature collecting market for postwar artists and we have seen record prices being set at international auctions. Turkish contemporary art is still reasonable or cheap in relative terms to Arab and Iranian, Indian, or Chinese art, which means that the demographic of buyers includes both individuals who have been collecting for 20 to 30 years and new collectors.

Tell me about the beginning of Art Beat Istanbul.

The idea for an annual art fair came about as a response to this development and to Istanbul’s growing art scene. In recent years there has been a lot of speculation about the Turkish art market, and the fair has been conceived as a way to overcome some of this hype — offering galleries and their artists a platform to introduce themselves directly to arts professionals, collectors, and enthusiasts…

The Istanbul art scene has changed tremendously over the last few years. What are, for you, the most striking aspects of this development?

With little or no state support for the contemporary arts, the most remarkable development over the last decade has been the commitment shown by corporate and private patrons to supporting the arts. Corporations including Garanti Bank, Yapi Kredi, and Koç Holdings, Borusan Holding, and Siemens have played a vital role in providing a platform, via their support of arts foundations and museums, for young Turkish artists. There has been a growing trend for private collectors to open non-profit art organizations…

The Cats’ Eyes Controversy

Image from Radikal

The Hittite sun symbol used to be the logo of the capital city of Ankara, represented in decals, public signs, statues, and touristic tchotchkes. Then in 1995 an Islamist Welfare Party mayor changed the logo to one that featured prominent minarets. (click here for that story) The minaret logo was challenged in court and in 2007 was overturned.  The AKP mayor of Ankara suggested that instead the city use a new logo — the Angora cat, with its different colored eyes. The court, however, had decided that the city should return to its Hittite logo and rejected the cat substitution. (click here, in Turkish)

The IHH and Israel

An interesting essay by historian Howard Eissenstat about the influence of the IHH, a Turkish Islamist organization (best known abroad as the Turkish group on the Mavi Marmara flotilla boat) on Turkey’s relations with Israel. The full essay is here. An excerpt is below.

…The IHH initially developed as a response to the targeting of Muslims in the breakup of Yugoslavia. Despite harassment by the Turkish government and early controversies regarding use of funds and its relationship to militant Islamist groups, it has, since the 1990s, become one of the most effective and influential Islamic NGOs in Turkey…

The IHH played an even larger role in the dissolution of the Turkish-Israeli alliance, which the AKP has inherited from its predecessors. The close relationship between Turkey and Israel was largely the product of the Turkish military’s determination, in the 1990s, to define Turkish foreign policy. From the perspective of the AKP, a cooling of this relationship was attractive in terms of domestic politics (demonstrating that the civilian government had the final say over all matters of policy), electoral politics (Israel’s standing with the Turkish public was never high and declined precipitously after the Second Intifada), and for Turkey’s standing in the wider Middle East. In order to be an effective regional player, Turkey needed to be able to interact with Israel without appearing to be merely a U.S. proxy. Ideologically, politically, and strategically, the Turkish-Israeli alliance was an unwelcome inheritance for the AKP and grew increasingly sour over time. By 2009, Erdoğan was loudly berating the Israeli government for “knowing well how to kill,” while at the same time increasing Turkey’s contacts with Hamas and Hizbullah.

Although the IHH had facilitated these shifts, both by lobbying in Turkey and through its contacts in Lebanon and Palestine, its most dramatic contribution has been its participation in an international “Gaza Freedom Flotilla,” in 2010, which aimed to weaken the Israeli blockade of the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip by transporting humanitarian aid directly to the Port of Gaza, bypassing Israeli controls. Despite claims that it had no role to play, there is little question that the Turkish government supported the flotilla, facilitating the IHH’s purchase of the Mavi Marmara ferryboat from the AKP-controlled Istanbul Municipal Government…

Although the flotilla was certainly designed to prompt a confrontation that would embarrass Israel and weaken the embargo of Gaza, it seems unlikely that anybody had foreseen Israel’s clumsy attack on the flotilla, which left nine activists killed and dozens injured. Despite the high human costs, however, Turkey had the excuse it needed to finally end an awkward alliance with Israel, while its moral stature in the region was now unparalleled. Turkey’s economy, its cultural output, and the broad model of a Muslim democracy all are important elements of its improved standing in the Middle East. Nonetheless, the assertiveness with which it has positioned itself as a critic of American policy in the region, along with its increasingly vocal support of Palestinian rights, has put it in a class by itself. According to recent polls, Tayyip Erdoğan is the most admired foreign political leader in the Arab world and most Palestinians see Turkey as their best regional ally.

Nonetheless, the AKP seems to have calculated that, while it has no particular interest in a warming of relations with Israel, it also has little to gain from further heightening tensions. The AKP successfully persuaded the IHH to forego a second Gaza Flotilla in 2011. Diplomatic ties will continue to be cool, but Turkey has a strong enough tradition in multi-party talks to serve as a mediator if the opportunity arises. In the meantime, Turkey can enjoy the independence and prestige of a public estrangement. Israel, in turn, is left painfully aware that it needs Turkey far more than Turkey needs it. Official apology or no, hopes in Israel that the estrangement with Turkey is temporary are simply wishful thinking…

High-Stakes Poker

Escalating saber rattling by Turkey and Israel has turned a fixable spat into a potentially explosive situation with little chance for a return to dialogue. (click here) Turkey has threatened to send its warships to accompany the next protest flotilla to Gaza. Israel has pointedly mentioned that its navy is in fine mettle. Israel’s foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman who is infamous in Turkey for staging a photo shoot that gratuitously publicly humiliated the Turkish ambassador, has shot off verbal volleys suggesting that Israel punish Turkey by cozying up to the Armenian lobby in the US and to the PKK in northern Iraq (he has denied saying the latter).

These are probably the two most flammable subjects in Turkey and Lieberman’s sparks might well cause a conflagration much larger than Israel expects. After two visits to Israel over the past two years and speaking with Israelis across the political spectrum and in all walks of life, I can say with confidence that ignorance about Turkey’s internal politics — what makes Turkey tick — is so widespread as to be shocking. Instead, Israeli policy toward Turkey seems to be based on stereotypes about the intentions and characteristics of “Muslims” that makes no differentiation between Turks and Arabs, or even between Arab states.

On the Turkish side, politics is driving much of Turkey’s reaction — not Islam (although anti-semitism does play a role). The AKP is in a position to lead the Arab world, an area to which it believes it has historic ties. It has beaten Iran at that game and has taken away some of its cachet by being the more proactive in pro-Palestinian affairs. It’s no secret that few Arab states care enough about the Palestinian plight to do much about it. They allowed anti-Israel sentiment to be expressed in their countries because it let off steam that might otherwise be directed against their own authoritarian governments. Turks are new to this game and have historically had good ties with both Palestinians and Israel, so there is still a genuine dose of desire to help the Palestinians as well as a refusal to be pushed around by the Israelis (who killed 9 Turks in the last flotilla). On the other hand, it is hard not to believe that hard-nosed politics is behind Turkey’s response — it is positioning itself to be a regional leader. Attacking Israel (verbally for now) is a well-thumbed calling card.