By Black Box Voting staffers, with the assistance of citizen volunteers including John Dean, Linda Franz, John Howard and Catherine Ansbro (with a tip of the hat to Brad Friedman). Permission granted to quote or reprint, with link to <u>http://www.blackboxvoting.org</u>.

The Diebold Persuasion Machine

INTRODUCTION

This is an investigative report about money and persuasion. It's a report pertaining to public money spent on vulnerable voting machines, money which indirectly bankrolls a large lobbying and public relations machine designed to persuade taxpayers to accept voting machine purchases.

At the same time, employees of one vendor are engaging in activities to disrupt and discredit those who question the wisdom of purchasing these machines.

The public money used to purchase these machines belongs to you, the taxpayer. You control it. You are picking up the tab for voting machine vendors who ultimately control your elections through the software, hardware and "updates" they provide, through their technicians, and through their election management services. Thus, the truthfulness, business practices, and ethics of these voting machine vendors are very much your concern.

After reading about security vulnerabilities⁽¹⁾ built into Diebold voting machines, you may be wondering how your tax dollars manage to keep buying them. In fact, taxpayer money helps underwrite not just the machines, but the vendor's attorneys who fight lawsuits filed by citizen groups.⁽²⁾ Your money indirectly underwrites party boats and luncheons and open bars that curry favor with elections officials,⁽³⁾ along with the salaries of employees who engage in deceptive practices to discredit critics.

You pay for it all.

SEE INSIDE -- Diebold's inept PR continues – **Internet troll exposé**: Diebold's self-described "HTML ninja" accidentally outs himself on his own blog, then captures himself on wife's Webcam (Pg. 5); BradBlog troll "Wally O'Diebold's" reign of disinfo comes to a close (pg. 18).

See also: Salt Lake Tribune Article: <u>http://www.sltrib.com/utah/ci_3890918</u> Quote from David Bear, Diebold crisis management firm on <u>Hursti Report II</u>: "It's only a vulnerability to those who would commit a felony."

The Persuaders Who Are Publicly Disclosed

Diebold Election Systems, one of the largest voting machine vendors in the US,⁽⁴⁾ spends millions on PR and lobbying efforts, employing both in-house and outside personnel. Some of Diebold's PR activities fall under the category of "Governmental Relations" (lobbying). Diebold's elections division also employs an outside crisis management team, a corporate media specialist, and as you will see later in this report, certain Diebold employees engage in PR activities that are morally, ethically and legally questionable.

Two of Diebold's crisis management experts (David Bear and Marvin Singleton) are employed by powerful and politically connected Texas-based Public Strategies Inc. According to check stubs obtained by Black Box Voting, Diebold has paid as much as \$145,210 to Public Strategies in a single month.


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REF. NO.	INVOICE NO.	GROSS AMT.	DISC. TAKEN	NET PAID	
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2636	Jun 1 04	11,718.46	0.00	11,718.46	
2704	Jun 1 04	10,000.00	0.00	10,000.00	
2705	Jun 1 04	10,000.00	0.00	10,000.00	
2706	Jun 1 04	10,000,00	0.00	10,000,00	
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	TOTAL	145,210.80	0.00	145,210.80	

June 1-29, 2004 Public Strategies Inc. invoices paid by Diebold Election Systems

Diebold also employs Mark Radke, an unflappable media relations expert who skillfully frames the issues with reporters to favor Diebold's point of view.



Mark Radke Video of Mark Radke at work: <u>http://www.bbvdocs.org/videos/MarkRadke.mpg</u> **Dix & Eaton** is a PR firm in Cleveland that shows up in the midst of a \$100,000 "unidentified security expense" in Diebold's general ledger listing.



The account number for the unidentified \$100,000 gives a connection to Dix & Eaton

Diebold ''Governmental Relations'' Experts

It's no surprise that a company the size of Diebold has many governmental relations experts. Who are some of Diebold's lobbyists?

- **Greenberg-Traurig**, the firm associated with convicted power-lobbyist Jack Abramoff (2 felony counts), has done work for Diebold.

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Greenberg-Traurig check stub from Diebold

- **Darrell W. Hunt**, investigated by the FBI in connection with a <u>bribery scandal</u> in Louisiana, "works the halls" for Diebold⁽⁵⁾:

From:	Beckstrand, Mark
Sent:	Tuesday, July 06, 2004 4:56 AM
To:	Herron, Barry; Martin, Susan (DES)
Cc:	Morris, Sarah; Pickett, Robert
Subject:	RE: PCM for Conferences
Darrell has many	political and personal contacts and his presence and behind the scenes lobbying/information gathering, the whatever Robert and I will be able to accomplish. While we are working the floor, he will be working
the halls.	ICS WINITERED IN THE DE SDIE TO SCONTINIST. WITHE WE BIG WORKING THE HOOT, HE WIN DE WORKING


(Louisiana lists Darrell Hunt as Diebold lobbyist)

- **Gilbert Genn**, a lobbyist paid by Diebold, also worked for Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC) while the SAIC was commissioned to evaluate Diebold's product.⁽⁶⁾

1 GL-JE Jan 31 03 ACCRUE GENN INITIAL RETAINER	
1 GL-JE Jan 31 03 ACCRUE 2ND HALF OF FEREY PYMT	
2 GL-JE Feb 29 03 RVSE JE2003-0147 SUCCESS FEES	2003-0220 206,825.00
2 GL-JE Feb 26 03 RVSE JE2003-0156 FEREY NOV	2003-0227 25,000.00
2 GL-JE Feb 28 03 RVSE JE2003-0150 GENN INI RET	20/13-0227 10,000.00

Disbursement to Gilbert Genn from Diebold Election Systems General Ledger

- **Rose & Kindel's** senior communications manager, Adan Ortega Jr., received an appointment with Calif. Secretary of State Bruce McPherson's new administration. Hiring an executive from Diebold's lobbying firm raised eyebrows among election integrity groups because it was an apparent conflict of interest. At the time, the Secretary of State was in the process of deciding whether to certify Diebold machines. Other concerns have been raised about the accuracy and truthfulness of reported Diebold payments to Rose & Kindel. California law requires reporting of how much lobbyists are paid by their clients. There is a discrepancy in what was reported to the state (April-June, 2004 only \$7,526 was reported) -- yet check stubs obtained by Black Box Voting reveal actual payments for May and June alone totaled \$45,248.



Rose & Kindel check stub from Diebold -- This is six times as large as Diebold reported in required lobbying disclosure forms (more on Rose & Kindel/Diebold)

- According to disclosure forms, Diebold Election Systems' Ohio lobbyists simultaneously acted as lobbyists for the Ohio Association of Elections Officials:

Clark	Neil S	137 East State Street	Columbu
Given	Mitchell L	8168 Lombard Way	Dublin
Hughes	Jonathan S	8168 Lombard Way	Dublin
Minton	Andrew	137 East State Street	Columbu
Tipps	Paul	137 East State Street	Columbu
Clark	Neil S	137 East State Street	Columb
Ockerman	Aaron M	137 East State Street	Columb
Tipps	Paul	137 East State Street	Columb
	Given Hughes Minton Tipps Clark Ockerman	Given Mitchell L Hughes Jonathan S Minton Andrew Tipps Paul Clark Neil S Ockerman Aaron M	Given Mitchell L 8168 Lombard Way Hughes Jonathan S 8168 Lombard Way Minton Andrew 137 East State Street Tipps Paul 137 East State Street Clark Neil S 137 East State Street Ockerman Aaron M 137 East State Street

In 2005, the same "State Street" lobbyists are representing Diebold voting machines and Ohio elections officials. Here is the Ohio Lobbyist list for 2005: <u>http://www.bbvdocs.org/ohio-lobbyists-2005.pdf</u>

Ohio is an important state. It's not really surprising that Diebold would have 5 lobbyists representing their interests, although it *is* surprising that, at the same time, some of these same lobbyists would also be representing the interests of the Ohio Association of Election Officials, whose members are the very customers to whom Diebold sells.

- Diebold's financial documents show hundreds of thousands of dollars in "success fees." The term generally refers to contingent "pay to play" fees and therefore "success fees" are frowned on (or illegal) in the lobbying business. Paul Tipps, Diebold's former Ohio lobbyist, became so disgusted with governmental "pay to play" that he left his lobbying firm to form an organization to clean up government.

http://www.bayoubuzz.com/boards/philboard_read.asp?id=1163

Many states prohibit contingent fee lobbying, the usual connotation of "success fee."

11	GL-JE	Nov	30	03	ACCRUE	SUCCESS	FEES	1103	2003-1156	242.775.00
12	GL-JE	Dec	31	03	ACCRUE	SUCCESS	FEES	DEC	2003-1210	186,783.33

Diebold Election Systems general ledger showing "success fees" (click here for full general ledger page)

The Undercover Persuaders

Clandestine attack campaigns are real. They can divide us and dilute our power as a united citizenry with a common goal.

Lobbyists and Public Relations practitioners are usually identified so that the public and the people being lobbied know the interests whom they represent.

Not so on the internet, where people with a vested interest sometimes hide behind a shield of assumed anonymity to conduct attacks against the targets of their choosing – for example, those who oppose their business interests.

Such is the case with at least one high level employee of Diebold Election Systems who has been using false identities to engage in aggressively distributed internet attacks targeting those who expose weaknesses in electronic voting systems. The disinformation spread through the Internet is vicious, and considerable effort has been taken to hide its origin.

At best, using a sham identity to conduct such practices may tread into the area of false advertising. At worst, it can be deemed a criminal offense. Under U.S. Code Title 47, Chapter 5 Subchapter II Part I § 223, utilizing a telecommunications device without disclosing identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass is prohibited, and this definition does include use of the Internet.

http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode47/usc_sec_47_00000223----000-.html

Meet the cyberguys: "Wally O'Diebold", "Jean-Claude Van Camme" and "therealrobp"



Diebold's "therealrobp" administers "Blackboxwatchdog.com," a Web site which specializes in skillfully written disinformation, attacking anyone who gets in the way of Diebold's business interests. Let's have a look at the headline that appeared on the deceptive "Blackboxwatchdog " Web site for 11 months, attacking the credibility of a specific reporter:

Case Studies in Dishonest Reporting, Part 1: Ian Hoffman

Ian Hoffman is an *Oakland Tribune* newspaper reporter who was one of the first mainstream news reporters to report flaws in Diebold voting systems. He published internal documents from Diebold's law firm, Jones Day, in which lawyers were advising Diebold that continuing to deliver uncertified equipment could result in criminal charges. In the documents, Jones Day proposed a budget for Diebold's criminal defense. A lawsuit over Hoffman's publication of the Jones Day documents followed; when that did not succeed, a Web site was set up attacking Hoffman's credibility.*

Although accusations against Hoffman remained on the website for 11 months, this was not the first attack to originate from the site. On May 26, 2005 in Leon County Florida, Black Box Voting sponsored a demonstration of some of the security vulnerabilities of a Diebold optical scan voting machine. The demonstration itself was conducted by Harri Hursti, a Finnish computer security expert.⁽⁷⁾ Within hours of the demonstration, Blackboxwatchdog was launched, and a few days later the site promised to debunk Hursti's report about Leon County.

The Blackboxwatchdog site posts general disinformation like this:

"Black Box Voting -- an organization now thought by many to be fraudulent."

(referring to the most recent Black Box Voting/Hursti report): "OK, I plagiarized this too. So sue me.

The site began by hurling general accusations at election integrity activists, then posted the anti-Ian Hoffman story. The Hoffman attack was replaced by a new story, once again attacking security expert Harri Hursti, this time alleging that Hursti and employees of Black Box Voting (naming Kathleen Wynne, Bev Harris, Jim March) were soon to be arrested for felony vote-tampering.

^{*}The alleged leaker of the Jones Day documents, Stephen Heller, has since received retaliation in the form of felony charges. To donate to Stephen Heller's defense, please visit <u>http://www.hellerlegaldefensefund.com</u>. More on Heller: <u>http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/1954/27423.html</u>

Hursti had written two critical security alerts pertaining to Diebold voting systems, both of which have received strong support from the U.S. scientific community. His work has been reported by the Associated Press, *Newsweek*, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* and has resulted in negative media stories for Diebold Election Systems.

In addition, Blackboxwatchdog attacks the organization that sponsored Hursti's studies, though these efforts consist primarily of ridiculing its founder, Bev Harris, with sarcastic statements like this:

"Ms. Harris rarely seems to do anything more significant than go to the bathroom without documenting her self-professed heroics on videotape."

Hoffman, Hursti, Harris and Black Box Voting are not the only ones to feel the wrath of Blackboxwatchdog. The site lobs unfounded accusations of bogus financial misdeeds at Joan Krawitz, co-founder of Vote Trust USA (<u>http://www.VoteTrustUSA.org</u>).

Utah election reform advocate Kathy Dopp (<u>http://www.utahcountvotes.org</u>) is belittled by an editor for the site who conceals his real name, calling himself "zerocool" (a pseudonym taken from the movie "hackers"). Blackboxwatchdog also levels criticisms against products made by two of Diebold's competitors, Sequoia Voting Systems and Election Systems & Software.

Attorneys who have dared to go up against Diebold are also subjected to Blackboxwatchdog attacks. Lowell Finley is currently suing to remove Diebold TSx touch-screens from our elections process with a group he co-founded, <u>http://www.VoterAction.org</u>. The site tries to drag elections attorney Lowell Finley through the mud, dropping made-up hints of improprieties in his handling of funds for a client.

Considerable effort appears to have been taken to hide the origin of the Blackboxwatchdog Web site. Blackboxwatchdog displays the following banner:

blackboxwatchdog.com is not owned, operated by or associated with any other group, vendor or activist organization.

This statement is false. Volunteer citizen researchers at Black Box Voting uncovered the following information tying the site to a Diebold employee who has been hiding behind various false identities.

"Jean-Claude Van Camme"

The current registration data for any web site can be reviewed through what is called a WHOIS search. A WHOIS search returns the name and address of the registrant, along with the required contact information. In addition, there are services available which provide the history of changes of WHOIS registrant information. (If you are unfamiliar with WHOIS searching, a check of your favorite search engine will help).

WHOIS registration information for Blackboxwatchdog.com:

Registrant: Jean-Claude Van Camme 77 E Main St Tucker, Georgia 30085 United States (917) 210-6543

Registered through: GoDaddy.com, Inc. (http://www.godaddy.com) Domain Name: BLACKBOXWATCHDOG.COM Created on: 27-May-05 Expires on: 27-May-07 Last Updated on: 27-May-05

The address given is nonexistent; the phone number is a New York City-based cell phone account which, although it appears to be live, on numerous occasions has never been answered nor does it have voicemail.

As it turns out, "Jean-Claude Van Camme" owns another Web site: <u>http://www.camlives.com</u>

Jean-Claude Van Camme 4426 Hugh Howell Rd Ste B Tucker, Georgia 30084 United States

Registered through: GoDaddy.com, Inc. (http://www.godaddy.com) Domain Name: CAMLIVES.COM Created on: 17-Feb-02 Expires on: 17-Feb-07 Last Updated on: 18-Mar-04 2063396085

Reader discretion is advised - the camlives.com site contains adult-oriented material. Although the address in Tucker Georgia is different, which might suggest that someone else was using the same name, a check of the registrant information change history shows that until mid-May 2006 the address used was **77 E. Main Street, Tucker Georgia**, precisely the same as Blackboxwatchdog.com. The new address is actually a commercial mailbox service, and the phone number is a portable phone that goes to a messaging center.


An internet search for Jean-Claude Van Camme returns the following link: http://www.webhostingtalk.com/archive/thread/252422-1.html

This link shows an apparent dispute between a representative of an internet hosting service, and an individual using the name "therealrobp" who signs himself "RobP," in which the hosting company points out the misleading nature of the contact information for CAMLIVES.COM, the web site around which the dispute centers. In one message the hosting company chides RobP for registering the site with a false identity, "Jean-Claude Van Camme." RobP identifies the site as being owned by his wife, and says that he is the administrator of the box.

In fact, there are numerous sites apparently owned or administered by RobP and his wife, a beach girl from North Carolina, most of which are teaser sites for a pay-per-click porn scheme.

abadteen.com acamcouple.com acamgirl.com camlives.com furiosity.com

It is the furiosity.com Web site that begins to lead us back to **Diebold Election Systems**. On furiosity, RobP reveals that he is a programmer who in April 2003 relocated to the Vancouver, BC area to take a job. [Vancouver happens to be where the Diebold Election Systems programmers office is located]. He continued to talk about himself until April 2004 when he explained that he has been too busy '...making the world safe for democracy...' to update his diary.



RobP then claims, presumably in jest, that he's been "working undercover for the government." In this graphic from the furiosity site we get our first suggestion of RobP's appearance.



Who, moi?? I've just been working undercover for the government, that's all. ;)

In his online profile at a site called LiveJournal.com, which he links to in his furiosity.com Web site, RobP describes himself as "an HTML ninja, a hotshot software guy and a spy."



Rob P, captured by his own Webcam

Although usually only seen from behind, on one of the websites with which he is connected RobP has a live webcam where you can view some of his activities.

Rob P. refers to his more unsavory work in one of his diaries:

"...But enough said about boring work stuff. Nobody really wants to hear about HTTP tunneling or snooping on the illicit activities of other people on your subnet."

In one of his online diaries, RobP describes the car he drives and the one he purchased for his wife. His wife is originally from Wilmington, North Carolina. She writes about staying at the family "beach house" (Kure Beach, NC). She says in her blog that she moved to the Vancouver area after marrying Rob in October 2003.


Yes, I specifically asked for the gayest car on the lot. Woo... brand new bright yellow celica. It's sort of girly and not necessarily my first choice but give me

Speaking of cars, after a gruelling all-day shopping adventure last weekend we went out Tuesday night to buy [redacted] a new car. She got a little green Kia

Both RobP and his wife provide abundant information about themselves, including photographs of their Vancouver area home. (With a green Kia out front)



RobP also frequents the Diebold section of the Yahoo financial message board, where he's been known to ridicule Diebold stockholders who are nervous about their position.



While "therealrobp" character on Yahoo, claims to be from Wilmington, NC rather than from the Vancouver area of BC, Wilmington was the home of his wife prior to her moving to BC.

He repeatedly attacks Black Box Voting and its founder, Bev Harris, engaging in a pattern of talking points and inaccurate statements trying to convince stockholders to ignore whatever they read if it comes from Black Box Voting.

Re: Diebold voting unit names exec

08/24/04 04:10 pm Msg: 8451 of 12135

by: therealrobp (34/M/Wilmington, NC)

You are not worth my time. Run along and tell your pal Bev Harri\$ that if she wants to debate e-voting sometime I'll be here to expose her pathological lies and crush her like the bug that she is.

"Bev Harris says *a lot* of crazy-ass nonsense. That's why she's been thoroughly discredited..."

"...conspiracy nutcases like Bev Harris and ultra-leftwing blogger web sites."

"Of course all the same information is available just by reading any of Ms. Harris' crazy ramblings."

"This crazy old woman and the organization she runs have exactly zero credibility. It boggles the mind that people believe her mindless drivel..."

"On the other had, I *also* totally know that the board of directors is made up entirely of friends and family of Ms. Harris..."

But does Rob P work for Diebold?

A check of a Diebold staff list identifies only two employees whose name is Rob or Robert and whose surname begins with the letter 'P' - a Rob Pelletier whose location was unspecified, and a Robert Pickett located in North Carolina.

Rob	Pelletier	R&D	- DE	
Robert	Pickett	Sales	Jamestown	NC

While the North Carolina employee may be the most obvious possibility, the other name proved to be correct.

Like most major metropolitan areas in North America, Vancouver, British Columbia is made up numerous adjoining municipalities each of which bears its own name. While a city in its own right, Surrey, BC is part of the greater Vancouver area.

Black Box Voting volunteers located an address in Surrey, BC belonging to a Rob and [redacted wife's name] Pelletier. Photographs of the house taken by Black Box Voting researchers bear an uncanny resemblance to the home shown in the photographs posted by RobP and his wife. Even the rocking chair on the porch is the same.





Outside the home, are two vehicles - a yellow Toyota Celica and a Green Kia, precisely as described by RobP in his blog.





The plate number of the Yellow Toyota Celica outside Rob Pelletier's house is 722BJW:



Could this be a different Rob Pelletier than Diebold's Pelletier?

We know that Rob Pelletier from Surrey drives a yellow Toyota Celica but is THIS Rob Pelletier connected with Diebold?

The offices of Diebold Election Systems in Vancouver BC are located at Suite 350-1200 73rd Avenue West, in a 14 story-high building known as Airport Square. This building is equipped with both ground level and underground parking.

http://www.1200-west-73rd.com



Diebold Election Systems Inc 604-261-6313 350-1200 73rd Avenue West, Vancouver, BC V6P 6G5



Airport Square: Front view & side view

Here's the parking garage for the Airport Square Building:





Let's go to the videotape: <u>http://www.bbvdocs.org/diebold-disinfo/rob-diebold.mpg</u> (12-second video)

Watch as a yellow Toyota Celica drives into the garage at the Diebold election Systems Office and compare the plate number, 722BJW, with that of the vehicle outside the Surrey home of Rob Pelletier. An earlier phone call to the Diebold Election Systems office in Vancouver confirmed that Rob Pelletier does in fact work at that office.

What does Rob Pelletier do for Diebold?

He seems to have a key position which carries a high degree of trust. Here is Rob Pelletier (misspelled, as "Pelltier") listed in a select group of the key Diebold people meeting with the Calif. Secretary of State's staff in December:

a/	First Participant's Name:	Diebold Election Systems, Inc.
6)	First Participant's Address:	P.O. Box 1019, Allen Texas
c)	First Participant's Representatives:	Dave Byrd, Marvin Singleton. Talbot Iredale, Tari Runyon, Rob Pelltier and Cathi Smothers
d)	Second Participant's Name:	Paul Craft
e)		
Ŋ	Second Participant's Representatives:	Paul Craft
g)	Disclosing Party:	Diebold Election I) Disclosure Start Date: December 21. Systems, Inc 2005
h)	Receiving Party:	j) Disclosure End Date: December 21, 2005
k)	Provide and the second s	5 years from the date of disclosure
ŋ	Description of Information Provided by First Participant	Access to the Diebold Election Systems equipment in a testing environment; also access to certain proprietary components of the system hardware, software and firmware which are being tested by the State of California.
m) Description of Information Provided by Second Participant:	No information will be provided by the Second Participant
n,	Permitted Use of the Information:	Observation of the Diebold Election Systems voting equipment in testing environment conducted by the State of California, and comment on such testing.

1. The information subject to coverage under this Agreement ("Information") is that shown in the above Description of Information, sections I-m, and is claimed to be confidential by the Disclosing Party. To be covered hereunder, Information must be disclosed by the Representative of the Disclosing Party to the Representative of the Receiving Party between the Disclosure Start Date and the Disclosure End Date. Information disclosed to the Receiving Party before the Disclosure Start Date and the Disclosure End Date. Information disclosed to the Receiving Party before the Disclosure Start Date and the Disclosure End Date. Information disclosed to the Receiving Party before the Disclosure Start Date and the Disclosure End Date.

In late 2005 Black Box Voting was invited by the California Secretary of State to demonstrate some security vulnerabilities of one of the Diebold voting systems. The Secretary of State's office sent Black Box Voting an electronic document outlining the test protocols that would be allowed.

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At Black Box Voting, we referred to the above "hack test" proposal as "the turkey shoot" – not just because it was served to us at Thanksgiving, but also based on the absurdity of the test protocols. Internal details of the electronic document revealed that it was written by none other than Rob Pelletier, and was then distributed to Black Box Voting by the California Secretary of State's office.

Does anyone else from Diebold promote Blackboxwatchdog?

According to public records obtained by Black Box Voting from San Joaquin county, another key Diebold employee, **Steve Knecht**, has been e-mailing California elections registrars recommending Pelletier's site without disclosing that the site belongs to a Diebold employee.

Email from Steve Knecht to San Joaquin County elections registrar:

"Why don't you put this URL out on elecnet after you've had a chance to review the web site. If you agree, let all the other registrars know about it. It finally **goes after the biased reporting of I an Hoffman**, **and goes after Bev as well**. Let's start promoting this site as a voice of reason!!!! Steve New website to counter black box voting: http://blackboxwatchdog.com/node

And there are more: Wally O'Diebold

"Wally O'Diebold," is another fake name Internet harasser who also happens to post from Surrey, BC. When "Wally O'Diebold" came to the popular "BradBlog" site, its owner Brad Friedman spotted the disinfo. Friedman writes:

"While he may be too cowardly to give his real name publicly – even while sliming folks like myself, Bev Harris, Jim March, Avi Rubin, Sen. Debra Bowen and others who are not afraid to put our real names on our work and behind our beliefs – he's a Diebold insider with a lot of knowledge of the systems, and (WARNING) a lot of mis/disinformation he's suddenly very eager to spread."

Friedman supplied "Wally O'Diebold's" IP address to Black Box Voting volunteers and they found that "Wally O'Diebold's" IP address traces back to the Vancouver, BC area – Surrey, to be precise. The same suburb where we found Diebold's Rob Pelletier.

More: See Bradblog archive – <u>It's Hard Out Here for a Pimp; Diebold Gets Desperate</u>, <u>Sends a Pro to Work the Corner of BRAD Street</u>...

Whatever happened to Wally, anyway?

It seems that after his IP address in Surrey, BC was exposed on BradBlog, Wally quieted down (or at least changed his moniker; in a particularly creepy episode, a message promoting a new Blackboxwatchdog story appeared at DemocraticUnderground impersonating the name of Bev Harris's children; another IP leading back to Blackboxwatchdog showed up at BradBlog pretending to be Catherine Ansbro, who helped to write this article).

It turns out that Wally O'Diebold has been roaming the Internet spreading disruption for at least a year and a half. When Black Box Voting compared the BradBlog Wally O'Diebold IP address with our own logs, we discovered that "Wally O'Diebold" spends a lot of time on our Web site.

His IP address -24.86.46.74 – is the seventh most frequent IP visitor of all time at Black Box Voting.

Not all visits by Wally O'Diebold are benign. He is not shy about stealing the identities of others. An identity thief calling himself "The Real Pat Vesely" plagued the Black Box Voting web site with harassment posts for a while, imitating one of the writers who provides assistance to citizens in our consulting forum. The fake Pat Vesely's IP was "24.86.46.74" – **Wally O'Diebold**.

A character who called himself "The Real Jim March" (at the time a Black Box Voting board member) also showed up to disrupt the site, as did a "JimsMarch" and a "Bev Harris" that was not the real Bev Harris.

"NC Beach Girl" on DemocraticUnderground forums once posted a series of three messages revealing the timing of several visits to Black Box Voting. Checking our IP logs for the same three time periods showed that only a half-dozen visitors had visited at coinciding times. The IP address that best matches the times of the "NC Beach Girl" posts is "24.86.46.74" – Wally O'Diebold.

"The Real Rob P" also has many names and co-distributors for his information. He visits slashdot under "**omega_rob**"; the DemocraticUnderground forums feature "**NC Beach Girl**" distributing information about Blackboxwatchdog.

Rob Pelletier's messages are also distributed on the Yahoo financial message boards by a particularly vicious poster who goes by the name "**lalaneytrue**" ("the real Laney," who is also signed up at one of Rob P's sites). A "lalaneytrue" cybertrash message was, in turn, copied verbatim onto a heavily used programmers' forum called "Fark.com" – this time, hijacking the identity of Linda Franz who was at that time president of the board of directors for Black Box Voting.

The distributors in this disinformation campaign are recognizable because they cut and paste from each other to swap talking points and copy them to multiple Internet sites under several different "screen names."

Is any of this appropriate?

A Diebold employee under the persona of "Jean-Claude Van Camme" and other pseudonyms creates propaganda and spreads disruption around the Internet. When that same employee propagates disinformation to a financial message board frequented by stockholders, the question arises if such activities are appropriate – or legal – for a representative of a publicly held company

When a Diebold employee, **Steve Knecht**, recommends a deceptive Web site developed by another Diebold employee, **Rob Pelletier**, to public officials while they are involved in purchasing decisions, it's time to look at whether false advertising and unfair business practice statutes apply.

When another Diebold employee, Knecht, asks a California public official to promote a deceptive web site using the private email list of the California counties election officials, Knecht exposes officials to embarrassment and potential repercussions. Knecht admits the site targets a newspaper reporter and the head of an elections-related nonprofit civil rights group. Propriety dictates that at the very least, he should have warned election officials – Diebold's customer base – that the site was created and run by another Diebold employee.

Diebold is a company that already spends millions on advertising, PR, media relations and lobbying, indirectly paid for by taxpayer dollars. Those same dollars payroll certain employees engaged in Internet disinformation about activists, lawyers, and reporters.

As citizens, we have to ask: Don't you think it's time to bring back citizen oversight? If we allow this type of behavior to divide the election reform community, then perhaps we deserve what we get.

It's up to you to decide. You're paying for it.

Footnotes

(1) New York Times Article:

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/12/us/12vote.html?ex=1147579200&en=ec24b4b9312fc0 e5&ei=5087%0A Salt Lake Tribune Article: <u>http://www.sltrib.com/opinion/ci_3894209</u> http://www.blackbovoting.org/BBVtsxstudy.pdf http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVtsxstudy-supp.pdf

http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf

(2) USA Today, June 4 2006, "Spate of Lawsuits Target e-Voting" — Lawsuits have been filed in at least six states, the most recent last week in Colorado, to block the purchase or use of computerized machines...

http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-06-04-electronic-voting x.htm

(3) Party boats: <u>http://www.votersunite.org/takeaction/ElecCentMediaAlert.htm</u>
"Diebold Wines and Dines Elections Officials": <u>http://www.ejfi.org/Voting/Voting-47.htm</u>
"Guess Who's Going to Hollywood?"
<u>http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=87&Itemid=51</u>

(4) The largest voting machine vendors are: Diebold Election Systems (statewide systems in Georgia, Maryland, Utah, and Mississippi and Alaska; widely used in California, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Florida, Washington, and Massachusetts; Diebold systems are used in at least 30 states and count approximately one-third of all votes in federal elections); Election Systems and Software (closely rivals Diebold in size; very heavily used in Indiana, Oklahoma, Nebraska, Alabama, Arkansas, Texas, has a presence in most states); Sequoia Voting Systems (heavily used in New Jersey, in areas with heavy Hispanic populations including Riverside, San Bernardino and Santa Clara Counties (Calif.), also used in Palm Beach and Pinellas Counties (Fla.), in Chicago/Cook County (III.) and throughout the state of Nevada. Sequoia machines dominate many areas where the gambling industry is heavily represented and also are used in many areas with high Hispanic voting populations. The fourth-largest vendor, Hart Intercivic, is widely used in Texas and has a presence in Orange County Calif.; Yakima and Skagit counties (Washington); Boulder County (CO) and a few other outposts.

(5) The New Orleans Times-Picayune, 23 July 2000: "A DIFFERENT KIND OF GATED COMMUNITY" and Saturday State Times/Morning Advocate, 29 April 2000: "Judge frees Bankston case figure"

(6) Washington Post, 28 Sept. 2003: Ehrlich Seeks Probe Over Ballot Machines; Contractor, Reviewer Used Same Lobbyist. "... Gilbert J. Genn, a former Montgomery County delegate, is registered as a lobbyist for Diebold Election Systems Inc., the company that has a \$55 million contract to provide the state with its electronic voting system, and Science Applications International Corp., the computer security company the state recently hired to examine the Diebold voting machines for flaws.

A FOLLOW UP: A formal ethics probe was launched by the state of Maryland, and ultimately concluded there was no wrongdoing. Nevertheless, Maryland taxpayers had to foot the bill for

the ethics probe, which was a response to the appearance of impropriety. Maryland did not learn that Genn represented parties on both sides until after the report was completed.

(7) From California Voting Systems Technology Assessment Advisory Board (VSTAAB): "Harri Hursti's attack does work: Mr. Hursti's attack on the AV-OS is definitely real. He was indeed able to change the election results by doing nothing more than modifying the contents of a memory card. He needed no passwords, no cryptographic keys, and no access to any other part of the voting system, including the GEMS election management server." http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/voting systems/security analysis of the diebold accubasic i nterpreter.pdf

About Black Box Voting

Black Box Voting is a nonpartisan, nonprofit elections watchdog group supported entirely by citizen donations. The organization and its founder, Bev Harris, have broken over 100 stories on problems with U.S. elections, all based on original research by Black Box Voting employees and citizen volunteers. Original research by Black Box Voting has been covered in the New York Times, Washington Post, Time magazine, Newsweek, and on ABC, NBC and CBS News as well as CNN, MSNBC, CNBC, and Fox News Network. Black Box Voting is well known for collecting videotaped, public records, internal documents and photographic evidence pertaining to election integrity issues.

If you would like to make a citizen donation to Black Box Voting, go to http://www.blackboxvoting.org/donate.html or mail to: Black Box Voting 330 SW 43rd St Suite K PMB 547 Renton WA 98055