Today I learned via Seattle Weekly that an Oregon blogger was deemed to be unprotected by Oregon’s shield law because, according to the judge, “Internet blogs” aren’t specified in that law.

Setting aside that any judicial opinion which uses the term “Internet blogs” as if any other kind exists should be considered de facto nonsense even if legally accurate, and with my standard proviso that I am not a lawyer, all that Marco A. Hernández proves in his decision, however, is that he is something of a shitty judge.

These statutes apply, however, only to actions for damages on account of a defamatory statement published or broadcast in a newspaper, magazine, other printed periodical, or by radio,television, or motion picture. O.R.S. 31.205, 31. 210. The Oregon Legislature has not expanded the list of publications or broadcasts to include Internet blogs. Because the statements at issue in this case were posted on an Internet blog, they do not fall under Oregon’s retraction statutes.

The problem here is that ORS 44.510 states that for the purposes of Oregon law the term “medium of communication” has “its ordinary meaning and includes, but is not limited to, any newspaper, magazine or other periodical, book, pamphlet, news service, wire service, news or feature syndicate, broadcast station or network, or cable television system.”

Read that again. The law begins its definition by stating that the term “has its ordinary meaning and includes, but is not limited to” the types of media which Hernandez cites in his ruling.

In fact, he himself in that ruling mentions the “not limited to” part but of course manages to neglect to mention the “has its ordinary meaning” part. And those two parts combined are what renders Hernandez’ ruling nonsense. Phrases like “its ordinary meaning” and “includes, but is not limited to” are there in conjunction with one another for a reason: to render the reading of the definition, and therefore the application of the shield law, in broad terms because the “ordinary meaning” of a term like “medium of communication” changes over time.

None of which touches on the other conclusion, which is that Oregon prohibits the use of the shield law in civil defamation lawsuits, or indeed any of the other conclusions to support his ruling that the blogger owes defamation damages.

But one can reach those conclusions without this obvious nonsense about Oregon’s shield law not applying to someone whose “medium of communication” clearly falls under “its ordinary meaning” in December of 2011 as well as what’s intended by “includes, but is not limited to”.