Today, we turn to risk #7 in our series of posts on Eurasia Group's Top Risks for 2012 and answer the most common questions we've gotten about it.

Here's a summary:

China -- Regional tension: A string of U.S. foreign-policy successes in Asia -- and the damaging of China's brand in the region -- have emboldened China's neighbors. The risk in 2012 is that Vietnam or the Philippines may test just how far U.S. security assurances will take them, provoking China into a maritime dispute. China has its own set of challenges in 2012, raising the risks of miscalculation and escalation.

Q- Why are China's neighbors feeling more assertive?

A- The U.S. had a very good year in Asia in 2011, while China's reputation suffered from an overly aggressive regional posture in 2010. The U.S. made gains in Asia on both security ties and economic diplomacy; it persuaded Japan to enter the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade talks, secured the stationing of 2,500 U.S. Marines in Australia; and will send 24 F-16 fighter jets to Indonesia and new coastal combat ships to Singapore. China's neighbors welcome the U.S. presence, because they recognize the importance of economic ties with China but don't want to become overly dependent on Beijing either economically or politically.

Q- How might China's neighbors push their interests against Beijing?

A- The South China Sea is the most likely arena of confrontation. Some of China's neighbors, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines, are eager to pursue oil and gas interests in areas that Beijing considers Chinese territorial waters, and the risk is that they will miscalculate that a heightened U.S. security presence will give them backing to do so. They may encourage oil and gas exploration in disputed territory or take a more aggressive posture against Chinese fishing interests or other Chinese vessels in contested waters.

Q- Why will it be harder to predict China's response to provocation in 2012?

A- There will be a lot going on within China's borders in 2012. China is focused on a once-in-a-decade leadership transition and has not resolved internal debates over its role on the world stage. The leadership vacuum and jockeying for power during the transition means China's response to provocations will be unpredictable -- perhaps even aggressive. The 2008-2009 financial crisis and resulting souring of confidence in the Western economic model led some Chinese leaders to push for a more aggressive foreign policy, which Beijing adopted in Asia in 2010. Dai Bingguo, the Communist Party's highest ranking foreign-policy official, resisted this push with a reaffirmation that China wants peaceful development and is not interested in challenging U.S. primacy. But Dai is retiring from government this year, and his replacement is unlikely to wield comparable influence with China's increasingly diverse set of foreign-policy actors and interests -- even if he shares Dai's views.

Asia is fraught with volatility and uncertainty in 2012. Investors and corporations should pay attention-the risks of misperceptions and unforeseen tensions in Asia are on the rise.

Next up, the dramatic twists and turns along Egypt's road toward democracy.

Today, we turn to risk #6 in our series of posts on Eurasia Group's Top Risks for 2012 and answer the most common questions we've gotten about it.

Here's a summary:

Pakistan: Turmoil and spillover  -- Pakistan's economic and security challenges will become more difficult in 2012, driven by weak governance, the spread of extremism, and deteriorating ties with the U.S.. The state will not collapse, but the risk of severe political instability is growing, not just for Pakistan but also the region, as the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan.

Q- What are the Pakistani government's biggest problems?

A- There is the weak economy, the government's deteriorating finances, a hostile military, judges spoiling for a fight over corruption charges, determined militants who have proven they can strike virtually anywhere inside the country, and worsening ties with a key source of direct and indirect financial aid -- the United States. Flooding last year did considerable damage to exports of rice and cotton, undermining the country's balance of payments position. Higher electricity subsidies and renewed pressure for large financial bailouts for cash-strapped public sector enterprises (especially airlines and railways) will also limit the government's ability to mind the budgetary gap.

The best thing this government has going for it is that neither the opposition nor the military wants responsibility for this mess and aren't ready to try to force the ruling party from power -- at least not yet.

Q- How does the beginning of withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan feed these problems and what is the risk of spillover?

A- A smaller U.S. footprint in the region will feed financial insecurity in Pakistan, because Washington will probably reduce development aid to the country and roll back Coalition Support Funds, a reimbursement program for Pakistan's counter-terrorism cooperation. Pakistan isn't totally dependent on U.S. aid, but it does plan on external financing from the U.S. and other donors when it prepares a domestic budget.

The U.S. drawdown will also add to Pakistani fears that Washington is passing leadership in Afghanistan to India, allowing Pakistan's long-time rival to encircle the country. That's not purely paranoia. India's development and diplomatic presence in Afghanistan is real, and the two governments signed a strategic partnership agreement last year. India also wants to build on traditional ties with the country's Northern Alliance groups, the Taliban's most obvious rival for power. That's why Pakistan will resist calls from Washington to increase pressure on the exiled Taliban leadership living within its borders this year, because the Pakistani military and security services may calculate that the Taliban will again become their most reliable friend inside Afghanistan.

This dynamic is bad for the entire region, because it undermines progress toward South Asian economic integration at a time when India's fast-growing energy demand, Pakistan's energy crisis, and Afghanistan's obvious development needs are only becoming more urgent. The Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement, for example, probably won't be extended to include India anytime soon.

Q- Does all of this raise the terrorist threat to India?

A- Whenever the Pakistani government pushes the Pakistani military to attack militants inside the country, those militants have a compelling incentive to try to launch an attack inside India. That's because when India goes on high alert, Pakistan's military will always turn its attention to threats from India's military. Let's be clear: heightened risk does not mean an attack will happen. The success of a particular attack comes down to the capabilities of the attackers, the effectiveness of Indian security officials and police, and some degree of luck. But this is certainly a threat that India will take seriously

Next up, China and its nervous neighbors.

Today, we turn to risk #5 in our series of posts on Eurasia Group's Top Risks for 2012 and answer the most common questions we've gotten about it.

Here's a summary:

North Korea: Implosion or explosion? North Korea recently became the world's first nuclear-­armed power without a clear leader, and competition and uncertainty within the ruling elite pose significant risks for East Asia in 2012. The secretive nature of the regime makes the likeliest threat -- belligerent military action or substantial domestic instability -- less predictable and much more worrisome.

Q- Is Kim Jong-Un really in charge in North Korea?

A- There's always been a clear limit on what outsiders know about how the North Korean elite makes decisions. That's still the case. But there are plenty of reasons to doubt that this political novice is fully in charge. He hasn't had much time to prepare for his new job. His grandfather Kim Il-sung brought his father, Kim Jong-Il, gradually into power over more than 20 years. Kim Jong-Il inherited the keys to the kingdom in 1994 at the age of 53. The preparation of 28-year-old Kim Jong-Un began only recently as it became apparent that Kim Jong-Il's health was failing.

For the moment, the regime appears stable. Kim Jong-­Il's family and entourage -- the so-­called guardians --look to have firm control of the ruling Korean Workers' Party and the Korean People's Army. The country's military continues to serve as guarantor of North Korea's baseline security. In the two years before his death, Kim Jong­-Il positioned his brother­-in-­law and the regime's previous number two, Jang Sung-­Taek, as regent for his son. Jang is believed to have strong personal ties with senior military officials, and he'll probably hold considerable power -- at least until Kim Jung-­Un can earn the confidence of the country's ruling elite. If Kim can't consolidate power, the guardians may push for another leader to ensure the survival of the regime. But for the moment, it's probably some combination of Kim Jong-Un's status, Jang Sung-­Taek's resourcefulness, and the military's authority that gives the regime whatever cohesion it now has.

Q- Why can't this arrangement last indefinitely?

A- The steady deterioration of North Korea's economy and infrastructure over several decades, particularly outside the capital, ensures that this new generation of leaders will have less political capital and a less sure popular mandate than their predecessors. Conflicts are likely to develop within the elite as rivals and factions compete behind the scenes for power and personal survival. There is evidence that, once he knew he was ill, Kim Jong-­Il tried to sideline as many as possible of his son's potential rivals. In fact, there were a suspicious number of fatal automobile accidents involving senior officials over the past two years -- all the more striking given how little traffic there is in the country. Some officials still in power probably wonder how long they can remain in favor and could move to protect themselves. It's also unclear what role Kim Kyung-­Hee, Kim Jong-­Il's sister and Jang Sung-­Taek's wife, might play in coming months.

Q- It seems clear that there's a threat of aggressive action from North Korea, since they've stirred up trouble many times before. There's also always the risk that the government will collapse. That could create a refugee crisis and a scramble for control of the country's nuclear weapons that draws in outside powers. But beyond 2012, what's the long-term risk for North Korea and its neighbors?

A- The DPRK has defied predictions of collapse for decades, mainly because China and South Korea have always been willing to bail the country out to avoid another war on the peninsula and to prevent North Koreans from starving. Yes, there is the risk that North Korea might use its nuclear capability. Even if it doesn't, its conventional arms are powerful enough to launch a horrendous attack on the South. This is also the scenario most likely to put U.S. and Chinese forces at odds with another and in the same arena.

But the longer-term problem is that, despite the efforts of outsiders to keep things going, North Korea will one day buckle beneath the weight of its contradictions, and an international debate will begin about who will pay to clean up the mess. Studies conducted over the years suggest that the reunification of North and South Korea will prove more complicated and far more expensive than the reunion of East and West Germany. Who will pay for it? Imagine the stresses on South Korea and its economy as 20 million North Koreans come in from the cold. Today this is hypothetical, but one day it will be a very real problem.

One of the most important lessons of last year's Arab world turmoil is that brittle authoritarian regimes can remain in place for a very long time with changes ongoing beneath the ice that outsiders don't see until cracks emerge. Anyone could have predicted that the governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria were vulnerable, but no one could have seen that the desperate act of one Tunisian vegetable vendor broadcast across the Arab world would trigger a wave of revolutions.

Given North Korea's isolation and the regime's secrecy, the fall of North Korea might come even more abruptly.

Next up, dark clouds over Pakistan.

Today, we turn to risk #4 in our series of posts on Eurasia Group's Top Risks for 2012 and answer the most common questions we've gotten about it.

Here's a summary:

The United States- Right after elections. Congress won't accomplish much as members face re-election and the presidential horserace develops over the first ten months of the year. But once the votes are counted, a couple of multi-trillion-dollar decisions with substantial long-term importance must be made quickly.

Q- You say that the lame duck session will be especially important this year. Why are the stakes so high?

A- Decisions have to be made by the end of 2012 on the future of the Bush tax cuts and on whether to waive the automatic spending cuts triggered by the failure of the congressional super-committee to agree on a long-term deficit reduction deal. Together, these issues will involve more than $5 trillion over the next decade, an amount large enough to have lasting influence on the trajectory of the U.S. economy. Even if there were more clarity on who will win the presidential election and on the post-election congressional balance of power, it would still be difficult to predict whether (and exactly how) the two parties can resolve these looming questions. In the meantime, companies and investors will have to cope with a lot of uncertainty in 2012 -- particularly about their own taxes and government contracts. This uncertainty will also weigh on economic growth this year.

Q- Isn't it possible that Democrats and Republicans will fail to agree on anything and that nothing will happen?

A- It's always possible that the leadership of the two parties and the White House will fail to reach a deal. But in this case, the failure to decide is a decision, because higher taxes would automatically go into effect and $1.2 trillion in cuts to government spending will move forward. Should lawmakers fail to agree on a solution by January 1, the next Congress could move in 2013 to retroactively reverse the impact. But the next class of legislators may prove no more amenable to compromise than the current one. Even if they succeed, these adjustments and readjustments would prove highly disruptive.

Q- How will the election results play into this risk?

A- If either party takes a big hit at the polls, its leaders will have clear incentives to reach a deal on tax and spending policies before their numbers decline in the new Congress. The other side would then have most of the bargaining leverage. But if the elections produce a continuation of divided government, the two parties would be much more likely to deadlock. The realistic best-case scenario is not so great either: Both sides could agree before the end of the year on yet another temporary fix, such as a partial or full extension of the tax cuts, combined with a delay on automatic spending cuts, and punt a solution to 2013. That outcome would be less disruptive than an expiration and a retroactive fix, but it would extend the uncertainty that companies and investors dread into next year.

Next up, keeping a watchful eye on North Korea.

Today, we turn to risk #3 in our series of posts on Eurasia Group's Top Risks for 2012 and answer the most common questions we've gotten about it.

Here's a summary:

Eurozone- The Muddle is the Risk. In Europe, it's not the breakup of the eurozone we need to fear in 2012 but a reactive, incremental approach to crisis management that will fail to satisfy investors and could push events beyond the control of political officials. The uncertainty and volatility we saw in 2011 has only just begun.

Q- Why can't European leaders solve this problem? Isn't it simply a question of collective political will?

A- There are many reasons why a grand bargain-style comprehensive fix is not going to happen. First, there is no common understanding of why this crisis is happening. Some say that the so-called peripheral countries -- Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain -- have failed to live within their means and now need Europe's stronger economies to bail them out. Others say that the divide between debtor and creditor nations has gotten too wide, and that countries like Germany, which has the second largest trade surplus in the world after China, are part of the problem. Still others say that the eurozone was doomed from the beginning by a governance system that allows for a common monetary policy but separate fiscal policies for each of its 17 members.

And it's in the interests of these players to disagree about the nature of the problem, because no one wants the lion's share of responsibility for solving it. Peripherals don't want core countries telling them how much to tax and spend. Core countries don't want to have to bail out less competitive economies. The European Central Bank (ECB) doesn't want to promise to backstop these problems for fear that it is mixing fiscal and monetary policy functions, and that any help it provides will allow governments to delay or avoid much needed structural reforms.

This is why the various leaders will do just enough this year to keep things from completely falling apart, but not much more. Peripheral countries will swallow the medicine of austerity, but they will continue to demand that sacrifice be shared. German Chancellor Angela Merkel's government will do enough to keep Europe intact, but not so much that her party's coalition partners and German taxpayers believe she has put Germany on the hook to bail out spendthrift countries whenever they get in trouble. The ECB will claim that its mandate does not include a guarantee against eurozone failure while working behind the scenes to help struggling governments stay afloat.

Finally, this is a complex problem, one that requires systemic changes to the eurozone itself. These changes will have to be negotiated and will take considerable time to implement. Much more than a few months.

Q- Then why are you confident that the eurozone won't simply collapse? If long-term confidence isn't restored, isn't it possible that markets will sink some eurozone members and break up the whole game?

A- That's a risk, but only a small one for 2012. No European government wants to see the euro go away. The single currency has allowed Germany to run up those large surpluses without the currency pressures they would face without it. The Greeks know that if the country leaves the euro, the value of its new currency would fall quickly -- while any debts it agreed to pay would still be denominated in euros. Default would wipe away some of the debt, but Greece can't walk away from all of its sovereign and corporate obligations. More than 70 percent of Greeks tell pollsters that they support their country's continued membership in the eurozone. And let's not forget that countries across Europe have invested tremendous hope and pride in the larger European idea. That's a hard thing to measure, but it's a crucial factor in Europe's cohesion.

Q- What's so dangerous about more "muddle through?"

A- There is going to be more market volatility in Europe this year, and growth across the eurozone will be painfully slow. Recession appears likely. Slower growth will make problems tougher to resolve, because all of the key negotiators will face greater pressure at home to drive a hard bargain with other governments and institutions. That's true for the core countries and the peripherals, particularly on issues that require ratification by domestic parliaments or public support expressed in a referendum. Adoption of the so-called European Stability Mechanism, essentially a crisis fund for governments in trouble, and establishment of a more tightly coordinated area-wide fiscal policy are the most obvious examples.

The broader risk is that half-measures will allow the eurozone to stumble along without its leaders ever really tackling the underlying problems. The peripheral countries need to change their behavior. Getting Greece back on its feet and restoring confidence in the balance sheets of larger countries is also crucial and will demand more than the incremental solutions currently in play-especially if its debt stock is to be made sustainable. But market confidence in the eurozone's long-term stability can't be fully restored without fundamental change to the design of the entire system.

Next up, the U.S. risk that no one is talking about. Yet.

Today, we turn to risk #2 in our series of posts on Eurasia Group's Top Risks for 2012 and answer the most common questions we've gotten about it.

Here's a summary:

G-Zero and the Middle East - The inability/unwillingness of major powers to bolster the region's balance of force will create new turbulence across North Africa and the Middle East in 2012 as unresolved political, sectarian, and ethnic tensions threaten more unrest. Continuing protests, autocracies under pressure, new democratic regimes fighting to establish stability, and the lack of a viable regional security framework will add to the potential turmoil. As this dynamic plays out in Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain, neighborhood heavyweights -- Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey -- will vie for influence and generate friction.

Q- What does 2012 have in store for the Arab Spring?

A- Last year's Arab world uprisings will have lasting impact on North Africa and the Middle East. Protesters in Egypt and Tunisia proved they could force an autocrat from power. Demonstrators in Syria and Yemen have pushed their governments to the brink. Muammar al Qaddafi, in power since the Beatles were cutting albums, is dead. Saudi Arabia had to send troops across the King Fahd Causeway to prevent insurrection in Bahrain.

But let's not overstate the lasting impact of last year's upheaval. In Egypt, Mubarak is gone but his support structure lives on, and the country's next president won't be the Egyptian equivalent of Vaclav Havel. The military remains firmly in charge and will share power with the Muslim Brotherhood. The protesters who made themselves famous in Tahrir Square last year will be the odd man out as Egypt looks to form its next government.

In Syria, Bashar Assad's presidency may not survive the year, but for the moment he remains in power. Military defections are a serious worry, but so far they've been limited. Sanctions hurt, but the business elites in Damascus and Aleppo haven't yet begun siding with the opposition and calling for his ouster.

In Libya, oil production is ramping back up, though not as quickly as the new government claims, but powerful militias show no signs of renouncing their individual ambitions and joining the new Libyan army.

Bahrain continues as a majority Shia state ruled by a Sunni monarch. Monarchs in Jordan and Morocco remain firmly in place.

The governments of Saudi Arabia and Iran face no existential internal threats. The Saudis appear poised for a smooth process of succession when King Abdullah dies, and though Iranian President Ahmadinejad remains on shaky ground, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei faces no direct near-term challenges.

That said, there is plenty of ongoing turmoil in some of these countries -- especially in Egypt, Syria, and Libya -- and Americans and Europeans don't believe they can afford direct intervention. U.S. troops are leaving Iraq, and there is no other outside power or alliance of powers capable of maintaining the region's delicate balance of power. That leaves local heavyweights -- especially Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran -- to compete for influence. None of them wants to get too involved in the complicated problems of its neighbors, but as the stakes rise in these less stable countries, they also face the risk of doing too little to bolster stability and to counter-balance their local rivals.

In short, the Middle East is top risk #2 this year because the absence of outside powers and the rivalries of local players could further destabilize a region that has already had its share of uncertainty and local violence.

Q- Syria remains in the headlines and there seems to be more violence in Iraq these days. What can we expect in these two countries?

A- In Syria, the risk is that prolonged stalemate will force the neighbors to intervene and bring things to a head. So far, the Arab League, led by Qatar, is most directly involved. As outside pressure on Assad increases, Iran may feel it has to bolster his government, one of the Islamic Republic's few reliable friends. The Saudis may decide that bringing the turmoil to a close means using their leverage to force Assad out, empowering Syria's Sunnis in the process. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's government may join them to put an end to the violence that has pushed many Syrians across the border into Turkey. Assad's fate may not be resolved quickly or easily, however, and Syria's troubles may extend well into 2012.

In Iraq, sectarian rivalry is filling the vacuum left behind by departing U.S. troops. Until recently the most exciting investment story in the Middle East, Iraq's stability is again in question. Nouri al-Maliki's government is no longer intent on accommodating Sunni Arab powerbrokers to keep the peace. In response, Sunnis who once opposed Kurdish demands for greater autonomy are now pushing to create a semi-autonomous bloc of their own in the Sunni-majority western provinces of the country. Here again, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey may calculate that they can't afford to hang back and let their rivals build new influence inside this country.

Q- What about Israel?

A- On the one hand, Israel will become more isolated. The Obama administration wants to reduce its risk exposure in the Middle East -- at least to the extent possible given the region's lasting importance for the United States -- and to focus more of its attention and resources on East Asia. In addition, Israel recognizes the surge of populism across the Arab world, and relations have become much more complicated with Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey. Add Iran's determination to continue development of its nuclear program and Israel will be on edge throughout this year. The risk has increased in recent weeks that Israel will face more violence in 2012 -- both within Israel and perhaps with Lebanon.

That said, whatever the differences between President Obama and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, U.S.-Israeli relations remain central to the domestic political health of both governments. Israel is not going it alone. And an Israeli military strike on Iran remains unlikely for two reasons. First, sanctions weaken Iran, even if only by forcing Tehran to sell oil to Asian states that will pay well below market prices for it. Second, sabotage, including via cyberattacks, appears to have slowed Iran's momentum in centrifuge development. This is a much less expensive and less dangerous approach than the conduct of bombing raids on Iranian territory.

Next up, another year of uncertainty for the eurozone.

Today, we begin a series of posts that detail Eurasia Group's Top Risks for 2012 and answers the most common questions we've gotten about each one.  

Here's a summary of risk #1:

The End of the 9/11 Era - It was a truism of globalization: economics drives markets, and national security drives geopolitics. No longer. In 2012, politics and economics will overlap almost entirely. Political officials around the world will worry mainly over economic risks. Market players, in turn, are anxious mainly about political decisions, especially those that will be made in Europe, America, and China this year, as shortsighted leadership from virtually all the major geopolitical players generates policy stalemate and uncertainty.

Q- You're calling this risk "the end of the 9/11 era." Surely you're not arguing that al Qaeda is no longer a threat to the United States?

A- Not at all. Bin Laden is dead, and many other al Qaeda leaders have been killed or captured. About 33,000 US troops are scheduled to leave Afghanistan in 2012, and the turmoil we've seen in North Africa and the Middle East over the past year has demonstrated al Qaeda's irrelevance for the Arab world's politics.

But the organization ceased to function as a centrally controlled network years ago. Its enduring power lies in its ability to inspire a few young people at the margins of society to become fundamentalist militants. This will continue to matter wherever political turmoil creates a vacuum of power. That's true for parts of North Africa, including Iraq and Libya, but especially in East Africa -- with Somalia (and perhaps Yemen) as an operational center of gravity.

By the "end of the 9/11 era" we mean that U.S. policymakers are now closing the book on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and refocusing foreign-policy priorities away from the "global war on terror" toward economic opportunities, particularly in East Asia. That's why, for example, we've seen Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spend so much energy on Asia policy and so much less time in the Middle East than her predecessors, despite the continuing turmoil there. This also reflects a trend within other governments to prioritize economic needs when making foreign and security policy decisions on a scale we've not seen in decades.

Q- You say that economic worries are driving political decision-making around the world and that politics are driving market outcomes. Why are these things dangerous? 

A- Policymakers around the world are deeply concerned with the fate of the eurozone, the resilience of the U.S. economy, and the ability of Chinese policymakers to implement a managed slowdown of China's economy. Three years ago, the financial crisis shifted the world's attention to global markets. In 2012, we'll see how far this process has evolved-from a drive for urgently needed international cooperation to a new "every nation for itself" approach to policy. The risk here is that neglected hotspots -- Pakistan, North Korea, Iran or something else -- will catch the world by surprise and move markets more than they should.

The second half of the risk has to do with differences between developed states and emerging markets. In 2012, the global economy will depend for much of its dynamism on potentially more volatile emerging market economies. Over the past decade, policymaking in many of these countries has become more transparent, predictable and foreign investor-friendly than ever. But unexpected shocks can still alter the business and investment environment more quickly and with greater force in China, India, Brazil and Indonesia than in the United States, Germany, Canada or Japan. At the same time, the U.S. and Europe, traditional anchors of global financial stability, will be almost entirely preoccupied with the need to repair balance sheets and restore long-term investor and consumer confidence.

Q- Back to the U.S., with official Washington focused on this year's elections, will U.S. lawmakers make any decisions of consequence this year? 

A- Absolutely. Right after the elections, Congress will have less than two months to haggle over the fate of the Bush tax cuts and the automatic cuts that come with last year's failure by the so-called super-committee to agree on a long-term fiscal deal. Those two items alone amount to more than $5 trillion in fiscal policy decisions. If Congress does nothing -- insert wisecrack here -- the cuts automatically go into effect.

In other words, Congress has decisions to make that will have profound and lasting implications for the U.S. economy. 

Today, The Call presents our top risks for 2012. Click HERE for Eurasia Group's complete report.

1. The End of the 9/11 Era -- It was a truism of globalization: economics drives markets, and national security drives geopolitics. No longer. Following the 2008 financial crisis, the killing of Osama bin Laden, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, and an end date for the war in Afghanistan, politics and economics will overlap almost entirely in 2012. Political officials around the world will worry mainly over economic risks -- the eurozone crisis, the strength of U.S. recovery, and China's evolving role in the global economy in 2012. Market players, in turn, are anxious mainly about political decisions, especially those that will be made in Europe, America, and China this year, as shortsighted leadership from virtually all the major geopolitical players generates policy stalemate and uncertainty.

2. G-Zero and the Middle East -- The inability/unwillingness of major powers to bolster the region's balance of force will generate greater turbulence across North Africa and the Middle East as unresolved religious, sectarian, and ethnic tensions threaten more unrest. The lack of a viable regional security framework, continuing protests, autocracies at risk, and enormous challenges facing newly democratic regimes will add to the potential turmoil. As this dynamic plays out in Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain, regional heavyweights -- Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey -- will generate friction as they vie for proxy influence.

3. Eurozone: the rollercoaster ride rolls on -- In Europe, it's not the breakup of the Eurozone we need to fear in 2012 but the "reactive incrementalism" that could spin beyond the control of political officials. The uncertainty and volatility we saw in 2011 has only just begun.

4. United States: right after elections -- Once the votes are counted in November, lawmakers will take up the $5 trillion worth of tax and savings decisions that must be taken in the final nine weeks of the year. Investors face uncertainty about their taxes and government contracts as well as about the broader impact of lawmakers' choices on economic growth.

5. North Korea: implosion or explosion -- The world's most opaque nuclear-armed state enters a year of uncertainty as the battle for power and influence within the regime gathers force.

6 - Pakistan: turmoil, spillover -- The end of the 9/11 era threatens neglect of other hotspots, and none is more combustible than Pakistan, a terrorism-plagued, nuclear-armed power burdened with an unpopular civilian government, a meddlesome military, politically motivated judges and an increasingly dangerous security environment. The expected withdrawal of thousands of U.S. troops from Afghanistan this year will fuel regional competition for new influence.

7. China: trouble in the neighborhood -- The Obama administration's recent emphasis on Asia will embolden China's neighbors to take more assertive positions with Beijing. Rising nationalism in China, its ongoing political transition, and the leadership's unwillingness -- perhaps inability -- to resolve internal debates about the country's role in the world suggest Beijing is especially likely to meet provocation with provocation in months to come with both naval and economic muscle.

8. Egypt: a transition in trouble -- Egypt faces the risk of political disintegration this year as anger builds between military and civilian political forces, both Islamist and secular. Egypt's base-line stability, its economic recovery, and its broader regional influence will suffer.

9. South Africa: populism ascendant -- The struggle for leadership of the ruling African National Congress will slow the pace of both policy and economic growth at a time when the eurozone crisis already weighs heavily on South Africa's trade and currency.

10. Venezuela: a no-win election -- The country's big political story this year is October's presidential election, which incumbent Hugo Chavez, if healthy enough for a vigorous campaign, is likely to narrowly win. But the outlook for economic and political stability is bad no matter the election result. Should Chavez die or abandon the race, the deep fissures between the Chavista movement and the opposition could stoke violence.   

In addition, Eurasia Group identifies four red herrings, the big stories we don't believe will happen in 2012.

Fallout from the 2012 political transitions -- In 2012, we'll see political transitions in the U.S., China, Russia, and France, countries that together represent nearly half of global GDP and four-fifths of the UN Security Council. But there's surprisingly little at stake in the outcomes for geopolitics and the global economy.

Eurozone breakup -- This is probably the single most overrated risk of 2012. The political will to maintain the eurozone remains strong among all the major political parties in the core Eurozone states, almost across the board in the European periphery and, just as importantly, among eurocrats in the ever-growing European bureaucracy. And there's no effective political mechanism for a Eurozone breakup.

China's hard landing -- There are signs of overheated growth in China, but the state has the tools and resources to manage short-term trouble, and it will pull out every stop to prevent a serious slowdown, especially during a major political transition.

Mayan apocalypse -- Just isn't happening. And if it does, well, sorry.

Over the next three weeks, we'll be posting more ideas and information on each of these risks.