Argument
James M. Dorsey
Wednesday, February 1, 2012
Wednesday's lethal soccer riots in the Suez Canal town of
Port Said, which left more than 73 spectators and security personnel dead, marks
a watershed moment in Egypt after the ouster of former president Hosni Mubarak.
This tragedy is not simply a story of a match gone horribly awry: It will have
important and wide-ranging political ramifications, further isolate militant,
highly politicized, violence-prone fan groups, single out the police for renewed
criticism, and strengthen calls for the imposition of law and order. [[SHARE]]
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POST
Khalil al-Anani
Tuesday, January 31, 2012
Despite its stunning victory
in the recent parliamentary elections, the image of the Muslim Brothers among revolutionary
Egyptians is enormously shaking. The clashes
between the movement's youth, who went to Tahrir Square to celebrate the
anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, and the revolutionary activists, who protested
against the military rule, reveals the widening gap between both groups. However,
the problem is not that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is less "revolutionary" than
other parties but rather because it simply cannot be.
Since its inception some
eight decades ago, the MB avoided revolution or comprehensive change and
embraced a gradual, sometimes sluggish, reform policy. Hassan al-Banna, the
founder and ideologue of the MB, abandoned the word "revolution" in all his
tracts instead advocating reform (Islah). More importantly, the social
construction of the movement's members disavows radical change for the sake of
gradual reform. The recruitment and socialization (tarbiyya) process,
which every MB active member has to undergo, advocates steady and incremental
reform of the self, society, and the state. Hence words like change,
confrontation, clash, etc. seem alien to the MB's leaders and cadres. More
significantly, whereas the "bottom-up" approach, which was espoused by the MB
for decades, entrenched its social presence, nevertheless, it aborted its
boldness and confidence in facing the Egyptian state. Read More »
POST
Noam Sheizaf
Monday, January 30, 2012
It
is one of those peculiarities of the Israeli political system that right now, under
a stable government and a strong prime minister, there is almost a consensus in
the Knesset that a date for early elections will be called soon. Conventional
wisdom suggests that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would like to
avoid the battle over the 2013 budget, especially since Israel seems to be
facing the prospect of an economic slow-down. Add to that the possible electoral
victory by President Barack Obama in the U.S. elections in November which could hurt the Israeli Prime Minister in the local polls, calling elections now seems
like an easy way out (the other potential political game changer -- an attack
on Iran -- will not be discussed here).
Yet
unlike previous campaigns, when many held out hope that called-for elections could
lead to new policies and a genuine Israeli interest in terminating the
country's 44 year-long military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, there are
growing signs that the next Knesset could be just as conservative and hawkish,
if not more, than the current one. The chances of a Yitzhak Rabin-style peace
coalition are therefore practically non-existent. Read More »
POST
Shlomo Brom, Shai Feldman, Shimon Stein
Monday, January 30, 2012
Israeli Defense Minister Ehud
Barak suggested recently that Israel's moment of decision on Iran would come
not when it obtained nuclear weapons but, instead, how close Iran is to
entering what he called "a zone of immunity." Barak's concern was that beyond this threshold
it would no longer be possible to halt Iran's nuclear program.
What would comprise such a
threshold? Increasingly, this means Iran's shifting of its enrichment
activities to the underground facility in Qom as well as with the moving to Qom
of more of the uranium previously enriched in Natanz. Barak seemed to imply
that a military operation designed to abort Iran's nuclear efforts after the
facility in Qom becomes fully operational would be meaningless or irrelevant --
it will be either impossible physically or so costly as to render it
prohibitive. Read More »
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The veto at the UN raises the odds that Syria will collapse into protracted, internationally fueled civil war -- 1980s Lebanon on steroids.
