Read: Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations Posted by Jacob Stokes

There’s no doubt that this week, like almost all of the last year-plus, will see breaking news events that keep us refreshing our Twitter feed and peeking at CNN. That said, it’s worth taking some time to read up on something a little more forward-looking: Kenneth Lieberthal and Peter Singer’s report “Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations.”

The report does a great job breaking down the issues America faces on cybersecurity and then explains how those issues play into Sino-American relations. This is the best kind of think tank report in that it’s put together by people with deep knowledge and written in clear, readable prose.

The report works great as a primer on cybersecurity issues generally, and it also provides a roadmap for addressing concerns bilaterally with China so as to tamp down the distrust that cyber issues are injecting into the relationship. And it does so without downplaying the difficulty of such a task. It starts with basic facts, including that the two parties lack common understanding of the issue’s terms and that many older policymakers simply don't get computers and, by extension, cyber issues. And it goes on from there.

Here are just a few of the insightful bits: 

On why cyber will challenge the Sino-American relationship. “[T]he cyber realm has a number of particular characteristics that significantly challenge current U.S.-China relations and the prospects for reaching a consensus on either norms or cooperative implementing mechanisms.”

One reason why the danger is so acute. “Historically, an imbalance in favor of the offense increases the incentives to act maliciously and quickly, while it also lowers each side’s confidence in its ability to deter attack and defend itself effectively.”

On how to start building a cybersecurity agenda. “Any such agenda must be realistic, respecting that each government will protect its ability to use cyber capabilities to carry out espionage activities and to support military actions should they become necessary. It must accept that the two political systems have significantly different views concerning freedom of information in cyber space. It must take into account that each government’s decision making concerning cyber activities is fragmented among many bureaucracies and is not well coordinated at any single node in the system. Finally, it must respect the reality that a variety of nongovernmental actors are significant players in each country’s use of and deliberations about the cyber realm.”

And a “wow” moment. “It is telling that even the vaunted U.S. National Security Agency, arguably the most sophisticated entity in the world at cyber issues, operates on the assumption that its networks are compromised.”

Read the whole thing here.

Photo: Brookings

Haiti: Open for Business, or Business as Usual? Posted by The Editors

This guest post by Johanna Mendelson Forman, a senior associate with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. It was re-posted from CSIS's blog.

It started as a rumor.  President Michel Martelly was going to sack his Prime Minister, Garry Conille, after four months on the job.  Then a special UN Security Council visit to Haiti led by U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice conveyed a strong message of support for Conille and tried to tamp down bickering among parliamentarians and the president.  Still, Conille tendered his resignation on February 24, raising the possibility of a new political crisis. 

Supposedly, 2012 is the year of hope for Haitians and international donors alike. With new foreign investments in Haiti making headlines, the country is poised to turn a corner.  For cynics, Conille’s departure tends to indicate that politics in Haiti, at least, are back to “business as usual.”  

 

A physician and international civil servant, Conille knew a lot about development.  He had successfully served as former President Bill Clinton’s chief of staff when Clinton was named U.S. Special Envoy after the earthquake.  Conille obviously wanted the best for his country.  Yet, his vision of how and on what schedule to move Haiti forward was clearly at loggerheads with some in parliament who resented his outside experience and Conille’s impatient boss, President Martelly.

 

For his part, Martelly says he wants the private sector to be the engine of reconstruction and has managed to attract some big name investors.   For that to go beyond the planning stage, he must enact rules that will make it easier to register a new business, reduce the time merchandise sits in customs, and provide investors with clear land titles, among a range of reforms.  The next prime minister will have to work more effectively with the president and parliament to do get this done.  

 

Despite its helpfulness following disasters, the international community is pretty much powerless when it comes to attenuating such internal crises, as past history shows.  No outsiders can dictate how Haiti’s politicians should work with each other—that is up to them.  Key at this juncture is President Martelly himself, who must find a new prime minister that shares his pro-investment vision. At the same time, he must persuade parliament to approve that person as well as cooperate with his (Martelly’s) agenda.  

 

It is a real leadership moment for the president as Haiti cannot afford to put its physical or political recovery on hold any longer.  New investment hangs in the balance.  And the ball is clearly in Martelly’s court.

Photo: CSIS

I Prefer to Give the Inhabitants a Say: Reality and the Surge in Iraq Posted by Eric Martin

Joel Wing recently conducted an interview with Douglas Ollivant - a retired Army officer who served as Chief of Plans for the Multi-National Division Baghdad both before and during "the Surge." Through the course of the question and answer session, Ollivant provides a detailed, thoughtful and remarkably balanced accounting of "the Surge." He seeks to correct the “new orthodoxy” - or mythmaking - surrounding the putative success of the Surge, while also providing credit where do. Ollivant's thesis is captured in this response:

My fundamental point is that we may want to consider the possibility that the actions of several million Baghdadis were more important than those of 30,000 troops or even one very talented general.

He goes on to note that the winding down of the civil war in Iraq had much more to do with decisions by Iraq's warring factions than with the change in US posture - from the stand-down of the Sadrists and the emergence of the Awakening movement, to demographic changes resulting from past sectarian cleansing in Baghdad.

That said, he does credit the Surge with conveying a sense of certainty with respect to US policy to Baghdad (which was valuable in informing certain decisions to be made by the Maliki administration), as well as enhanced security and a more efficient targeting of the extremist fringes. However, Ollivant considers these to be the “supporting characters” to the lead role played by Iraqis - a conclusion which was previously espoused by me on this site.

Ollivant also discusses the crucial role Iraqi sovereignty and agency played in setting the stage for the withdrawal of US forces (again, echoing sentiments appearing on this site):

I don’t think it is quite accurate to say that deadline was “set” by the Bush Administration, but rather that is was “negotiated by” the Bush Administration. Again, the Iraqis had a vote here, and made it very clear that they wanted a clear end date when U.S. troops would leave the country after the expiration of the United National mandate...I think we got about as good as we could get in the 2008 SOFA, and even that was a near thing.

Finally, I think it is important to note that while we call this agreement the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement, the Iraqis call it something like the “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq.” I would highlight the words “withdrawal” and “temporary.” From the Iraqi perspective, this agreement was always about our withdrawal, and our presence over the last three years was simply a temporary accommodation to allow us to do that in an orderly manner. [emphasis added]

I do have one quibble with Ollivant, however, and it concerns something mentioned in the following excerpt:

While there are some disadvantages to the withdrawal of U.S. troops, I think that it is, overall, a good thing. First, I think it has gone a long way towards restoring U.S. credibility in the region. There are still Iraqis who don’t believe we have really left, that the U.S. was there to get Iraqi oil. As the truth sinks in that we really did leave, in accordance with an agreement that we signed with the Iraqi government, I think that will help repair the narrative as to why we went to Iraq in the first place. This is not to say that I endorse the invasion of Iraq, but rather that we did not go there with the intention of stealing oil or setting up long term bases.

I do not mean to argue, with certainty, that the US invaded Iraq for the sole purpose of obtaining access to Iraq's vast oil reserves, or for the purpose of establishing a robust military basing network in such a strategically vital region. However, there were myriad objectives, desired outcomes and possible benefits that motivated the various policymakers, and it is at least possible that some viewed such bases and the proximity to an increasingly scarce and invaluable resource as potential positive results of the invasion.

Furthermore, I would be wary of pointing to our exit from Iraq as definitive evidence of our ultimate intentions. As Ollivant is wont to point out quite correctly, the Iraqi people - and the democratic political apparatus established in Iraq - were the driving forces of our departure, regardless of what we might have wanted to occur.

After all, it is no secret that our military leaders were pushing for a prolonged presence in Iraq, it's just that they were stymied by political realities. Likewise, the original Bush administration plan was to govern Iraq via a Viceroy for several years before gradually easing into some form of domestic representative rule for the Iraqi people. It was only in response to mounting pressure from Iraq's religious leaders (Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in particular) that the Bush team was forced to accelerate the democratic transition.

At the risk of stating a tautology, simply because a given conflict ends with a certain status quo does not mean that the various participants had intended that status quo as the end-game. Ultimately, the Iraqis had a vote.

The Apologist Posted by David Shorr

I'm sorry, but the apology controversy is a sorry-**sed sorry affair (latest coverage here and here). If this is going to be taken seriously as campaign issue, it needs to be looked at from both directions. The Republicans shouldn't get a free pass to put the president on the defensive. We need to hear more about how this Americans-do-no-wrong thing works. We've heard plenty of President Obama's opponents' shock and dismay. The Republicans have been scathing about the current commander in chief, cocksure they'd do a better job. Well okay, we have two cases here: the careless destruction of sacred texts and friendly fire that claimed the lives of two dozen troops who were on our side. What would the would-be commanders in chief say to the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan? As far as I can tell, it's along the lines of "forget you."

What's the Matter With Martin Dempsey? Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at Foreign Affairs, Micah Zenko and I have a new piece that makes the somewhat obvious and yet counter-intuitive point that for all the doom-saying and threat-mongering of foreign policy elites . . . the world today (and the United States) is actually pretty safe:

The world that the United States inhabits today is a remarkably safe and secure place. It is a world with fewer violent conflicts and greater political freedom than at virtually any other point in human history. All over the world, people enjoy longer life expectancy and greater economic opportunity than ever before. The United States faces no plausible existential threats, no great-power rival, and no near-term competition for the role of global hegemon. The U.S. military is the world’s most powerful, andeven in the middle of a sustained downturn, the U.S. economy remains among one of the world’s most vibrant and adaptive. Although the United States faces a host of international challenges, they pose little risk to the overwhelming majority of American citizens and can be managed with existing diplomatic, economic, and, to a much lesser extent, military tools. 

And yet for a variety of reasons this singular reality of global affairs in the 21st century is pretty much not reflected in our foreign policy and national security decision-making. If you want a good explanation as to why this is - I present to you the words of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Martin Dempsey, who in testifying before Congress earlier this month said this, “I can’t impress upon you that in my personal military judgment, formed over thirty-eight years, we are living in the most dangerous time in my lifetime, right now.”   

Now keep in mind, Martin Dempsey wasn't born yesterday. While this might seem obvious it's also relevant. You see, Martin Dempsey was born in 1952 and lived through 39 years of the Cold War. He lived through the end of the Korean War, the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the Yom Kippur War (which almost sparked a superpower conflict) the first few years of the Reagan Administration etc and yet in Martin Dempsey's personal judgment the most dangerous moment in his lifetime . . was February 15th, 2012.

Not only is this quite clearly and empirically incorrect - it's also completely insane. To believe that February 15th, 2012 is the most dangerous moment in Martin Dempsey's lifetime is to have a stunningly poor grasp of international relations, history and common sense.

Someone who holds such views would barely be qualified to teach undergrad IR no less be the highest ranking officer in the American military. To be sure, I don't know if Martin Dempsey actually believes what he is saying here. It may be that he is engaging in the endless bureaucratic activity of protecting his budget (i.e. if the world is really dangerous then the military needs even more advanced toys that blow s**t up) or perhaps he simply skipped over the Cold War in his academic training. (And in fairness to Dempsey he certainly has some positive attributes, like believing that an Israeli attack on Iran would be  "destabilizing.")

Whatever the rationale, however, the far bigger problem is that such statements can be made and not be dismissed as complete balderdash and gobsmackingly uninformed about the world we live in. Either way it's a problem - and that's a big part of the reason Micah and I wrote this piece (and why you should read it!)

What the Candidates Didn’t Talk About Tonight Posted by Jacob Stokes

Tonight’s GOP debate featured a longer discourse on Arlen Specter than it did on America’s relationship with the rest of the world. It’s become something of a lost cause to lament the lack of discussion of foreign policy issues in the GOP debates, but tonight once again confirmed that trend. Here are several of the most important topics that didn't get talked about:

China. The U.S. recently hosted the next president of China, Xi Jinping, in an effort to build personal relationships between leaders of our two countries. And this week marks the anniversary of Nixon’s visit to China, one of the most important pieces of diplomacy in American history. What are the candidates' plans for managing this extremely important relationship? Mitt Romney wrote a big op-ed on it last week. Where’s the follow-up?

Afghanistan. As I’ve written, Romney’s plan for Afghanistan has all the makings of a 100 years war. He’s pledged not to talk to the Taliban and to fight them until they’re defeated militarily. That would require a dramatic escalation for an unspecified period of time. Do his fellow candidates agree with that position, and how would justify such an expenditure against other interests?

Real defense budget plans. Romney’s plans for the defense budget call for massive increases in addition to the increased war funding he’d need to fight the continued escalation in Afghanistan. How will Romney pay for that? We heard false claims about Obama's plan "cutting $1 trillion from the defense budget," but no talk about what candidates' suggestions would be. To be fair, Santorum mentioned it at the beginning, but only said he would not cut spending on defense.

Europe. This week Greece got a deal from the European Union on their debt. But it will impose draconian austerity measures on the Greek economy. Two questions here that weren’t answered: How important is the Transatlantic alliance to U.S. security, does the U.S. have a role in resolving the European debt crisis and what will it take to sustain that alliance in the face of budget pressures? And a bigger question: Austerity is failing Europe, why would it work in the U.S.?

Cybersecurity. The threat from cyber is real and growing. A bill is being debated in the Senate that would address a lot of key holes in America’s defenses, but it faces Republican opposition. Where do the candidates stand on the importance of cyber security? As president, would they be willing to back such a bill?

Instead of answers to those questions, Americans got Gingrich insulting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and pushing a foreign policy narrative that amounts to essentially Neocons 2.0. I wrote about this back in November, and it has proved more or less accurate (with Ron Paul as the exception, of course).

Sad, sad night for U.S. foreign policy and America's role in the world.

Pity the Fact-Checkers Posted by Heather Hurlburt

I would say the just-completed GOP debate set a new record for mendaciousness in its Iran/Syria phase, but that record's been falling a lot lately. But I took away five developments -- and in lieu of drinking games consumed quite a bit of cough syrup.

1. The GOP has discovered women in combat. none of the candidates would come right out and oppose this and Gingrich said, quite rightly, that servicemembers are in danger everywhere now in an age of total warfare. This is a remarkable turnabout from just 2 years ago -- I'm looking forward to analysts of the GOP women's vote to explain it.

2. Gingrich thinks you can question the judgment of a wartime Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on national tv, and get away with it.  He ridiculed General Dempsey for saying that Iranian President Ahmadinejad is a rational actor (a view shared by the CIA, among others) and dismissed Dempsey's opposition to an Israeli strike.  Now, thought experiment -- if candidate Obama, or Clinton, or Edwards had ever said something so negative about the senior uniformed American on national tv, what would have happened the next day? An outcry of editorial writers urging him/her to apologize and/or get out of the race. Donations drying up. Protests from the VFW. So, can you get away with it if you're a Republican?

3. Looks like no one really cares about the Syrian people. Fascinating to see how every candidate turned the Syria question to Iran, with scarcely a word for the terrible travails of Syrian civilians on behalf of the same "freedom" these candidates are always on about. Of course, if you don't favor military intervention or arms deals, that leaves you with... the UN. Never mind.

4. Looks like no one cares much about gas prices either. Mitt Romney was shockingly quick to pivot away from the real effects of a gas price rise to the still-hypothetical effects of a still-hypothetical military strike on a still-hypothetical Iranian nuclear weapon (note, the program is not hypothetical, it's real, but it hasn't produced a weapon, or anywhere near it). One could have a serious debate about how much volatility in gas prices, for how long, would be worth it to produce what concrete increase in regional stability/security. One would have to look elsewhere to have it, however.

5. Did I say mendacious? The candidates:

• repeated oft-debunked critiques of alliance management;
• mistakenly claimed that Obama "got nothing" for missile defense change of plans (what we got: 1) a system that actually works 2) Russian coop on Iran in 09-10 and overflights for Afghanistan)
• misstated Admin positions on the 2009 Iranian Green Revolution, and on support for Syrian opposition and demanding Assad step down
• claimed that Obama opened a new embassy in Syria, when in fact he sent a new ambassador who was widely praised for toughness on Assad;
• said that Admin wasn't considering military options for Iran, when Panetta has said publicly at least twice (once to Jewish group and once to Wall Street Journal) that Pentagon was drawing up plans.

Profoundly grateful not to be a fact-checker tonight.

Today in Iran-Diplomacy-Will-Fail Fatalism Posted by David Shorr

When you boil it down, much of the recent right-wing commentary on Iran are variations on the theme of just how futile diplomacy is. President Obama's handling of Iran has been subject to intense cross-pressures --and plenty of second-guessing -- at every step along the way. And now, having painstakingly built an international coalition for economic sanctions far more stringent than ever before, the president's skeptics are no less impatient with him. Which leaves us with a policy / political debate skewed dangerously toward military confrontation.

Given this rush to war, kudos to the New York Times for today's piece by Scott Shane trying to separate the rhetoric from the facts of Iran's nuclear program. Shane gives the last word to Shadow Government's Peter Feaver, who situates President Obama at the midpoint of public sentiment on the issue and notes how election campaigns tend to distort policy debates. This is my exact question about Feaver's most recent post about Iran: which side of the line is he on, straight policy analysis or political maneuvering?

In comparison with the GOP candidates, who would have voters believe Obama is helping Iran get the bomb, Feaver does give a more sympathetic and realistic take on Obama administration policy. But then, that sets the level-of-discourse bar pretty low. Wrapped within the fair-mindedness, however, is a policy prescription that would more likely doom diplomatic efforts to failure than help them succeed. 

Feaver wrote in response to a Times op-ed by former architect of Obama policy Dennis Ross, who argues that the intensified pressure of recent sanctions could change how Iranian leaders calculate cooperation versus defiance toward the rest of the world. The moment could be ripe for a peaceful solution, and we must give diplomacy a chance. Now look at the way Feaver gives with one hand and takes away with the other: 

He rightly points out that the current Obama strategy on Iran was to squeeze Iran with sufficiently painful sanctions so that Iran's cost-benefit calculation would change, making the regime decide that the costs of the nuclear program were not worth the gain.

...then a few sentences later...

All current sanctions must be maintained at the current level of pressure throughout, until a deal is struck that will verifiably prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

According to Feaver, the key to a diplomatic solution is to resist ratcheting the sanctions back even a single notch until a final deal is reached. The United States and the other nations imposing sanctions should not relent in the slightest until Iran's total cooperation has been pocketed. (Please note: the strongest current sanctions are those being imposed bilaterally by various countries, with the UN Security Council resolution merely providing a framework.) He is imagining a diplomatic process -- imagine being the operative verb -- in which all of the significant moves come from one side, while the other sits impassively until fully satisfied. This leads me to a critique I've made many times: the right wing's inability to make a crucial distinction between cooperation (or concessions) versus capitulation. In their imaginary diplomacy, you can insist on outcomes that meet your every wish and give the other guy nothing. But back here in the real world, negotiation is based on give-and-take, not take-and-take. 

At one point in his post, Feaver writes, "As Ross surely knows, the Iranians have a standard approach for alleviating the kind of sanctions and isolation they currently face." Feaver then goes on to note Iran's past success in blaming sanctions for undercutting diplomacy, which has indeed helped Iran fend off pressure and keep working on its nuclear program. 

But if Ross and presumably his former Obama administration colleagues "surely know" this, then what is Feaver's point? I really have to flag how brazen it is to tell President Obama how to manage the unprecedented set of sanctions that he's put together. Given that Feaver's been trying to argue that all of President Obama's policy successes stem from his adoption of Republican ideas, it's no surprise that Feaver would short-change the very un-Bushlike diplomacy needed to get the sanctions.

And oh by the way, I don't have much patience for critics who claim utmost concern about Iran while shrugging off the US-Russia reset; whatever else can be said about the reset, it had everything to do with the cooperation on Iran that Moscow has provided. Likewise it's totally hypocritical for Republicans to be staunch advocates of sanctions and then complain about high oil prices, which are being driven upward mainly by the Iran standoff. 

So even though Feaver didn't really mean it, yes, the Obama administration knows very well that Iran must be kept from wriggling out from under the international pressure. Let me remind everyone that President Obama pressed ahead with the pivotal UN sanctions resolution in June 2010 in rejection of a deal brokered by Brazil and Turkey, based precisely on the argument Feaver presents. The administration's policy for three years has put the clear burden of proof squarely on Iran, a strategy that Feaver acknowledges but can't quite affirm.

I'll conclude by focusing on what a ridiculous false choice Feaver presents, with his idea of keeping every sanction in place until Tehran capitulates. A fuller outline of the choices includes Feaver's prescription, his straw man, and the sensible approach:

A) refuse to reciprocate any Iranian moves short of a final agreement

B) trade significant elements of the sanctions in exchange for trivial Iranian concessions

C) gradually ease sanctions in response to any meaningful Iranian steps to prove the civilian nature of their activities (if and only if they materialize)

Contrary to the right wing's over-the-top alarmism, President Obama is not foolish enough to adopt approach B. Sadly, Republicans are too ideological to go for option C. And the ultimate irony is that option C was the key to President Bush's success in getting Ghaddafi to abandon his nuclear program. 

Caribbean Security Wake–Up Call Posted by The Editors

This guest post by Johanna Mendelson Forman, an expert in international security issues who serves on the board of RESDAL, the Latin American Security Network, and Michele Manatt, a former official of the Clinton administration’s Office of National Drug Control Policy and now serves as Chair of the Council on Women’s Leadership at Meridian International Center.

When Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer and his wife became crime victims while on vacation on the Caribbean island of Nevis, news spread rapidly of this home intrusion.  Fortunately, the Justice, his wife and guests were only relieved of their money by a machete-wielding robber who fled the scene.  As of this writing the police in St. Kitts and Nevis have not caught a suspect.  But the events underscore the ongoing need to address citizen security in the Caribbean.

California’s Dianne Feinstein, Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, held a hearing on this very subject in the Senate Drug Caucus on February 1^st.   Her opening statement noted that the Obama Administration continues to provide assistance to the Caribbean, through an initiative started in April 2009. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative continues to receive funding to help address the ongoing crime wave, and especially the increased violence associated with drug-related attacks that have become the norm in the region. The high homicide rates in Jamaica (52 homicides per 100,000), the Bahamas (28 per 100,000), the Dominican Republic (up from 14 to 25 per 100,000 in one year) all signal the urgent need to support training and professionalization of the police.  The Breyers were just plain lucky.

Crime reduction is essential in a region that is so dependent on tourism, both mass market and high-end.   Many Caribbean countries earn 25 percent of their foreign exchange earnings from tourism. 20 percent of all jobs are connected to it.   Keeping the islands safe not only in the best interest of business, but is also akin to their credit rating. When it takes a hit, everyone suffers.

The Obama administration gets precious little credit for its work in the Americas.  Not fair, given the sharp focus put on Caribbean citizen security through many programs and partnerships.  “Citizen Security” is the Lingua Franca throughout official circles these days, and will be the “IT” issue of the next gathering of democracies at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia in April.  Coming to common cause on addressing the realities of youth unemployment, the swelling number of youths in gangs and better preparing citizens to vigilantly report drug-related crime are unifying governments and NGO players across the Caribbean.

While Republicans continue to spend most time either micromanaging US policy towards Cuba or neutering the OAS, there has been a strong, whole-of-government effort to ensure that our third border gets the attention it needs in response to onslaughts from illegal drug syndicates and related activities like human trafficking and counterfeiting.

In the run-up to the Colombia-hosted Summit in April, look for more progress as President Obama and Secretary Clinton emphasize their diplomacy and programs that address the core issues underlying criminality – professionalization of police, strengthening rule of law, and empowering citizens to be more involved in community vigilance.   Through fiscal year 2012, $212 million have been committed to this objective.

Justice Breyer ‘s unfortunate vacation intrusion in what seems an idyllic place is just what complacent Americans may need to wake up and take notice of what their government does to assist Caribbean friends and neighbors join closer to confront the joint threat of insecurity.

Photo: ABC News

What The Anti-Declinists Get Wrong Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at Foreign Policy I have a new up that takes on the argument that tales of American decline are a myth - by noting that relative US power on the global stage is all well and good but it doesn't mean much if its built on a shaky foundation:

U.S. global power remains unparalleled and its hegemony is uncontested . . . America today faces no great power rival, no existential threat, and an economy that -- while currently in the doldrums -- remains vibrant and adaptive.  Compared to other nations, the United States is not simply a great power, it is the greatest power. Even if its influence declines, it is likely to continue to enjoy an outsized role on the international stage, in part because there is a consensus among foreign-policy elites -- like Romney and Obama, for instance -- that the U.S. must do whatever it takes to remain, as Madeline Albright once put it,  "the world's 'indispensable nation.'"

There is, however, one serious problem with this analysis. Any discussion of American national security that focuses solely on the issue of U.S. power vis-à-vis other countries -- and ignores domestic inputs -- is decidedly incomplete.

A focus on U.S. global dominance or suasion that doesn't factor in those elements that constitute American power at home ignores substantial and worsening signs of decline. Indeed, by virtually any measure, a closer look at the state of the United States today tells a sobering tale of rapid and unchecked decay and deterioration in a host of areas. While not all of them are generally considered elements of national security, perhaps they should be.

You can read the whole thing here - and please do! But the bottom line is that any discussion of national security that ignores our worsening education system, our inefficient health care system, our lack of technological innovation and our horrible legislative dysfunction tells a very incomplete tale of what defines national power in the 21st century.

Has Iran Decided to Build the Bomb? Posted by David Shorr

Senator Lindsey Graham is convinced the goal of Iran's nuclear program is military, and the contrast between Graham's certainty and the more judicious view of President Obama's director of national intelligence highlights critical points for a peaceful resolution of the issue -- or a war. Hat tip to Eli Clifton over at Think Progress for flagging an exchange between Sen. Graham and DNI James Clapper at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing earlier this week. The bottom line of Graham's position is that a diplomatic solution is impossible, and a military confrontation is inevitable. 

Clifton's post focuses on the key elements of the intelligence assessment. Here's how Director Clapper described where Iranian policy stands in terms of building the bomb:

I think they’re keeping themselves in a position to make that decision but there are certain things they have not yet done and have not done for some time.

Underneath the careful vagueness of this statement lies a crucial point. There is a clear logic for Iran to hone uranium enrichment techniques that would make it a near-nuclear power, yet still remaining a non-nuclear weapon signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- which is Tehran's stated policy. Of course that leaves the questions of how far down the nuclear technology road Iran goes and how the outside world will verify that Iran's nuclear activities are civilian, questions that will have to be addressed as part of any diplomatic solution. 

Now let's look at the logic for Sen. Graham to assume the worst about Iranian intentions. I can only assume Graham reached his conclustion through an assessment of Iranian governmental players and his information on the nuclear program. And yet ... I can't help noticing that Graham's position fits the familiar Republican tougher-than-thou formula as most GOP foreign policy positions.

So with this view of Iranian intentions, Lindsey Graham presumably dismisses Iran's official line about a keeping on the civilian side of the nuclear line. My question, then, is whether it's smarter for the United States and others to toss aside Iran's promise not to build a bomb, or hang onto that pledge as the standard by which we measure their behavior. Aside from political posturing, is it really in America's interests to completely discount Tehran's stated intentions?

Let's be clear about what our alternatives are here. When I argue against assuming the worst, I'm not saying that we take Iranian statements about remaining a non-weapon state at face value. Like I said a few paragraphs ago, the point of diplomatic negotiations is to define -- and verify -- the parameters of Iran's civilian nuclear activities. In fact, I look at President Obama's policy on Iran as an effort to keep the burden of proof on the Iranians. Now over on the side of assuming the worst, that seems to me like a conclusion that diplomacy is futile. If Senator Graham and other conservatives believe Iranian leaders are determined to build the bomb, does that mean war is inevitable?  I think so.

And this is the point of the other quotation from the national intelligence director cited in Eli Clifton's Think Progress post, that Iran's course is not yet set and still susceptible to diplolmatic pressure: 

We judge Iran’s nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran. Iranian leaders undoubtedly consider Iran’s security, prestige, and influence, as well as the international political and security environment, when making decisions about its nuclear program.

The very possibility of a peaceful solution hinges on whether you believe an Iranian n-weapon is still an open question in Tehran.

But the issue at the heart of legislative efforts by Senator Graham and others is a different one. Recalling once again, negotiations with Iran must specify how far down the nuclear technological road they are, i.e. the fate of Iran's uranium enrichment activities. For the hard-liners in the Senate, the only acceptable answer is that Iran will be not one step down the nuclear road -- that they must walk their technical efforts all the way back. It is a Boltonesque approach that insists on the other side's total capitulation. 

As the clamor for war with Iran grows louder and louder, we must be clear what's at stake. If you were paying only faint attention to this debate (as most voters probably are), you'd think it's about keeping Iran from building nuclear weapons. But senators have been pushing to set the bar much higher, the kind of stringent requirements that make diplomacy impossible and war inevitable. Americans need to know the real question here: are you willing to go to war in order to stop Iran from spinning their centrifuges to enrich uranium?

Doing Your Homework on Nuclear Weapons Policy Posted by The Editors

This guest post by Stephen Young, senior analyst in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists. It is reposted from AllThingsNuclear.org.

The Pentagon is working on finalizing nuclear weapons policy options for the president, who is preparing to make decisions that will set the size, structure and roles of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and set positions for future potential negotiations with Russia on force reductions below New START. The media was abuzz in the last 36 hours with reports that the options under consideration were 300-400, 700-800 or 1,000-1,100 deployed warheads.

At a hearing of the House Armed Services committee on Wednesday where Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta testified, Republican members were clearly distressed by the thought that the administration would even consider such reductions, calling it “reckless lunacy” and a “preposterous notion.” 

In that light, you may recall the committee’s attempt last year to constrain the Obama administration’s prerogative to set U.S. nuclear policy, an attempt that was essentially neutered in the final FY12 Defense authorization bill.

A few thoughts on this latest kerfuffle:

1. The new study falls well within the normal range of activities any administration undertakes. Time and again, the Pentagon, its various defense boards and affiliated think tanks have been tasked with looking at a range of stockpile sizes. Those who think it is surprising simply do not know the history. In fact, the congressionally mandated 2009 Strategic Posture Commission, often cited by Republicans as an unimpeachable source on nuclear policy, specifically set out options for deep cuts that it thought should be studied in the future. The person selected by the Commission to lead that effort to establish the options to study was none other Jim Miller, who now is directing the Pentagon’s study for the Obama administration. (See Chapter 12 of the Commission’s In the Eyes of Experts.)

2. As Secretary Panetta testified yesterday, one option that will be presented to the president is maintaining the current stockpile, in its current size. Cuts are not a foregone conclusion. 

3. Those criticizing these options act as if the president will unilaterally make these reductions tomorrow. That is not the case. As mentioned above, one of the mandates for the Pentagon study is to develop the U.S. position in the next round of arms controls with Russia. The Senate mandated that the administration seek such an agreement when providing its consent to the New START agreement in 2010. Would critics prefer that the administration approach such negotiations from a position of ignorance?

4. In 1991, when President GHW Bush unilaterally cut thousands of deployed U.S. nuclear weapons, there was nary a hit of concern from the Congress. Even more interesting, in 2001, President GW Bush simply told the Pentagon that they needed to develop a nuclear strategy based on maintaining 2,200 warheads, without asking them to first study what the implications of such a decision would be. Coming down from the then stockpile of 6,000 strategic warheads, it was a fairly dramatic call, but made without critical comment from the Congress. 

5. More importantly, if this story is accurate on the ranges of options under consideration, it is certainly true that moving to 300-400 warheads would be a major shift in U.S. nuclear policy, but it would not reduce our security. It would end the current focus, maintained since the end of the Cold War, on fighting and winning a nuclear war. Instead it would require a focus on what the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review identified as the fundamental role of nuclear weapons: deterring a nuclear attack on the US and its allies.

6. Such a policy change would truly reflect the “end to Cold War thinking” that President Obama has called for, and would allow the U.S. military to increase its focus on the threats that we do face today, rather than the threats of the past. The fact is, nuclear weapons are now a security liability for the United States, rather than an asset for our defense.  More and more military leaders, foreign policy and defense experts are recognizing that not only can we reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons, but for our own security we must.

Where’s Romney? National Security Budgeting Edition Posted by Jacob Stokes

The president’s budget for FY 2013 drops today. We already know the outlines of what it will look like. For an overview, see here. But it’s worth comparing that budget to Mitt Romney’s plan for defense spending. Ezra Klein has a solid rundown of the effects of Romney’s fiscal plans, following Romney’s speech at CPAC. As Klein notes, “Romney has, essentially, made four significant fiscal promises: He has pledged to cap federal spending at 20 percent of GDP. He has pledged to cut taxes to about 17 percent of GDP. He has pledged to a floor on defense spending at 4 percent of GDP. And he has pledged to balance the budget.” We’ll look at the defense portion, because that’s what we’re focused on here at DA.

But first, a note about Romney’s criticisms of the administration’s budget plans: Romney has alleged that Obama has cut a trillion dollars from the defense budget over the next 10 years and that he’s “hollowing out” our national defense. Already today the Romney camp has called Obama’s budget an “insult” to the American taxpayer. This is of course political speak for the Budget Control Act, which was passed by Congress in a bipartisan fashion – no one in the Obama administration has voiced support for actually imposing the cuts to defense that would occur under the “sequestration” portion of the BCA. The one trillion number is supposed to force a compromise.

What the Obama administration has supported is a $487 billion reduction in the growth of Pentagon spending over 10 years. Those reductions are based on a strategy, which was released last month. As for the hollowing out claim, the non-partisan Congressional Research Service says that term is “inappropriate” for the current circumstances. One can debate the merits of sequestration-size cuts, which are possible but would be stupid to implement the way the law is currently written (i.e. with a drastic cut in the near-term, levied across all accounts equally). But one cannot argue that the administration wants the second tranche of cuts to the defense budget that would happen under sequestration. It’s simply inaccurate – they want tax increases.

Now, the reductions in growth to the military budget that the administration wants are broadly accepted. As Thom Shanker and Elizabeth Bumiller of the Times reported last month, “There is broad agreement on the left, right and center that $450 billion in cuts over a decade — the amount that the White House and Pentagon agreed to last summer — is acceptable.” Some, such as Fred Kaplan and Lawrence Korb, have persuasively argued that the administration could go further with cuts, although again, the administration has gone to great pains to say they don’t support such reductions.

Now to Romney’s plan: The Romney team made the four percent pledge for defense spending in their foreign policy white paper. Remember, the four percent figure means pegging the size of the base defense budget to four percent of GDP and does not include supplemental war funding. (For why such an approach abandons strategy, see here.) Michael Linden over at CAP did the math on this promise. He writes: “Under current projections (with the adjustments described above), defense spending will be about $560 billion in 2016, or about 2.9 percent of GDP. But Romney has promised to ensure defense spending never drops lower than 4 percent of GDP. Keeping that promise will add more than $200 billion in additional federal spending in 2016.” That’s just the base budget; it does not include war funding. Romney’s plan for Afghanistan will entail a long-term, large-scale military presence costing billions more dollars; he also criticized the drawdown in Iraq, which also has significant budgetary implications.

The Romney campaign believes such a stance will benefit them politically. As Scott Conroy of RCP reports, “Key members of Romney's foreign policy team argue that no matter what happens in the months ahead, Obama will be vulnerable in November on defense spending, his shaky relationship with Israel's leaders, and a ‘reset’ policy with Russia that many observers see as ill-fated.”

Romney’s fellow conservatives aren’t so sure though. As George will writes: 

The U.S. defense budget is about 43 percent of the world’s total military spending — more than the combined defense spending of the next 17 nations, many of which are U.S. allies. Are Republicans really going to warn voters that America will be imperiled if the defense budget is cut 8 percent from projections over the next decade? In 2017, defense spending would still be more than that of the next 10 countries combined.

Will is arguing that Republicans will have hard time arguing against the administration’s plans. Imagine how much tougher that argument gets once you’re arguing for the massive increases, both in base defense spending and war spending, that Romney’s plans propose.

Photo: Mitt Romney Flickr

Has the US Gotten Its Groove Back in the Middle East? Posted by Michael Cohen

Over the past couple of days a rather odd argument has developed around the question of international intervention in Syria - namely, that the whole process, and in fact US diplomacy in the region, has somehow been undermined by the heavy-handed manner in which the US and its NATO allies worked to topple Qaddafi in Libya.

Here's Stephen Walt's take:

Russia and China . . . supported Resolution 1973 back in 2011, and then watched NATO and a few others make a mockery of multilateralism in the quest to topple Qaddafi. The Syrian tragedy is pay-back time, and neither Beijing nor Moscow want to be party to another effort at Western-sponsored "regime change." Our high-handed manipulation of the SC process in the case of Libya may have made it harder to gain a consensus on Syria, which is arguably a far more important and dangerous situation.

Josh Foust makes a similar point and then says this:

The failure to gain international buy-in to do something -- not necessarily militarily but some response -- to the atrocities there is a direct consequence of interventionists ignoring politics in their rush to do good. Unfortunately, the people of Syria are now paying the price, and will continue to do so.

Walter Russell Mead and Scott Horton make much the same arguments. Now I should start off by saying that I was critical of US and NATO efforts in Libya and I am highly dubious about the efficacy of intervention in Syria so I'm sympathetic to the overall sentiments of these writers.

But having said I, generally speaking, find their arguments sort of ludicrous. I suppose it makes sense that Russia and China were angered about the way that NATO expanded its US mandate to topple Qaddafi, but the notion that Moscow and Beijing were surprised by this hardly seems credible. Even if Russia was shocked, shocked that NATO went further then a narrow mandate on Libya does anyone really believe that they would have then turned around and authorized a foreign military intervention in Syria - a country where Russia has very specific and long-standing strategic and economic interests.

And even if Security Council Resolution on Syria had passed it did not directly authorize the use of force and even if it did there is to date, no country that has signalled a great willingness to send troops to Syria. It likely would have changed very little on the ground. (I also can't help note the irony of complaints about the Syrian people "paying the price" over Libya being made by individuals who would have had the West do nothing in Libya).

The more obvious assessment of what happened in the UNSC is that Russia and China are using their "surprise" about Libya as an excuse for taking the morally dubious position of defending the heinous Assad regime - a position the Russians are trying somewhat half-heartedly to walk back. That otherwise intelligent US commentators are parroting the self-serving arguments of a couple of semi-authoritarian regimes like these two is a real head-scratcher.

Indeed, a more clear-eyed view of this situation might suggest that both China and Russia have not only played this whole situation rather poorly - they've been outfoxed by the United States. As Paul Bonicelli points out over at Foreign Policy, "The stance the Russians and the Chinese are taking hinders them from attaining the very goal they seek: to be seen as legitimate world leaders on par with the U.S. and the EU." 

Being on the same side as fading dictators like Assad is not exactly a high growth diplomatic strategy or one that will improve the political standing of either Moscow or Beijing. Both nations now look both isolated and even worse water carriers for some of the most loathsome regimes in the world. This is almost certainly why Russia is trying now to spearhead a diplomatic initiative with Damascus. If one didn't know better they might conclude that this whole bit of UN diplomacy has been a bit of a miscalculation for them.

For the United States, simply pushing the issue of a UNSC resolution on Syria, not to mention its actions around supporting democracy movements in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia have had the precise opposite effect. Today the US finds itself in a much more advantageous diplomatic position in the region. It's not hard to imagine this will help the US build regional coalitions in the Middle East to isolate Iran, but also in the Far East to contain Chinese regional ambitions. And much of this has been accomplished by the United States leading from behind and by working in concert with like-minded allies

Broadly speaking after the diplomatic wreckage of the Bush years the United States has, for the most part, shown itself to be a friend of democracy in the Arab world - and at a rather opportune time.

To be sure, all of this is now possible not despite the US intervention in Libya, but because of it. 

Go back one year. You had democratic movements emerging across the Arab world - in Egypt, Tunisia and potentially Syria. How would it have looked for the US to have turned its back on anti-Qaddafi rebels then? We can't know the answer for sure, but one can hardly blame the Administration for viewing with great concern the possibility that US inaction in the face of a potential humanitarian catastrophe directed at the Libyan people would significantly have tarnished the US image in the region and left the US on the wrong side of an incipient democratic movement in the Middle East. 

For the United States to have done nothing in Libya might not only have short-circuited the Arab Spring but also left the US in the unenviable position of being where Russia is today - at least indirectly on the side of the region's dictators. (Can you imagine how hard it would have been for the US to diplomatically throwdown on Syria if they had nothing on Libya?)

By acting when it did and how it did the US consolidated its own position in the Arab world and strength end the emerging role of the Arab League as an organization dedicated to speaking and acting out against the more brutal dictators in its midst. Again, this isn't a perfect story. It doesn't excuse how the Obama Administration played fast and loose with congressional approval of the Libya operation; or the continued instability in Libya - and US dealings with the government in Bahrain and Yemen, to a not insignificant degree, undermine this argument. But the overall story is a positive one - and speaks to an improved US image in the region that would have been unimaginable three years ago. And it's been done at a rather minimal political and military cost. 

Libya was a very rare and extraordinary circumstance in which the stars aligned in favor of military intervention. It's not one that can be easily replicated in Syria; but that doesn't mean it hasn't proven beneficial to US interests - and hopefully over the long run those of the Arab world. In the end, critics seemingly obsessed with proving that the Libyan intervention was a mistake should perhaps broaden their perspective a bit.

The UNSC Syria Vote, Renewal of American Leadership, and the Case for a 2nd Obama Term Posted by David Shorr

A recent post over at The Economist's Democracy in America blog says the Syria showdown at the UN between the US, Russia, and China demonstrates a crucial yet underappreciated success of Obama foreign policy:

Ten years back, America often found itself isolated, struggling to pull together "coalitions of the willing" packed with small client states. Lately, we have been finding ourselves in the majority, along with the democratic world, while Russia and China front a dwindling coalition of the unwilling.

Yes, President Obama has shown a remarkable ability to forge a united international front   on issue after issue. The quantum increase in support for US positions and initiatives is a much bigger deal than media assessments have acknowledged. As other nations have become more welcoming toward the United States' global role, the president can make a strong claim to have rehabilitated American leadership.

Actually if I'd fault the Economist writer for anything, it's that s/he lacks the courage of her own optimism. I disagree when the blogger says it's too bad Obama can't use this part of his record as a plank in his reelection platform. Voters recognize the importance of international goodwill toward the United States just as readily as the writer does. If not, then why do you think the public was so horrified to see Bush and Cheney defiantly thumbing their noses at the rest of the world? (The big mystery to me is why on earth the current crop of candidates have tacked back toward Cheney-esque chest-thumping.) More to the point, though, all signals from the White House put this success in their "top three" foreign policy achievements of the first term: winding down the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, decimating Al Qaeda, and greater receptivity and trust around the world of US leadership. 

Interestingly, James Fallows of The Atlantic makes the exact same underestimation of voters in his rigorous new assessment of Obama's presidency. Here's how he concludes a graf stressing the importance of America's improved standing in the world:

These changes can make a real difference for American ideals and interests, but it is hard to mention them in American political debates without sounding “French.”

Okay, let me try this in my very best American accent (whatever that is). It is very difficult and sometimes impossible to accomplish America's international aims -- disrupt terror networks, keep the global economy strong, stem the spread of nuclear weapons -- without the support and help of others. Is the common sense of this really so hard to get across to the voting public? 

One key point is how the importance of international support applies across a wide range of issues. You can see this within the Democracy in America post, which is ostensibly about the nations aligned with America in opposition to a butcherous Syrian regime but also notes the Southeast Asian countries grateful for US help in resisting China's territorial claims in the South China Sea. In other words, those who pigeonhole such forward-leaning diplomacy as "soft power" are missing the point. 

Which brings us to the problem of Iran. Whenever you hear about President Obama's success in ratcheting up the toughest set of sanctions ever imposed on Iran, you should think about the massive diplomatic effort required to accomplish this. And it is ongoing. Our friends at Center for American Progress, for instance, remind us that discussion of Iran with China has continued throughout the past three years and is bound to be on the agenda for Vice President Xi Jinping's visit next week. 

Given America's difficult history with Iran and close alliance with Israel, there's been a tendency in the international politics of the Iranian nuclear program to view the issue as a pet cause of the United States -- rather than a truly shared nuclear proliferation problem. This is the essence of the challenge, and of the Obama administration's success, in recasting American leadership. A measure of an effective foreign policy is to convince others that the United States is upholding important norms of the international community -- preserving a social contract -- and not just a big bad superpower. That's the point of President Obama's frequent references to the obligations and responsibilities of nations, including our own (e.g. the New START nuclear arms treaty).

After reading this skepticism in The Economist and The Atlantic about America's improved international image as a campaign theme, I looked back at some of my own posts from four years ago. In 2008, candidate Obama could aim his foreign policy argument at a public deeply unsettled at how out of step with the rest of the world we had gotten -- and acutely aware what trouble it could cause us. In 2012, President Obama runs for re-election having put these ideas about a more conscientious style of global leadership into action. And his record shows that they work.

From Hama to Homs, by way of Sarajevo, Kigali (but also Skopje and Nairobi) Posted by Heather Hurlburt

It's thirty years this month since the father and brother of the current Syrian President Assad cracked down on a Muslim Brotherhood rebellion in Hama, Syria, killing somewhere between 5,000 and 25,000, according to Amnesty International's best guess.

If you wonder what the Assad family style of large-scale killing is like, here are some insights:

The fighting took two weeks; one to recapture the city from insurgents and two to "root out" insurgents and others.

The killing and destruction documented by Syrians and outsiders included dynamiting city blocks with people inside; pouring gasoline into underground tunnels and setting them on fire; aerial bombardment, extended shelling, torture.

Many Americans will remember their first encounter with this piece of history as a chapter, "Hama Rules," in Tom Friedman's From Beirut to Jerusalem in which he cites the current president's uncle and then-president's brother, Rifaat Assad, as boasting that he had killed 38,000 people.

It is fair to ask, as we are presented with gruesome images of a Syrian government assault on another city tonight, whether anything other than the speed and ubiquity of information technology has changed in the intervening 30 years. In recent months, a number of UN debates, academic conferences, and policy task forces have asked this question in specialist language:  Whither R2P? Responsibility to Protect or Responsibility While Protecting? Humanitarian Response in a New Age...

I suggest that three major things have changed, in a manner which speaks well for the arc of history but terribly for families cowering in terror in Syria tonight.

1. Ignorance is No Longer an Excuse. It's worth re-reading Samantha Power's 2001 Atlantic article on Rwanda, in which she persuaded a number of rather senior Clinton Administration officials (my bosses) to say that they didn't know, or didn't understand, soon enough how widespread the genocidal killing was. Whether or not that is so, it's worth noting that 1994 is the last time a Western leader attempted to claim ignorance as an excuse for inaction. No one says s/he didn't know the threat to Kosovars in 1999, or to Macedonians (an overlooked success of peaceful intervention) in 2001; or for that matter to two abject failures, Congo and Sri Lanka. A web of NGO projects were founded specifically in order to end the ignorance defense, from the International Crisis Group to the Satellite Sentinel project for Sudan and South Sudan; we have nodes and offices and procedures within governments and at the UN.

2. Sovereignty Is No Longer Absolute. Just how different are international attitudes toward how rulers treat their citizens? In 1982, the New York Times reported that

The United States Ambassador, Robert Paganelli, was summoned to a meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Nasir Qaddour at 1:30 A.M. to receive a strong protest over the State Department's statement Wednesday that Hama had been ''sealed off by Syrian authorities'' as a result of ''serious disturbances.''

Nowadays even Russia and China declare Assad's actions unacceptable. The core insight of twenty years' work -- and twenty years of UN acronyms -- that sovereignty over people entails responsibility toward them, responsibilities in which the rest of the world has a legitimate interest, is triumphant in word. In deed, not so much.

3. Accountability Has Meaning. Hafez Assad ruled Syria longer after Hama than before, dying of heart failure in 2000 as the Middle East's longest-serving ruler. His son is unlikely to be so fortunate. His former colleagues Hosni Mubarak and Zine el-Abedine Ben Ali are on trial in their own countries, Ben Ali in absentia since Saudi Arabia has declined to return him.  Liberian strongman Charles Taylor is awaiting the verdict from the Special Court for Sierra Leone on his role in sparking that horrific violence. Slobodan Milosevic died of a heart attack while on trial in the Hague. The UN Human Rights Commissioner has called for Assad to be brought up on charges by the International Criminal Court, and the Gulf Cooperation Council appears to be considering a similar step. This would leave Assad very little ability to travel outside Syria, even were he to be successful in suppressin protests and rebellion.

4. Pressure Mounts Over Time. In 1982, Hafez Assad faced little more international pressure in week three of his campaign than he did on day one. That is simply no longer imaginable. Power documents how in 1994, calls for action in Rwanda eventually mounted among smaller countries at the UN, and in some quarters in Washington, but never reached critical mass. In Bosnia, later that same year, UN and NATO embarrassment and public anguish did eventually lead to action that, in turn, led to an end to fighting and the Dayton Accords. (I have been re-reading Madeleine Albright on this; Richard Holbrooke is also instructive.) Kosovo and Libya were both instances where loud and ugly threats from dictators spurred action; Kenya and Macedonia, almost a decade apart, successful examples of non-violent prevention; Cote d'Ivoire an often-forgotten case that had languished before Libya but, in its aftermath, allowed a small show of force to end ugly and growing post-election violence.  The international community has sometimes gotten better at saving some lives; it has gotten less better more slowly at preventing any lives from being lost and a spiral of violence from starting in the first place.

None of this is much help to the Syrians who, tonight, stand in for our simple failure as human beings to control our own worst impulses, or each other's. The UN says it quit tallying deaths last month after 5400. We have reason to hope, non-interventionists, and arm-the-SNC and do-something-ers alike, that what we have achieved in the past thirty years will help us stop that tally before it gets to 25,000 or 40,000. But if the past thirty years have taught us anything it is that hope doesn't do it alone.

How to Respond to a Changing World: Stimulant or Anesthetic? Posted by Jacob Stokes

 

Mitt Romney’s foreign policy platform rests on the notion that he will ensure another “American century,” and he has criticized Obama by saying the president “fundamentally believes that this next century is the post-American century.”

That formulation has drawn a sharp response over the last week. Fareed Zakaria argues in the Washington Post that Romney’s argument is based on a flawed reading of global politics:

This is a new world, very different from the America-centric one we got used to over the last generation. Obama has succeeded in preserving and even enhancing U.S. influence in this world precisely because he has recognized these new forces at work. He has traveled to the emerging nations and spoken admiringly of their rise. He replaced the old Western club and made the Group of 20 the central decision-making forum for global economic affairs. By emphasizing multilateral organizations, alliance structures and international legitimacy, he got results. It was Chinese and Russian cooperation that produced tougher sanctions against Iran. It was the Arab League’s formal request last year that made Western intervention in Libya uncontroversial.

Later, Zakaria blasts Romney’s criticisms of Obama’s foreign policy, saying Romney’s response ignores global realities:

By and large, you [Romney] have ridiculed this approach to foreign policy, arguing that you would instead expand the military, act unilaterally and talk unapologetically. That might appeal to Republican primary voters, but chest-thumping triumphalism won’t help you secure America’s interests or ideals in a world populated by powerful new players. You can call this new century whatever you like, but it won’t change reality. After all, just because we call it the World Series doesn’t make it one.

In Foreign Policy, Charles Kupchan expands on this second point, noting that accepting the recent and ongoing expansion and de-centralization of world power simply means accepting facts. Such a shift doesn’t equate to American “decline.” Instead, recognizing these shifts will allow the U.S. to identify the real challenges facing us in world affairs and then craft appropriate responses for husbanding American power:

To acknowledge the need for the United States to adjust to prospective shifts in the global distribution of power is not, as Duke University professor Bruce Jentleson recently pointed out in Democracy, to be a declinist or a pessimist. It is to be a realist. And safely guiding the United States through this coming transition requires seeing the world as it is rather than retreating toward the illusory comfort of denial…

Shepherding the transition to this more pluralistic world is arguably the defining challenge facing U.S. statecraft in the years ahead. Romney appears ready to pave over this challenge by denying that such change is afoot and attempting to portray Obama's policies as "an eloquently justified surrender of world leadership.”

To be sure, there’s an argument to be made that, as Tony Karon of TIME tweets, “nationalist political culture requires sustaining illusions.” In other words, Romney is in the middle of a fierce nomination fight and will likely carry the banner for the GOP in a heated general election. Drawing on themes of nationalism will almost surely help him prevail in those contests. Fair enough. Obama did much the same thing in his State of the Union speech and subsequent highly public embrace of Robert Kagan’s piece rejecting “decline.” (A tactic for which Rosa Brooks took the president to task.)

But the rhetoric has to meet reality somewhere, and that's where there’s a difference between progressive and conservative approaches to “greatness” and “decline” set of questions. As Bruce Jentleson wrote in that Democracy piece, progressives use the changing global landscape as a call to increase our ability to compete with the rest of world, confident that we can still be a—if not the—global leader across the spectrum of power (diplomatic, economic, military, soft power). As Jentleson writes, “It’s not that progressives don’t believe in American greatness; it’s that we invoke the past as stimulant not anesthetic. America can and should play a leading role in the twenty-first-century world. But to do so we need a foreign policy geared to how the world is, not how it used to be.”

In contrast, it seems Romney prefers the approach of ignoring reality. Hopefully he'll wake up. The world won’t wait.

Video: "Halftime in America" superbowl ad

Iran, Israel and Rock Star Prescience Posted by David Shorr

True story. In September 2008 I was waiting for a flight at Minneapolis airport. And so were the members of Rage Against the Machine. Which was how I found myself in a foreign policy discussion with Zack de la Rocha. (Our flight also gave me a chance to introduce Tom Morello to Ben Stein, but that's another story.)

The upshot of my chat with the RATM frontman was his observation that if Israel attacked Iran, that could pose big problems for us foreign policy establishment types. Not that de la Rocha and I would share views on Israel, but he could see tricky dilemmas down the road. Sure enough, here we are three plus years later, watching the Israeli government reaching for the lid of that very pandora's box. So a tip of the hat goes to Zack for his keen instinct.

The last few weeks have brought such a flood of analysis and commentary that there's a lot to choose from, but let me highlight and react to some of the points I found most interesting. Starting with Colin Kahl's excellent Foreign Affairs essay. Kahl offered some very useful reminders from the Iraq case. For instance, we know that bombing facilities will merely delay a nuclear program, rather than permanently halt it, because that's what happened after Israel bombed Osirak in 1981. It hardly prevented us from having to deal with the issue in the 1990s. I should quickly add that when people argue for the value of such a delay, that is hardly a strategic perspective.

The discussion of Israel's role in the first Gulf War in 1991 is quite interesting too from our current vantage point the perspective of Republicans' foreign policy message. Just to recall, President George H.W. Bush prevailed upon Israel to refrain from letting itself be pulled into the war -- despite Saddam's deliberate provocation of missile attacks on Israel. In return, Bush 41 helped shield Israel from the attacks with the Patriot anti-missile system, but the restraint shown by Israel was impressive. The main point of this restraint was that Israel's direct involvement would blur the stakes and distract from a clear focus on Iraq. In the geopolitics of the region, Israel brings added layers of conflict and sensitivity. In other words, we can't look only through the prism of America's own view of Israel as a close ally, but also the attitude and response of other players. As a matter of simple strategic calculus, duh. 

But wait, let's pause to note the huge disconnect between this kind of clear eyed-ness and the 2012 Republican competition over who can place themselves farthest to the right on the Israeli domestic political spectrum. We cannot highlight this crucial point enough. When the Republican candidates talk about the nation of Israel (see, support of) their rhetoric more accurately applies to a certain segment of opinion in Israel. One more time: the Israeli national security establishment and political elite are sharply divided over the wisdom of attacking Iran.

The other major issue, of course, is the prospect for a diplomatic resolution with Iran over its nuclear program. On this question, no one maps the terrain better than Trita Parsi, even if you don't completely agree with him. Trita has an excellent new book, A Single Roll of the Dice. But if you're not going to read the book, his blog post over at Fareed Zakarkia's Global Public Square blog lays out the core problems. 

Trita gives President Obama and his administration a lot of credit for placing Iran under heavy pressure, and for the deft diplomacy it took to build international support. His main critique concerns the trade-offs between exerting pressure (mainly sanctions) and leaving space for diplomatic negotiations. As he sees it, Obama's own so-called "pressure track" has boxed him in and potentially put a diplomatic solution out of reach. 

This is mainly a debate between different views of how to bring the Iranians to the table. From one vantage, Iran has a genuine interest in reaching an agreement, and the key things for the West are patience, diligence and a comprehensive agenda. My reading of Trita is that he sees the need for pressure, but also views it as essential to calibrate the pressure to give diplomacy enough time and patience for it to work. What these two views share is a worry that mounting Iranian mistrust may have reached a threshold that luring them to the negotiating table will be difficult to impossible. 

So where does the administration's policy come down on this question? The way I interpret it, the policy assumes Tehran is disposed against an agreement -- preferring the freedom of action to master the uranium enrichment process. Not that they're implacable and and unwilling to meet outside powers' demands for transparency and monitoring. Rather, it's an assumption that Iranian cooperation rests squarely on the cost associated with continued resistance. For critics who see an over-reliance on pressure, the administration is underestimating Iran's ability to withstand hardship. To which I'd respond that they might be overestimating it's ability to withstand isolation. Putting it another way, Iranian leaders know they can't sustain the same degree of autarky as North Korea's Kim family regime. As Iran moves closer to full-pariah status, they will start to alter their calculation.

Now finally to the core substantive quandary of this problem: whether a diplomatic solution would let Iran continue its uranium enrichment. As Trita explains, this question is actually a source of tension mainly between the United States and Israel. (Bill Keller delved into the wonkish practicalities of the issue in a recent post over at NYTimes.com.) The Israelis take a very hard line against any ongoing future enrichment by Iran. 

This is where the issue tilts toward the need to accomodate Iran somewhat in order to reach a deal -- aka the complete fantasy under Obama's predecessor of a diplomatic outcome whereby Iran totally capitulates. As it happens, the authors of an op-ed on the subject in today's NYTimes (Ambassadors Tom Pickering and Bill Luers) told us nearly four years ago in a much-cited NY Review of Books essay that zero enrichment was, practically speaking, a non-starter. Now as we look into the abyss of a new war with Iran, let me put the question directly. If an agreement can be reached that permits some enrichment -- under close international supervision -- is that a prospect really worthy of going to war?

The rumors of war have significantly notched up the danger of a real catastrophe. Meanwhile, it's the same tangled mess it's always been. Even a rock star could see that.

Photo: thetripwirenyc

Premature Evacuation? Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at Foreign Policy I have a new post up looking at the politics of Afghanistan withdrawal - and why ending not one not two wars a year before a presidential election is basically unheard of:

Barack Obama is nothing if not a trailblazing politician -- after all, when you're the first African-American elected to the nation's highest office, breaking the mold is sort of part of your political DNA. However, with the announcement by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta on Tuesday, Feb. 1, that the Obama administration intends to end combat operations in Afghanistan in mid-2013 he is laying out another unique course -- seeking re-election this November as the architect of two drawdowns of U.S. military engagements. This is the kind of thing doesn't happen too often in American politics.

You can read the whole thing here.

But there is one smaller point I wanted to reference. Check out what Mitt Romney had to say about Panetta's announcement:

“The president’s mistakes, some of them are calculated on a philosophy that’s hard to understand and, sometimes, you scratch you head and say: How can he be so misguided and so naive?”

“Today, his secretary of defense unleashed such a policy,” said Romney. “The secretary of defense said that on a day certain, the middle of 2013, we’re going to pull out our combat troops from Afghanistan.”

He announced that. So the Taliban hears it, the Pakistanis hear it, the Afghan leaders hear it,” said Romney. “Why in the world do you go to the people that you’re fighting with and tell them the date you’re pulling out your troops? It makes absolutely no sense.” 

First of all it's not true that the US is going to pull out combat troops in 2013; rather the US is going to be shifting away from a combat mission in 2013. That's an important distinction.

But here's the interesting part - look at what Romney said in June 2011 at a Republican debate:

It's time for us to bring our troops home as soon as we possibly can, consistent with the word that comes to our generals that we can hand the country over to the Taliban military in a way that they're able to defend themselves.

I suppose in fairness Romney didn't reveal the date that US troops would be leaving as soon as possible so I suppose he is in the clear here.

On Consistency, Precedents and Humanitarian Intervention Posted by Eric Martin

Daniel Trombly wrote a thorough and well-argued critique of three recent pieces that advocate, or at least consider, the use of military force by Western powers in Syria. While the whole piece is well worth the read, there is a particular aspect that I wanted to highlight due to its relevancy to topics previously discussed on this site.

The following is from the Anne-Marie Slaughter article that Trombly takes issue with:

If the Arab League, the U.S., the European Union, Turkey, and the UN Secretary General spend a year wringing their hands as the death toll continues to mount, the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine will be exposed as a convenient fiction for power politics or oil politics, feeding precisely the cynicism and conspiracy theories in the Middle East and elsewhere that the U.S. spends its public diplomacy budget and countless diplomatic hours trying to debunk.

Slaughter thus argues that by targeting the regime in Syria the US can debunk certain "conspiracy theories" rampant in the Middle East that claim that the United States cynically pursues its national interests, and places a higher priority on such interests than human rights concerns and democratic norms.

A variation of the argument was made in support of the Libya intervention, though it originally debuted as part of the case for invading Iraq. It remains just as dubious in each of its incarnations.

There are two primary reasons that this argument is deeply flawed:

First, it's not exactly a "conspiracy theory" to suggest that the US pursues its national interests with a certain degree of cynicism. Such a non-controversial contention is true not only of the US, but of most (if not all) other states, throughout known history.

For example, the US does actually support (and lavish aid on, and sell arms to, etc.) undemocratic states in the region with atrocious human rights records, including states like Yemen and Bahrain that violently suppressed pro-democracy movements during the recent, and ongoing, Arab Spring uprisings. Not only did we not have a responsibility to protect those beleaguered populations, apparently, but we feel justified in green-lighting large arms sales to at least one of the regimes in question.

Second, if the United States is trying to convince local populations that it has adopted a different approach whereby it prioritizes human rights and democracy over narrower self-interests, attacking an adversary like Syria (or Libya or Iraq), while continuing to support the same despotic regimes that earned it the reputation in the first place is unlikely to succeed.

If we are truly interested in setting a consistent precedent for the valuation of democracy and human rights ahead of other considerations (not that I'm suggesting that such an approach is necessarily prudent in all contexts), it seems that we should start by cutting off support for those despotic regimes that we consider "friendly" rather than using humanitarian concerns as a casus belli to target regimes that we otherwise find problematic when viewed through the prism of less sentimental national interests.

Seriously, What's The Matter with Leon Panetta? Posted by Michael Cohen

On several occasions here at DA I've raised the issue of Leon Panetta's performance as Secretary of Defense - and it seems that the man is intent on giving me even more ammunition to question his very effectiveness as Pentagon chief.

Consider his latest head-scratcher: an interview with CBS News in which he suggested a) that the Pakistani government might have known about Osama bin Laden's presence in Abbotabad and b) he confirmed that Shakil Afridi, a Pakistani doctor, worked with the United States in its efforts to kill bin Laden.Considering that Afridi is at risk of being tried in Pakistan for "high treason" this strikes me as a decidedly unhelpful statement not only for Mr. Afridi but also for any hopes the US might have in getting foreign citizens to work with US intelligence agencies in the future.

Now I'm willing to entertain the possibility that Panetta made this reveal as a way to heighten Afridi's profile and lessen the chance that Pakistan prosecutes him. Not sure how that would work but I have to consider the possibility that there is a method behind Panetta's madness - because if there isn't he just publicly sold out a person who bravely put themselves harm's way to help the United States.

As for publicly alleging that unnamed individuals in Pakistan were aware of Bin Laden's location . . . I've given up trying to figure out what Panetta is thinking. Seriously, how does this in anyway help the United States and in particular its relationship with Pakistan? Why even go there? Shouldn't the main thrust of US policy in the region to strengthen the US relationship with Islamabad not re-open old wounds. Indeed, the worst part about Panetta's statement is that he offers no evidence of Pakistani support for OBL just idle speculation.

Here's what he said: "I don’t have any hard evidence, so I can’t say it for a fact. There’s nothing that proves the case. But as I said, my personal view is that somebody, somewhere probably had that knowledge." 

If you don't have any hard evidence Leon why would you say this? 

The Pentagon's defense of Panetta's latest gaffe is that this interview came several months ago. Guess what: that's not a defense! It was a stupid comment in January 2012; it's also a stupid comment in October, November and December 2011. Of course this isn't the first time that Panetta has made a comment that forced the Pentagon to "clarify" his remarks. Indeed, it has become a regular occurrence.

You would think that someone who has been in Washington as long as Panetta would know enough not to make these sorts of public "comments." Of course, as long as he continues to stick his foot in his mouth I'll have plenty of fodder for DA posts . . . but the impact on US foreign policy is perhaps a bit less of a good thing.

Making Foreign Policy an Issue Posted by Jacob Stokes

Rich Fontaine argues on Tom Ricks’s blog that foreign policy will matter it the election. After the usual disclaimers about how economic issues will be front and center, Fontaine writes:

This does not mean, however, that voters will not consider foreign policy as they enter the voting booth. Both eventual candidates, the incumbent president included, will have to demonstrate to the electorate that they pass the commander-in-chief credibility threshold.  They must demonstrate that they have the knowledge, the temperament, the skills and the wisdom to lead a superpower in times of both peril and plenty. If they can cross this threshold, they will still have to make a winning case on domestic issues. If they cannot, no amount of focus on the American pocketbook will salvage their chances. Foreign policy will matter in 2012.

Fontaine is probably too unequivocal when he says no amount of focus on economic issues can outperform the commander-in-chief factor. But his main point, that national security will surely matter, stands. 

The Obama campaign thinks so, too, writes Michael Hirsh in the National Journal. Hirsh reports that the campaign plans to present Obama as the toughest national security president since Kennedy – what’s called the “3 AM strategy,” which of course refers to the crisis situations each president will inevitably confront. Clearly Obama campaign staffers have been reading their Nate Silver.

Hirsh’s piece goes through the huge amount of evidence and public support Obama has on his side when it comes to national security. For that, read the piece. It’s well worth it. The piece includes a quote from Michael Lagon, a former George W. Bush administration official, saying Obama is, in some ways, more sure-footed than the elder Bush. 

Hirsh’s encapsulation of the campaign’s argument against his opponents is telling as well: 

Meanwhile, the administration has been busy preparing a bill of particulars against Romney (and now one against Gingrich). “Romney has said he would have left tens of thousands of troops in Iraq indefinitely, with no plan for what they would do there or how he would end the war,” says the Obama campaign official, who delivers a kind of rap sheet: Romney has failed to outline a plan for ending the war in Afghanistan and flip-flopped on setting a timetable for withdrawal. He said it wasn’t worth “moving heaven and earth” to catch bin Laden and criticized Obama for making it clear he would take out Qaida targets in Pakistan. He flip-flopped on removing Qaddafi, first attacking Obama for demanding regime change and then celebrating it. He has proposed to drastically increase military spending without articulating how it would improve security or how to pay for it. Meanwhile, a Democratic campaign official points out that Gingrich has a history of making erratic statements about national security and once told The Times, “I don’t do foreign policy.”

Romney has gone to great lengths to establish himself as the national security candidate among the GOP field and make foreign policy a wedge issue, including giving two big speeches on the subject (for DA’s take, see here and here).

There’s a fight a-brewin’.

Photo: RotaryDialPhones.com

Iran Takes Over... the Media Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Kudos to US and international media and my analyst friends -- we have lots and lots and lots of good reporting and analysis on the Iran situation this morning.  An embarrasse des riches, as Mitt Romney might say. I'm organizing my thoughts for an Iran panel on the Hill at 1230 today, and I thought I'd share.

Military-Strategery

Three heavyweight Israelis lay out the full range of strategic considerations to be debated:

• are Iranian nukes an existential threat to Israel
• can a nuclear Iran be deterred
• What would the regional and inside-Iran consequences of an Israeli attack be
• what are the long-term security consequences of Israel launching an attack against US wishes

The Pentagon doesn't think its current bunker-buster bombs will do the trick against Iran's defenses, and has asked for heavier weapons to be developed urgently. (Wall Street Journal)

Geo-Strategery

Iran's Foreign Minister invites IAEA inspectors to extend their visit... at same time as Iran's military tests new delivery systems.

Israeli intel journalist (and author of this weekend's NY Times Mag piece predicting Israel will bomb) seems to reverse himself by suggesting to Laura Rozen that Israel is asking the West to hold it back.

The Economist says China will choose regional stability over its relations with Iran.

Beltway Strategery

Les Gelb says Obama should bite the bullet and officially offer the peaceful-enrichment-for-full-inspections-and-safeguards deal.

Sara Sorcher at National Journal reports that Senate leadership says they want to move another round of sanctions -- this one targeted at Revolutionary Guard, human rights violators, crowd control equipment... also a proposal to deny entry to US ports to any ship that has visited Iran in last 180 days.

The New Yorker's Steve Coll reads the tea leaves, says that war is not imminent, and that a strategy of "patience and persistence" should be kept on the table. 

what does all this add up to? A lot of posturing for domestic and international audiences... some progress toward the foundations of a negotiated outcome... consensus among experts and the business community, but emphatically not among political factions here or elsewhere, on what an acceptable negotiated outcome would look like... and some big opportunities for miscalculation and unintended escalation.

Reacting to Robert Kagan on American Decline Posted by David Shorr

Now that the White House and President Obama himself (thanks Josh Rogin) have given Bob Kagan a heaping helping of buzz for his New Republic piece, I want to offer a few thoughts. First off, the cheesy partisan debate over perceived decline has been bugging me for a long time, so kudos to Bob for helping spur a more substantive discussion. (Take a look at Dan Drezner and Stephen Walt to see what Bob was drawing on.)

As indicated by President Obama's warm endorsement, Kagan lays the ground for a bipartisan internationalist consensus. Responding to calls for the US to pull back from our role as a global power -- often couched in terms of being financially unaffordable -- he rightly asks about the costs of such a pullback itself. It's worth quoting at length:

If the decline of American military power produced an unraveling of the international economic order that American power has helped sustain; if trade routes and waterways ceased to be as secure, because the U.S. Navy was no longer able to defend them; if regional wars broke out among great powers because they were no longer constrained by the American superpower; if American allies were attacked because the United States appeared unable to come to their defense; if the generally free and open nature of the international system became less so—if all this came to pass, there would be measurable costs. And it is not too far-fetched to imagine that these costs would be far greater than the savings gained by cutting the defense and foreign aid budgets by $100 billion a year. You can save money by buying a used car without a warranty and without certain safety features, but what happens when you get into an accident?

American power indeed plays a constructive hegemonic function in undergirding the international economic and political order. We have the job and giving it up would be a dereliction and likely come to grief. I would stress one amendment, however. The more successfully we are at gaining international support and cooperation, the more we'll be able to buttress the international system and share the associated burdens. Indeed, that's the strategy behind President Obama's emphasis on shared international obligations and responsibilities. 

I'd like to focus on one other passage of the Kagan piece, and it's a point he, Drezner, and Walt all dwell on. Bob offers a response to the perception that "the United States can no longer shape the world to suit its interests and ideals as it once did." Confession time: I have harped on this exact challenge pretty regularly. Again, let me quote Bob at length: 

And of course it is true that the United States is not able to get what it wants much of the time. But then it never could. Much of today’s impressions about declining American influence are based on a nostalgic fallacy: that there was once a time when the United States could shape the whole world to suit its desires, and could get other nations to do what it wanted them to do, and, as the political scientist Stephen M. Walt put it, “manage the politics, economics and security arrangements for nearly the entire globe.”

He then proceeds to list the many aggravating episodes of the Cold War when other international players defied America's wishes. It's an impressive list, yet one of the examples didn't seem quite right. In 1956, France, Israel, and the UK invaded Egypt against President Eisenhower's wishes to seize control of the Suez Canal. And then were forced to withdraw. So can't we make the opposite interpretation that the crisis' outcome reinforced American influence? Was Eisenhower's influence eroded or enhanced by the episode?

I do understand Bob's warning not to consider these challenges to be 'new under the sun.' Even if we consider the problem of influencing other actors and steering events to be a hardy perennial, however, doesn't it still seem like the salient underlying challenge for foreign policy at the present moment? Can it be argued that the difficulty of exerting influence needs to be kept in mind, and is too often underestimated?

And this is where I have to play mood-killer to all this good bipartisan comity. Because I see a major gap between Kagan's sober reminder that world events don't yield so easily to America's control, and Republican talking point after talking point argument after argument that assume the opposite.

Get Real on Cuba Posted by The Editors

This post by NSN intern Ian Byrne.

During Monday night’s GOP debate in Florida, Brian Williams asked Mitt Romney what he would do as president if he received a 3 AM phone call reporting that Fidel Castro had died and “half a million Cubans may take that as a cue to come to the United States.”

Romney started with a hypothetical “thank heavens that Fidel Castro has returned to his maker and will be sent to another land,” before offering up his policy prescriptions: “Now, number two, you work very aggressively with the new leadership in Cuba to try and move them towards a more open degree than they have had in the past.”

Sorry Mitt, meet the new boss, same as the old boss. Fidel’s brother Raúl is in charge of Cuba’s leadership now and will be in charge of Cuba’s leadership after Castro’s death.

Newt followed with his idea of a “Cuban Spring”:

“I would suggest to you the policy of the United States should be aggressively to overthrow the regime and to do everything we can to support those Cubans who want freedom. You know, Obama is very infatuated with an Arab Spring. He doesn't seem to be able to look 90 miles south of the United States to have a Cuban Spring.”

Romney and Gingrich doubled down on their criticism of the Obama administration’s policies and calls for regime change on Wednesday. Romney remarked that President Obama “does not understand that by helping Castro; he is not helping the people of Cuba; he is hurting them.” Gingrich lamented that the Obama administration’s policy is "almost exactly the opposite" of what it should be.

The Obama administration’s new policies aren’t all that new, as Arturo Lopez-Levy notes in Foreign Policy:

“Obama's new policy restores the "people-to-people" contacts between the United States and Cuba that existed under Bill Clinton's administration, restoring the embargo exemptions for Americans traveling for humanitarian, religious, and academic purposes that were disallowed under Bush. More direct flights to the island -- albeit chartered ones -- will be allowed, and Americans now can transfer remittances of up to $500 per quarter, as long as they aren't going to the Cuban government or Communist Party.”

(A full fact sheet of the policy revisions can be found here.)

I’d challenge Romney to highlight how the administration’s policies directly help Castro and hurt the Cuban people. Wouldn’t hurt to ask how the trade embargo benefits the people either. If Gingrich asserts that the administration’s policy is all wrong, what can he offer besides drawing policy inspiration from Ronald Reagan, Pope John Paul II and Margaret Thatcher in leading up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, besides the film that has any and all a conservative has ever wanted?

Romney and Gingrich offer ambiguous and tired (see: neoconservative) policy options where “might makes right.” If Gingrich believes we can look 90 miles south “to have a Cuban Spring” he has failed all duties of being a historian or a scholar.

The Arab Spring was unique in that it was, well, Arab. Cuba is not the Middle East (I can’t believe I actually have to write that) and each possess different dynamics on the ground. I imagine the people of Cuba, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Syria all have the same yearning for freedom. But as we’ve seen in the Middle East and North Africa, each process is going to be different getting from point A to point B.

The administration’s current policies appreciate the limitations of what can be done. Lifting the trade embargo would require congressional approval and any Washington-Havana communication is out of the question as diplomatic relations are nonexistent.

Our decades long policy of isolation towards Cuba has failed. The guy in charge of Cuba’s last name is still Castro. If one wants to change U.S. policy, as the candidates seem so intent on doing, perhaps there is a lesson to be learned from our recent policy towards Burma.

Anya Landau French, a Cuba policy analyst, writes that by enacting sanctions that expired within a defined period of time, the U.S. offered incentives to the Burmese government which planted the seeds for reform. Case in point: Washington will soon have a Burmese ambassador. 

Indefinite sanctions offer Cuba no incentive to reform. I imagine that Cuba sees little incentive in the prospect of being “aggressively overthrown” as well.

President Obama’s “people-to-people” policies circumvent the Cuban government and are able to operate in the constricted environment where U.S.-Cuba policy exists. If we are proposing new policy, let us take a page from the Burma playbook. If the GOP candidates want the Cuban people to truly experience freedom, perhaps they should propose something a little more groundbreaking than continuing the trade embargo. 

Einstein said that the definition of insanity is “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” It has been a rather kooky 54 years.

Photo: AP via MSNBC